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ABSTRACT 
Innovation is crucial for firms’ growth and competitiveness. Yet, because knowledge is 
a public good, firms may underinvest in innovation activities to avoid freeriding and 
opportunistic behaviour. Besides market failures, another cause of underinvestment in 
innovation is associated with the concept of systems failures, advanced in the literature 
on systems of innovation. Potential adverse effects of market and systems failures 
provide scope for government intervention designed to foster investment in innovation 
and bring about innovation activities at the socially optimal level. This thesis 
investigates the effectiveness of innovation policy for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) by exploring whether public support has an "additionality" effect on 
their innovation activities. First, we investigate the impact of public support on 
innovation output (output additionality) in traditional manufacturing industries. Second, 
we focus on the effect of innovation support programmes on innovative behaviour, 
particularly on networking and cooperation for innovation among Spanish SMEs 
(behavioural additionality). Finally, we assess both output and behavioural additionality 
among European SMEs.  
 
 In the evaluation of innovation policy, public support  is treated as endogenous 
because of the selection bias that arises when firms self-select into government 
programmes, and/or when government agencies adopt a "picking-the-winner" strategy, 
whereby the selected firms are those most likely to succeed in innovation activities. 
Therefore, due to the endogeneity of public support, appropriate econometric techniques 
should be applied. Most cross-sectional studies apply matching estimations to assess the 
additionality of public support measures. One contribution of this thesis is the 
application of the endogenous switching regression model in estimating treatment 
effects.  
 
1. The main findings of the thesis reveal important policy implications with regard 
to the distribution of public support and the magnitude of treatment effects. In 
the three empirical chapters, the respective "headline" results include the 
following.Public support for EU SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries 
could have a larger additional effect if randomly distributed to innovative firms 
rather than adopting a "picking-the-winner" strategy.  
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2. Public funding of Spanish SMEs has the largest effects on cooperation with 
government institutions and on R&D outsourcing, but rather small effects on 
cooperation with other networking partners, perhaps due to cooperation failure.  
3. Finally, public support measures have a heterogeneous effect on innovation 
behaviour among European SMEs. Regarding output additionality, a random 
allocation of public support would yield an additionality effect among highly 
innovative firms, but not among less innovative SMEs. With respect to 
behavioural additionality, overall results indicate that a lottery system would 
benefit firms' innovative behaviour, although the magnitude of its impact would 
be the largest on cooperation with research organizations, while it would only 
marginally increase the probability of using online technology or knowledge 
brokers.  
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PREFACE 
 
 Innovation policy has taken the centre stage among policy makers in the 
European Union (EU) (Edler et al., 2012b). Its importance stems from the key role 
innovation is playing in enhancing firms' performance and competitiveness. At the 
Lisbon Summit in 2000, policy makers set the major goal for the EU to become the 
world's most competitive knowledge economy by 2010 (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005, p. 
623). With respect to investment in Research & Development (R&D) and innovation, 
the Lisbon Strategy set a goal of investing 3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
on R&D by 2010. However, by 2011, official statistics indicated that the goal of 3 per 
cent had not been achieved as R&D expenditures were, on average, 2.03 per cent of 
GDP (ONS, 2011).  
 
 One of the three priorities put forward in a new EU strategy for economic 
growth and employment - Europe 2020 - is achieving and sustaining smart growth by 
developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation (European Commission, 
2010). To achieve Europe 2020, the European Commission designed Horizon 2020, the 
2014-2020 Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development, with 
a generous budget of nearly 80 billion Euros to be invested in creating innovation-led 
growth and fostering research (CLORA, 2013). A key feature of Horizon 2020 is the 
emphasis placed on innovation that encompasses a broad perspective. It acknowledges 
not only R&D but also demand-driven innovation, through public procurement and the 
setting up of standards and regulations, as well as non-technological innovation and 
areas relevant for this type of innovation, such as design, service innovation and 
creativity (European Commission, 2013). 
 
 Another relevant feature of Horizon 2020 is the attention dedicated to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), through policy instruments that will aim to support 
development, growth and internationalization of SMEs (European Commission, 2013a). 
Small and medium-sized enterprises are regarded as the engine of growth in the 
European economy, accounting for 66.5 per cent of all European jobs in 2012 and 57.6 
per cent of gross value added (European Commission, 2013b). Innovations are among 
the most important means through which small and medium sized enterprises contribute 
to increased employment, economic growth and development.  
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 Policy makers not only recognize the importance of innovation and its public 
support, but increasingly recognize the relevance of evaluating the impact of support 
measures (Edler et al., 2012a). Therefore, the central question within the evaluation 
debate is related to the effectiveness of public subsidies, i.e. whether firms indeed 
increase their innovative efforts as a result of public intervention. Evaluation of public 
innovation support attempts to answer this question through qualitative evaluation 
(including case studies and interviews) and through quantitative evaluation using 
econometric models and techniques. Referring to the latter, the key research questions 
arise as to whether public support measures induce larger investment in R&D and 
innovation than firms' private funding in the absence of public support programmes 
(input additionality); larger innovation output, such as the introduction of technological 
and non-technological innovations (output additionality); and, whether policy 
instruments establish changes in firms' innovative behaviour (behavioural additionality).  
 
 There are a large number of empirical studies investigating input additionality, 
whereas only recently has increased attention by researchers been devoted to output and 
behavioural additionalities. Furthermore, most cross-sectional empirical studies employ 
matching estimators, although their main disadvantage is the selection based on 
observables; i.e. unobserved firm characteristics cannot be taken into account, thus 
raising the issue of the robustness of empirical findings to unobserved heterogeneity. 
Moreover, very few studies examine the effectiveness of public innovation support 
measures for SME innovation. This research project aims to fill this gap by examining 
the impact of policy support at national, regional and EU level on SME innovation. 
Moreover, our focus is on the less investigated, but at least as important, output and 
behavioural additionalities.  
 
 Given the importance of innovation related policies and their quantitative 
evaluation, several research questions are identified which provide guidelines 
throughout the thesis.  
1) How is innovation defined? What are theoretical contributions to understanding 
and conceptualizing innovation?  
2) How do SMEs undertake innovation, and what are the main advantages and 
limitations of innovation in SMEs relative to innovation in large firms? What 
conceptual frameworks can be adopted to investigate innovation processes in 
SMEs? 
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3) How have innovation related policies evolved from science policy to systemic 
policy, and what does empirical evidence indicate in relation to input, output and 
behavioural additionalities?  
4) Do government support measures increase SME innovation output? Is there a 
misallocation of public resources (i.e. if public funds are directed towards 
innovation projects that the firm would have undertaken anyway)? Do public 
agencies follow a strategy of “picking the winner” and select those innovation 
projects for support that are most likely to be successful? 
5) Do public innovation measures induce behavioural additionality among Spanish 
SMEs and, more widely, among European SMEs? Does the treatment effect 
vary depending on the source of funding? Are estimated treatment effects robust 
to hidden bias (i.e. unobserved heterogeneity)? What policy recommendations 
can be deduced so that public intervention, in the domain of innovation, has a 
larger additionality effect? 
 
 Questions related to the effectiveness of public support will be answered through 
quantitative analysis. The originality of the approach stems first from applying a 
switching model, which, in the context of a cross-sectional analysis, is characterized by 
the ability to estimate programme effects conditional on both observed and unobserved 
firm characteristics. Another contribution of the thesis is related to the application of 
matching estimators, whereby sensitivity analysis was conducting to investigate the 
robustness of the empirical findings to unobserved heterogeneity. To investigate the 
research questions, we have utilized three cross-sectional datasets: the first is a unique 
dataset gathered within the EU Framework 7 project “GPrix”, covering SMEs in 
traditional manufacturing sectors in seven EU regions during the period 2005-2009; the 
second is the Spanish Community Innovation Survey covering the period 2004-2006; 
and the third is a unique dataset gathered within the EU Framework 7 project 
“MAPEER”, covering SMEs across Europe during the period 2005-2010.1  
                                                          
1 Following the GPrix Deliverable 1.1 (2010a, p. 3): 'The main objective of the GPrix project is to 
identify good practices in innovation support measures to SMEs from the traditional sectors in seven 
European regions by developing a methodological framework for collecting internationally comparable 
data on existing Research and Innovation support programmes/measures in the public sector.' For more 
information, see the project's web page http://www.gprix.eu/. The main objective of the MAPEER project 
is to gather information on the design, implementation and impact of existing SME research and 
innovation support programmes and initiatives in the EU27 Member States and one non-EU country, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. One EU country, Croatia, was not included in the survey, as it joined the EU in 
2013. For more information, see the project's web page http://mapeer-sme.eu//.  
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 The motivation behind testing the theory by employing three distinct datasets is 
manifold and stems from each dataset having different strengths and shortcomings. 
First, given our participation in the GPrix project, we were able to gain access to two 
unique datasets - the GPrix dataset as well as the MAPEER dataset. These datasets 
differ with respect to their country and industry coverage. Namely, the GPrix dataset 
contains information on the innovative activities of SMEs in six traditional 
manufacturing sectors in seven EU regions. Traditional industries include the 
manufacture of food products and beverages, textiles and textile products, leather and 
leather products, ceramics or other non-metallic mineral products, 
mechanical/metallurgy or basic metals and fabricated metal products, and automotive or 
motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers. Our definition of a traditional manufacturing 
sector is different from the OECD classification of “high”, “medium” and “low-tech” 
industries, which is based on the R&D intensity of the industries. Instead we defined as 
“traditional” those manufacturing industries with the following characteristics: long 
established; once a main source of employment at the (sub-)regional level; recent 
decline; still a major source of wealth creation, employment and, in particular, exports; 
and retention of capacity for innovation. In contrast, the MAPEER dataset covers all 
manufacturing sectors as well as service sectors across 28 European countries.  
 
 As well as differing with respect to their country and industry coverage, the 
GPrix and MAPEER datasets also differ with respect to their range of innovation 
measures. Whereas the GPrix dataset includes many innovation output measures in the 
specific context of traditional manufacturing industry, the MAPEER dataset includes 
only a single measure of innovation output but several variables relevant to behavioural 
additionality in a more general sample of European SMEs. The GPrix dataset enables 
the evaluation of support measures in relation to a wide range of innovation output 
measures, including sub-categories of product, process, marketing and organisational 
innovation together with “innovation sales” (i.e. sales accounted for by recent product 
or process innovation). Relative to the GPrix dataset, the MAPEER dataset has broader 
country and industry coverage and, while including only a single measure of innovation 
output, enables behavioural additionality to be investigated. The MAPEER dataset 
contains information on the exploitation of several sources of external knowledge that 
are seldom available to researchers when investigating behavioural additionality, such 
as informal networking with other firms and with research organizations, as well as 
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strategic alliances and non-equity alliances. Thus, besides investigating output 
additionality, similar to the analysis conducted on the GPrix data, the empirical analysis 
on the MAPEER dataset encompasses also behavioural additionality.  
 
 Next, we explain our decision to use the Spanish CIS dataset to evaluate the 
effectiveness of innovation support measures. Our initial intention was to use the CIS 
UK dataset to explore a range of research objectives from the literature on innovation 
studies. However, after 24 months of PhD studies, we did not manage to produce a 
single empirical analysis due to a range of practical difficulties encountered during the 
process of obtaining access to the data as well as analysing them. Not only was the 
process of obtaining access to the data extremely time consuming, it was also the case 
that, due to confidentially issues, researchers are not allowed to print or write down 
anything during their analysis. Moreover, researchers are required to finalize the 
analysis and interpret the findings by working in Essex, where the Secure Data Service, 
the CIS data provider, is located. For these reasons, we eventually decided to employ 
other available data sources to be able to finalize the PhD research in a timely manner. 
(In passing, we note that the obstacles to efficient access and use of UK CIS data make 
replication of published results all but impossible.) The motivation for using the Spanish 
CIS dataset is associated with the requirements of applying matching estimators. 
Namely, in the absence of longitudinal data and one or more valid exclusion 
restrictions, matching estimators are the only available econometric technique for 
estimated the treatment effects in the cross-sectional setting. However, because the 
selection on observables is achieved by matching the treatment and the comparison 
group, obtaining the appropriate size of the common support (i.e. matched pairs) 
requires a large dataset. As both the GPrix and the MAPEER data are not large-scale 
surveys (in comparison to the CIS), we opted to use the Spanish CIS data available on 
CD-ROM. Moreover, our intention to apply matching estimators in the thesis was 
motivated by the prevailing trend in the innovation literature, whereby most empirical 
studies, as discussed in Section 3.6, employ matching estimators, without reporting the 
results of sensitivity analysis. Our objective was to explore the underlying assumption, 
although not explicitly stated in the empirical studies, that participation in innovation 
support programmes is conditional only on firms' observed characteristics.  
 
 This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter I begins with the conceptualization 
of innovation and continues with a broad overview of two economic frameworks for 
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analysing the innovation process: mainstream, neoclassical economic theory; and 
evolutionary theory. We briefly review Schumpeter’s theorizing on innovation as he 
was the first scholar to recognize the key role of innovation in economic development 
and growth. Continuing Schumpeter's tradition of placing innovation in the centre of 
economic development, a new theoretical framework was developed within the 
evolutionary theory of the firm in the 1990s. Within this stream of literature, the concept 
of innovation systems was developed. In addition to theoretical developments within 
economics, another important stream of research, advanced within management science, 
is the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991), which emphasises the role of 
internal human and financial resources for the firm's innovation performance and its 
competitive advantage. In the second part of this chapter, the evolution of economic 
thought on innovation is depicted through the evolution of innovation models, from the 
first generation of linear technology push and demand pull models, to the latest, fifth 
generation of system and networking models. The final section of the chapter provides a 
comprehensive overview of the internal and external determinants of innovation. The 
lack of a canonical theoretical model for identifying the determinants of innovation and, 
being consistent with this, the effectiveness of innovation support programmes, makes 
measuring the effects of innovation policy a particularly challenging task for economists 
– one to which we apply our recognised empirical tools, but with less guidance from 
theory than in many other areas of economic enquiry. 
 
 Chapter II focuses on small and medium-sized firms and the innovation process 
within this heterogeneous group of firms. After defining SMEs based on their headcount 
and turnover, we continue by discussing advantages and disadvantages of SME 
innovation relative to innovation activities in large firms. A key advantage of SMEs in 
comparison to large firms is their behavioural characteristics; due to their simple 
organizational structures and (small) size, SMEs can easily adapt to changes in market 
dynamics. In contrast, a major constraint that SMEs face in undertaking innovation is 
related to limitations on their human and financial resources. A final section of this 
chapter focuses on the innovation process, identifying a conceptual framework for 
analysing technological innovations in SMEs, as well as reviewing several taxonomies 
based on prominent innovation processes at the organizational level. 
 
 Chapter III discusses innovation related policies and quantitative evaluation 
methodology. The first part of the chapter, drawing upon the discussion in Chapter I, 
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reviews two complementary rationales for public intervention: the neoclassical market-
failure rationale; and the evolutionary system-failure framework. Our discussion 
continues by investigating the evolution of innovation related policy, from science and 
technology policy to modern innovation policy, and, in parallel, reviewing supply-side 
and demand-side policy instruments. After briefly presenting a theoretical framework 
for evaluating public support for innovation, we give an overview of qualitative 
evaluation methods together with their main advantages and shortcomings. This 
overview serves as a basis for the empirical literature review presented in the second 
part of the chapter. The review is organized by dividing empirical studies into two 
categories: studies applying matching estimators; and studies applying other evaluation 
methods. This division of empirical studies is motivated by the prevalence of matching 
estimators in empirical studies. The chapter concludes by reviewing the empirical 
evidence on input, output and behavioural additionalities as well as reviewing 
recommendations for policy makers and evaluators of innovation policies on how to 
progress, within the emerging field of innovation studies, policy effectiveness.  
 
 Chapter IV provides empirical evidence on the output additionality of innovation 
support programmes for SMEs operating in traditional manufacturing sectors across 
seven EU regions. The empirical analysis utilizes a unique cross-section dataset 
gathered within the GPrix project covering the period 2005-2009. The author 
participated in the GPrix project team. However, our role was limited to econometric 
analysis of the primary data. Therefore, we were not a part of the project team that 
designed the questionnaire and collected the primary data. Econometric analysis of the 
primary data included modelling and estimating baseline and augmented models by 
applying a binary endogenous switching model. In addition, a robustness check is 
conducted by estimating treatment effects using matching estimators.  
 
 Chapter V focuses on Spanish SMEs and investigates the behavioural 
additionality of regional, national and EU support programmes. Behavioural 
additionality is investigated from the narrow perspective of network additionality. 
Treatment effects are estimated by applying several matching estimators to data from 
the Spanish Community Innovation Survey conducted in 2006 and covering the period 
2004-2006. Given that matching estimators cannot control for unobserved firm 
characteristics, the main contribution of this chapter is testing for unobserved 
heterogeneity through sensitivity analysis.  
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 Chapter VI investigates output and behavioural additionality among European 
SMEs utilizing a unique dataset collected within the MAPEER project covering the 
period 2005-2010 and including 27 EU member states and one non-EU country, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The only EU country not included in the survey is Croatia, as it joined 
the EU in 2013. The rationale for using two datasets (the CIS and the MAPEER 
datasets) for investigating behavioural additionality is that the MAPEER dataset 
contains information on sources of external knowledge that are not included in the CIS 
survey questionnaire, but are particularly relevant for SMEs, such as informal 
networking. Two models - baseline and augmented - are estimated applying a binary 
endogenous switching model, similar to the analysis presented in Chapter IV. In 
addition, the participation in innovation support programmes is analysed separately for 
national and international programmes, as well as jointly for both streams of funding. 
The empirical results indicate that a random distribution of public support measures 
would yield behavioural additionality for most types of networking. The results are not 
directly comparable with the findings from Chapter V on the CIS dataset, given that the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) was not estimated in the latter (this is because 
matching methods typically do not yield estimates of ATE that are are statistically 
distinct from estimates of ATT). Therefore, the comparison of results is restricted to the 
estimated Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT), which are, overall, 
suggesting an additionality effects on Spanish SMEs as well as on SMEs across Europe.  
 
 Finally, in Chapter VII, we summarize our empirical findings and formulate the 
conclusions of the thesis. After identifying the contributions to knowledge of this 
research, we also discuss its limitations, which can offer avenues for further research. In 
addition, we provide a set of policy recommendations based on the empirical evidence 
from previous chapters. The main policy implication stemming from our analysis is that 
public support measure could have a larger additional effect if randomly distributed to 
innovative SMEs. The results suggest a perverse selection into innovation support 
programmes with respect to output additionality in SMEs in traditional manufacturing 
sectors (GPrix data). Contrary to the consistent findings for this group of SMEs, 
empirical evidence on output additionality in European SMEs more generally is rather 
heterogeneous (MAPEER data). In this respect, a perverse selection into programme 
participation is found for more innovative firms, which would benefit from a random 
distribution of support measures. However, opposite findings are found for less 
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innovation firms, for which a random distribution of support measures would further 
increase the crowding out effect reported for participating firms. Regarding behavioural 
additionality, the empirical analysis of Spanish SMEs revealed robust treatment effects 
for two open innovation practices: cooperation with government institutions; and 
outsourcing R&D. A lack of robust and large treatment effects for other networking 
partners might indicate a cooperation failure among Spanish manufacturing 
SMEs.Moreover, behavioural additionality was also a subject of investigation among 
the more general sample of European SMEs (MAPEER data) and here the empirical 
findings indicate that a random distribution of policy instruments would either increase 
the treatment effect, or, at least, reduce crowding out of public funding. The conclusions 
drawn from the analysis of the Spanish SMEs in Chapter V and European SMEs in 
Chapter VI are not directly comparable, as the former does not report the Average 
Treatment Effects (ATE). However, with respect to the Average Treatment on the 
Treated (ATT), both analyses report additionality of public support measures on 
innovative behaviour.  
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Policymakers and economic scholars around the world agree that the primary source of 
economic growth, competitiveness, and increases in standards of living in a globalized 
economy is innovation in the form of new products and services, more efficient 
production processes, and new business models.      
           (Atkinson and Audretsch, 2010, p. 163) 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Innovation is a subject of investigation in a large number of disciplines, such as 
economics, sociology, strategic management, entrepreneurship, economic history, 
psychology, human resources management, organization studies, technology, science 
and engineering, knowledge management, marketing and regional science. Innovation 
studies, as a scientific field, start to emerge during the 1960s. Although Schumpeter is 
regarded as the father of innovation studies, his contribution to economic theory and 
innovation economics was neglected until the 1960s. In the early phase of the emerging 
field of innovation studies, innovation was investigated mainly in economics and 
sociology, with almost no interaction between the disciplines. The economics of 
innovation focused on technological innovation and R&D as a measure of innovation 
and technological progress (Fagerberg et al., 2012).
2
  
 
 From the 1970s, the emerging field of innovation studies entered its growth 
phase. This phase is characterized by the increasing number of other social sciences 
whose researchers begin investigating innovation, particularly in the field of 
management. This rising interest in innovation across disciplines reflects the complex 
nature of innovation, resulting in dispersion of innovation studies across and between 
disciplines. From the 1980s, the field reached its more mature phase, particularly with 
the emergence of evolutionary economics and advances in relation to systems of 
innovation. The broadening of the field with respect to theoretical and methodological 
developments introduced a further diversity in the field. However, it is questionable 
whether the field is also deepening, given a continuous lack of interaction among 
researchers across disciplines. Communication failure among researchers from different 
disciplines added a further complexity and fuzziness to exploring innovation processes 
(Fagerberg, 2005). This, coupled with a complexity of conceptualizing and formalizing 
innovation, resulted in dispersion and a lack of cohesive and comprehensive theorizing 
                                                          
2
 Other disciplines, relative to the economics of innovation, differ with respect to their approach to 
exploring innovation activities. For instance, in sociology, Rogers 's (1962) book on the diffusion of 
innovation focused on the diffusion of innovation from a sociological perspective, examining the 
conditions that affect the adoption of innovation. Also, organizational sociology explores social changes 
within organizations caused by innovative activities. Behavioural aspects are explored by process 
sociologists, who study the impact of the cognitive processes of the workers and managers on innovation 
activities (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997). 
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on innovation. Of importance is to note that although it is generally accepted that as an 
object of enquiry innovation is a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary phenomenon 
(Fagerberg, 2005; Fagerberg et al., 2012), interaction between research communities 
was more pronounced in the early stages of innovation studies than in the later stages of 
development.  
 
 Moreover, in their review on recent developments in the economics of 
innovation, Nascimento and Teixeira (2010) note, among other trends in the field, that 
empirical research is increasing at a faster pace than theoretical advances, which they 
interpret as a sign of a disconnect between theory and empirical studies. Their findings 
suggest a lack of theoretical underpinnings in applied empirical research and, 
consequently, call for an increased use of economic theory in guiding empirical studies. 
In a similar vein, Galende (2006) notes the necessity for developing a common 
theoretical ground, which would serve as a basis for empirical analysis. However, it 
seems that few scholars are attempting to undertake such a complex and paramount 
task. 
 
 Since the 1950s, two strands of research within the economics of innovation 
emerged; one focusing on macroeconomic aspects of innovation and the role of 
innovation in driving economic development (i.e. neoclassical growth theory and the 
"Solow residual" measuring technical progress), and another strand identifying and 
analysing the determinants of innovation at the micro level (Galende, 2006). Within the 
discipline of Industrial Organization economics, the main research objectives are 
associated with analysing how external, market characteristics affect innovation. 
Following the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1956), 
market structure has a profound effect on firms' conduct and, indirectly, on firm 
performance. Therefore, researchers within the field of industrial organization are 
interested in identifying external, market-specific determinants of innovation, such as 
market demand and competition. Internal determinants of innovation are mainly related 
to firm size (Asc and Audretsch, 1988).  
 
 In contrast to Industrial Organization economics, the resource-based view 
(RVB) of the firm deals with internal resources and their role in firms' realizing 
competitive advantages (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). The RBV 
originated with Edith Penrose (1959) who related firm diversification – which to a large 
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extent overlaps the modern concept of innovation – to the firm’s managerial and, in 
particular, entrepreneurial resources. 
 
 Among many internal resources, the RBV pays a specific attention to intangible 
assets, among which innovation and technological competences are of high importance. 
However, only those new technologies that are developed within the firm are considered 
as strategic resources, which are a critical factor in sustaining competitive advantage. 
Thus, new technologies generated externally, outside of the firm, are easily imitated and 
adapted by other, competing firms and cannot be regarded as inimitable strategic 
resources (Kostopoulos et al., 2002; Galende, 2006).  
 
 Finally, the current research on innovation is strongly related to the evolutionary 
theory (Galende, 2006). While the neoclassical analysis neglects the innovation process, 
treating it as a 'black' box and adopts a static, equilibrium framework in economic 
analysis, innovation and dynamic changes take the central stage in evolutionary theory 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994; Hodgson, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 
2002). Firms, as heterogeneous economic agents, are not rational, but operate under 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). Instead of a profit maximising objective, firms adopt 
satisficing behaviour (Simon, 1957) based on organizational routines. In recent years, 
the basic evolutionary framework has been extended to incorporate networks and 
interactions between firms and institutions, for example in the systems of innovation 
framework (Lundvall, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; Rossi, 2002).  
 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a review of various 
definitions of innovations, while Section 1.3 elaborates the economic theorizing on 
innovation and technological change, from neoclassical economics to evolutionary 
theory and the resourced-based view of the firm. Section 1.4 presents innovation models 
and identifies a broad range of determinants of innovation. Concluding remarks are 
presented in the final section.  
 
1.2 Defining innovation  
 
The significance of innovation is recognized at both the micro and the macro level of an 
economy. At a firm level, Zahra and Covin (1994, p.183) noted that 'Innovation is 
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widely considered as the life blood of corporate survival and growth'. The process of 
innovation and its effect on firms’ performance is studied in different disciplines, as 
noted in Section 1.1, and is defined depending on the prevailing paradigm of a certain 
discipline. Its multidisciplinary aspect resulted in the absence of a general definition of 
innovation (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997; Garcia and Calantone, 2002; 
Baregheh et al., 2009). Therefore, the term innovation is ambiguous, which hampers 
measurement and empirical research on innovation processes.  
 
 Schumpeter’s definition of innovation is often cited and has become a standard 
in 'innovation studies' (Fagerberg et al., 2012).
3
 Schumpeter's notion of innovation 
refers to “new combinations” of existing factors of production (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 
65), which include: 1) production of new goods or improvements of the existing goods; 
2) introduction of the new methods of production; 3) entering into new markets; 4) use 
of new sources of raw materials and intermediate goods; and 5) new organization of 
production (Schumpeter, 1934, p.66). What is striking in Schumpeter’s definition of 
innovation is how similar it is to the definition of innovation in the Oslo Manual 
(OECD, 2005), the international source of guidelines for the collection and use of data 
on innovation activities. Building on the experience of early innovation studies, the 
OECD and Eurostat have created three editions of the Oslo Manual (1992, 1997 and 
2005) with a purpose of formalizing and harmonizing innovation studies across 
countries. Nowadays, most European countries, but also the USA, Canada and New 
Zealand regularly conduct the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), a large-scale 
survey on innovative activities at the firm level (Moiresse and Mohnen, 2010). Based on 
the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005), the following definition is proposed in the third wave 
of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS): 
 
Innovation is a new or significantly improved product (good or service) 
introduced to the market or the introduction within an enterprise of a new 
or significantly improved process. Innovations are based on the results of 
new technological developments, new combinations of existing 
technology or the utilisation of other knowledge acquired by the 
enterprise. Innovations should be new to the enterprise concerned; for 
product innovations they do not necessarily have to be new to the market 
                                                          
3
 Fagerberg et al. (2012, p. 1132) define innovation studies as 'scholarly study of how innovation takes 
place and what the important explanatory factors and economic and social consequences are’. 
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and for process innovations the enterprise does not necessarily have to be 
the first to have introduced the process (European Commission, 2005). 
 
 In the second edition of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997), the focus is only on the 
product and process innovations or technological innovations, because they are easier to 
define and measure. However, the third edition of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) 
defines, besides technological innovations, also non-technological (organizational and 
marketing) innovations. Innovation as such is defined as the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, 
or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or 
external relations. In one respect, the modern definition of innovation is more restrictive 
than the Schumpeter’s, because marketing innovation excludes “entering into new 
markets”, specifically exporting. Corresponding to this restricted understanding is that 
firms’ innovation and firms’ exporting are treated in entirely different literatures even 
within economics, while, on the policy level, innovation and exports are promoted by 
different public agencies. Although this issue is of importance, we do not pursue it 
further in the thesis, given our focus on the effectiveness of the existing innovation 
related policies.  
 Each type of innovation is defined as follows:  
- Product innovation: the introduction of a good or service that is new or 
significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses; 
- Process innovation: the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
production or delivery method;  
- Marketing innovation: the implementation of a new marketing method involving 
significant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, product 
promotion or pricing; 
- Organisational innovation: the implementation of a new organisational method 
in the firm’s business practices, workplace organisation or external relations. 
 
 Baregheh et al. (2009) review definitions of innovation in seven disciplines: 
business and management; economics; organization studies; innovation and 
entrepreneurship; technology, science and engineering; knowledge management; and 
marketing. They gathered around sixty definitions of innovation and used a content 
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analysis to identify key characteristics of innovation processes. The aim of the analysis 
is to derive a multidisciplinary and common definition of innovation. Their proposed 
definition of innovation is:  
 
Innovation is a multi-stage process whereby organizations transform 
ideas into new/improved products, services and processes, in order to 
advance, compete and differentiate themselves successfully in the market 
places (Baregheh et al., 2009, p. 1334).  
 
Furthermore, the authors distinguish between different attributes of innovation:  
- Type of innovation: the result of innovation (product, services, process and 
technical); 
- Nature of innovation: new, improved or changed various types of innovation; 
- Stages of innovation, often defined as “invention-innovation-diffusion”; 
- Social context: social systems, institutional set-up and agents involved in the 
innovation process; 
- Means of innovation: financial, technical, human resources necessary for the 
innovation process; 
- Aim of innovation: results that are achieved through innovative activities.  
 
 Another relevant classification of innovation is associated with the degree of 
novelty of innovation or the degree of technological change (new knowledge embedded 
in innovation). Namely, radical innovations are defined as fundamental advances in 
technological competences, whereas incremental innovations are minor changes to 
existing technology (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Dewer and Dutton, 1986). Drivers 
of innovation are often divided into market pull and technology push. Dosi (1988) notes 
that incremental innovations are driven by market demand, whereas radical innovations 
are often generated by technological opportunities.  
 
 Conditional on prevailing innovation types, Freeman and Soete (1987, p. 56) 
suggest the following division of technical change:
4
 
- Incremental innovation (those innovations that are continuous and frequent); 
                                                          
4
 Often in the literature, the terms “technological” and “technical” innovations are used interchangeably; 
both terms refer to the same type of innovation (Baregheh et al., 2009).    
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- Radical innovation (discontinuous and unevenly distributed over sectors and 
time);
5
 
- New technological systems based on a large number of incremental and radical 
innovations; 
- Changes of techno-economic paradigms (technological revolutions), 
characterized by pervasive technological changes affecting almost the entire 
economic system, i.e. clusters of radical and incremental innovations. 
 
 A taxonomy of innovation is also provided within the literature on the 
management of technology, where the classification by Abernathy and Clark (1985) is 
considered to be the most important. Combining the market and technology dimensions, 
they created a 2x2 matrix, labelled the transilience map, to illustrate the impact of 
different forms of innovation on firms' competitive advantages. Four different types of 
innovation are classified as: 
- Architectural innovation, referring to the development of new technologies that 
either create new or transform existing industries (the combination of new 
technologies and new market opportunities). 
- Niche creation (innovation in the market niche). This type of innovation creates 
new market opportunities by applying existing technological competences (the 
combination of existing technologies and new market opportunities). In most 
cases, it is associated with incremental changes in the established technology 
base.  
- Regular innovation, refers to refinements in established technologies applied in 
existing markets (the combination of existing technologies and existing market 
opportunities). This type of innovation induces incremental changes in 
established technological competencies.  
- Revolutionary innovation: The use of new technologies applied in existing 
markets (the combination of new technologies and existing market 
opportunities). 
 
 Abernathy and Clark's categorization of innovations is intended to contrast with 
Schumpeter's notion of 'creative destruction' (see Section 1.3.2 on Schumpeter's 
                                                          
5
 Radical and incremental innovations are also termed revolutionary and evolutionary innovations (Kline 
and Rosenberg, 1986). 
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theorizing on innovation) by emphasizing that innovation does not necessarily have to 
be disruptive or radical and render existing technologies obsolete, but can sometimes be 
incremental and thus enhancing established technology competences. 
 
 As a conclusion to our review of definitions of innovations, it can be inferred 
that scholars utilizing information provided in the Community Innovation Survey, 
uniformly adopt the definition and categorization of innovation advanced in the third 
edition of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). The lack of 
consensual or, indeed, any overarching theory either between or within disciplines leads 
researchers – at least quantitative empirical researchers - into a default position of 
accepting the theory and concepts underlying the design of the CIS and similar surveys, 
which are those of the Oslo Manual. Given the current state of theory and empirical 
evidence, this seems to be the prevailing approach, and we broadly adopt this approach 
in the thesis, which contributes to empirical evidence and policy development rather 
than to innovation theory. We would argue that 80 years after Schumpeter's definition 
of innovation, it is high time that a consensus is reached among scholars on a commonly 
accepted definition of innovation. Adopting a common definition of innovation can 
enhance interdisciplinary collaboration among researchers and provide a basis for 
theoretical advances in the field.  
 
1.3 Different theoretical approaches to innovation 
 
In this section, we will provide an overview of several but not all theoretical approaches 
to innovation, mostly but not exclusively from within the discipline of economics. Our 
review of theorizing on innovation can be broadly divided into four categories: 1) 
innovation within the neoclassical economics tradition; 2) Schumpeter's contributions to 
a theory of innovation; 3) evolutionary economics and the systems of innovation 
approach; and 4) the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and innovation. Our choice 
of theoretical frameworks to be reviewed in the thesis is motivated by our research 
objective of assessing the effectiveness of innovation related policies. Namely, the 
design and implication of contemporary innovation policies is influenced by two 
complementary rationales: a market-failure rationale advanced within neoclassical 
economics; and a system-failure rationale proposed within the evolutionary economics 
framework. Therefore, before a detailed discussion on rationales behind innovation 
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policies is provided in Section 3.2, we review the role of innovation within these 
theoretical frameworks. In addition, given the prominent role of Schumpeter's 
theorizing on innovation, the next section also briefly reviews Schumpeter's 
contribution to innovation studies. Finally, the resource-based view of the firm is 
included in our review of the literature on innovation – given the importance of limited 
resources to performing innovation in SMEs. The innovation processes  in SMEs will 
be further elaborated in the following chapter. 
 
1.3.1 Innovation in neoclassical economics  
 
 
The origin of macroeconomic theorizing on economic growth and technological change 
is particularly identified with Solow (1956). According to Solow’s seminal neoclassical 
growth model, the productivity level in an economy depends, ceteris paribus, on the 
capital-labour ratio. Yet, because capital accumulation is subject to diminishing returns, 
the growth-promoting potential of saving and investment at a constant technical level 
are limited. Under these circumstances - i.e. continued investment without technical 
progress - the model demonstrates that productivity growth approaches and eventually 
reaches a stable, no-growth steady state. In contrast, technical progress - or innovation - 
enables sustained productivity growth - i.e. per capita growth and increasing welfare - 
but is exogenous in Solow's model (Nelson and Winter, 1974; Freeman and Soete, 
1997; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Mulder et al., 2001) (The level of technology is present 
in Solow's model as a parameter and technical progress is correspondingly represented 
by increase in the value of this parameter;
6
 however, neither the parameter nor its 
change are explained within the model.) Hence, Solow's model demonstrated the unique 
importance of innovation while remaining silent on its origins and mechanisms. 
 
 From the mid-1980s, new growth models were developed in which 
technological change (thus innovation) is treated as an endogenous determinant of 
economic growth. These models are labelled endogenous growth models, and among 
the first were those by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). In the former, a key 
determinant of economic growth is technological change embodied in new capital 
                                                          
6
 In general, parameters in the model are similar to exogenous variables, as they are pre-determined or 
treated as given variables. But the difference between parameters and exogenous variables is that the 
former are given by nature, such as technology and consumer preferences (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
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stock.. In the latter, a driving force of increase in aggregate income and production is 
the accumulation of human capital. Models of growth based on monopolistic 
competition were also developed, at around the same time, by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994). In their model in each period a new generation of technology is introduced that 
is more efficient than the previous one: a protection mechanism via the patent system 
allows the innovating firm to generate super-normal profit (i.e. rents), contrary to zero 
economic profit earned by firms using the previous generation technology. The 
innovator continues to earn rent until the following generation of new technology is 
introduced. Models such as this are called “neo- Schumpeterian”, because firms' main 
incentive for innovation is Schumpeterian profit leading to a temporary monopoly 
power.  
 
 In these models, innovation through "creative destruction" is crucial for 
economic growth (Rossi, 2002). Another model adopting the neo-Schumpeterian 
approach to economic growth was developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992). Again, the 
process of "creative destruction" is a key feature of technological progress; innovation 
in the form of quality improvement is a random process arising from firms' research 
activities. The innovating firm gains a temporary monopoly position, which is 
eliminated when someone else introduces the next innovation.  
 
 Parallel to the development of macroeconomic growth models, a neoclassical 
microeconomic analysis of innovation focussed on how firms introduce process 
innovation into the production process. Innovation regarded as technology is an integral 
element of the production function. Increase in the price of a production input (labour or 
capital) motivates firms to undertake process innovation, i.e. to introduce technical 
changes that will enable the firm to reduce the employment of a more expensive factor 
of production and increase the use of a cheaper factor. Internal technological changes, in 
this scenario, bring production back into equilibrium, as a new optimal combination of 
production factors is achieved along the original production function. Another way of 
introducing process innovation is the use of newly introduced external technology, 
which shifts the production function to a new isoquant, thus increasing the efficiency of 
the production inputs (Stoneman, 1983; Grilliches, 1998; Rossi, 2002). 
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1.3.1.1 Modelling product and process innovations in neoclassical economics  
 
 
Stoneman (2010) presents a simple model of the determinants of firms' decisions to 
undertake process innovation. Most theoretical models explain the determinants of 
process innovation (for instance, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Link and Lunn, 1984; 
Levin and Reiss, 1988; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Lee, 2002; Gonzáles and Pazó, 
2004). The firm i sets a price at level pi and quantity at level qi, while qj denotes the 
supply of other firms in the market. The unit costs of productions are ci, and they are 
defined as the function of R&D expenditures (Ri) such as ci=f(Ri). The profit function is 
defined as  
        (     )   (  )      (1.1) 
 
Where  i denotes profit determined by the levels of qi and Ri. Profit maximization 
occurs under the following two conditions: 
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Where dRi denotes the differential of Ri; dc(Ri) denotes a differential of the unit costs of 
production;  pi is the first-order partial derivative of pi;  qi is the first-order partial 
derivative of qi;  pj is the first-order partial derivative of qj; and dqj denotes the 
differential of qj.  
 
 The first condition (Equation 1.2) stipulates that the marginal reduction in 
production costs as a result of process innovation (i.e. investment in R&D aimed at cost 
reduction) is equal to the marginal cost of undertaking that reduction. The second 
condition (Equation 1.3) defines the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue. 
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Jointly, these two conditions determine the level of investment in R&D, the unit costs of 
production, output and profit of firm i. 
 
 Equation 1.3 expressed through the first order conditions results in the 
following: 
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Where η denotes the firm i price elasticity of demand and ηCR represents the negative of 
the elasticity of unit costs related to Ri. Therefore, the ratio of R&D expenditures to 
sales is determined by the price elasticity of demand and the elasticity of unit costs in 
relation to R&D expenditures. 
 
 In a similar vein, a simple model of product innovation can be presented. The 
key difference between the model of product innovation, compared to the model of 
process innovation, is that it is assumed that product innovation, expressed as 
investment in R&D, affects the demand for the firm's product, rather than the unit costs 
of production. Before the model is demonstrated, it should be asserted that product 
innovation is less investigated in economic theory (Stoneman, 2010), but has received 
equal attention as that of process innovation in the literature on technology management 
and technology life cycle (see Meuller and Tilton, 1969; Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975; Clark, 1985; Klepper, 1996; Adner and Levinthal, 2001). 
 
 In the model, it is assumed that the demand for the firm i product is a function of 
price pi, the output of competitors qj and the firm's expenditure on new product 
development (R&D expenditure) Ri. Moreover, the unit costs of production are assumed 
to be fixed and exogenous. The profit function is given as: 
 
 
 
       (        )          (1.6) 
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As in the model of process innovation, the firm chooses the output qi and the level of 
investment Ri in order to maximize profit. Profit maximization occurs under the 
following two conditions: 
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Where  Ri is the first-order partial derivative of Ri. Equation 1.8 can be expressed as: 
   (     ) (  
 
 
)     (1.9) 
 
 The first condition (Equation 1.7) states that the marginal increase in revenue 
generated from the last unit of R&D expenditure is equal to the cost of R&D 
expenditure. The second condition (Equation 1.8) states that marginal cost is equal to 
marginal revenue. These two conditions jointly determine the level of R&D expenditure 
incurred for the new product development (i.e. product innovation), the output of the 
firm i, its profit, total costs and total revenue.  
The first-order conditions of Equation 1.9 is given by: 
 
  
    
     (1.10) 
 
Where ηPR represents the firm's price elasticity with respect to Ri. 
 
 Therefore, the ratio of R&D expenditures on new product development to sales 
depends on the firm's price elasticity with respect to R&D expenditures. However, it 
should be noted that the price elasticity related to R&D encompasses two effects: the 
impact of the firm's R&D expenditure on its price pi, but also the impact of competitors' 
reactions to the firm's price pi. Intuitively, when the firm undertakes product innovation, 
the firm's price elasticity of demand decreases, implying that the successful introduction 
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of product innovation enables the firm to capture a larger market share and/or to sell at a 
higher price thereby increasing profit.  
 
 The models of product and process innovation presented above are mostly 
applied in empirical studies on the correlation between market concentration and 
innovation, to test Schumpeter's Mark I and Mark II hypotheses (Stoneman, 2010).
7
 
However, as the focus of the thesis is to investigate the effects of public intervention on 
innovation, we limit our exposition of neoclassical theorizing on innovation to these 
simple models of product and process innovation, to illustrate how technological 
innovations are analysed within neoclassical economics.  
 
1.3.2 Schumpeter's contribution to innovation studies  
 
Schumpeter’s contribution to economic theory and analysis has three strands: an 
evaluation of classical and contemporary economic theory (History of Economic 
Analysis, 1954); the elaboration of a theory of economic evolution encompassing the 
books The Theory of Economic Development (1934) and Business Cycles (1939); and 
expansion of a theory of social and institutional changes in his 1942 book Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (Giersch, 1984). Moreover, the concept of entrepreneurship 
cannot be fully understood without his contributions. 
 
 In his early work The Theory of Economic Development (1934), Schumpeter 
argues that entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial innovation are the main determinants of 
economic growth. Schumpeter’s theory of economic development is elaborated on the 
basis of the Walrasian general equilibrium theory, which he names the circular flow 
theory. Circular flow is, according to Schumpeter (1934), a static state in which 
economic agents earn zero profit, the economy is closed, equilibrium is perpetually 
reached and there are no specific factors that disturb a static state. Schumpeter argues 
that the circular flow theory is unable to explain why economic change occurs (Frank, 
1998). For Schumpeter, development is discontinuous (i.e. cyclical) and induced by 
dynamic changes caused by entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial innovation. Therefore, 
the primary cause of cyclical movement is innovation. Following Sweezy (1943), after 
discussing an economic system as a circular flow, Schumpeter continues to develop his 
                                                          
7
 For the discussion on Schumpeter's hypotheses, see the following Section 1.3.2. 
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method consisting of three steps: first, analysis of entrepreneur’s personal traits and 
motivations; second, introduction of the entrepreneur as a source of change and 
disturbance in the model of circular flow; and third, analysis of a process of economic 
development.  
 
 The essential feature of a capitalist system is constant evolution and Schumpeter 
argues that evolutionary changes are caused by endogenous factors. The reason why the 
entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial functions are emphasized in Schumpeter’s work is 
because he regarded them as exactly those internal factors causing economic change. 
Therefore, the endogenous changes do not occur on the consumption side of the 
economic process, but rather on the supply side (Heertje, 2006, p. 14). After 
indentifying the causal factor of economic development (i.e. entrepreneurs whose 
function is to undertake innovation and cause changes in the economy), Schumpeter 
continues to develop his theory by explaining the occurrence of business cycles. His 
analysis of a business cycle starts with the prosperity phase. Initial static equilibrium is 
disturbed by the introduction of innovation. Schumpeter defined innovation in the form 
of the production function. The production function, he argues, 'describes the way in 
which quantity of product varies if quantities of factors vary. If, instead of quantities of 
factors, we vary the form of the function, we have an innovation' (1939, p. 62). 
Therefore, he explicitly defines innovation as shifts in the production function, rather 
than changes along the production function. Heertje (2006, p. 19) notes that shift in the 
production function is the characteristic feature of technological innovations (i.e. 
product and process innovations). 
 
 Innovation leads to cost reduction in the production process of the innovative 
firm (i.e. process innovation) or the introduction of new products (i.e. product 
innovation), and lowering costs or commercializing a new product results in the 
increase of profit. Higher profits resulting from innovation-induced lower production 
costs are labelled Schumpeterian profit (Nordhaus, 2004). In addition, when the firm 
introduces a new product, it temporarily obtains a monopoly position and generates 
monopoly profit. The duration of a monopoly position hinges on the availability of 
protection mechanisms. For instance, if the firm successfully applies for a patent, it can 
maintain its monopoly position until the patent expiration. 
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 However, the next phase in the innovation process is diffusion of innovation, 
where more firms start to produce new products or introduce new processes, supply 
increases, and prices start to fall, until the Schumpeterian profit is exhausted. Therefore, 
decline and eventual disappearance of economic profit is a direct consequence of the 
diffusion of innovation. Several processes enable the final stage of the innovation 
process, i.e. diffusion and imitation of innovation, and those processes include the 
expiration of the patent protection, a loss of the first-mover advantage and/or 
introduction of superior goods and services (Kurz, 2008). Firms incur losses soon after 
the price starts to decrease, which results in an economy entering into the second phase 
of the business cycle (i.e. depression) (Heertje, 2006, p. 78; Kurz, 2008). While 
experiencing a downturn in economic activity, entrepreneurs are temporarily 
discouraged from innovation, and thus from raising new funds. The primary cause of 
depression is the process of adaptation to the conditions caused by prosperity. That is, 
the economy cannot rapidly absorb radical innovation, which was the cause of 
disturbance of the initial equilibrium (Fagerberg, 2003). Eventually, the economy enters 
a recovery phase, in which entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in new innovations, 
because the system of economic values is again stable and reliable (Festré, 2002). 
 
 Schumpeter made a clear distinction between invention, which is a discovery of 
a new technique, and innovation, which is the practical and commercial application of 
an invention and the result from this application is a new production function. 
Innovation is carried out by entrepreneurs who are not necessarily inventors 
(Thanawala, 1994). The reason why Schumpeter stressed the differences is because 
innovation is a specific social activity with commercial purpose, while invention is not a 
part of the economic sphere and has no commercial use: 'Innovation is possible without 
anything we should identify as invention and invention does not necessarily induce 
innovation, but produces of itself no economically relevant effect at all' (Schumpeter, 
1939, p. 84). Thus, invention is an exogenous factor in economic development, whereas 
the endogenous factors are innovation and the innovative activity of entrepreneurs, who 
are individuals doing things in new ways (Hagedoorn, 1996).  
 
 Schumpeter’s definition of innovation has been a subject of criticism by many 
authors. One strand of criticism points out that definition is too narrow, because it 
includes only new firms and new entrepreneurs (Hagedoorn, 1994; McDaniel, 2002, p. 
32). However, Schumpeter augmented the definition in his later work, Capitalism, 
27 
 
Socialism and Democracy (1942), where existing, large firms are innovators in modern 
capitalism. Even in The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter refers to new 
firms as innovators in an earlier stage of capitalism, i.e. competitive capitalism as he 
termed it, but not in the later stages of "trustified" capitalist development (Schumpeter, 
1934, p. 67).
8
 Another strand of criticism refers to the broad and vague definition of 
innovation (Hagedoorn, 1996). The definition includes not only technical, but also 
marketing and organizational aspects of the innovative activities. Hagedoorn (1996) 
suggests that different aspects of innovation should be separated and limits innovation 
only to product and process innovation, i.e. new goods and new or improved methods of 
production. Thus, technological innovation should be separated from organisational and 
marketing innovations, which is the approach adopted in the latest version of the Oslo 
Manual (2005).  
 
 Schumpeter is also criticised for neglecting minor innovations (continuous 
learning and continuous technical development), because existing routinized 
technological changes have no impact on economic development (Hagedoorn, 1996).
9
 
However, in his later work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), routinized 
innovations within large enterprises have a larger impact on business cycles and 
changes in the economic system.  
 
 Entrepreneurs are the only agents who are capable of carrying out new 
combinations, and lose the character of entrepreneurs as soon as their business is built 
up and return to capitalist routines: '(…) everyone is an entrepreneur only when he 
actually carries out new combinations, and loses that character as soon as he has built up 
his business, when he settles down to running it as other people run their businesses' 
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 78). The personal traits of the entrepreneur are important in 
understanding his key role in Schumpeter’s theory of economic development. Following 
Matis (2008), the entrepreneur is an innovator who is capable of recognizing new 
innovative ideas. His primary motive is not profit, but rather is driven by “the will to 
conquer”, “the dream and the will to found a private kingdom” and “the joy of creating, 
of getting things done" (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 93). Moreover, the entrepreneur has 
                                                          
8 Schumpeter distinguishes between two phases of capitalist development: competitive and trustified 
capitalism. In the latter, entrepreneurial leadership tends to disappear and is replaced by innovative 
activities incorporated as routines within large firms (Ebner, 2006). 
9
 For instance, the Oslo Manual (2005) defines product innovation as introduction of new or significantly 
improved products, thus integrating minor innovations within the concept of innovation.   
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persistently to overcome social resistance to changes and innovation. It is also important 
to note that entrepreneurs are not capitalist or social class, but rather a special 
sociological type (Sweezy, 1943). 
 
 In his early work, Schumpeter emphasized the crucial role of the entrepreneur in 
economic development, but his later analysis of the capitalist system, the 
entrepreneurial function is assigned to formal R&D departments within large firms. 
Namely, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), Schumpeter argues that the 
main feature of the capitalist system is the introduction of new combinations (Heertje, 
2006, p. 82). Introduction of “new combinations” is an endogenous process, which 
Schumpeter termed “creative destruction”. In this work, Schumpeter argues that large 
firms are fulfilling the entrepreneurial function, as innovation is the critical factor in 
maintaining their monopolistic position. Contrary to Schumpeter's early analysis, 
innovation is no longer, a radical, disturbing force, but rather a routinized activity, 
performed on a regular basis (Heertje, 2006, p. 83). Moreover, in The Theory of 
Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) developed a theory of individual 
entrepreneurship, but, in later work on the capitalist system, circumvented a deeper 
analysis of corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
 This conceptual dualism of an early and a late Schumpeter, shifting from the 
“Schumpeter Mark I” model of individual entrepreneurship in new firms to the 
“Schumpeter Mark II” model of institutionalized research and development departments 
in large firms has been noted by many scholars.
10
 The terms 'Schumpeter Mark I' and 
'Mark II' are first mentioned in the works of Nelson and Winter (1982) and Kamien and 
Schwartz (1982). Schumpeter Mark I models industries with low barriers to entry, thus 
enabling new, entrepreneurial firms to enter the market at low cost, engage in 
innovative activities and disrupt the existing production processes. Therefore, the main 
feature of this model is “creative destruction” and the pattern of widening of technology 
and innovation bases as new, innovative firms enter the market and introduce new ways 
of organizing production and distribution. Conversely, Schumpeter Mark II model is 
pertinent to industries with high barriers to entry, which allow few incumbent firms, 
through the process of “creative accumulation”, to accumulate their technological base 
                                                          
10
 The former is proposed in The Theory of Economic Development (Schumpeter, 1934) and the latter in 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1942). 
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and enhance their innovative capabilities. This model is characterized by the deepening 
pattern of innovation processes (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Breschi et al., 2000).  
 
 Several scholars attempt to explain why Schumpeter's conceptual dualism does 
not invalidate his theoretical reasoning. Following the industry life-cycle view, 
industries can experience both patterns of innovation activities, depending on the phases 
of their development (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995). Namely, in early stages, the 
industry is populated with a large number of small firms without monopoly power, 
because low barriers to entry encourage the entrance of new, innovative firms. Due to 
absence of monopolistic power among incumbent firms, no firm has dominant 
technological and innovation competences that would lead to increase in technological 
barriers to entry. Yet in advanced stages of the industry life cycle, innovation activities 
tend to be concentrated in a few large, established firms with monopoly power that 
enables the creation of high barriers to entry. 
 
 Another line of argument in favour of the consistency of Schumpeter's dualism 
was advanced by Frank (1998), who argues that, in Schumpeter’s theory of economic 
development, the critical feature is the entrepreneurial function per se, while it is not of 
such importance whether this function is ascribed to the individual entrepreneur or to 
large firms, because historical facts are unpredictable ex ante. Therefore, it is not 
possible to predict who will fulfil the entrepreneurial function. Although entrepreneurial 
creative response introduces the element of indeterminateness into Schumpeter’s model, 
his theory is not inconsistent as different economic agents can fulfil the entrepreneurial 
function. 
  
 Finally, following Ebner (2006), the analytical consistency of Schumpeter’s 
theory of the entrepreneur can be validated through evaluating the historical specificity 
of entrepreneurship in specific phases of capitalist development, namely competitive 
capitalism during the nineteenth century and “trustified” capitalism in the twentieth 
century (see Table 1.1 for the main characteristics of both stages).
11
 In competitive 
capitalism, individual entrepreneurs are the driving force of economic change, while in 
“trustified” capitalism large monopolistic enterprise play the main role in the economic 
development (Fagerberg, 2003). A similar argument can be found in Sweezy (1943), 
                                                          
11
 Schumpeter introduced the concept of "trustified" capitalism in his book Business Cycles: A 
Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process (Schumpeter, 1939). 
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who argues that Schumpeter’s theory of economic change presented in The Theory of 
Economic Development is more suitable to the conditions inherent to competitive than 
to “trustified” capitalism. 
Table 1.1. Varieties of entrepreneurship in competitive and "trustified" capitalism 
  
Competitive capitalism 
 
Trustified capitalism 
Type of enterprise Family enterprises Corporations and trusts 
Type of entrepreneur Merchant Corporate director 
Mode of innovation Individual impulse Organizational routine 
Mode of behaviour  Intuitive creativity  Professional calculation 
Selection mechanism Market competition  Political compromise  
Type of income Entrepreneurial profit Employee salary 
Source: abridged from Ebner (2006, p. 326). 
 
1.3.3 Innovation  in evolutionary economics   
 
Besides neoclassical and neo-Schumpeterian theories, the third strand of 
macroeconomic theorizing on economic growth is associated with the evolutionary 
economics where technological progress is taken as endogenous. Models of 
evolutionary economics are the models of economic growth at the macroeconomic 
level, but based on the evolutionary theory of technological change, rather than on the 
neoclassical moving equilibrium (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994; 
Nelson and Winter, 2002). Moreover, the microfoundations of the two theories are quite 
different (Nelson, 1995). Macroeconomic evolutionary models are based on explicit 
microfoundations; that is, macroeconomic models are tested using microeconomic data. 
The microeconomics of the evolutionary theory are based on the behavioural theory of 
the firm, in which learning and adaptive behaviour take a central stage (Metcalfe, 1994). 
Firms in evolutionary theory are heterogeneous agents with variations in technologies 
they use, in their productivity and growth. In contrast, neoclassical microfoundations are 
based on a “representative agent” and its characteristics are extrapolated to the entire 
population of firms. The central principle of evolutionary dynamics is Fisher’s theorem 
of natural selection, which states that selection increases the average performance of the 
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population, and the rate of increase is equal to the variance of performance. Therefore, 
the driving force of growth is variety. Variety (i.e. innovation) improves not only the 
performance of a firm, but also of the entire population of firms (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994; Mulder et al., 2001; Nelson and Winter, 2002; Fagerberg, 
2003). 
 
 Often in the evolutionary economics literature we can find a distinction between 
“the old evolutionary economics”, pertaining to Schumpeter’s work, and “the new 
evolutionary economics”, associated with Nelson and Winter’s work and later 
contributions. Schumpeter is widely regarded as the most prominent evolutionary 
theorist (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007). According to Fagerberg (2003), there is a common 
core connecting these somewhat different strands of analysis. First, innovation is the 
driving force of long-run economic development in both “old” and “new” evolutionary 
economics. In the absence of innovation, the economic system would be in a static state. 
Second, both strands recognize strong regularities embedded in economic development 
and evolution, for instance, clustering of innovation, the sequence of innovation and 
imitation etc. Third, economic knowledge is a result of the set of routines adopted 
through repetition.  
 
 However, the “old” and the “new” strands differ in several aspects as well. First, 
although Schumpeter assigned the entrepreneurial function to large firms (according to 
Schumpeter Mark II hypothesis), unlike Nelson and Winter, he did not elaborate his 
concept of corporate entrepreneurship. Second, Schumpeter did not apply any biological 
principles or analogies in his economic analysis. Third, Schumpeter emphasized the role 
of radical innovations in the capitalist development, while Nelson and Winter allowed 
for minor (incremental) innovative activities (e.g. the learning process) in their model 
(Fagerberg, 2003). However, we cannot agree with the last argument. Schumpeter only 
focused on radical innovation in his theory of individual entrepreneurship (Mark I), 
while in his later work, following the Mark II hypothesis, he argued that incremental 
innovation is routinely undertaken in large firms, who played the key role in innovative 
activities. 
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 The basic building blocks of the evolutionary process are heterogeneity of the 
population or agents (firms, countries or technologies), mutation (often in the form of 
technological innovation) and selection.  
 
 Heterogeneity: In evolutionary micro models, technological differences are the 
main source of heterogeneity between firms (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). Firms differ with 
respect to their capabilities, procedures and decision-making rules, which, in turn, 
determine their conduct (Mulder et al., 2001). In some evolutionary growth models, 
heterogeneity of firms is defined as differences in firms' technological capabilities (for 
instance, in the model by Conlisk, 1989). In other models (e.g. Chiaromonte and Dosi, 
1993), heterogeneity is associated with both differences in technological competences 
and behavioural characteristics of firms.  
 
 Mutation refers to the process of learning (variation) and to the mechanisms by 
which firms adapt to novelties in the system. This is a point of departure from the 
neoclassical behavioural assumptions. In neoclassical theory, the basic behavioural 
assumption is that of rational agents who optimize their decisions, i.e. make decisions 
that will maximize their utility under the budget and other constraints. Contrary to the 
“rational” neoclassical models, evolutionary theories are based on the premises that 
agents adopt different forms of rule-guided behaviours, which lead to temporary and 
suboptimal adaptation but seldom to optimal behaviour (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). 
Decision-making is based on bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), stemming from the 
limited cognitive abilities of individuals and too much information, which cannot be 
fully comprehended.
12
 Thus, instead of choosing the optimal solution, agents will seek a 
satisfactory solution. Agents follow the pattern of “satisficing” behaviour (Simon, 1957) 
and not of the rational one. At the firm level, this behavioural pattern implies that profit 
maximization is not the objective, but rather profit satisficing (Simon, 1957; Hodgson, 
1998; Mulder et al., 2001; Rahmeyer, 2010). The concepts of bounded rationality and 
satisficing behaviour were initially developed to explain the behaviour of individuals. 
Following Fagerberg (2003), the most prominent contribution of Nelson and Winter 
(1982) is the application of these concepts to the behaviour of firms. 
 
                                                          
12
 According to Simon (1957), bounded rationality pertains to individual as well as organizational 
decision making processes. In the process of profit maximization within organizations, or of utility within 
consumer behaviour, economic agents are faced with an enormous amount of information, the processing 
and understanding of which transcends human cognitive abilities.   
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 Various rule-guided behaviours are defined by Nelson and Winter (1982) as 
invariant routines, i.e. habits, customs and beliefs. Routines are the result of a learning 
process. The authors divided routines into three categories. First are “standard operating 
procedures”, those that involve decisions about the level of production given the firm’s 
capital stock and other relevant factors. Prominent among these routines are 
technologies. The second group includes routines pertaining to firm’s investment 
decisions; and the third those that involve searching for novelty (i.e. searching for 
innovation).  
 
 Selection: Selection criteria are defined as variables that have an impact on the 
probability of survival of the population. Selection criteria are relatively invariant in 
natural sciences, which is not the case under many economic and social conditions. If 
the unit of selection is a firm, these selection criteria are often relatively simple, such as 
profit, prices, delivery conditions, etc. (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). The process of 
selection is inherent within a firm and between firms. Firms will imitate successful 
routines from other firms or innovative firms will introduce new routines and skills 
(Rahmeyer, 2010).  
 
 Nelson and Winter (1982) developed the first formalized evolutionary growth 
model in which the unit of analysis is heterogeneous firms. The analysis is restricted to 
one sector and only process innovation is considered. Firms’ profitability determines the 
“fitness” (competitiveness) of technologies employed by firms, while technological 
competition is the driving force of the economic system. Search processes are intended 
to discover the ways to improve routines or replace them with those that are more 
profitable. Search may lead to innovation, if a new routine is developed, or to imitation, 
if an existing routine is adopted and used for other purposes (Fagerberg, 2003). 
Although routines might belong to any of three previously defined groups, Dosi and 
Nelson (1994) note that, in all of the Nelson-Winter models, search is aimed at 
discovering new production techniques or to improve old ones; thus, search is 
determined by R&D activities within firms. Other authors of similar models use the term 
“learning” to describe the stochastic search processes. 
 
 The structure of Nelson and Winter (1982) model is presented in Figure 1.1. The 
model exhibits a stochastic dynamic process of correlation between micro and meso 
(industry) levels. The behaviour of firms determines industry performance and, in turn, 
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market conditions affect a firm’s innovative activities and its technological and 
investment decisions. Due to the presence of a stochastic dynamic process, the model is 
too complex to be analytically tractable. Accordingly, the model can only be tested by 
means of computer simulation analysis (Castellacci, 2011). 
 
Figure 1.1. The analytical structure of Nelson and Winter's (1982) model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Castellacci (2011, p. 92). 
 
 One of the assumptions of the model is that retained profit is the only source for 
financing investments. Fagerberg (2003) argues that large firms with market power have 
a competitive advantage because they can invest more in R&D than can small firms, 
and the search process is likely to result in finding a better technology (routine). 
Moreover, due to higher volumes of production, the benefits of introducing new 
routines are larger for large firms.  To overcome this bias, Nelson and Winter assumed 
that large firms have a higher price/cost ratio, and also that large firms do not 
necessarily create high barriers to entry, so new firms can enter the market.  
 
 Several authors developed variants of the Nelson-Winter model. Most prominent 
are the models by Soete and Turner (1984), Metcalfe (1988, 1992), Silverberg (1987) 
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and Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989). The main difference between this class of models 
and the Nelson and Winter model is the absence of the stochastic introduction of new 
technologies. Instead, the models only deal with a given and fixed set of technologies. 
Increase in productivity is the results of two dynamics, the improvement of the 
individual technologies, as well as the extended use of more productive technologies 
(Dosi and Nelson, 1994). The model of Silverberg et al. (1988) considers the case when 
only two technologies are employed. Moreover, “learning by doing” is a complement to 
search activities (Fagerberg, 2003). Search processes are limited to improving a firm’s 
prevailing routines (technologies) through a learning process. Learning leads to increase 
in productivity, but other firms might be free-riders and imitate improvements in 
technology, if spillover of learning occurs. Firms are forward- looking agents, unlike 
firms in the Nelson-Winter model, and may realize that less productive technology has a 
potential of improvement to the level of the highest productivity, if a firm invests in its 
improvement and learns through its operation.  
  
 Recently, within the evolutionary theory, a new approach to analysing 
innovation has emerged, termed Systems of Innovation (IS) approach. The approach 
focuses on broader, institutional settings conducive to innovation and is elaborated in 
the next section. 
  
1.3.4 Systems of innovation approach 
 
Developed in the last decade, the systems of innovation (SI) approach is a conceptual 
framework for the study of innovation and technological change that explicitly 
acknowledges the collective and non-linear properties of innovation processes (see 
Section 1.4.1 on models of innovation). Edquist (1997, p. 14) defines systems of 
innovation as 'all important economic, social, political, organizational, and other factors 
that influence the development, diffusion and use of innovation'. The SI approach 
attempts to identify determinants of innovation, rather than to analyse the effects of 
innovation on firms’ performance or economic growth (Edquist, 2001).  
 
 Lundvall (1992, p. 13) distinguishes a narrow and a broad definition of a system 
of innovation. A system of innovation in a narrow sense specifies institutions and 
organisations that support searching and exploring processes in firms, such as R&D 
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departments, technological institutes and universities; whereas a broad definition 
includes subsystems involved not just in searching and exploring, but also in learning 
processes, such as the production system, the marketing system and the finance system. 
Lundvall (2007) defines the core of the innovation system as firms and their interaction 
with other firms (competition, cooperation and networking) as well as with the 
knowledge infrastructure (universities, research centres and technological institutes). 
 
 The systematic approach to innovation covers the concepts of national, regional, 
sectoral and technological systems as well as the concept of industrial clusters. 
Following Johnson et al. (2003), systems of innovation can be divided into three 
categories. Based on geographical or spatial criterion, innovation systems could be 
local, regional, national and supranational. The concept of National Innovation Systems 
(NIS) was introduced in the late 1980s in the context of debates over industrial policy in 
Europe.
13
 Its aim was to challenge orthodox economic theory and its distinction 
between macro and micro- aspects of innovation. National innovation systems can be 
defined as a subsystem of interconnected institutions which contribute to generation and 
diffusion of new technologies (Sharif, 2006). Second, sectoral/technological innovation 
systems refer to either a particular product group or a particular technological field or a 
knowledge field. Technological innovation systems identify the general patterns of the 
emergence and development of new technologies. Finally, the third category – industrial 
clusters - refers to the breadth of activities and institutions included in an innovation 
system. Lundvall (2007) distinguishes between codified knowledge exchange 
(knowledge transfer through information flow) and tacit knowledge exchange (body-
body contact) and continues  to infer that the main difference between various levels of 
innovation systems is the role these two types of knowledge play in innovative 
activities.  
 
 Innovation according to this concept includes not only technological (product 
and process) innovation but also the determinants of innovation, which include the 
R&D activities of both the public and private sectors. Lundvall (2007, p. 101) notes that 
he prefers to define innovation 'as a process encompassing diffusion and use as well as 
the first market introduction'. Lundvall’s definition of innovation is thus broader than 
Schumpeter’s definition, because the former includes diffusion of innovation as an 
                                                          
13
 The concept is also termed National Systems of Innovation (NSI). 
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integral part of innovative activities. Lundvall continues to infer that the successful 
implementation of innovation critically relies on training and organizational change. 
 
 The systematic approach to innovation focuses on the interaction and influence 
of various institutions and organizations in the generation and diffusion of innovation. 
Hence, the SI approach stresses the central role of institutions and their influence in the 
innovation process as well as the importance of actors collaborating and interacting in 
networks. A broader definition of institutions as habits and practices or routines is based 
on the definition by Nelson and Winter (1982) (see Section 1.3.4). Furthermore, 
institutions refer to laws and regulations in a national economy. Such institutions reduce 
the uncertainty inherent in innovative activities and ensure stability for the firms and 
other actors in the system. Institutions should not be confused with organisations, 
defined as the tangible and legal parts of the innovation systems, which facilitate 
economic actors in the carrying out of innovative activities (Soete et al., 2010).  
  
 The concept encompasses a non-linear and multidisciplinary perspective on 
innovative activities.
14
 Innovation does not occur in isolation, but firms innovate 
through complex interactions, which are characterized by many forms of feedback 
mechanisms. The multidisciplinary aspect refers to application of perspectives from 
different social science disciplines (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004). Lundvall (2007) 
maintains that the concept of NIS is an evolutionary concept, because knowledge and 
learning play a strategic role in the innovation system. Furthermore, the dynamics of 
innovation are often path dependent and evolve over time (Castellacci et al., 2005). 
National systems are at different stages of innovation generation and diffusion due to 
both different levels of production and trade specialization but also of the knowledge 
base. However, optimal or best practice innovation systems cannot be determined, 
because innovation processes are evolutionary and the notion of optimality is not 
applicable in an evolutionary framework. 
 
 Following Soete et al. (2010) the literature on innovation systems can be divided 
into three areas.  
                                                          
14
 Non-linearity of innovation process suggests the presence of feedback mechanisms between the stages 
of the innovation process (see Section 1.4.1 on innovation models).  
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1. The first is based on Freeman (1987), where the Japanese NIS was analyzed. 
Freeman noted four elements comprising the Japanese NIS: public policy aimed 
at creating comparative advantages in the strategic industries; corporate R&D, 
which combined external knowledge from abroad with in-house technological 
advances; human capital and innovative forms of work organisation; and, 
finally, the conglomerate structure of the Japanese economy, which is 
characterized by both the absence of competition and consequently opportunities 
for vertical integration in the supply chains.  
2. The second direction of the development of the NIS concept is related to 
Lundvall’s (1992) theoretical contribution. Lundvall emphasizes interactive 
learning as the most important process and knowledge as the most important 
resource of innovation. Soete et al. (2010) identified three theoretical building 
blocks of the NIS concept developed by Lundvall, one of the first and also major 
innovations systems scholars.  
a. The first premise refers to sources of innovation, divided into two 
categories: learning; and search and exploration. Distinction is made 
between learning and R&D. R&D is a second source of innovation and 
covers corporate R&D or search activities as well as academic R&D or 
exploration.  
b. The second theoretical building block pertains to the nature of 
innovation, because Ludvall is mainly focused on incremental, rather 
than on radical innovations. Innovation in general is defined as a process, 
not a single event (Lundvall, 1992, p. 9). Incremental innovations are the 
results of continuous learning and searching processes in firms, and they 
also provide a feedback between innovators and imitators.  
c. The third premise is the role of non-market institutions in the systems of 
innovation. Lundvall distinguished two forms of non-market institutions: 
user-producer interaction; and the institutions in the system. The former 
refers to the communication between users and producers beyond market 
exchange, while latter emphasizes the role of institutions in risk 
reduction and provision of stability for firms in the inherently uncertain 
economic environment.  
3. Finally, the third distinctive area in the development of the NIS concept is the 
empirical study of national innovation systems by Nelson (1993). Nelson’s 
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approach is narrower than Lundvall’s, focusing on institutions that facilitate 
formal R&D activities, especially the role of universities in supporting R&D.
15
  
    
 Furman et al. (2002) introduced the concept of national innovation capacity 
(NIC). It represents a combination of three related theoretical concepts: endogenous 
growth theory; the theory of international competitiveness (Porter, 1990); and the NIS 
concept. The NIC concept is based on three components: innovation infrastructure; the 
environment for carrying out innovative activities in industrial clusters; and the linkages 
between these two components (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004). The main contribution of 
the NIC concept is the linkage between endogenous growth theory and the 
contemporary, systemic approach to innovation. The major pitfall of the empirical 
literature is that it only models one measure of innovation, i.e. patent data.  
 
 Empirical studies of national innovation systems have developed in three 
directions: policy-oriented studies of innovation systems; the development of 
descriptive models; and the NIS studies of low and middle income countries (Balzat and 
Hanusch, 2004). The first strand was triggered by the political interest in deriving 
technology policy implications from the systemic analysis of national innovation 
systems. Within this trend, national benchmarking studies are conducted to identify 
“best practice” policies and to derive policy recommendations. Descriptive models of 
national innovation systems are aimed at identifying the structural specifics and 
performance of a national innovation system. Finally, studies of the NIS concept in 
developing countries focus on country–specific innovation patterns and different 
development stages of NIS in low and middle income countries (Balzat and Hanusch, 
2004).  
 
 The most important impact of the concept, according to Lundvall (2007), is that 
policy makers realized the importance of national policy strategies that are aimed at 
promoting international competitiveness. Furthermore, the concept induced policy 
makers to change their perspective from a linear to an interactive process of innovation. 
The systematic approach to innovation gained its relevance after the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) was carried out. Innovation surveys pointed out not just the 
importance of R&D sources of innovation but also, and especially, the non-R&D 
                                                          
15
 The prominent triple helix model of university-industry-government relations is developed with the IS 
framework (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Etzkowitz, 2003).   
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innovation inputs such as purchase of equipment, design and marketing (Soete et al., 
2010).  
 
 The IS concept has its weakness. It is often argued that the definition of 
innovation systems is too broad, the boundaries of the system are not determined and 
thus it is not clearly specified what should be included in the system (Edquist, 2005, p. 
186). Lundvall (1992, p. 14) noted that the broad definition of innovation systems stems 
from the relevance of interactive learning as a basis of innovation. A system of 
innovation based on the linear model of innovation could be defined in a narrow 
context. However, the non-linear and multidisciplinary approach to innovation 
processes inherent to the IS concept requires the broad definition of the system.  
 
It should be obvious that a definition of the system of innovation must, to 
a certain degree, be kept open and flexible regarding which sub-systems 
should be included and which processes should be studied (Lundvall,  
1992, p. 14).  
 
 Based on the shortcomings of the IS concept, many scholars (see Lundvall, 
2007; Edquist, 2005, p. 186) argue that the concept is not a theoretical concept or a 
formal theory, but rather an approach or a conceptual framework. However, the concept 
is important as a point of departure from neoclassical theory, which specifies one 
general rule of behaviour of economic agents, that of utility and profit maximisation. 
Systemic approach to innovation, as in the institutional approach, emphasises the 
importance of the economic structure and institutional set-up and their affect on learning 
and interaction between agents (Johnson et al., 2003). 
 
1.3.5 Resource-based view of the firm and innovation 
 
The resource-based view (RBV) is one of the most influential approaches to the study of 
strategic management (Hoskisson et al., 1999; Acedo et al., 2006; Newbert, 2007). The 
origins of the RBV can be traced back to the work of Edith Penrose (1959), in which 
she argues that firm growth depends on internal resources, in particular managerial and 
entrepreneurial resources. The RBV basically identifies firms’ resources as a key factor 
in achieving sustainable competitive advantage. It is important to note that the RBV is 
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not a theory of the firm. As Foss (2011) notes, if it is a theory, then it is a theory of 
sustainable competitive advantage rather than a theory of the firm. Gavetti and 
Levinthal (2004) divide the RBV into “high-” and “low-church” RBV. The low–church 
RBV encompasses the following streams of research: the knowledge-based view of the 
firm; the evolutionary theory of the firm; the capabilities view of the firm; and the 
dynamic capabilities view of the firm (for reference see Foss, 2011).  
 
 The major contribution of high-church RBV is the identification of criteria that 
have to be jointly fulfilled (Foss, 2011). Only if these criteria are jointly met does a 
resource provide sustainable competitive advantage. Barney (1991) defines these 
criteria as follows: 
- Valuable; either it seizes opportunities or mitigates threats;16  
- Rare: either no other firm possesses the resource or only few; 
- Costly to imitate; and 
- Costly to substitute.  
Peteraf (1993) adds new criterion to those formalized by Barney (1991), but also groups 
them under different terms (Foss, 2011):  
- Relative resource immobility (new criterion); 
- Resource heterogeneity (valuable and rare in Barney’s framework); 
- Ex ante limits to competition; and  
- Ex post limits to competition (costly imitation and substitution in Barney’s 
framework).  
 
 Further, it is important to distinguish between resources and capabilities. 
Resources are the tangible (physical and financial) and non-tangible (knowledge and 
skills, know how, organizational procedures etc.) assets of the firm. Capabilities are 
firm-specific processes developed for the exploitation of resources. Their purpose is to 
increase productivity of resources by deploying and coordinating inputs (resources) into 
outputs. The main distinction between resources and capabilities is that the latter are 
firm-specific, while resources usually are not (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Kostopoulos et al., 2002). However, there is a group of resources that are firm-specific 
and thus non-tradable, such as human resources (e.g. leadership, managerial and 
                                                          
16
 In the SWOT analysis, opportunities are internal, while threats are external (Foss, 2011). 
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entrepreneurial resources) and those are strategic resources. Only strategic resources 
can be a source of competitive advantage, following the criteria formalized by Barney 
(1991) and Peteraf (1993).  
 
 Kostopoulos et al. (2002) note that the RBV identifies the critical link between 
firm’s resources and innovation whereby internal resources and capabilities determine 
the innovative capacity of the firm.
17
 The authors categorized resources pertaining 
innovative activities into three groups: 
- Financial resources from internal and external funds;  
- Technical resources (Information Technology- IT, equipment and machinery); 
- Intangible resources (human capital and knowledge). 
 
 The knowledge-based view of the firm, as an extension of the RBV, is based on 
premises that the firm’s stock and flow of both tacit and formal knowledge is a source 
of competitive advantage. Besides resources, capabilities also determine the innovative 
capacity of the firm and Kostopoulos et al. (2002) argue that the following capabilities 
have a positive effect on the firm’s capacity for innovation:  
- Entrepreneurship, defined as ‘the articulation of a long-term vision for the firm 
that aims at higher growth through the introduction of innovative products and 
technologies at the expense of short-run profit maximization’ (Kostopoulos et 
al., 2002, p. 11). Thus, entrepreneurship is regarded as a long-term goal of firm 
growth through technological innovations.  
- Learning: Innovative activities are carried out through learning processes; 
firms’ absorptive capacities depend on acquiring and applying new knowledge, 
on adapting to changing environments.    
- Sense and response: This capability refers to the firm’s ability to rapidly react to 
market dynamics. We would argue that sense and response capability refers to 
the agile response to market conditions, one of recognized advantages of SMEs 
in innovation.   
                                                          
17
 The authors refer to organizational innovation, which, in their study comprises firm-level innovation 
encompassing product, process and administrative innovations. However, the OECD Oslo Manual (2005) 
defines organizational innovation as non-technological innovations pertaining to new organizational 
methods in any functional area of the firm (OECD, 2005). Thus, we would like to emphasise the 
difference between these two conceptualizations of organizational innovation.   
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- Marketing skills: Successful commercialization is a critical aspect of the 
innovation process, and marketing competencies play a crucial role in the 
commercialisation of innovation.  
- Dynamic capabilities: the Firm’s ability to adapt its competencies to respond to 
market conditions is regarded as its dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt, 2000).  
 Finally, Kostopoulos et al. (2002) make an interesting observation that there is 
interaction and feedback between the firm’s internal resources and innovation. 
Resources are inputs necessary for innovative activity, but innovation also affects 
resources in the sense that generation and application of innovation create new, specific 
resources that are difficult to imitate or substitute. 
 
1.4 Models and determinants of innovation  
 
1.4.1 Models of innovation  
 
The focus of the thesis is not on macro-level analysis of the role of innovation in 
economic growth and development. Rather, our research objectives are associated with 
the firm-level investigations of contemporaneous issues regarding R&D and innovation 
policy. Accordingly, our review of theoretical developments in the economics of 
innovation will continue with a critical assessment of firm-level innovation models. 
 
 Different taxonomies of innovation models can be found in the innovation 
literature. Rothwell (1992) is the first scholar who divided the development of 
innovation models into five generations from the 1950s to the 1990s:  
 
- First generation: technology push models; 
- Second generation: demand pull models; 
- Third generation: coupling or interactive models; 
- Fourth generation: integrated models; 
- Fifth generation: systems integration and networking models. 
 
 The prominent features of innovation models can be summarized as follows 
(Rothwell, 1992): 
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- Earlier models are not automatically substituted by the next-generation models, 
but rather co-exist.  
- Appropriability of particular innovation models is contingent upon the industry 
in which the firm operates and on the type of prevalent patterns of innovation 
(for instance, whether incremental innovation is a dominant pattern of 
innovation activities or the firm mostly engages in radical innovation). With 
reference to industry-specific innovation models, an example would be the case 
of resource-intensive firms (de Jong and Marsili, 2006), that are less likely to 
adopt innovation models from the fifth generation, because those models 
emphasize the importance of interaction between firms and of cooperation with 
a broad network of partners.  
 
 Hobday (2005) reviews the models and discusses their explanatory power and 
their weaknesses. Of principal concern from a theoretical perspective is that Hobday 
notes the lack of an explicit theoretical base in the innovation models. However, he does 
not expand his criticism, but rather suggests a resource –based theory as a possible 
approach for providing theoretical underpinnings for innovation models. We discuss the 
resource-based view in Section 1.3.5, and proceed by presenting the summary of the 
five generations of innovation models in Table 1.2. 
 
 The first generation of the innovation models are the technology push models. 
The model is related to the “science push” model developed by Vannevar Bush in his 
1945 report Science: The Endless Frontier. The model is simple and linear, in which the 
driving force for innovation is development of new technologies (Marinova and 
Phillimore, 2003, p. 46). Public policies for fostering innovative activities were focused 
on the interventions and instruments on the supply side, such as R&D subsidies and 
loans which, the model suggested, would result in additional R&D investments and, 
thus, increase in innovation activities. The stages of the model are presented in Figure 
1.2. 
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Figure 1.2. The technology push linear model 
Source: Marinova and Phillimore (2003, p. 46); Hobday (2005). 
 
Table 1.2. Five generations of innovation models 
Innovation models Characteristics 
1st Generation Technology push (1950s 
to mid-60s)          
 Simple linear sequential innovation process.   
 Key stage is investment in R&D. 
 Commercialization of R&D activities. 
2nd Generation Market pull  
(mid-1960s–1970s) 
 Simple linear sequential innovation process where 
market (i.e. consumers' needs) induce innovation 
activities.  
 Focus in the model is on marketing, as consumers' 
needs and preferences are the source of ideas and 
R&D activities are directed by the market. 
 R&D has a reactive role. 
3rd Generation Coupling models (mid 
1970s–1980s)       
 Sequential innovation process, but with feedback 
loops from later to earlier stages. 
 Involves both R&D activities as an initial impetus 
to innovation as well as innovations induced by a 
combination of R&D- push and market- pull 
activities. 
 Both R&D and marketing activities are equally 
relevant for the innovation process. 
 Emphasis is on integration of internal R&D 
activities and marketing functions.  
4th Generation Integrated model (early 
1980s–1990)     
 Parallel development with integrated development 
teams. 
 Relevance of networking and cooperation for 
innovation with suppliers and leading customers 
through joint ventures and strategic partnerships. 
 Emphasis on integration between R&D and 
manufacturing (e.g. design for manufacturability). 
5th Generation Systems integration and 
networking   
(post-1990) 
 Fully integrated parallel development model 
supported by advanced Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT). 
 Cooperation with leading customers is the key 
driver of innovation.  
 Cooperation with customers and suppliers (i.e. 
vertical cooperation) is through joint ventures, 
collaborative research groupings, collaborative 
marketing arrangements etc. 
 Emphasis on corporate flexibility and speed -to-
market strategy (i.e. rapid commercialization of 
innovation). 
 
 Source: Hobday (2005, p. 123).  
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 However, the stages of the linear model slightly differ depending on the source. 
Swann (2009) distinguishes the following stages (Figure 1.3): 
Figure 1.3. The linear model 
Source: Swann (2009, p. 23). 
 
 The sequence of the model reflects the stages of the innovation process whereby 
research and creativity should lead to invention and further development and design 
should result in innovation. The linear model can be a model of technological 
innovation at both a firm and an economy level. At the micro level, it represents a 
sequence running from R&D into production engineering and then marketing, similar to 
the technology push model by Marinova and Phillimore (2003, p. 46). At the macro 
level, the model reflects the transition from basic research into applied R&D, then 
innovation and commercialisation of knowledge. The origin of the linear model can also 
be associated with the Schumpeterian trilogy, which distinguishes technological change 
in three different phases: invention; innovation; and diffusion. The first phase represents 
the generation of new scientific and technological ideas, while the second refers to the 
commercialization of novelties. Finally, the diffusion stage involves the distribution of 
innovation, over time and space (Swann, 2009). 
 
 The second generation is represented by the demand pull model, which is also a 
linear model of innovation but, contrary to the technology-push model, based on the 
recognition of the importance of the demand side in the innovation process. The key 
factor in the innovation process is the existing demand for a certain technology. The 
marketplace (i.e. customers' needs) is the main source of new ideas. The sequence of the 
model is depicted in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4. The demand pull linear model 
Source: Marinova and Phillimore (2003, p. 46); Hobday (2005). 
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 Development of the linear models of innovation, especially the technology push 
model, induced policy makers to recognize the importance of research and development 
in the innovation process as well as to recognize market failure and underinvestment in 
research activities at the firm level. The discussion on various market and systems 
failures can be found in Section 3.2 on the innovation policy. Another important 
contribution of the linear models is related to the concept of barriers to innovation and 
success factors which can be identified in both the supply (push) as well as the demand 
(pull) side of the innovation process. However, whether technology or market demand 
has a leading role in successful innovation remains open to debate: 'The question of 
what comes first - technology or need - has turned out to be a chicken and egg question, 
and that field of research has remained relatively quiet' (Marinova and Phillimore, 2003, 
p. 46).  
 
 The main strength of the linear model, i.e. its simplicity and clarity is also the 
source of much criticism. The actual process of innovation is neither linear nor simple, 
i.e. different stages of innovation process are interconnected and mutually 
interdependent. For example, information acquired during the diffusion stage provides 
an important feedback in improving a technology. Therefore, a more realistic 
representation of the innovation model would be to identify the feedback mechanisms 
and incremental patterns of development and avoid ordering them in strict sequential 
stages (Swann, 2009, p. 128). Hobday (2005) notes the main criticism of the linear 
models: 
 
- the innovation process is not linear in the practice; 
- feedback mechanisms occur between different stages of the innovation process;  
- there is no systematic evidence to verify the models; 
- the absence of external sources of knowledge, such as customers, suppliers, the 
private sector, universities; 
- the stages of the innovation process are not explained; and 
- the overestimation of rational processes underpinning the innovation process and 
the corresponding lack of recognition of bounded rationality in human behaviour 
and of alternative innovation routes.  
 
 The need for more sophisticated models of innovation, which incorporate 
feedback mechanisms and non-linear relations between different stages of the 
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innovation process, led to the introduction of the third generation of interactive models 
of innovation. Such a model is presented in Figure 1.5. Innovation in the interactive 
models can occur at different stages in the innovation process. The process itself is no 
longer linear and sequential, but rather circular (iterative). The interactive models of 
innovation are derived from the systems approach to innovation (Hadjimanolis, 2003, p. 
564). 
 
Figure 1.5. The coupling or interactive model 
New need             Needs of society and the marketplace  
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Prototype 
production 
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and sales   
  
 
 
 
 
          
New 
technological 
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State-of-the-art in technology and production techniques 
 
Source: Rothwell (1994, p. 10). 
 
 
 
 A well- known interactive model is the chain-link model developed by Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986) presented in Figure 1.6. Science is divided into two major parts - 
knowledge (known science) and research (pure science). The model contains five 
different paths of innovation processes. The central chain of innovation is labelled C. 
The second path, labelled F and f, represents a set of feedback mechanisms.
18
 The third 
path refers to the links between the central path and knowledge and research (white 
arrows in Figure 1.6). The forth path marked by arrow D indicates potential radical 
innovations. Finally, the fifth path indicated by arrow I is the feedback loop from the 
innovation output to science.  As noted by Kline and Rosenberg (1986, p. 293), the 
linear model with one central path for innovation and with the notion of science as the 
driving force of innovation is too simple and leads to distortion in understanding 
innovation processes.  
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 F indicates particularly important feedback.  
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Mar- 
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Figure 1.6. The chain – link model proposed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) 
 
Source: Gulbrandsen (2009, p. 57). 
 
 The interactive models stress the importance of interaction and interdependence 
of different stages of the innovation process on both the supply and the demand side. 
Therefore, the models attempt to include both technology push and demand pull 
approaches to the innovation process and create a comprehensive innovation model. The 
distinguishing feature of the third generation compared to the first and second, is the 
explicit link between the decision-making of firms and both the marketplace and the 
public and private Science and Technology (S&T) community (Hobday, 2005). The 
main shortcoming of the interactive models is the insufficient elaboration of 
environmental factors, such as government regulations and the S&T community.  
 
 The fourth generation of the integrated models was developed in the 1980s, and 
their main feature is the functional overlap between different departments and activities 
in the firm. However, the models also incorporate external linkages with suppliers, 
customers, the public sector and research organizations. The model based on the 
Japanese automotive and electronics sectors is presented in Figure 1.7. Instead of the 
sequential flow of information immanent to previous innovation models, the integrated 
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model is characterized by information sharing through joint group meetings that bring 
together R&D personnel (engineers) and managers from different departments in the 
firm. Besides functional integration and parallel activities across departments, firms 
establish and maintain close links to customers and suppliers, as well as other 
networking partners. Overall, the innovation process is regarded as cross functional and 
non-sequential, requiring both internal innovative capacities and external sources of 
knowledge.  
 
Figure 1.7. The integrated model 
 
Source: Rothwell (1994, p. 12). 
 
 The fifth generation systems integration and networking models extended the 
fourth generation integrated models by recognized the importance of vertical 
cooperation with suppliers and consumers and of horizontal cooperation with other 
firms. The main emphasis is on the learning processes and their flow between firms. 
Innovation is recognized as a networking process, in which the internal and external 
links of the firm are reinforced by the introduction of information technology (IT) and 
use of electronic tools (Information and Communication Technologies- ICT). The 
driving force of the innovation process is information exchange through ICT. The main 
criticism of the fourth and fifth generation models is that the empirical evidence does 
not suggest that the innovation process is conducted in the suggested manner. 
Furthermore, the benefits of IT systems on the innovation efficiency are disputable, as 
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their introduction requires certain organisational changes and IT knowledge (Hobday, 
2005). 
 
 Marinova and Phillimore (2003) extended Rothwells’s typology and divided 
innovation models into six generations: 
- First generation: the black box model; 
- Second generation: linear models; 
- Third generation: interactive models;  
- Fourth  generation: system models; 
- Fifth generation: evolutionary models; and 
- Six generation: innovation milieu. 
 
 These models refer to the process of technological innovation, not including 
other types of innovation, such as organizational and marketing innovations. The first 
generation - the black box model - is derived from Solow’s (1956) neoclassical growth 
model, in which the process of innovation is treated as a black box (an exogenous 
parameter). The second generation - the linear models - were developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s including the technology push and demand pull models. These models are 
already discussed in this Section as well as the third generation, the coupling or 
interactive models.  
 
 The systems models belong to the fourth generation of innovation models. These 
models are derived from the systems of innovation approach, and the most well- known 
model is the national systems of innovation. The model emphasizes the systems features 
of the innovation process i.e. interaction and inter-connectedness among actors (firms, 
public sector and private and public research organizations). Marinova and Phillimore 
(2003, p. 48) argue that the main contribution of the systems models is in exploring the 
role of small firms in the innovation process. Small firms are able to survive and 
compete with large firms by interaction and collaboration within external innovation 
networks.   
 
 The next generation is the evolutionary model of innovation. Based on a 
conceptual model, Nelson and Winter (1982) were the first to develop a computer 
simulation of innovation. The main contribution of the model is in explaining the 
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process of decision-making in firms, and also how agents in the innovation model 
interact to produce innovations.  
 
 Finally, the innovative milieu model focuses on regional clusters of innovation 
and the importance of geographical location in knowledge and technology transfer. The 
model contributes to explaining the successful innovative activities in SMEs, by 
focusing on the regional networks of innovation and the role of proximity and of the 
specific cultural and economic environment for generation and diffusion of innovation 
among SMEs (Marinova and Phillimore, 2003, p. 51). The concept of innovation 
clusters developed by Porter (1990) is related to the innovative milieu model in that the 
concepts of clusters and of networks are similar. However, clusters are a broader 
concept than networks, as they include all types of knowledge transfer and exchange in 
a certain location.  
 
 A few conclusions can be drawn from reviewing taxonomies of innovation 
models. First, attention shifted from exploring internal factor of innovative activities 
(such as R&D activities, marketing, and finance) to examining the role of external 
factors in the innovation process such as networks, clusters, public policy and 
geography. Second, the genesis and development of various models of innovation 
reflects difficulties in examining innovation processes. As Marinova and Phillimore 
(2003, p. 51) noted: 
 
What becomes apparent from this overview of the six generations of 
innovation models is that the more we study innovation, the more we 
realize how complex a process it is and how difficult it is to “master” it, 
whether at a corporate or government policy level.  
 
1.4.2 Determinants of innovation 
 
Although some authors argue that the question as to what are the determinants of 
technological innovations is out-dated, Souitaris (2002) notes that, after numerous 
studies were conducted in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the debate remains open.  
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 In their comprehensive review of the determinants of technological innovation in 
the manufacturing sector, Becheikh et al. (2006) examined the findings from 108 
empirical articles published between 1993 and 2003. They identified around sixty 
variables, out of which forty concern the internal determinants of innovation and twenty 
the contextual determinants. The inspection of variables presented in Table 1.3 and 
Table 1.4 reveals an eclectic approach adopted towards empirical analysis in identifying 
determents of innovation.  
 
Table 1.3. Internal determinants of innovation 
Category Subcategory Variables 
Firm's general characteristics  -  Firm size 
Firm age 
Ownership structure 
Past performance  
Firms' global strategies Strategy definition  The firm has a defined strategic 
orientation  
 Corporate strategy  Diversification strategy  
Export/ internationalization  
External vs. internal growth  
 Business strategy  Differentiation strategy  
Cost reduction strategy  
Protection mechanisms 
Firm's structure  Formalization  Formal structure 
Flexible structure 
 Centralization  Centralization of decision making 
Empowerment of employees 
 Interaction  Interaction between firm's units 
Control activities  - Financial versus strategic control  
Firm's culture - Resistance to change 
Total quality management 
Culture of support for innovation  
Management team  Leadership variables  Presence of a project leader 
CEO characteristics  
CEO change 
 Manager related variables  Qualification and experience 
Perception of risk  
Perception of innovation returns 
Functional assets and 
strategies  
R&D R&D assets and strategies 
 Human resource Personnel 
qualification/experience 
Human resource strategies 
 Operation and production  Advanced 
equipment/technologies 
Degree of capacity utilization  
 Marketing  Marketing strategies  
Monitoring of competitors 
 Finance  Financial autonomy 
Turnover/profit 
Budget/  funds availability  
Source: Becheikh et al. (2006, p. 651).  
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Table 1.4. External determinants of innovation 
Category Variables 
Firm's industry related variables  Sector 
Demand growth in the industry  
Industry concentration  
Firm's regional variables  Geographic location of the firm  
Proximity advantage  
Networking  Interaction with universities/research 
centres/consumers/suppliers etc. 
Knowledge/ technology acquisition  Formal and informal knowledge and technology 
acquisition  
Government and public policies  Government policies 
External financial support 
Surrounding culture  Power distance/risk avoidance/feminity-
masculinity/individualism-collectivism etc.  
Source: Becheikh et al. (2006, p. 657).  
 
 Internal determinants of innovation encompass a broad range of variables: 
financial and human resources; firm size and age; firm strategy and structure; the firm's 
culture; and individual and professional characteristics of managers and directors. 
External or contextual determinants include industry and regional-specific 
characteristics, networking, public policy and support, knowledge acquisition and 
national culture.  
 
 Furthermore, careful examination of variables included in Table 1.3 and Table 
1.4 points to several caveats in exploring determinants of innovation. First, 
diversification can be regarded as an integral element of innovation, as it encompasses 
product diversification and international (market) diversification, i.e. introduction of 
new products and entering new markets (Lee and Jang, 2007). Therefore, it can be 
argued that diversification cannot be a determinant of innovation but is, rather, itself a 
measure of product and marketing innovation. Second, there may be a mutually causal 
link between innovation and firm performance, in the sense that past innovation 
influences firm performance, which, in turn, affects current innovative activities.  
 
 The diversity of determinants indicates the lack of a core (minimum) set of 
determinants; i.e. there is no consensus on a parsimonious model comprising the 
minimum set of variables that influence innovation. However, each category of 
determinants has its own theoretical background. The resource-based view of the firm 
emphases the importance of internal resources in achieving competitive advantage of 
the firm (see discussion in Section 1.3.5). The relationship between firm size, market 
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structure and innovation is grounded in Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II (see Section 
1.3.2). Individual characteristics of managers are examined in the entrepreneurship 
studies (for example, see Carland et al., 1984; Chell, 1985; Littunen, 2000). Strategic 
management recognizes the relevance of firm's strategy and culture and their impact on 
firm performance. The knowledge-based view of the firm recognizes the critical role of 
knowledge in achieving a firm's competitive advantage. Finally, the systems of 
innovation approach explores the institutional surrounding of the firm, including 
networking and public policy (see Section 1.3.4). Becheikh et al. (2006) note that the 
relevance of contextual or external determinants is the main reason for the emergence of 
various approaches to studying innovation, such as innovation clusters, the innovation 
milieu and national and regional systems (see Section 1.4.1 on innovation models). 
 
 We conclude that the inclusion of determinants suggested by different 
disciplines clearly indicates the multidisciplinary nature of innovation studies. However, 
a broad range of determinants of innovation seriously hampers the comparison between 
studies and generalization of their findings (Becheikh et al., 2006).   
 
 Souitaris (2002) maintains that theory cannot provide a general framework for 
analysing the innovation process and its determinants, because the process itself is firm-
specific and depends on the industry and region in which the firm operates. The solution 
suggested by Souitaris (2002) is the adoption of a contingency approach in analysing 
the determinants. For that purpose, the author developed a portfolio model that 
illustrates the full range of determinants, the application of which depends on 
contingencies as defined by economic and social environments. This model is presented 
in Figure 1.8. A comparison of the determinants presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 with 
those in Figure 1.8 indicates similarities between the portfolio model by Souitaris 
(2002) and the list of variables in the study by Becheikh et al. (2006). 
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Figure 1.8. The portfolio model of the determinants of innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Souitaris (1999, p.292). 
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- Education  
- Experience 
- Training  
Business organization  
- Slack time of engineers and managers 
- Team work for innovation 
- Project champion  
- Internal communication  
- Incentives to employees to encourage new 
ideas 
 
 
 
Rate of technological 
innovation 
Economic variables 
- Size 
- Age  
- Growth rate  
- Profitability  
- Earnings from export 
- Foreign capital involvement  
Strategic variables 
Innovation budget  
Business strategy 
Management attitudes  
- Degree of formalisation  
- Locus of control 
- Attitude towards risk  
Decision-makers' profile  
CEO's profile  
Perception of the dynamism of the business 
- Rate of changing customer needs 
- Intensity of competition  
 
 
 
  Source: Souitaris (2002, p. 884). 
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 We would argue that a contingency approach might be a solution for empirical 
analysis of the determinants of innovation. External factors affect the innovative 
behaviour of firms, which is a subject of interest in the systems of innovation approach. 
On the other side, SMEs are a highly dispersed group of firms, and analysing SME 
innovation should take into account firm-specific characteristics as well as the industry 
and region in which the firm operates. Souitaris (2002) goes one step further by 
suggesting that instead of searching for a unified theory of innovation, researchers 
might adopt portfolio models as a way to identify determinants of innovation relevant in 
a particular context.  
 
1.5 Conclusions  
 
Although the importance of innovation at both micro and the economy level is long 
recognized, there is no generally accepted theory of innovation at the firm level. In 
economics, at least, such a theory would be widely supported, yield a parsimonious list 
of determinants and find overwhelming support from quantitative evidence. Within 
economics, both Schumpeter and neoclassical growth theory established the central 
importance of innovation in capitalist economic development. Among policy makers, 
promotion of innovation is the “holy grail”, the means to revive economic growth 
without – indeed, while reversing - environmental degradation. Yet innovative 
behaviour and its determinants and, hence, how innovation may be promoted are not so 
well understood. This relative lack of microeconomic foundations is partly a 
consequence of the complexity and fuzziness of the concept of innovation per se. The 
heterogeneity of the various definitions of innovation advanced in the literature 
contributes to the lack of convergence towards a generally accepted definition of 
innovation.  
 
 Moreover, the absence of a canonical theory of innovation is further accentuated 
by its multidisciplinary nature, as the innovation process, its determinants, and its 
effects are all subject to investigation in many research disciplines, such as economics, 
strategic management and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, theories of the innovation 
process have evolved from a simple, linear model, that was dominant in the 1950s, to 
the complex, systems models of innovation in the 1990s. Given the complex and 
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evolving nature of innovation theory, a large number of internal and external 
determinants of innovation are identified in the literature.  
 
 Joseph Schumpeter is regarded as the father of innovation studies, because of his 
two crucial contributions. First, Schumpeter was the first scholar to provide a definition 
of innovation, which is surprisingly similar to the latest definition advanced in the Oslo 
Manual (OECD, 2005). Second, Schumpeter was the first economist to recognize the 
crucial role of innovation in capitalist economic development. According to 
Schumpeter, the entrepreneurial function can be embedded in individual entrepreneurs 
in new firms but also in corporate entrepreneurship immanent to large firms. The former 
model, labelled 'Schumpeter Mark I', assigns the role of innovator to individual 
entrepreneurs who establish new firms to undertake innovation activities. The latter 
model, labelled 'Schumpeter Mark II', places the entrepreneurial function within large 
firms with formal R&D departments. 
  
 Within neoclassic economics, the macroeconomic analysis of innovation 
encompasses two distinct models: neoclassical exogenous growth models (Solow 1956, 
1957) and endogenous growth models (e.g. Romer, 1986 and Lucas, 1988). Solow's 
model identified technological change as a driving force of economic growth. Treating 
technology (thus innovation) as exogenous is recognized as the main limitation of 
exogenous growth models, which resulted in the next generation of endogenous growth 
models, first formulated by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). The microeconomic 
analysis of innovation in the framework of neoclassical economics resulted in the first 
generation of innovation models, incorporating two linear models: a demand pull 
model; and a technology push model. Regarding the types of innovation, most 
theoretical models focused on process innovation (Stoneman, 2010), although product 
innovation was investigated to a lesser extent. As theoretical models predict that the 
introduction of technological product and process innovation, in general, depends on the 
price elasticity of demand, a large body of empirical studies examined the determinants 
of process and product innovations in relation to market structure, thereby effectively, in 
this context, testing Schumpeter's hypotheses on the relationship between firm size and 
innovation.  
 
 A point of convergence between neoclassical theorizing on innovation and 
innovation studies as a distinct field can be identified in two areas. First, innovation is 
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treated as an endogenous driver of economic growth in both endogenous growth models 
as well as in innovation studies (Mulder et al., 2001; Rossi, 2002). Second, neoclassical 
economics advanced the rationale for policy intervention based on market failure. 
Discussion of market and system failures as both offering a rationale for government 
intervention is undertaken in Section 3.2. 
 
 Another strand of literature examining the impact of innovation on economics 
development is evolutionary economics. The main contribution of the evolutionary 
theory of the firm is that firms are considered as heterogeneous entities, with the main 
source of heterogeneity being the innovation process. Furthermore, innovation is treated 
as a dynamic and complex process, in which – in contrast to earlier linear models of 
innovation - stages of the process are connected through loops and feedback 
mechanisms. Arguments advanced in evolutionary economics found their place in the 
systems models of innovation. By introducing the concept of national innovation 
systems, evolutionary economics put forth the importance of the institutional setting and 
firms' environments in their innovation processes. Within the system, firms innovate by 
interacting with other firms and institutions.  
 
 Among evolutionary theories of the firm, the resource-based view of the firm 
recognized the relevance of firms' internal innovative resources in achieving 
comparative advantages. Among intangibles, strategic resources, innovation and 
technological competences play a significant role. While Industrial Organization 
economics emphasizes the effect of external determinants of innovation, such as market 
structure and networking , the resource-based view stresses a critical role of internal 
resources in innovation processes.  
 
 Innovation studies as a field of enquiry is currently in its mature phase 
(Fagerberg et al., 2012). Given its interdisciplinary nature, innovation is of relevance in 
many disciplines, such as economics, management, psychology and sociology 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2009). However, as the field is rapidly broadening, it is 
questionable to what extent a multi-disciplinary, heterogeneous research community is 
cooperating and developing a common research agenda – which is a desirable basis for 
further advances and a deepening of the field.  
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 This chapter provided an overview of theoretical approaches to the 
understanding of innovation within the disciplines of economics and management 
studies. The review of economic theorizing on innovation started with the 
macroeconomic contributions, advanced in Solow's neoclassical growth model, 
endogenous growth models, and Schumpeter's contributions to a theory of economic 
development. Because our main contribution is related to the firm-level evaluation of 
innovation support programmes, our focus subsequently shifted to microeconomic 
foundations of a theory of innovation. 
 
 Theoretical frameworks discussed in this chapter serve as a basis for the 
following two chapters of the thesis. Namely, in the next chapter, our focus is narrowed 
to the innovation processes in SMEs, where the resource-based view provides useful 
insights. Furthermore, Chapter III begins with the discussion on two rationales for the 
provision of public support in the domain of innovation. While the market-failure 
rationale is developed within the neoclassical economics framework, the more recent 
system-failure rationale was proposed by evolutionary economists. Thus, the theoretical 
approaches to innovation discussed in this chapter are extended in Chapter III into the 
area of public policy.  
 
 The overview of the determinants of innovation provides an guidelines for the 
econometric modelling of the impact of public support on innovation. The review of 
empirical studies presented in Section 3.6 will reveal a rather eclectic approach to 
selecting explanatory variables in empirical modelling. Thus, we would argue that, 
effectively, a contingency approach and portfolio model suggested by Souitaris (2002) 
and Becheikh et al. (2006) is a commonly adopted practice among practitioners 
undertaking the quantitative evaluation of innovation related policies. Given the absence 
of a canonical theoretical parsimonious model in estimating the effectiveness of public 
intervention, our preferred approach is associated with a contingency approach 
proposed in the literature on the determinants of innovation.  
 
 As a final remark, it can be noted that a dominance of practice over theory in 
this field is reflected in a fast-growing number of empirical studies. However, their 
comparison and the development of a consistent body of empirical evidence is limited 
by the lack of a unifying and parsimonious theoretical model that would both improve 
our understanding of innovation processes and serve as a basis for building a consistent 
61 
 
body of empirical evidence on the relationship between innovation, firm performance 
and economic growth. 
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Encouraging innovation in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) remains at 
the heart of policy initiatives for stimulating economic development at the local, 
regional, national and European levels. 
             Edwards et al. (2005, p. 1119) 
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2.1 Introduction  
 
Innovation is equally relevant for the survival and competitiveness of large as well as of 
small and medium sized firms (Hoffman, 1998; Edwards et al., 2005; Oke et al., 2007). 
While a broad overview of theoretical approaches to innovation is provided in Chapter 
I, this chapter shifts the attention to SMEs and the innovation process among this 
heterogeneous group of firms (Curran, 2000; Hadjimanolis, 2003). Similar to 
innovation, there is no broadly accepted definition of SMEs. Recently, practitioners 
across Europe increasingly have adopted the definition of SMEs by the European 
Commission given in the EU Recommendation 2003/361.  
 
 Schumpeter's Mark I and Mark II hypotheses initiated the debate within the 
economics of innovation as to whether small firms or their large counterparts are more 
able to engage in innovation. This chapter does not extensively discuss the link between 
firm size and innovation (for a review of empirical studies, see Damanpour, 1992; 
Camisón-Zornoza et al., 2004; Camisón-Zornoza et al., 2007; Damanpour, 2010; 
Cohen, 2010), but highlights the advantages and disadvantages of undertaking 
successful innovation in SMEs relative to innovation in large firms. The main 
advantages of SME innovation are associated with their behavioural characteristics, 
such as flexibility and motivation, whereas critical weaknesses are identified in relation 
to the limited pool of financial and human resources. Therefore, analysing the 
innovation process in SMEs is closely related to advances within the resource-based 
view of the firm, originating from Penrose (1959).  
 
 Within the disciplines of economics and management of innovation, one the 
main research questions is how innovation can affect firms' performance. Focusing on 
the innovation process in SMEs, Bolinao (2009) developed a conceptual framework for 
the management of technological innovation, connecting the building blocks of 
innovation as the explanatory variables and variables associated with the 
commercialization of innovation to firms' financial and non-financial performance.  
 Finally, Pavitt's (1984) taxonomy of firms in relation to their innovation 
processes motivated several authors (e.g Rizzoni, 1991; de Jong and Marsilli, 2006) to 
propose a taxonomy of SMEs based on their innovative activities. Taxonomies of SMEs 
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can be a useful tool in analysing how SMEs undertake innovation, given the 
heterogeneity of their conduct and performance.  
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of various 
definitions of SMEs, while Section 2.3 elaborates on advantages as well as weaknesses 
pertinent to SME innovation. Section 2.4 presents the innovation process in SMEs and 
provides an overview of several taxonomies of firms based on the characteristics of 
their innovation processes. Concluding remarks are presented in the final section. 
 
2.2 Defining small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)  
 
 
Definition of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has changed over time and 
across countries. Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) discuss variations in definition and 
define SMEs with respect to the headcount as firms with less than 500 employees. In the 
1980s, national definitions of SMEs varied from less than 500 and sometimes even 
1000 employees. A complementary criterion for defining SMEs is the amount of 
turnover, and in relation to this criterion, the threshold of turnover varied from $1 
million to $ 5 million and more (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982, p. 7). In the European 
Union, starting from 2005, SMEs are defined on the basis of both the number of 
employees and the value of turnover (or alternatively the value of the balance sheet; see 
Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1. Definition of SMEs in the European Union 
 
Enterprise 
category 
Headcount Turnover Or Balance sheet total 
Medium-sized < 250 ≤ € 50 million ≤ € 43 million 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 million ≤ € 10 million 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million ≤ € 2 million 
Source: European Commission (2005). 
 
 In the UK, Sections 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 define a small 
company as one that has a turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total 
of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees. A medium-sized 
company has a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not 
more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees. However, this classification 
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is not universally applied within the UK (Ahmed and Chowdhury, 2009). On the other 
side, the threshold for categorizing firm size in the USA is different than in the 
European Union. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) categorizes firm size 
depending on the industry in which firms operate. On average, small firms are those 
with not more than 500 employees and with an annual revenue not exceeding USD $10 
million (Hooghhoudt, 2010).  
 
 Nooteboom (1994) discuss the diversity as both a major characteristic of SMEs 
and a source of much confusion and misunderstanding and, hence, the reason why a 
generally accepted definition of SMEs is missing. The diversity between markets and 
industries is common among small, but also among large firms. What is specific to 
small firms in comparison to large firms is diversity of conduct and purpose within 
industries. He further discusses the conditions and sources of diversity. The conditions 
of diversity are associated with the profit objectives of the entrepreneur. Nooteboom 
(1994) suggests that entrepreneurs are more risk–averse than shareholders who can 
spread their risk in the portfolio, but are less risk-averse than managers in large firms 
who have a secure income.
19
 Therefore, their profit objectives depend on the degree of 
risk-aversion. Sources of diversity are also related to the wider motives and goals of the 
entrepreneur, i.e. reasons for starting their own business. Three groups of factors 
influencing the entrepreneur’s motive are identified: a) “push” factors (discontent with 
current job perspectives); b) “pull” factors (benefits and merits of self-employment); 
and c) coincidence (random reasons for self-employment).
20
 Moreover, he notes that a 
particular definition of SMEs depends on the purpose of the study and the researcher’s 
perspective.
21
 
 
 Therefore, past research on SMEs was hampered by the lack of consistent and 
unified definition of SMEs. The proposed EU framework for defining SMEs is helpful 
for research, because it enables comparison between cross-country and inter-temporal 
studies. Finally, even with a widely accepted definition of SMEs (at least in the EU), it 
is difficult to generalize or stylize facts about SMEs conduct due to their diversity 
among and within industries. 
                                                          
19
 However, we would argue that the managers in large firms can be risk-loving to a greater extent than 
entrepreneurs if their income depends on their performance (i.e. incentive pay or “pay for performance”, 
such as bonus system, share options etc.).   
20
 For a detailed discussion on three categories, see Nooteboom (1994, pp. 330 - 331). 
21
 His definition of SMEs is in accordance to the Dutch convention in the period of study: small firms 
employing less than 10, and medium between 10 and 100 employees.  
66 
 
 
2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of SMEs in innovation  
 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) and Vossen (1998) identify the following advantages of 
carrying out innovation in SMEs:
22
 
- Marketing: Small firms are often positioned in a market niche which enables 
them to establish and maintain close relations with their customers. Due to flat 
organizational structure and lack of bureaucratic inertia, they rapidly react to 
changing, dynamic market requirements. 
- Dynamic, entrepreneurial management: It is argued that managers in small 
firms are risk-takers and thus more inclined to innovative activities than are 
managers in large firms, who are often limited in the decision-making process 
by their accountants.
23
 
- Internal communication: Small firms often adopt informal internal 
communication, which is characterized by rapid information dispersion and 
prompt feedback mechanisms between managers and employees. Effective 
internal communication fosters rapid reaction to internal and external changes.  
 
 On the other side, SMEs have certain disadvantages relative to large firms: 
- Skilled workers: Technological innovations often require the application of 
specific knowledge of scientists and engineers. However, SMEs are hampered in 
their ability to attract and keep qualified workers. However, it should be noted 
that the authors considered the relative disadvantages of SMEs in the 1980s 
taking into account just technological innovation. We would argue that lack of 
skilled workers is not so critical to the extent that firms are engaged in non-
technological innovation, for which the need for specific knowledge may be 
significantly reduced. Moreover, cooperation between SMEs and universities 
and research centres has gained impetus, which diminishes the need for qualified 
                                                          
22
 For the overview of the barriers approach to innovation, see Hadjimanolis (2003). 
23
 Not all small businesses are growth-oriented. On the contrary, the literature on SME growth suggests 
that, in most cases, the strategic objective of small firms is survival, rather than growth (Nooteboom, 
1994; Holmes and Zimmer, 1994; McMahon and Stanger, 1995). Therefore, a dynamic and 
entrepreneurial management is imminent to small firms that are strategically focused on growth and, 
consequently, innovation. In that sense, this argument is similar to that of Penrose (1959), who explicitly 
notes that the focus of her analysis is on growing firms, whereas non-growing, stagnating firms are 
outside of the scope of her theory of the firm.  
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engineers and scientists working within SMEs. Yet, we would argue that 
building absorptive capacity is influenced by in-house expertise, thus the role of 
qualified workers remains relevant in the context of SMEs. In addition, SMEs 
could be more constrained in employing and accessing marketing experts (Freel, 
1999), rather than facing constraints regarding technical expertise.  
- External communication: Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) suggest that SMEs 
face difficulties in gathering information about technological advances, public 
policy measures, changes in markets etc. This limitation is associated with the 
previously noted constraints with respect to qualified engineers, scientists and 
other specialists, and their role in exploring external sources of information and 
knowledge in regard to technological advances as well as constraints arising 
from the lack of expertise in marketing, necessary for searching and identifying 
market needs. This information gap hampers SMEs in discovering new 
opportunities and forces them to seek new ideas internally. 
- Management techniques and practices: Lack of adequate management 
expertise within SMEs may create problems in formulating and implementing 
strategic planning, which is a critical management tool in a dynamic and 
turbulent business environment. Besides lack of technical skills and managerial 
competencies, Freel (1999) also emphasizes poor marketing skills, which 
hampers successful innovation in SMEs. 
- Finance: Difficulties in providing adequate financial resources for innovative 
activities are often identified as a barrier to innovation in SMEs, especially for 
high-risk projects. Moreover, small firms cannot engage in more innovative 
projects simultaneously, unlike large firms, which are able to diversify their 
portfolio and thus reduce the risk. The above points are all consistent with 
Penrose (1959) and the subsequent tradition of RBV; namely, that the constraint 
on growing firms – SMEs in particular – is their managerial and entrepreneurial 
resources from which arise their capabilities. Interestingly, Penrose (1959) also 
relates lack of finance to this constraint. After all, she argues, good 
entrepreneurs should be able to convince financiers to support them. If a firm 
lacks the entrepreneurial capability to convince financiers then that firm will 
probably lack the capability to convince customers.  
- Economies of scale: Economies of scale are relevant for particular industrial 
sectors, such as automotive, electricity supply, consumer durable goods etc. 
There are a few solutions to this issue - to avoid entering these markets or to 
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specialize in supplying large firms with subcomponents. Economies of scale are 
not limited to production, but they occur in R&D as well; i.e. large firms can 
invest more in R&D (Hooghoudt, 2010). 
- Government regulation: SMEs often suffer the burden of complying with 
various technical and social legislations, because the compliance can be time 
consuming, costly and requiring a particular expertise. The latter constraint is 
again in line with the RBV and difficulties arising from limited or otherwise 
inadequate managerial and entrepreneurial competences.   
- Absence of SMEs growth: Many small firms do not grow even after many 
years in business. Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) review a few studies that 
identified potential problems causing the stagnation of small firms. One 
interesting finding is that some managers do not want to expand the business, 
because that would mean a loss of control but also of close interpersonal 
relations within a firm. Furthermore, lack of financial resources is also 
recognized as an important barrier to firm growth. Finally, expansion of the firm 
requires changes in management style and incumbent managers might lack the 
professional expertise required for the next phase in the firm life cycle. Again, 
this line of argument is consistent with Penrose's (1959) seminal work on the 
growth of firms and a subsequent theorizing in the RBV framework.  
 
 Given the above overview, advantages of SMEs are mainly behavioural (e.g. 
internal communication; dynamic management), while disadvantages are material or 
resource-related, particularly constraints in relation to financial (e.g. lack of internal 
financial funds for innovation, credit constraints) and human resources (e.g. lack of 
management and entrepreneurial competences, issues in employing and retaining skilled 
workers, lack of marketing expertise). Furthermore, difficulties in compliance with 
government regulation are also associated with the lack of financial and human capital. 
Finally, absence of growth of SMEs is an outcome of their weaknesses, again, mostly 
related to lack of financial and human resources. 
  
 When reviewing strengths and weakness of SMEs in the innovation process and  
diffusion of innovation, Nooteboom (1994) begins by identifying three core 
characteristics of small firms, and then formulates derived characteristics, which can be 
the source of either strengths or weakness in SME innovation (see Figure 2.1 for an 
illustration of Nooteboom's approach).  
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The author ascertains three core characteristics in the functioning of small firms:
24
 
a) Small scale (in production, management and marketing). Small scale is self-
explanatory; small firms are characterized by low volumes of production. Small 
scale of production also results in a small scale in distribution and marketing. 
b) Independence (different goals and motivation of entrepreneurs relative to 
managers). Independence refers to autonomy from the goals and conducts 
dictated by the capital market. Larger firms are characterized by a separation of 
ownership and management. The main objective of managers is short-term profit 
maximization so that dividends can be paid to shareholders. If the managers do 
not pursue profit-maximization, they can be replaced.
25
 Furthermore, we already 
mentioned that managers are often more risk-loving than entrepreneurs. On the 
other side, in small firms, ownership and management is often concentrated in 
one person, avoiding the separation. Further, entrepreneurs start their business 
either by borrowing financial capital from the banks, or by utilizing own 
resources. In either case, profit maximization might not be the goal or, at least, 
not the main objective of the entrepreneur. Nooteboom (1994) observes that 
some small business owners are not entrepreneurial, i.e. innovative and do not 
pursue firm growth. They rather want to keep the firm small and thus follow a 
traditional way of business conduct (craftsmanship).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Nooteboom (1994) uses the terms small firms and SMEs interchangeably.  
25
 Agency theory, in contrast, posits that managers attempt to maximize their utility function comprising 
job security, power, status, dominance, prestige and professional excellence (Williamson, 1963, 1964). 
Managerial opportunism, according to agency theory, can be prevented through several control 
mechanisms, such as the functioning of capital market (the reduction in the price of shares of less 
profitable firms results in a decrease in the market value, which, in turn, increases the probability of 
takeover) (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Another mechanism for aligning managers' objectives with those of 
shareholders is via the activism of institutional shareholders (for instance, pension funds and insurance 
companies). In modern companies, institutional shareholders emerged as the most important element in 
corporate governance (Hansen and Hill, 1991). Through their voice, institutional shareholders can impose 
their own short-term objectives onto industrial managers (Hoskisson et al., 2002). 
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Figure 2.1. Core and derived characteristics of SMEs, their advantages and 
weaknesses 
DERIVED CHARACTERISTICS                                                           STRENGTHS                                                
Intertwined ownership and management                      Motivated management/commitment 
Integration of tasks in worker's  
variation and improvisation                                           Motivated labour 
Few hierarchical levels; short                          
communication lines                                                     No bureaucracy; internal flexibility 
Few and simple procedures; personal,                          Low costs and little distortion of internal 
direct, oral internal communication                              communication  
Personal and close relations with  
customers                                                                      Capacity for customization 
Craftsmanship                                                               Unique or scarce competencies 
Tacitness of knowledge                                                Appropriability 
Idiosyncratic perception                                               Originality of initiatives  
                                                                                                                            
         
                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Weaknesses  
Idiosyncratic perception                                                   Unopposed misapprehensions                                       
"Tacit knowledge"                                                            Limited absorptive capacity 
Craftsmanship                                                                  Technical myopia 
Few products and markets                                                Little spread of risk, limited synergy  
Small volume of production                                             Diseconomies of small scale 
No staff functionaries                                                       Lack of functional expertise  
Lack of managerial time                                                  Ad hoc management  
Much authority and many functions                                Vulnerability to discontinuity of 
in one person                                                                     management and staff                                                                                             
Few layers of hierarchy                                                   Limited career opportunities                                        
Low level of abstraction                                                  Lack of information 
Product or technique orientation                                     Errors in marketing and strategy 
Possible Lack of finance                                                  Lack of financial resources for growth  
 
 
Source: Nooteboom (1994, p. 334). 
 
c) Personality (personal characteristics and traits of the entrepreneur). The third 
core characteristic of small firms, besides small scale and independence, is 
personality. Personality refers to the overlapping of personal and professional 
life and work of the entrepreneur. For instance, she might have an office at 
home, her family could be involved in business, her objective could be to run a 
small business without a tendency to grow etc.   
Core strategies 
- Innovation through new products  
- Niche markets 
- External networks 
- Independence 
 
 
Core characteristics
- Small scale 
- Personality 
- Independence 
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 Based on the core characteristics of small business, Nooteboom (1994) identifies 
the derived characteristics of SMEs, which can be either advantages or disadvantages 
(see Figure 2.1). However, three derived characteristics can yield both strengths and 
weaknesses. Craftsmanship can lead to the development of competitive advantage in 
human capital (i.e. unique competencies), but can also result in the lack of attention to 
financial and commercial aspects of business operation (technical myopia). Tacit 
knowledge can be difficult to imitate or adopt (an appropriability issue).
26
 However, a 
lack of formal education or skills and training might adversely affect small businesses 
with respect to acquiring, developing and adopting new knowledge (i.e. limit their 
absorptive capacity). Finally, idiosyncratic perception might create an organizational 
culture which promotes initiative and creativity.
27
 On the other side, it might also lead to 
unopposed misapprehensions.   
        
 We would argue that, similar to Rothwell and Zegveld (1982), strengths and 
weaknesses identified by Nooteboom (1994) can be grouped into resources and 
behavioural characteristics. Resources would include: lack of finance; limited capacity 
for absorption of new knowledge (absorptive capacity); and lack of functional expertise. 
Behavioural characteristics refer to staff and management motivation; internal 
communication; internal flexibility; tacitness of knowledge (learning by doing); and 
unopposed misapprehensions  associated with the peculiarities of entrepreneurial 
perception, initiative and creativity (Rothwell, 1989).  
   
 Further, Nooteboom (1994) suggests that SMEs can adopt three core strategies 
for innovation: new products; niche markets with differentiated goods; and external 
networks. The first strategy refers to radical innovation, and Nooteboom (1994) argues 
that only 10-20 per cent of SMEs carry out radical innovation. Furthermore, new 
products and niche markets offset the weakness of small scale, whereas the third 
strategy, networking could offset the lack of absorptive capacity within SMEs; because, 
through networking, small firms can acquire new knowledge. External networking is 
                                                          
26
 Appropriability of innovations is associated with the mechanisms of protecting innovation from 
imitation, which, in turn, is related to the possibility of reaping benefits from innovation (Breschi et al., 
2000). High appropriability conditions indicate the existence of mechanisms for protecting innovations, 
whereas low appropriability is characterized by widespread spillovers arising from the difficulties in 
successfully protecting innovation (Breschi et al., 2000). 
27
 Openness to new ideas, initiative and creativity are especially important in the first phase of the 
innovation process, idea generation. The innovation process will be discussed in the following section.  
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important for SMEs, as it can compensate the lack of absorptive capacity. However, the 
relation between radical innovation and firm size is ambiguous. Economic theory posits 
that small firms are more likely to introduce radical innovation (Sood and Tellis, 2005), 
and this hypothesis is substantiated by the theory of inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
Cohen and Levin, 1989).
28
 Namely, large firms are burdened with a complex 
organizational structure, organizational routines and bureaucratic inertia. Employees 
with a potentially successful innovation usually have to exert significant effort to 
overcome bureaucratic resistance. As a result, large firms are prone to slow reaction to 
radical product innovations.
29
 Ettlie et al. (1984) found that centralization of decision 
making is a necessary condition for the introduction of radical innovation. In addition, 
individual innovators might have less incentive to introduce radical innovations in large 
firms, if they cannot reap the benefits of their efforts (Cohen, 1995). For instance, while 
moving and presenting their innovative efforts through layers of administration, their 
innovative ideas could be diluted (Chandy and Tellis, 2000). These impediments can 
seriously discourage individual innovators within large firms, who, faced with 
bureaucratic inertia and resistance, might decide to commercialize their radical 
innovation by starting their own enterprise.  
 
 In contrast, innovative activities in large firms, unlike in small firms, are not 
hampered by limited financial and human resources (Chandy and Tellis, 2000). This 
advantage over small firms would suggest that large firms should introduce radical 
innovation to a larger extent than small firms. Even in the case when radical innovation 
fails to commercialize, large firms with their enormous financial and human resources, 
are better equipped to neutralize the failure. In addition, Cohen and Levin (1989) and 
Freel (2000) posit that, due to capital market imperfections, large firms are more likely 
to obtain external funding than small firms. Other advantages of performing radical 
innovation in large firms are their ability to exhibit economics of scale in R&D and to 
spread risks across a number of innovative activities (Ali, 1994).  
 
                                                          
28
 Another theory explaining why small firms might be more innovative in respect to radical innovation is 
the willingness to cannibalize specialized investment, i.e. investment in current, old technology, that 
would be destroyed or rendered obsolete when new technology emerges (Chandy and Tellis, 1998). As 
large firms are more likely to incur larger specialized investment, due to their large pool of financial and 
human resources, they are less willing to adopt radical, new technologies, which would replace old 
technology.  
29
 Ettlie et al. (1984) found that centralization of decision making is a necessary condition for the 
introduction of radical innovation. 
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 Therefore, as theory posits ambiguous hypotheses in relation to firm size and 
radical innovation, empirical evidence could contribute to the on-going debate on what 
type of firms introduces radical innovations (Chandy and Tellis, 2000). For instance, 
Dewar and Dutton (1986) found that large firms are more likely to adopt radical 
innovation than are small firms in the footwear industry. Ettlie and Rubenstein (1987) 
found no relationship between firm size and radical innovation adoption in firms with 
less than 1,000 employees. Conversely, they found a positive relationship in firms 
having between 1,200 and 11,000 employees, whereas very large firms with more than 
45,000 employees are unlikely to adopt radical innovation. In his review of empirical 
studies in the last fifty years, Cohen (2010) notes that empirical findings mostly suggest 
that large firms are more likely to introduce incremental innovation, while small firms 
pursue radical innovation to a larger extent. Moreover, Oke et al. (2007) conclude that 
small firms are more inclined towards radical innovation, because of their ability to 
adjust to changes necessary for generating radical innovation.  
 
 Other authors suggest a non-linear relationship between firm size and radical 
innovation. For instance, Ettlie and Rubenstein (1987), as noted above, found a bell-
shaped relationship, whereby medium-sized firms are most likely to adopt radical 
innovation, because, unlike large firms, they are not prone to bureaucratic inertia, and, 
on the other side, their innovative capacity is larger than in small firms. In contrast, 
Pavitt (1990) suggests a U-shaped relationship, arguing that medium-sized firms are 
least engaged in radical innovation, as this category of firms exhibit weaknesses in 
innovation activities pertinent to both large and small firms, but without incorporating 
their strengths.  
 
 Hooghoudt (2010) identified additional strengths and weaknesses of SMEs in 
innovation. He argues that non-formalized innovation (i.e. informal R&D) is a distinct 
disadvantage. However, SMEs do not establish formal R&D departments, because of 
lack of financial resources. Therefore, this is not a distinct disadvantage, because it is 
embedded in the lack of resources. Furthermore, he argues that SMEs are more likely to 
introduce radical innovation, and this is characterized as their advantage. First, this is an 
outcome of SMEs advantages, not a distinct advantage. Second, as we have seen, there 
is mixed evidence on SMEs’ proclivity towards radical innovation. Nooteboom (1994), 
for instance, argues that only a small percent of SMEs carry out radical innovation. 
Further, Hooghoudt (2010) suggest that innovation is the long-term goal of SMEs, 
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while large firms pursue short-term profit-maximization. However, not all SMEs are 
innovative. Innovation might be the main objective but only for entrepreneurial, i.e. 
innovative, SMEs or for SMEs that adopt an innovation orientation.
30
 Further, the 
author argues that pursuing innovation as a long-term goal is derived from another SME 
advantage, and that is intertwined ownership and management. However, Nooteboom 
(1994) argues that this is a derived characteristic of SMEs which can lead to both 
strengths (motivated and committed management) and weaknesses (vulnerability to 
discontinuity of management and employees). We summarized the advantages and 
disadvantages of SMEs in innovation in Table 2.2 below.   
  
Table 2.2. Advantages and disadvantages of SMEs and large firms in innovation  
 
Large firms 
 
Small firms 
Reference 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages 
 High 
bureaucracy 
Low bureaucracy 
(rapid and 
effective internal 
communication, 
shorter decision 
chains, i.e. faster 
decision making) 
 Vossen (1998); 
Hooghoudt (2010); 
Rothwell  and 
Zegveld (1982); 
Nooteboom (1994) 
 Sluggish 
response to 
market 
dynamism 
Agile response to 
market dynamism 
 Vossen (1998); 
Hooghoudt (2010) 
 
Economies of 
scale in 
production, 
distribution and 
R&D  
 
  Diseconomies of 
scale in 
production, 
distribution and 
R&D 
Hooghoudt (2010); 
Rothwell  and 
Zegveld (1982); 
Nooteboom (1994) 
Large resource 
base (absorptive 
capacity) 
  Small resource 
base 
Vossen (1998); 
Hooghoudt (2010); 
Rothwell  and 
Zegveld (1982); 
Nooteboom (1994) 
Diverse resources 
 
  Narrow 
resources 
 
Hooghoudt (2010) 
                                                          
30
 The goal of innovation orientation is innovation. Siguaw et al., 2006 (p. 560) define innovation 
orientation as: 'A multidimensional knowledge structure composed of a learning philosophy, strategic 
direction, and transfunctional beliefs that, in turn, guide and direct all organizational strategies and 
actions, including those embedded in the formal and informal systems, behaviors, competencies, and 
processes of the firm to promote innovative thinking and facilitate successful development, evolution, and 
execution of innovations'. 
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 Incremental 
innovation 
Radical 
innovation 
 Hooghoudt (2010) 
 
 
 
 
Ownership-
management 
separation  
 
Ownership-
management 
consolidation 
 Hooghoudt (2010); 
Nooteboom (1994) 
 Profit-
maximization as 
a goal 
Innovation as a 
goal 
 Hooghoudt (2010) 
 Closeness (low 
employees’ 
fluctuation) 
Openness (high 
employees’ 
fluctuation)  
 Hooghoudt (2010) 
Formal 
management 
skills  
 Motivated,  
committed and 
entrepreneurial  
management   
Lack of 
adequate 
management 
techniques and 
practices  
Vossen (1998); 
Rothwell  and 
Zegveld (1982);  
 
Nooteboom (1994) 
 
Diversification of 
risk  
 Risk taking Little spread of 
risk and limited 
synergy  
Vossen (1998); 
Nooteboom (1994) 
  Tacitness of 
knowledge 
(learning by 
doing) and 
consequent 
appropriability  
 Nooteboom (1994); 
Vossen (1998);  
Skilled  workers  Motivated labour  Lack of 
functional 
expertise  
Rothwell  and 
Zegveld (1982); 
Vossen (1998); 
Nooteboom (1994) 
 
  Marketing; 
capacity for 
customization  
 Rothwell  and 
Zegveld (1982); 
Nooteboom (1994); 
Vossen (1998) 
 
 
External 
communication, 
i.e. networking 
Low 
cooperation  
High cooperation   Rothwell  and 
Zegveld (1982); 
Vossen (1998); 
Hooghoudt (2010) 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Vossen (1998, p. 90) and Hooghoudt (2010, p. 16). 
 
 As both large and small firms have distinct strengths and weaknesses regarding 
innovation activities, scholars have attempted to provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship between firm size and innovative since Schumpeter advanced his two 
innovation models - Mark I and Mark II. However, the evidence is ambiguous 
(Nooteboom, 1994; Hooghoudt, 2010; Damanpour, 1992) and can be categorized into 
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three groups: a positive relationship argued by ”classicists”; a negative relationship by 
“modernists”; and no relationship suggested by “nihilists” (Hooghoudt, 2010). 
However, Damanpour and Schneider (2006) observe that while single studies yield 
ambiguous results, aggregate findings from meta-analysis suggest a positive relationship 
between firm size and innovation (e.g. Damanpour 1992; Camisón-Zornoza et al., 
2007).  
 
 There are two potential explanations for the inconsistency of the empirical 
findings. The first argument is associated with the methodological issues of measuring 
both firm size and innovation. Researchers recognize four measures of firm size: a) 
financial resources; b) physical capacity; c) number of employees; and d) the volume of 
tangible and intangible assets and outputs (Damanpour, 1992; Hooghoudt, 2010). 
Damanpour (1992) notes that different measures of firm size could contribute to 
ambiguity in empirical evidence on the link between firm size and innovation.  
 
 Further, defining and measuring innovation is also diverse. As early as 1962, 
Kuznets noted that ‘the greatest obstacle to understanding the economic role of 
technological development was a clear inability of scholars to measure it’ (Acs and 
Audretsch, 2005, p.7). To illustrate this claim, the authors review the state of the theory 
through the lenses of the introduction of different measures of innovation. Three 
categories of measures of technological change are indentified, depending on the stage 
of the innovation process:
31
 
- A measure of the inputs in the innovation process (e.g. R&D expenditure); 
- An intermediate output (e.g. number of patents); 
- Direct measures of the output of the innovation process, including product and 
process innovation and the share of innovative sales in total sales.  
 
 The first measures of inputs were introduced in the literature in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, and the most frequently used was investment in R&D. The main criticism 
of this measure is that the level of innovation input does not reflect the level of 
innovation output proportionately, i.e. Innovation output cannot be appropriately 
measured by innovation input such as investment in R&D. Furthermore, this measure 
only captures formal R&D activities reported in financial statements and conducted in 
R&D departments. Informal R&D, particularly associated with the innovative activities 
                                                          
31
 As often in the literature, the authors use terms innovation and technological change interchangeably.  
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in SMEs, is absent. Moreover, in UK manufacturing firms, spending on technical design 
is much larger than spending on R&D but is not recorded. In this context, Livesey and 
Moultrie (2009), in their survey of 358 UK firms, found that only 8 per cent of surveyed 
firms report to claim R&D tax credits, while more than one third of firms report 
spending on technical design. Technical design overlaps greatly with R&D but is 
neither conceptually distinct not (therefore) measured. In their 2010 report, the Design 
Council identifies design as a 'coping stone of an innovation system' (p. 5), whereby the 
recent estimates of UK firms' spending on design exceed spending on R&D by five 
times.  
 
 In the mid-1960s, scholars were able to use a new measure of innovative 
activities, the number of patents. Although the number of inventions patented is superior 
to measuring innovative input, it was mistakenly interpreted as the measure of 
innovation output. However, not every invention is successfully commercialized. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the number of patents as an intermediate output 
measure. Moreover, many inventions are not patented, even though they lead to 
successful innovation. In sum, the number of patents is a better measure of innovative 
activities than the measures of innovation input, but still it does not fully capture 
innovation output.  
 
 The traditional knowledge about technological change and innovation was based 
on insight from research employing these imperfect measures of the innovation process. 
Only when direct measures of innovation output (e.g. number of innovations; share of 
innovative sales in total sales) were introduced in the 1970s could the traditional 
approach be challenged. Schumpeter hypothesized that market power exercised by large 
firms is a necessary condition for bearing the risk and uncertainty inherent to 
innovation. Yet many subsequent empirical studies on balance indicate that innovative 
activities are not only conducted in large firms with market power, but also in small 
firms.  
 
 Moreover, empirical analysis based on the direct measures of innovation output 
has unambiguously rejected the conventional wisdom and indicated that small firms 
were also innovative. Earlier studies, employing the measure of innovation input (e.g. 
R&D expenditures), support the Schumpeterian hypothesis that firm size and innovation 
are positively related (i.e. large firms are more innovative than small). However, when 
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patents were introduced into empirical studies, evidence for the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis was less overwhelming. Indeed, some empirical evidence even indicated that 
the propensity to patent is higher in SMEs than in large firms (Bound et al., 1984). With 
regard to a direct measure of innovation output, studies by Acs and Audretsch (1988, 
1991) and Pavitt el al. (1987) report that small firms engage in a higher number of 
innovations relative to their innovation input, i.e. R&D expenditures, as a result of a 
decreasing returns to R&D relative to firm size. Vossen (1998) reviews several 
complementary arguments in favour of small firms outperforming large firms in 
producing innovation output: small firms are more cost efficient than large firms 
(Vossen, 1996); small firms are more efficient in utilizing knowledge spillovers from 
public research institutes and universities (Acs et al., 1994); and small firms are more 
efficient in employing and retaining engineers with higher ability and skills (Zenger, 
1994). Therefore, the lack of standardized measures of innovation and firm size could 
result in mixed evidence on the effect of firm size on innovation (Damanpour, 1992). 
Cohen (2010) observes that this might be the most serious limitation in empirical 
analysis of the size- innovation relationship. 
 
 In conclusion, advantages of SMEs in innovation are associated with their 
behavioural characteristics (flexibility, motivation). On the other side, large firms have a 
large and diverse resource base as their main advantage (Nooteboom, 1994; Vossen, 
1998; Andreassi, 2003). However, ambiguous empirical evidence and methodological 
issues pertaining to analysis of the firm size-innovation relationship do not provide a 
consistent answer. Reasons for the ambiguity are manifold. First, both innovation and 
firm size are multidimensional and heterogeneous concepts and these features hamper 
their conceptualization and operationalization (Damanpour, 1992; Hooghoudt, 2010). 
Second, Damanpour (1992) argues that exclusion of moderating factors could produce 
inconclusive evidence on the effect of firm size on innovation. Third, the issue of 
endogeneity of firm size is recognized as a relevant problem, which should be taken into 
account in reviewing empirical evidence and conducting empirical analysis 
(Symeonidis, 1996). Fourth, most studies focus on the effect of firm size on product 
innovation. It would be useful to shed light on the correlation between non-
technological innovations and firm size.  
 
 Finally, Symeonidis (1996) argues that inconclusive findings of empirical 
studies indicate that the size-innovation relationship should be explored within specific 
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industries, taking into consideration particular factors that are affecting innovative 
activities in a specific sector. In this way, researchers would not attempt to find a 
general pattern, because maybe it does not exist, but rather focus on factors fostering 
and hampering innovation at industry level. This reinforces Nooteboom’s (1994) 
observation that both Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II are valid, and that a general 
conclusion is that both large and small firms are innovative. But this synthesis requires 
an additional explanation. Large firms are more likely to be innovative in some 
industries and at particular stages of the innovation process (e.g. following Nooteboom, 
1994, large firms engage in invention to a larger extent than small firms, but small firms 
might have advantages in the implementation of invention), while small firms are more 
innovative in other sectors. We would add types of innovation as an important 
moderator. Therefore, from this perspective, innovation is industry-specific, but also 
innovation type-specific and contingent on the phase of the innovation process. Finally, 
empirical studies should encompass both quantitative and qualitative research methods, 
while employing both primary and secondary sources of data.  
 
 Next, we will discuss the stages of innovation process and a conceptual 
framework for managing innovation processes in SMEs. 
 
2.4 The innovation process in SMEs 
 
 
It is widely accepted that firm-level innovation is not a single event, but a process 
consisting of three overlapping stages: a) idea generation; b) problem solving; and c) 
implementation with potential diffusion. Idea generation is a result of design or 
technical proposal; problem solving leads to original technical solutions (i.e. invention); 
implementation is a commercialization of a new idea (i.e. innovation) and diffusion is a 
widespread use of innovation (Utterback, 1971). The innovation process, defined in this 
manner, encompasses invention, innovation and imitation. However, as Bolinao (2009) 
observes, diffusion is not a part of the innovation process, because it occurs in the firm’s 
environment.
32
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 The Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) defines diffusion of innovation as the spread of innovation across 
firms, industries and countries. The Manual emphasizes that, without diffusion, innovation would not 
have economic impact.  
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 Nooteboom (1994) presents the innovation process in five stages: invention; 
development; tooling/production; introduction to practice/market; and diffusion. In the 
first stage, large firms have more advantages than do small firms, especially in 
fundamental research, because they can invest more in R&D. In the phase of developing 
inventions, small firms are more efficient in decision-making, due to flat organizational 
structure, less bureaucracy and more informal and hence faster communication. In the 
production and market phase, large firms can utilize economies of scale and scope, not 
just in production but also in marketing if the market is characterized by a large number 
of consumers.
33
 However, small firms are better off in niche markets, with a small 
number of consumers who are in a close proximity to the firm. Finally, Nooteboom 
(1994) observes that small firms should position themselves in niche markets with 
differentiated products or could introduce a new product if close relations with 
customers are relevant for product development.  
 
 Bolinao (2009) developed a conceptual framework for analysing the innovation 
process in SMEs, with respect to the management of technological innovation.
34
 He 
augmented a conceptual framework formalized by Atherton and Hannon (2000), which 
consists of four distinct phases:
35
 
a) Building blocks of innovation:  
- Strategy for innovation refers to the firm’s ability to develop and improve its 
technology, to imitate new technologies, to invest in R&D and manage it; 
- Awareness of the external environment: The firm’s operation and performance is 
affected by political, social, technological and economic external factors 
(Utterback, 1971); 
- Innovative capability (i.e. absorptive capability): Absorptive capacity is the 
firm’s ability to absorb and utilize external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990).  
b) Innovation implementation, defined as a process of appropriate use of the 
adopted innovation by employees. Therefore, human resources are critical in the 
process of diffusion of innovation throughout the organization. Failure in 
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 Economies of scale in marketing refer to use of distribution channels, advertising, promotions etc.  
34
Once more, we would like to stress that discussion on innovation defined in a broad manner 
encompassing both technological and non-technological innovation cannot be found in the innovation 
literature, regardless of the discipline (economics, management studies etc.). Our general observation is 
that technological innovations are more considered in the economics of innovation, whereas 
organizational innovation is in focus of management science.  
35
Innovation in this framework is defined as a management process, and the framework is developed in an 
attempt to evaluate innovative capacities of SMEs.  
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innovation implementation, not in innovation itself, is often a cause of sub-
optimal benefits of innovation (Klein and Sorra, 1996).  
c) Commercialization of innovation defined as turning innovation into a 
marketable product or service.
36
 This stage requires utilization of the following 
factors (Rosa and Rose, 2007): 
- Transfer and creation of knowledge (technical knowledge; knowledge of market 
conditions and of legislation); 
- Skills and human resources (intellectual rights management, marketing); 
- Financial and physical resources; 
- Organizational management which incorporates identification of customers and 
suppliers; marketing strategy; selection of strategy for technical acquisition; and 
identification of obstacles to commercialization;  
d) Outcomes of firm performance:  
- Financial performance (return on assets, return on equity, revenue growth, 
market share, profitability); 
- Non-financial performance (reputation, goodwill, public image, competitive 
advantage);  
- Innovative capacity. 
 
 In this conceptual framework, Bolinao (2009) stresses the importance of the 
commercialization of the innovation phase. In the framework, commercialization of 
innovation plays a mediating role between generation and implementation of innovation 
as independent variables and firm performance measures as dependent variables (see 
Figure 2.2). Furthermore, he discusses the factors hampering successful 
commercialization. Two major barriers are the lack of financial resources and the lack 
of personnel specialized in promoting new products or services. Another, less 
pronounced obstacle is associated with rapid product obsolescence insofar as SMEs 
cannot promptly react to changed market demand.   
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 We found this framework to be somewhat puzzling. First, Utterback (1971) defines implementation as 
a phase in innovation process which incorporates commercialization of innovation. However, Atherton 
and Hannon (2000) separate innovation implementation from its commercialization. Furthermore, 
absorptive capacity is regarded as an integrative element of innovation (i.e. independent variable) but is 
also suggested as a measure of firm performance.  
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual framework for the management of technological innovation 
Source: Bolinao (2009, p. 74).  
 Intervening variables related to commercialization of innovation are those 
factors that serve as mediators between a dependent variable (firm performance) and 
corresponding independent variables (the building blocks of innovation). Therefore, 
intervening variables capture conditions for effective commercialization of innovation. 
 
                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:  
Building blocks of innovation  
 
Strategy for innovation: 
 
- Improving existing technology 
- Adopting new technologies 
(imitation) 
- Developing new technologies 
(innovation) 
- R&D management 
- Investment in R&D 
- Investment in innovation 
Awareness of external environment: 
- Social 
- Technological 
- Economic 
- Political 
Innovative capacity (absorptive 
capacity): 
- Number of innovation adopted 
successfully 
- Firm’s innovative culture and 
characteristics  
 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
Firm performance outcome 
 
Financial performance: 
 
- Return on assets  
- Return on equity  
- Revenue growth 
- Market share 
- Profitability 
 
Non-financial performance: 
 
- Goodwill 
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- Public image 
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Innovative capacity  
 
INTERVENING 
VARIABLES: 
Commercialization of 
innovation 
 
- Financing  
- Skills and human 
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- Marketing strategy 
- Intellectual property 
management  
-  
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With respect to SME innovation, two barriers to effective commercialization are the 
lack of financial resources and of human resources, i.e. specialized personnel for 
promotion and sale of innovative products (marketing team).  
 
 Coccia (2006) reviewed several taxonomies of firms based on their innovative 
activities (see also de Jong and Marsili, 2006). The ambiguity of classifications hinders 
both the theoretical advances in the various disciplines and comparison of empirical 
studies on innovation. Pavitt’s sector taxonomy (1984) divides firms into four groups 
depending on the way firms generate innovation: 
 
- Supplier-dominated firms which generate innovation through purchase of 
equipment and machinery; 
- Specialized suppliers of capital goods and equipment; 
- Science –based firms which generate innovation through in-house R&D 
departments; 
- Scale- intensive firms, i.e. mass production companies. 
 
 In a later version, due to development of innovation technology, Pavitt replaced 
specialized suppliers with a new category, information-intensive firms (Tidd et al., 
2001). As de Jong and Marsili (2006) note, Pavitt's taxonomy is developed from a 
sample that is skewed towards large firms. Small firms in the sample are mainly 
categorized into two groups: supplier-dominated and specialized suppliers (de Jong and 
Marsili, 2006). The lack of taxonomies of innovative small firms has motivated de Jong 
and Marsili (2006) to build a taxonomy of small and micro Dutch firms.
37
 They identify 
four clusters of small firms:  
 Supplier-dominated firms: Firms with a low innovative capacity. Firms establish 
and maintain a large network of cooperative partners, among which suppliers are 
the most important external source of knowledge.  
 Specialized suppliers: Firms with a rather high innovative capacity. Customers 
are by far the most important source of innovation and formal cooperation 
between them is frequent. However, their degree of external knowledge 
exploitation and openness of the innovation process are generally low, as these 
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 Small firms in their study are defined as having less than 100 employees. Furthermore, the sample is 
skewed toward micro firms (firms with fewer than 10 employees).  
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SMEs are less likely to cooperate with other partners, such as suppliers, 
universities and research centres. 
 Science-based firms: Firms with a high level of innovative capacity. These firms 
display the highest level of openness of innovation activities, frequently 
cooperating with a large number of partners, mainly with universities and 
research institutions, but also heavily involving customers in their innovative 
activities. 
 Resource- intensive firms: Firms in this cluster are focused on developing in-
house absorptive and innovative capacities by investing the largest proportion of 
financial and time resources to innovation compared to firms in other categories. 
However, these firms mainly maintain a low degree of networking relationships.  
 
 This taxonomy indicates a diversity and heterogeneity of SMEs with respect to 
their level of innovativeness as well as the intensity of use of various external sources of 
knowledge. Moreover, the taxonomy provides a broader categorization of small and 
micro firms than does Pavitt's taxonomy.  
 
 It is of interest to mention the taxonomy of small firms by Rizzoni (1991), who 
developed a taxonomy based on the theoretical and empirical advances in several 
prominent studies (e.g. Freeman, 1982; Pavitt, 1984). Her taxonomy is of importance 
because a large number of criteria are used in identifying the six following types of 
small firms:
38
 
- 'Static' small firms: The main feature of firms belonging to this category is an 
absence of innovation activities, other than the purchase of machinery and 
equipment. These non-innovative small firms are family businesses established 
and organized to foster the social status of the owner-entrepreneur. Therefore, 
the firm's objective is survival, not growth.  
- 'Traditional' small firms: These firms are very similar to Pavitt's (1984) 
category of supplier-dominated firms. Rizzoni (1991) notes that, typically, 
furniture, clothing and footwear industries are populated with traditional small 
firms. These firms engage in incremental innovation by imitating adopting 
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 The author utilized six criteria in categorizing small firms: the key determinant of the firm's survival 
and growth; the industry to which the firm belongs; the level of technological competences; types of 
innovations prevailing in the firms (radical versus incremental innovations); innovative strategy; 
corporate strategy; organizational structure (managerial and entrepreneurial skills); and barriers to 
innovation.  
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technological changes developed elsewhere. Traditional small firms are similar 
to static small firms, insofar as the firm's objective is short-run survival, rather 
than growth.  
- 'Dominated' small firms: Firms in this category are suppliers to large firms, 
which implies that the only way these firms enter the market is through sub-
contracting. Innovation activities are limited to user innovations, i.e. the external 
stimuli from the large firm in the supply chain. Firms' objectives are short-run 
survival and achieving a higher level of autonomy.  
- 'Imitative' small firms: These small firms tend to innovate through imitation and 
by exploring and exploiting external sources of knowledge, mainly from large 
firms operating in the same sector. Innovations introduced in imitative small 
firms are complementary to innovation processes undertaken in large firms. 
Unlike firms belonging to the aforementioned categories, imitative small firms 
have medium-run growth objectives.  
- 'Technology-based' small firms: This group of small firms undertakes in-house 
R&D activities, thus enhancing internal innovative capacities, but also are 
actively involved in cooperation for innovation with external partners. 
Technology-based small firms engage in significant product innovations, 
described as a consequence of significant technological change, but that cannot 
be categorized as either incremental or radical innovations. Their growth 
objective is focused on the development of distinctive competence and 
networking with other firms. 
- 'New-Technology-based' small firms: Finally, firms belonging to this group are 
innovative firms at the frontier of technological development. They mainly 
introduce radical innovations, through internal R&D activities as well as through 
strong linkages with external partners, particularly research centres and 
universities. Growth is recognized as the firms' strategic goal, accomplished 
through technological leadership.  
 
2.5 Conclusions  
 
 
Given the importance of innovation to SME growth and competitiveness, this chapter 
elaborates on how SMEs innovate and indentifies their strengths and weaknesses 
relative to large firms. Before focusing our attention on innovative activities in SMEs, 
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this heterogeneous category of firms should be defined and distinguished from their 
large counterparts. Although in the past research, most cross-country studies adopted 
the definition of SMEs prevailing within their national boundaries, the European 
Commission, with its EC Recommendation 2003/361, provided a uniform definition of 
SMEs across the European Union.  
 
 Regarding the innovation process in SMEs, the literature mainly emphasizes that 
the major obstacles to innovation in SMEs are related to limited human and financial 
resources, whereas the main advantages of SME innovation are associated with 
behavioural characteristics of small firms, such as a simple organizational structure, 
agile response to market demand, openness to cooperation with external partners etc. 
Therefore, in analysing and identifying determinants of innovation in SMEs, the 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm seems to provide particularly useful insights into 
barriers to innovation within SMEs. 
 
 The review of the determinants of innovation given in Section 1.4.2 revealed a 
rather eclectic approach to modelling and analysing firms' innovative activities. To 
bring together the building blocks of innovation and their impact of SME firms' 
performance, Bolinao (2009) proposed a conceptual framework in estimating the effects 
of the innovation process (innovation inputs and outputs) on firms' financial and non-
financial performance indicators. Finally, since Pavitt's (1984) taxonomy of innovating 
firms gave an impetus to analysing sectoral characteristics of firms regarding their 
innovative behaviour, several authors focused on examining taxonomies of innovative 
SMEs in relation to technological innovation, for instance, Rizzoni (1991) for 
manufacturing SMEs and de Jong and Marsili (2006) for Dutch SMEs. 
 
 As this chapter serves as a bridging chapter between Chapter I on the theoretical 
underpinnings of innovation and Chapter III on innovation related policies and 
evaluation methodology, its main role is to briefly elaborate on the general context of 
SME innovation, rather than to identify gaps in the literature and the knowledge 
contributions of the thesis. However, in the following chapter, the focus is on the 
particular contribution of this thesis; namely, on public intervention in the domain of 
innovation and on quantitative evaluation methodologies. 
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The new realities of a global, knowledge-based economy in the 21st century require a 
new approach to national economic policy, one that is based more on smart support for 
the building blocks of innovation and entrepreneurship and less on capital 
accumulation, budget surpluses, or social spending.  
      (Atkinson and Audretsch, 2010, p.165) 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter describes the rationales for government involvement in the domain of 
innovation. It provides an overview of evaluation methodology applied in assessing the 
effectiveness of innovation policy, and reviews empirical evidence with respect to 
additionality effects of public support. Moreover, this chapter identifies knowledge gaps 
and contributions of the thesis from the perspective of evaluation of innovation related 
policies.  
 
 In the last few decades, the evolution of contemporary policies for fostering and 
stimulating innovation has  resulted in an increasingly complex mix of policies and 
programmes. For instance, the INNO-policy Trendchart database of innovation policy 
measures in Europe has reached more than 1,000 measures in 2009, compared to less 
than 200 in 1995 (Tsipouiri et al., 2008; Tsipouiri et al., 2009). The main reason for this 
increased complexity is the co-existence of two policy rationales; alongside the 
neoclassical market-failure rationale, an evolutionary-systemic rationale has emerged as 
a complementary basis for justifying public intervention in the domain of innovation. 
Whilst the market-failure rationale emphasizes the importance of investing in science 
and technology, the evolutionary-systemic rationale focuses on the interaction of 
organizations and institutions within systems of innovation. A direct consequence of the 
widening of policy rationales is the introduction and implementation of a large number 
of policy instruments. Besides traditional, hard innovation policy instruments, stemming 
from the neoclassical, market-failure approach, a set of soft and non-coercive policy 
instruments has been implemented, reflecting the proliferation of evolutionary, systemic 
policies. Therefore, the innovation policy domain is characterized by the existence of 
complementary policy rationales, accompanied by a complementary mix of policy 
instruments. To reflect the widening of policy rationales and a proliferation of various 
policy instruments, the concept of the innovation 'policy mix' has only recently 
emerged.  
 
 Among the reasons contributing to the bewildering multiplicity of innovation 
support programmes may be the following. The variety of theories of innovation, and 
uncertainly about what works and what does not work, provides a changing intellectual 
and policy climate that favours new initiatives and changes in policy. Moreover, bearing 
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in mind the role in public choice theory of self-interested public-sector bureaucracies 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), both officials and politicians may have interests in new 
initiatives: ambitious officials like novelty, as change offers better prospects of career 
advancement than does routine; and political changes bring new ministers and public 
officials into office who are generally keen to make their name by launching new 
initiatives (often irrespective of how well existing policies are working). Public choice 
theory also points to the role of interest groups who may resist the elimination of 
existing programmes even as new ones are introduced. Hence, new policies and 
programmes do not necessarily entail the retirement of existing ones, which may be 
subject to inertia irrespective of their effectiveness from the perspective of public 
policy.  
 
 Finally, the complexity of innovation policies is further actuated by the 
broadening of policy domains. More specifically, implementation of innovation policies 
is practically conducted at different administrative levels: local; regional; national; and 
supra-national (European Union). The implications are that a wide range of policy 
measures implemented at all administrative levels are interacting with one another. 
Given the interaction between various innovation instruments implemented at different 
administrative levels but in the same geographical area, difficulties arise in evaluating 
individual policy measures. Therefore, the emergence of the innovation policy-mix is 
accompanied by the emerging need for systemic evaluation, which takes into account 
interactions and interdependencies of modern innovation policies. An alternative, but 
complementary explanation for increasing emphasis on evaluation is the proliferation of 
programmes with uncertain results in what is now an era of austerity. Increasing 
concern with value for money, together with increasing awareness of the difference 
between previously mainly poor practice in evaluation (OECD, 2007) and the potential 
of current best practice, are driving increased interest in evaluation on the part of policy 
makers. Scholars and evaluators of innovation policies have only recently put forth the 
necessity for the systemic evaluation of innovation policies (Arnold, 2004; Molas-
Gallart and Davies, 2006; Flanagan et al., 2011; Magro and Wilson, 2013). For instance, 
following a rising awareness of the best practice in the quantitative evaluation of SME 
programmes, Bakhshi et al. (2013) evaluated the impact of the Creative Credits, a UK 
innovation voucher initiative designed to encourage the establishment of cooperative 
partnerships between SMEs and creative service providers, by adopting a randomized 
trial control (RTC) approach.  
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 In assessing the impact of innovation policy, scholars have traditionally 
investigated the market-failure concepts of input and output additionality (i.e. the 
influence of public measures on innovation inputs and outputs respectively). With the 
emergence of the evolutionary-systemic failure approach, attention has been drawn to 
behavioural additionality, that is, to the broader impact of innovation support measures 
on firms' innovative behaviour (Magro and Wilson, 2013). Systemic innovation policy 
evaluation should encompass all three categories of additionality, to reflect interrelated 
effects of various policy instruments implemented at different administrative levels or 
the effects of the same instrument awarded at two or all three levels (regional national 
and EU). However, following Magro and Wilson (2013), studies integrating different 
additionality measures are scarce. The aim of the thesis is to fill this gap in the 
evaluation literature and focus on the less investigated, but equally relevant output and 
behavioural additionality effects.  
 
 Assessing the effectiveness of innovation related policies encompasses a broad 
range of evaluation methods that can be grouped into two categories - structural and 
non-structural (reduced-form) models (Cerulli, 2010). The main difference between 
these two categories of evaluation models is that the former estimate the outcome 
equation and the participation equation separately, whereas the latter only estimate the 
outcome equation. Besides briefly reviewing each model, this chapter also discusses 
their main advantages and disadvantages, which will be used as the basis of the review 
of empirical evidence on three types of additionality - input, output and behavioural.  
 
 A critical element of any evaluation exercise is a proper modelling of 
participation in support programmes. Namely, treatment assignment into support 
measures should be regarded as endogenous due to selection bias arising in the process 
of application and distribution of public measures. The selection bias occurs because a) 
firms self-select themselves into programmes, and b) the government adopts a 'picking-
the-winner' strategy during the selection process (selecting those firms that are more 
likely to succeed with their project) (Walsten, 2000; Aerts et al., 2006; Arundel et al. 
2008; Heckman, 2008; Cerulli, 2010; Grilli and Murtinu, 2011; Antonioli and 
Marzucchi, 2012). Our review of empirical evidence is restricted to those studies 
conducting after 2000 because, in that year, David et al. (2000) published their 
influential work on the state of the art in the evaluation of innovation related policies. 
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Their work, among other relevant conclusions which will be discussed later, emphasizes 
that most studies conducted before 2000 treated public support as exogenous. Thus, we 
omit those studies from our review, and focus on empirical studies undertaken after 
2000, starting with Busom (2000).  
 
 Our review of empirical studies reveals mixed empirical results for input and 
output additionality. With respect to input additionality, this is in line with previous 
descriptive and meta-analyses of empirical findings (e.g. David et al., 2000; García-
Quevedo, 2004; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). As there is no meta-analysis of empirical 
evidence on output additionality, our review provides an assessment of findings and 
puts forward the need for conducting meta-analysis of this type of additionality. 
Furthermore, as the only meta-analysis of input additionality was published in 2004 by 
García-Quevedo, it has become necessary that another meta-analysis be undertaken, 
given the large body of research that has emerged since 2004. Finally, our review of the 
empirical evidence provides an unambiguous conclusion of positive behavioural 
additionality found in the few studies recently conducted within this stream of research.  
 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets the stage for further 
discussion by exploring two complementary rationales for public intervention in the 
domain of innovation. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the evolution of innovation 
related policies, from science and technology policies to innovation policies. In 
addition, various supply-side and demand-side public measures are discussed in this 
section. Section 3.4 presents a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of 
public support measures on firms' innovation processes. A brief overview of evaluation 
methods, with their main advantages and disadvantages, is presented in Section 3.5. 
Empirical literature review, provided in Section 3.6, reveals that empirical evidence on 
additionality of public support is inconclusive and mixed. Section 3.7 concludes.  
 
3.2 Economic rationale for public policy  
 
3.2.1  Market failure rationale  
 
 
The traditional or neo-classical approach to public support of technology and innovation 
is based on the theory of market failures. Other approaches are those of evolutionary 
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economics and systems of innovation, which focus on system failures. System -failure 
and market -failure approaches are not mutually exclusive, but rather complement each 
other. Accordingly, public policy addressing the issues of enhancing the innovative 
activities should take into account both types of failures (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999).  
 
 Market failures refer to inefficient allocation of goods and services in a market 
due to externalities, asymmetric information, non-competitive markets, uncertainty and 
risk, appropriability issues, indivisibility of knowledge generation, imperfect capital 
markets and missing markets for high-risk investments. From the late 1950s onwards, 
the market failure rationale has provided a basis for public innovation policies. The 
Arrow-Nelson argument (Arrow 1962; Nelson 1959) refers to three basic market 
failures to provide an optimal level of innovation (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999): 
- Uncertainty and risk which are  inherent to innovation processes;  
- Appropriability problems arising from the public-good character of knowledge;  
- Knowledge generation is often indivisible.  
 
 Market failure results in higher social returns from R&D and innovative 
activities than the private rates of return. Uncertainty affects private rate of return as 
firms face higher risks when realizing innovation project than those incurred by society. 
Therefore, the future rate of return of a firms’ innovation project will be discounted at a 
higher rate than those society applies in investment appraisal. The result is 
underinvestment of private R&D and innovative activities in general. Furthermore, the 
difference in private and social rates of return reflects the problem of partial 
appropriability; i.e. the innovator cannot fully appropriate the outcome of innovation 
because of spillover effects or positive externalities (customers and competitors will 
also benefit from innovation). Finally, indivisibility arises when a firm has fewer 
resources than needed for a particular innovative activity (see Section 1.3.5 on the 
resource-based view of the firm). Innovation often requires investment in specific 
equipment (asset specificity) which, in case of a failure, leads to high sunk costs 
(Schrӧter, 2009).  
 
 Schrӧter (2009) noted two additional market failures relevant for justifying 
innovation policy: 
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- Asymmetric information: When one party in a transaction has more information 
than the other, asymmetry of information can result in moral hazard or adverse 
selection. In the case of innovation processes, information asymmetry can arise 
in the exchange of knowledge, when the seller faces the risk of disclosing 
information while negotiating a higher price. The process of negotiation incurs 
the risk of disclosing information, where the price exhibits a positive function, 
because the prospect of a higher price gives an incentive to the seller to disclose 
more information. Because of the risk, the seller will propose a higher price than 
the true value of knowledge resulting in an inefficient transaction. There is also a 
problem from the buyers’ perspective. The buyer can only know the full value of 
information once it has been purchased. Fearful of buying a “lemon” (Akerlof, 
1970), the buyer offers a lower price than the value of the information or makes 
no offer at all. In other words, the market for information is subject to severe 
information asymmetries, which – as Akerlof predicted – tend to result in 
reduced volumes of trade or even entirely missing markets (Akerlof, 1970). 
- Inflexibility: Firms might lack the ability to adapt to new technologies. Various 
reasons causing inflexibility can be identified, such as: lack of resources; 
insufficient information; high sunk costs; internal resistance to change; and 
incompetence.     
 
 Cerulli (2010) notes additional types of market failure other than positive 
externalities in production. 
- Imperfect capital markets: Due to asymmetric information, lenders might be 
prone to high rationing of funding. 
- Missing markets for high-risk investments: Markets for investing in highly 
innovative projects are not developed. This type of market failure is consistent 
with Akerlof's (1970) insights into the consequences of missing information.  
- High barrier to entry and exit: High sunk costs are an obstacle for entering or 
exiting a market. 
- Market power or lack of it: Following the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) paradigm, market structure affects the R&D performance of firms.  
 
 The market failure rationale is complementary to three trends in innovation 
literature and practice prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999):   
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- The innovation process is considered to be linear and sequential (the linear 
models of innovation; see Section 1.4.1). In the linear model, economic actors 
carrying out a particular stage of the innovation process can be identified: 
universities would be mainly a source of basic research; private research 
laboratories would conduct applied research; and firms would introduce new 
products and processes as a result of basic and applied researches (Cowan et al., 
2009). Outcomes of basic research are mainly regarded as public goods (Arrow, 
1962; Nelson, 1959), consistent with the Arrow-Nelson argument on market 
failures. This, in turn, implies that basic research will be undersupplied due to 
appropriability issues. Furthermore, due to opportunistic behaviour and free-
rider problems, firms frequently use protection mechanisms such as patent 
protection and secrecy, when introducing product and process innovations.  
- Capital accumulation is regarded as the main driving force of economic growth 
and technological advances. 
- The innovation process is technology-induced (based on the first generation of 
technology push innovation models). As noted above, a technology push model 
of innovation emphasizes the role of basic and applied research in the innovation 
process. The public-good character of research creates problems with respect to 
reaping full benefits from research (i.e. appropriability issue), which is one of 
the essential market failures identified in the Arrow-Nelson argument.  
 
 The policy instruments in the market-failure approach are aimed at facilitating 
innovative activities and at protecting the use of the outcome. The instruments are 
designed to either lower the costs of private R&D and innovative activities or to raise 
the payoff from knowledge creation. The problem of under-investment in innovative 
activities stemming from uncertainty, risk and asymmetric information implies direct 
support in the form of subsidies and/or tax relief; while the appropriability problems 
resulting in a positive externality suggests either direct support or the provision of 
intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights) (Smith, 2000). 
 
 However, the major criticism of the traditional, mainstream approach to 
government intervention in knowledge creation and diffusion is the absence of analysis 
to determine the optimal rate of R&D (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999). Moreover, this 
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approach does not provide guidelines either for how to identify where market failures 
exist or for how to determine the adequate level of public support (Smith, 2000). 
 
 Martin and Scott (2000) suggested that market failures should be identified at an 
industry level, rather than at the country level. Depending on the innovation mode 
prevailing in a particular sector and on the type of market failure identified in that 
sector, government should design and implement policy measures. They identified four 
innovation modes and instruments for each type of innovation mode (see Table 3.1).
39
 
 
 The first mode of innovation, innovating input suppliers, refers to intermediate 
goods producers, whose products will be further used in vertically related downstream 
sectors. Market failures in this mode are associated with transaction costs in the 
financial markets (especially SMEs and start-ups) as well as with relatively low 
appropriability of the returns to innovation. Suggested instruments are aimed at 
lowering the barriers of entry, especially for SMEs by providing capital funding. 
However, the government should avoid direct funding, because of the difficulties in 
identifying a priori sectors with potential technological advances. Martin and Scott 
(2000) proposed the method of bidding as an efficient way of mitigating opportunistic 
behaviour of private agents. The auction mechanism, authors claim, would choose the 
best bidder, firms that can produce the best outcome at the lowest cost.  
 
 Innovating input users belong to the second mode of innovation. These firms 
innovate by improving products from upstream sectors and using them for their own 
production. Market failures occur due to limited appropriability of knowledge and 
asymmetric information. Suggested measure for overcoming market failures in these 
sectors is to establish extension services, i.e. networks or public institutions in the form 
of the cooperative research associations. These institutions would be most beneficial to 
SMEs, because they would provide timely and trusted information on relevant 
technological advances and would promote the diffusion of knowledge and research.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 The innovation modes are not mutual exclusive, as noted by the authors.  
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Table 3.1. Innovation modes, sources of sectoral innovation failure, and policy 
measures 
Main mode of 
innovation 
Sources of sectoral 
innovation failure 
Typical sectors Policy instrument 
Development of 
inputs for using 
industries 
(intermediate goods 
industries) 
Transaction costs 
facing SMEs in 
financial markets; 
risk associated with 
standards for new 
technologies; 
limited 
appropriability of 
generic 
technologies  
Software, 
equipment, 
instruments 
Support for venture 
capital markets; 
bridging 
institutions to 
facilitate standard 
adoption  
Application of 
inputs developed in 
supplying 
industries  
Small firm size, 
large external 
benefits; limited 
appropriability  
Agriculture, light 
industry 
Low-tech bridging 
institutions 
(extension services) 
to facilitate 
technology transfer 
Development of 
complex systems 
High cost, risk, 
limited  
appropriability  
Aerospace, electrical 
and electronics 
technology, 
telecom/computer 
technologies, 
semiconductors  
R&D cooperation, 
subsidies; bridging 
institutions to 
facilitate 
development of 
infrastructure 
technology  
Applications of 
high-science-
content technology  
Knowledge base 
originates outside 
commercial sector; 
creators may not 
recognize potential 
applications or 
effectively 
communicate new 
developments to 
potential users  
Biotechnologies, 
chemistry, materials 
science, 
pharmaceuticals  
High-tech bridging 
institutions to 
facilitate diffusion 
of advances in 
basic research  
 
Source: Martin and Scott (2000, p. 439). 
 
 The third mode of innovation, complex systems innovation, is where large firms 
are involved in the generation of radical innovations. The market failure is associated 
with the high risk and uncertainty and high cost of introducing radical innovations. 
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Moreover, firms adopting this mode of innovation are inclined to be first movers, 
introducing new products or processes at an industry level, because imitators bear a risk 
of falling rapidly behind competitors. The policy instruments should promote joint 
research, either through direct subsidies or through designing a competition policy that 
allows research cooperation. We would add that protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) through, for instance, patent protection would also be a relevant policy 
instrument for firms who are prone to be first-movers with respect to introducing 
innovation. Patent protection would reduce appropriability issues and ensuing free-rider 
problems (i.e. opportunistic behaviour).  
 
 Finally, the fourth mode of innovation pertains to sectors with high science-
content technologies. The market failures in these sectors arise because of the absence 
or inadequate diffusion of basic research in the academic community to the private 
sector. Suggested policy measures are related to establishing bridging institutions to 
promote research cooperation between universities and industries, such as public 
research institutes or university-industry research parks. Moreover, in any collaborative 
partnership, mutual trust is a factor upon which the sustainability and success of 
collaboration critically depends (Lee et al., 2010; Barge-Gil, 2010). Therefore, bridging 
institutions should foster trust among universities and businesses, as previously noted. 
 
 With the emergence of the innovation system approach (see Sections 1.3.3 and 
1.3.4), the system-failure rationale was advanced, which is the topic of the following 
section.  
 
3.2.2 Systems failure rationale 
  
 
The evolutionary approach of system failures has been developed since the 1990s as a 
corollary of the development of evolutionary economics and of a resource-based, 
evolutionary theory of the firm. The main criticism of the neoclassical theory pertains to 
the stringent assumptions of the model of perfect competition. However, we would note 
that the mainstream or neoclassical approach developed the model of perfect 
competition as a benchmark. Then, where markets are identified as “imperfect”, there is 
a potential rationale for public intervention. Perfect competition is a framework of 
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analysis, to be regarded not as a description of reality, but as an abstraction for purposes 
of analysis. Another criticism is related to the concepts of equilibrium and the 
optimality assumptions under the static analysis of perfect competition, whichare 
inadequate for analysing dynamic and evolutionary innovation processes. Although the 
neoclassical approach does allow for dynamics, this is typically achieved by way of 
continuous adjustment to some equilibrium, even if this equilibrium may be never 
achieved or is achieved only temporarily. In contrast, dynamic and evolutionary 
approaches might argue that there is no equilibrium but, rather, continuous change and 
disruption of economic relationships (in the manner of Schumpeter’s “waves of creative 
destruction”). In this view, the processes of change cannot be captured by the 
neoclassical framework of equilibrium and adjustment processes, even when this 
framework is enlarged to include periodic (radical) structural breaks.  
 
 Therefore, innovation policy in the systems of innovation approach is considered 
as an alternative to the policy based approach of the neoclassical theory of market 
failures (Schrӧter, 2009). However, the systems of innovation approach will not replace 
the neoclassical approach, until it demonstrates superiority in designing innovation 
policy, although some authors argue that, from a broader perspective, the evolutionary 
system-failure framework is incorporated in contemporary innovation policies (such as 
policy instruments facilitating university-industry links and of establishing and 
maintaining knowledge intermediaries, Nill and Kemp, 2009) and that this framework 
has taken a predominant role over the neoclassical market-failure argument (Bleda and 
del Rio, 2013).  
 
 The systems approach to public innovation policy emphasizes the role of 
institutions and innovation infrastructure. Innovation policy should enhance firms’ 
access to knowledge by developing an institutional structure that is aimed at supporting 
innovation processes, i.e. an innovation system. The policy incorporates not just 
innovation-related activities, but also the domains of education and training, science, 
technology, the labour market and regulated industries (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999). 
The market is just one constitutive element in the process of technological advances and 
innovation processes. The other element pertains to institutions and networks in the 
broad context of innovation systems. Therefore, the systems approach does not exclude 
the policy instruments designed to address market failures, but introduces additional 
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instruments aimed at changing the institutional set-up under which innovation processes 
occur.  
 
 Although there is no clear consensus on what constitutes the concept of system 
failures (Magro and Wilson, 2013), several categorizations of the concept are advanced 
in the literature. Malerba (1998) discuses four types of system failures:  
- Learning failures: firms or sectors might not be able to adopt new technologies 
in a timely manner. 
- Trade-offs and embedded imbalances between exploration and exploitation: 
firms can be divided into two groups depending on the prevailing processes in 
the generation of innovation: the first group consists of firms with a lot of 
variety generation (exploration) but weak selection processes (exploitation); the 
other group includes firms with tough selection processes but little variety 
generation. 
- Appropriability traps (i.e. lock-in to particular sources or owners of technology). 
- Absence of relevant complementary competences in an industry or an 
innovation system. Complementarities are related to knowledge, skills, know-
know and capacity (Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
 
 In addition, Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) divide system failure into two 
categories: 
 
- Network failures refer to inappropriate interaction between actors and 
organisations in a system. Distinction is made between strong (too much 
interaction) and weak network failures (little or no interaction). Strong network 
failure implies that actors in a system fail to exchange information and 
knowledge. It can be caused by myopia due to internal orientation, lack of weak 
ties and dependence on strong partners (Woolthuis et al. 2005).
40
 Weak network 
failures lead to poor connectivity between actors. As Woolthuis et al. (2005) 
noted, this type of failure matches Malerba’s (1998) concept of relevant 
complementary competences. Both weak and strong network failures hamper 
innovative activities. On the other hand, well-established networks lead to the 
                                                          
40
 Myopia and inertia might occur in long-lasting relationships, in which firms tend to focus more on 
internal cooperation and interaction, and not paying enough attention to the technological developments 
outside. External weak ties are relevant for overcoming myopia and inertia caused by internal orientation. 
Finally, when a firm cannot easily find an alternative partner, it might be locked in a relationship.  
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mutual exchange and accumulation of knowledge as well as to a common vision 
of future technological development. Therefore, government measures should be 
aimed at promoting cooperation between firms and research communities 
(universities, research centres, R&D laboratories etc.) through various policy 
instruments such as joint research, technology foresights and R&D grants for 
joint projects (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999). 
- Institutional failures: Systems of innovation approaches divide institutions into 
two categories. Hard institutions are formal organisations, including the legal 
system (laws and regulations) and especially relevant for innovation, intellectual 
property rights (IPR), whereby a too stringent IPR might prevent the diffusion of 
technological developments (Woolthuis et al., 2005). Soft institutions are 
informal, social organisations including social norms, values and attitudes. 
Institutional failures in both hard and soft institutions adversely affect innovative 
activities in a system.  
 
 Alternatively, Smith (2000) identifies four system failures: 
 
- Failures in infrastructural provision and investment: physical infrastructure 
refers to supply of energy and of communications, while science-technology 
infrastructure refers to universities, research institutes, regulatory agencies and 
government ministries. Woolthuis et al. (2005) add accommodation (offices, 
laboratories) and transport (roads) to this category. These infrastructures have 
specific technical characteristics, such as long time span of investment and/or 
large scale of operation, which will likely result in inadequate returns to private 
investments.   
- Transition failures: transition from one technology to other can be difficult for 
firms if they lack absorptive capacity to adopt new technologies. Firms need 
flexibility, resources, competence and knowledge to be able to shift to new 
technologies. Lack of resources is especially salient for SMEs (see Section 2.3). 
Woolthuis et al. (2005) label this type of system failure as ‘capabilities’ failure’, 
while Malerba (1998) refers to it as ‘learning failure’. 
- Lock-in failures: the notion of path-dependency or “lock-in” to existing 
technologies is often emphasized in evolutionary economics. As firms face 
“learning failures” (Malerba, 1998) in adopting new technologies, industries and 
the socio-economic system can be locked-in to a particular technological 
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paradigm. Changes and adoption of new technologies require not only changes 
at the firm level, but also changes in the system in which technologies are 
embedded. 
- Institutional failures: The regulatory system (technical standards, risk-
management rules, health and safety regulations, intellectual property rights etc.) 
affects firms’ technological capabilities and their performance. Therefore, public 
policy should encompass monitoring and assessment of the regulatory system 
and, when a failure occurs, introduce adequate changes in the system.  
 
 Different categorizations of system failures point to what Woolthuis et al. (2005, 
p. 610) describes as ‘the lack of standardization in the NIS literature’. Consequently, the 
same concepts appear under different names. For instance, Smith (2000) defines 
institutions as laws and regulation, whereas Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) refer to 
organisations as institutions. In the systems of innovation approach, a sharp distinction 
is made between organisations and institutions (see Section 1.3.4 on the Innovation 
Systems approach). Woolthuis et al. (2005) suggest that the confusion in terminology 
can be avoided if institutions and organisations are divided into rules (institutions) and 
players (organisations). In a policy framework, players are the public sector, firms, and 
universities, while rules refer to the outcome of player’s actions (e.g. laws and 
regulations, joint researches). System failures mostly occur when the rules are not 
properly designed or implemented, while rarely emerge from the perspective of 
economic agents, i.e. when a crucial organisation or institution  is absent from a system. 
Moreover, following Woolthuis et al. (2005), lock- in/ path dependency are considered 
as a result of system failures not as their cause. For instance, network and/or capability 
failures can lead to lock-in in a certain technology regime or paradigm. However, no 
consensus in the systems of innovation literature is reached on the issue as to whether 
lock-in is actually a type of system failure or an outcome of network and capabilities 
failures (Schrӧter, 2009).  
 
 The main difference between the neoclassical and the evolutionary approach is 
that the latter focuses on the variety in firms’ behaviour and their attempt to adjust to 
framework conditions, often referred to as “given technology”. Therefore, the main 
focus is on how firms endogenise technological advances (Hauknes and Nordgren, 
1999). Given the endogenous and systemic feature of innovation, the optimum 
allocation of resources cannot be determined. As Hauknes and Nordgren (1999, p. 15) 
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suggest: 'There is no single, optimal public policy'. Recognizing the importance of the 
institutional setting in the generation and diffusion of technical changes and innovations 
leads to a shift in innovation policy, from optimizing to adaptive policy making. 
Adaptive policy implies the relevance of evaluation and assessment of public policies 
while, at the same time, encompassing the learning process through trial and error and 
experimentation. The innovation systems approach regards innovation as a cumulative 
process that is path dependent and context dependent. Therefore, the systems rationale 
for public policy points out that the instruments and mechanisms of government 
intervention are firm specific (or industry, region or country specific depending on the 
level of government intervention). That is the main reason why “best practice” cannot 
be inferred from one innovation system and transferred to another; and contrary to the 
principles of market failures, which can be applied universally (Lundvall and Borrás, 
2005, p. 617). 
  
 Given the systematic framework of the innovation process, it is recommended 
that the stakeholders should be involved in the process of developing innovation policy. 
The methods used to identify the areas of system failure are benchmarking and best 
practice. The next step in designing public support is the choice of adequate policy 
instruments. Their selection depends on the nature of a system failure. Different 
instruments will be needed in the presence of institutional failure and others if a network 
failure exists. Failures in soft institutions could suggest changes in laws and regulations 
that affect suppliers’ and consumers’ behaviour, such as competition regulation, 
consumer protection, improving access to information etc. (see Table 3.2 for a review of 
policy instruments). Failures in hard institutions might imply changes in the working 
conditions of universities and research institutes, but also in support to new firms. 
Network failures reflect the weak cooperation and interaction between the actors in the 
innovation system. In the presence of network failures, public support might be in the 
form of establishing bridging institutions between firms and research community, 
managing technology forecasting, standardization etc. (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999).  
 
 Whether the neoclassical market failure approach and the systems of innovation 
approach are complementary or supplementary remains an open question. Within the 
evolutionary system failure framework, two theoretical positions are advanced (Bleda 
and del Rio, 2013). The first theoretical perspective explicitly rejects the market failure 
argument, because of its failure to capture the complex evolutionary nature of 
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innovation (Metcalfe, 2005; Nelson, 2009). Within the second position, the market 
failure rationale remains valid, but the system failure argument is regarded as a more 
general theoretical justification for public intervention and support for innovation (Bach 
and Matt, 2005; Aghion et al., 2009). 
 
 In contrast, some scholars raise the issue of the contribution of the system failure 
rationale to the development of innovation policy theory and practice. For instance, 
according to Schrӧter (2009), the systems of innovation policy approach adds nothing in 
comparison to the neoclassical theory of market failures. The author points out three 
reasons for the lack of a significant contribution: 
a) The systems of innovation approach to innovation policy mostly identifies the 
symptoms rather than causes of the failures. This argument is closely linked 
with the second point and will be jointly discussed.  
b) System failures are very similar, if not identical to the market failures. A review 
of system failures and their corresponding market failures is presented in Table 
3.2. Schrӧter (2009) argues that each system failure has its corresponding market 
failure. Therefore, infrastructural failure arises from indivisibility problems. 
Innovation projects can be unprofitable if period of amortization is long or sunk 
costs are high if the project fails. Externalities (appropriability problems) might 
also be relevant for infrastructural failures. Knowledge created during 
infrastructural investments cannot be fully appropriated by the private sector, 
because of positive external effects (spillovers). Moreover, Schrӧter (2009) 
argues that infrastructural failures are not a type of market imperfection, but the 
consequence of market failures (indivisibility and externalities). Furthermore, 
Schrӧter (2009) distinguishes between capability and learning failures, on the 
one side, and transition failures on the other, although Woolthuis et al. (2005) 
suggest that capability, learning and transition failures are the same type of 
failures, just labelled under the different name. Both types of failures are 
considered as a consequence of inflexibility; but for transition failures, 
indivisibility and high sunk costs are additional causes of market inefficiency. 
Network failures are compared to the implications of the market theory in which 
division of labour and interaction among economic agents is salient for 
productivity growth. Weak network failures are related to the problem of 
asymmetric information and high transaction costs if an innovation project 
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requires specialized competencies. In such a case, searching for a partner and 
negotiating a contract incurs high transaction costs. Strong network failures 
correspond to the concept of overembeddedness, i.e. a situation where 
organizations’ relations became long-lasting, trust-rich, thick, and eventually 
redundant. Firms can also be locked into a relationship because of asset 
specificity or the absence of alternative partners (Williamson, 1985).  
 
Table 3.2. Comparison between system and market failures  
 
System failures Market failures 
Infrastructural failures  Indivisibilities, externalities  
Capability and learning failures  Inflexibilities  
Transition failures  Consequence of inflexibilities 
indivisibilities and sunk costs 
Network failures (strong and weak) Market theory is a theory of 
interaction: transition costs due to 
asymmetric information; inflexibility 
and lock-in 
Institutional failures (hard and soft) Institutions taken for granted; option 
for policy measures (e.g. IPR, 
competition policy etc.) 
Lock-in/path dependency failures Inflexibilities due to asymmetric 
information and indivisibilities  
 
Source: Schrӧter (2009, p. 13). 
 
In the neoclassical framework, institutions are regarded as exogenous and a 
precondition for market functioning, but not a cause of market failure. However, 
the importance of institutions is recognized in policy creation. For instance, 
competition policy and IPR are policy instruments in the neoclassical 
framework. Finally, lock-in or path dependency, whether a specific type of 
system failure or the outcome of several combined system failures, may be 
understood as a result of market failure, rather than its cause. Firms’ present and 
future innovative activities are determined by their past experience, capabilities 
and competencies. Firms are locked into old technologies because of the lack of 
information on technological advances (asymmetric information) or of high sunk 
costs in the presence of uncertainty and indivisibility pertaining to the 
introduction of new technologies.   
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c) Because the cost-benefit analysis of public interventions is not considered, the 
innovation systems framework imposes no limitations in designing public 
policy. The dimensions of government failures and of costs related to the public 
interventions are ignored in the innovation systems framework. Government 
failures refer to the problem of self-interested bureaucrats and rent-seeking 
private actors (a detailed discussion on government failure is relegated to 
Section 4.2). Furthermore, the design and implementation of public measures 
incur direct costs of the intervention, transaction costs and deadweight losses if 
government failures occur. Following Schroter (2009), the systems innovation 
approach can justify any public intervention as costs and benefits are not 
weighted, whereas the neoclassical framework requires a cost-benefit analysis. 
Therefore, the latter is a superior for designing innovation policy.  
 
 The only contribution of the system failure approach, according to Schrӧter 
(2009), is recognizing the relevance of the institutional setting and interactions among 
actors in an innovation system. Moreover, benchmarking is criticized on two grounds: 
- The choice of the reference innovation system: What are the criteria for selecting 
the reference system? Schrӧter (2009) concludes that the choice and criteria for 
selection are left to the discretion of innovation policy makers. Lack of adequate 
instruments for identifying an appropriate reference system is a common issue 
for both neoclassical and systems of innovation approach, and along this line of 
argument, Schrӧter (2009, p. 21) concludes that ‘the comparative institutional 
approach does not provide a superior framework for indentifying systemic 
failures’. 
- The interdependence of institutions in the system: Institutions are mutually 
dependent and complementary, affecting one another’s efficiency. Innovation 
systems vary in their functioning because institutions and interactions between 
them differ. Therefore, copying the design of a particular institution from one 
system to another is not effective, because institutions are embedded in a 
broader institutional framework. This implies that in achieving desired results, 
the whole system should be copied (Lundvall, 2007). 
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3.3 Science, technology and innovation policy 
 
 
Following Bartzokas (2001, p. 13): ‘Technology and innovation related policies can be 
thought of as a specific set of policies that aim to improve the ability of firms to 
compete by promoting technological improvements through the generation, diffusion 
and adoption of process, product and organizational technological changes.’  
 
 Public policies aimed at supporting and promoting innovation are divided into 
two broad categories: supply-side public measures and demand-side measures. Boekholt 
(2010, p. 334) defines a policy instrument as 'a government measure or programme that 
aims to change the behaviour and actions of the actors involved in the whole process 
from generating new ideas into innovative market introductions and solutions'. Supply-
side measures stem from the linear innovation models, and have been the dominant 
category of public intervention in the domain of innovation since the market-failure 
rationale was advanced in theory and practice (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). The first 
generation of innovation models (see Section 1.4.1) represent a linear, technology-push 
model that focuses on the supply side in innovation policies, ignoring the demand for 
innovation and the market conditions, such as prices and other factors, that influence the 
profitability of innovation (Nemet, 2009). The second generation of demand-pull 
innovation models shifted the focus to the demand side of the innovation process but, at 
the same time, ignored the role of firms' technological capabilities in the innovation 
process (Brem and Voigt, 2009; Nemet, 2009). However, both models suffer from 
several pitfalls. First, both models formalize the innovation process as a linear, 
sequential process, without any interaction and feedback mechanisms betweens stages 
in the process (Nemet, 2009). Second, both the technology-push and the demand-pull 
linear models of innovation only take into account process innovation, without taking 
into consideration product innovation and/or non-technological innovations. While the 
technology-push models explain how radical innovations are introduced and developed 
(Walsh et at., 2002), the demand-pull innovation models focus on formalizing 
incremental technological innovations (Walsh et at., 2002; Nemet, 2009). Demand-side 
public measures were designed after the formalization of the third-generation interactive 
or coupling innovation models. These models, and specifically the Kline-Rosenberg 
chain-linked model (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986) (see Section 1.4.1) brought together 
the technology-push and the demand-pull arguments and emphasised several relevant 
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features of the innovation process, not taken into consideration in linear innovation 
models (Edquist and Hommen, 1999): i) a crucial role in the innovation process is 
ascribed to the demand for innovation; ii) non-linearity of innovation is taken into 
account by incorporating interactions and feedback loops between stages in the 
innovation process; iii) contrary to linear models where research is identified as the only 
source of innovation, interactive or coupling innovation models suggest that the source 
of innovation is primarily design, thus shifting the focus from process innovation to 
product innovation;
41
 and iv) interactive/coupling innovation models recognize the 
existence and relevance of linkage structure between the firm and other economic 
agents in the innovation process. It is of importance to note that the Oslo Manual is 
explicitly designed on the basis of the Kline-Rosenberg chain-linked model, rather than 
the linear model of innovation, thus acknowledging the non-linear and complex nature 
of the innovation process (Mytelka and Smith, 2002).  
 
 Boekholt (2010) reviews the historical evolution of Research, Technology 
Development and Innovation (RTDI) policy and identifies four generations of RTDI 
policies: 
- The first generation covered the period from the 1950s to the 1980s and was 
mostly focused on science policy. The prevailing innovation model was the 
linear model, notably the technology-push model, whereby research was 
identified as the only source of innovation. Therefore, the government role was 
to provide funding for both basic and applied research within universities and 
research centres and, thus, the policy instruments were focused exclusively on 
the supply side of the innovation process.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 As noted in Section 1.3.1.1, product innovation was less investigated than process innovation in the 
neoclassical economics framework, and the introduction of interactive or coupling innovation models 
shifted the attention to product innovation and its role in firms' performance.  
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Figure 3.1. Taxonomy of innovation policy tools (Edler and Georghiou, 2007, p. 953). 
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- The second generation RTDI policy was introduced in the mid-1980s, where 
the shift in the innovation policy paradigm occurred with the development of the 
chain-linked innovation model (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). In parallel to the 
development of the third generation innovation models, this period is 
characterized by the rising importance of clusters and value chains in the 
innovation process. However, in this period, the implementation of RTDI policy 
was lagging behind the advances in innovation theory, with the ensuing 
consequence of the reliance on the linear innovation model. In many countries, 
the main policy instrument was the direct funding of private R&D through soft 
loans and credits, R&D tax incentives and financing specific R&D projects. 
Although a direct funding was the prevailing policy tools, new measures were 
also introduced across industrialized countries, such as: 
o Technology transfer mechanisms. This category of new policy 
instruments was designed to encourage knowledge transfer from 
universities and public research centres to the business sector. One of the 
policy instruments among technology transfer mechanisms was the 
setting up of science parks, where universities would facilitate the 
creation of university spin-offs.  
o Schemes to provide finance for innovation. In order to overcome the 
problem of financing risky businesses and start-ups, governments across 
Europe began setting up schemes for risk finance, such as joint public-
private venture capital funds and business angles networks.  
- The third generation of RTDI policy stems from the innovation systems 
approach (see Section 1.3.4). Although theoretical advances on the innovation 
systems concept were forged in the 1990s, its application in the policy domain 
started a decade later, in the 2000s. A prominent feature of public instruments 
used in support of the innovation systems was further encouraging inter-linkages 
of various economic actors, i.e. firms, universities and public research centres. 
These so-called 'bridging instruments' mostly included public-private 
partnerships, competence centres (long-term research alliances connecting the 
private sector with universities aimed at undertaking basic but also applied 
research), and centres of excellence. Within the third-generation policy 
instruments, a prominent role within the European Union is assigned to those 
instruments promoting internationalization of R&D through transnational 
cooperative agreements covering a broad range of EU research initiatives and 
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agreements, such as the European Commission programmes (particularly the 
Framework Programmes). 
- The fourth generation of RTDI policies encompasses investment in research 
and development in those areas that have crucial societal and economic effects, 
such as health care, climate change, energy supply etc. New concepts such as 
social innovation and eco-innovation have recently emerged to signify changes 
in the policy domain. Scholars put forth the proposition that sustainable 
innovation could bridge a gap between tensions arising from, on the one side, 
pursuing economic growth and on the other side, from environmental and social 
issues that are imminent to modern society (Shapira, 2010).  
 
 As innovation policies were evolving from one generation to another, new 
instruments were launched but older ones were seldom abolished (Boekholt, 2010). 
That is one of the reasons why nowadays a very large number of public measures exists. 
Another reason, as noted in the introductory section of this chapter, is associated with 
public choice theory (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) and the behaviour of government 
officials and politicians, who, in the pursuit of their own political agendas, may 
introduce new initiatives irrespective of how well existing policies are working. 
Moreover, the lobbying of various interest groups can also have a significant impact on 
the conduct of public policy in general as well as on specific policies, such as those in a 
domain of innovation. Another more recent trend in the conduct of innovation policy is 
the reinforcement of the demand-side measures, particularly public procurement (Edler 
and Georghiou, 2007; Edler et al., 2012a). However, we circumvent further discussion 
on the use of the demand-side instruments, as our empirical strategy (see Chapters IV, V 
and VI) did not attempt to evaluate demand-side programmes.  
 
 Another consequence of the evolution of policies related to innovation is the 
shift in policy-making focus, from identifying the best policy instruments to formalizing 
a portfolio of instruments that will have a joint positive impact on innovation. A policy 
mix can be defined as 'the combination of policy instruments, which interact to 
influence the quantity and quality of R&D investment in public and private sectors' 
(Boekholt, 2010, p. 353). Finding a holistic solution based on the policy mix is not an 
easy task, as the synergetic effects of policy instruments might amplify or cancel each 
other’s' individual positive effects. Nowadays, proponents of the systems of innovation 
approach (e.g. Boekholt, 2010; Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Edler et al., 2012a) argue 
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that the approach can provide an analytic tool in the construction of a policy mix that 
would increase innovative activities by removing deficiencies in the innovation system 
so they are most conducive to innovation.  
 
 Lundvall and Borrás (2005, p. 599) provide a brief discussion on the 
development of public policy from science to technology and innovation policy, 
although, according to Boekholt (2010, p. 333), clear distinction between them cannot 
be inferred. Science policy is a concept developed after the Second World War. The 
major focus is on the efficient allocation of resources to science. Therefore, supporting 
scientific research within universities, technological institutes, research centres and 
R&D laboratories is the main objective of science policy. An important policy tool is 
the evaluation of research, and the scientific community has developed its internal 
evaluation through peer review. However, internal evaluation is not without 
shortcomings, mainly with regard to difficulties in generating and especially in 
disseminating new ideas from interdisciplinary areas of research.  
 
 On the other hand, technology policy is oriented toward promoting specific 
technologies and industrial sectors. It is a common procedure to determine “strategic 
technologies” and those sectors developing them (strategic sectors). Lundvall and 
Borrás (2005, p. 608) noted the main issues in conducting technology policy: 
- Should government support particular industries for commercial reasons?  
- What technologies and industries should be promoted? 
- At what stages of the innovation process should government provide support? 
- Are there limitations in the provision of technological policy in regard to public 
competence? 
- How can public support be combined with competition?  
 
 The main objective of technology policy is similar to science policy, i.e. 
promotion of scientific research in the scientific community, but the shift is made from 
universities’ research activities to engineering and how universities and other research 
institutions cooperate and interact with industry. Policy tools vary depending on the 
public competence, sectors and technologies promoted etc. Besides instruments 
promoting university-industry links, they include public procurement, direct support in 
the form of subsidies, tax relief and protectionist trade policy. The evaluation of 
technology policy is also important and the public sector has several policy instruments 
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at its disposal. For instance, technology forecasting is the policy tool useful for 
detecting the development of new technologies (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005, p. 610). 
 
 Finally, innovation policy appears in two different versions: the market failure 
approach of mainstream, neoclassical economics; and the system failure approach of the 
systems of innovation school. The similarities between these approaches are that in both 
the innovation policy covers all stages of the innovation process, and the emphasis is 
more on institutions and organisations than on science and technology policy. The 
differences between these approaches are mainly related to the methods prevailing in 
designing innovation policy. In the neoclassical approach, as mentioned earlier, there is 
a single, optimal innovation policy recommended to all countries; conversely, in the 
systems approach, innovation policy is country specific and, therefore, no single, 
optimal policy exists. Lundvall and Borrás (2005, p. 613) imply that the major 
distinction in innovation policy tools is between those instruments that support 
innovation in the existing institutional setting and those designed to alter the 
institutional structure to promote innovation processes. The first category of instruments 
is the same as those used in science and technology policy. The second category 
encompasses changes in the working conditions of universities and other research 
institutions but also changes in education, the labour market and regulated industries.  
 
 Therefore, as Figure 3.2 depicts, innovation policy is a broader concept than 
science and technology policy, including not just universities and technological sectors 
but also every part of the economy affecting the innovation processes, i.e. the national 
innovation system. This broad coverage of innovation policy implies that the 
instruments of science and technology policy are encompassed by innovation policy. 
Yet, in addition, innovation policy emphasizes the importance of institutions and 
organisations in engendering competence and in enhancing organisational performance. 
As Lundvall and Borrás (2005, p. 614) noted: ‘Innovation policy calls for “opening the 
black box” of the innovation process, understanding it as a social and complex process. 
 
113 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Relationship between science, technology and innovation policy 
Relationship between science, technology and innovation policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lundvall and Borrás (2005, p. 615).  
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respect to R&D and innovation activities, and the regulation of universities and 
public research centres.   
 Economic and financial instruments: This type of instrument is extensively 
used as an innovation policy tool. The array of economic and financial 
instruments includes R&D tax incentives; support to venture capital; public 
support to universities and public research centres; and research funding (for 
both basic and applied research).  
 Soft instruments: Instruments in this category are voluntary and non-coercive 
policy measures, aimed at providing information and guidelines for public 
organizations and firms in conducting innovation. Examples of soft instruments 
are standards, best practices, codes of conduct, public-private partnerships based 
on cost-sharing etc. These instruments are increasingly used since the 1990s, and 
most recently are focused on the establishment and maintenance of innovation 
networks. Freitas (2007) identified more than 80 soft instruments implemented 
in the UK since the 1990s. 
 Meta-instruments: Provision of meta-instruments is focused on the design and 
implementation of innovation policy per se, not on the innovation process. 
Examples of meta-instruments are the development of innovation indicators, 
policy benchmarks and technology foresights.  
 
3.4 A theoretical framework for evaluating public support  
 
David et al. (2000) and David and Hall (2000) developed a structural model to illustrate 
how government intervention might affect private R&D investment. The model assumes 
profit maximising firms that reach an optimum level of R&D investment when the 
marginal cost (MC) of R&D investment is equal to the marginal rate of return (MRR). 
Marginal costs are opportunity costs of investing in R&D represented by an upward 
sloping curve, which implies that increased costs are a result of increased gearing (the 
ratio of debt to equity). Marginal rate of return is an internal rate of return on R&D 
investment represented by a downward sloping curve as firms will prioritize projects 
with higher rate of return. Furthermore, both marginal cost and marginal rate of return 
are a function of R&D investment and other variables. That is, 
     (   )  (3.1) 
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     (   ) 
 
Where R denotes the firm's R&D expenditure, X is a vector of variables determining 
marginal costs (technological opportunities, appropriability conditions and demand 
conditions), and Z is a vector of variables reflecting innovation policy instruments, 
macroeconomic conditions and external costs of funding and availability of venture 
capital.  
 The firm's optimum level of R&D investment R* is achieved when MC equals 
MRR, hence 
     (   ) (3.2) 
 
Under the assumption of exogeneity of X and Z, Equation 3.2 is a reduced-form model 
of the structural model set out in Equation 3.1.   
Finally, the actual level of R&D investment can be presented as: 
        (3.3) 
 
Where H is the additional R&D expenditure induced by the subsidy S. Depending on 
the relation between H and S, we can identify several outcomes of a public support 
measure (subsidy).  
H > S (additionality effect) 
H = S (no additionality or crowding out) 
0 < H < S (partial crowding out) 
H = 0 (full crowding out) 
H < 0 < S (more than full crowding out)
42
 
The task of empirical analysis is to determine the actual effect of public support in a 
specific context, as each of these cases can occur in practice.  
                                                          
42
 See Figure 3.3 below for the graphical illustration of the outcomes of a public support. Note that the 
second category 'no additionality or crowding out' and the fifth category 'more than full crowding out' are 
not illustrated, as Figure 3.3 is a simplified representation of the outcomes, disregarding the cost and 
illustrating only the effects of a public support.  
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 The literature on innovation policy evaluation lacks clarity in defining the 
additionality effect. First, the authors agree that additionality represents the increase in 
R&D intensity (or innovation intensity, depending on the narrow or broader perspective 
on innovation) induced by a subsidy (Heijs and Herrera, 2004, p. 3). However, 
confusion arises in determining the exact magnitude of the increase in innovation 
intensity. Some authors argue that any increase in innovation intensity can be regarded 
as additionality (Heijs and Herrera, 2004). Others note that additionality refers to the 
increase in innovation intensity larger than the amount of subsidy (Cerulli and Potí, 
2008).  
 
 Conversely, there is a consensus in defining full and partial crowding out effects. 
Full crowding out refers to 'a complete substitution of private by public funds, and this 
means that firms’ total R&D expenses would be the same with or without subsidies' 
(Gonzáles and Pazó, 2008, p. 372). Cerulli and Potí (2008, p. 11) provide a very similar 
definition: 'total crowding-out: when the private R&D, compared to what the firm 
would have done in the absence of the grant, remains the same' (see also Busom, 2000; 
Streicher et al., 2004; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Gonzáles and Pazó, 2008). Therefore, a 
full crowding out effect implies that a firm reduces its private spending by the amount 
of the subsidy, so the total spending including a subsidy is the same had the firm not 
receive a subsidy. Finally, partial crowding out refers to a partial substitution of private 
spending. Partial crowding out occurs if firms raise their total R&D, but this amount is 
smaller than the subsidy itself (Gonzáles and Pazó, 2008, p. 372) (see also Cerulli and 
Potí, 2008; Streicher et al., 2004; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008). The hypothesis of a partial 
crowding-out effect can only be tested when the amounts of subsidies are available 
(Busom, 2000; Cerulli, 2010; Cerulli and Potí, 2008; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008, 
Gonzáles and Pazó, 2008). 
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Figure 3.3. Additionality and crowding out effects 
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Source: Author's own illustration. 
 
 Figure 3.3 gives a graphical presentation of additionality and crowding out 
according to the definitions followed in our research:  
- Additionality: the firm does not reduce its own innovation; instead, the firm’s 
innovation is greater than it otherwise would have been by an amount brought 
about by the support measure in addition to the firm’s own innovation. 
- Full crowding out: the firm reduces its innovation by an amount equal to the 
innovation brought about by the support measure; hence, the firm’s total 
innovation activities with the support measure  are not greater than they would 
otherwise have been (the support measure substitutes fully for the firm’s own 
efforts). 
- Partial crowding out: the firm reduces its innovation but by an amount less than 
the innovation brought about by the support measure; hence, the firm’s total 
innovation activities are greater than they would otherwise have been but by an 
amount less than the full effect of the support measure (the support measure 
substitutes partly for the firm’s own efforts). 
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 In addition to distinguishing between additionality versus crowding out effect, 
innovation policy literature recognizes several concepts of additionality. Falk (2007) 
grouped these concepts into three categories (see Figure 3.4): 
A. Resource-based concepts 
- Project additionality occurs when a project would be abandoned without public 
support; 
- Scale additionality occurs when the project is undertaken at a larger scale due to 
a receipt of public support (Georghiou, 2002);
 43
 
- Input additionality refers to the effect of support measures on the private R&D 
expenditures (i.e. whether firms increase their private R&D investment when 
public funding is provided); 
B. Results-based concepts  
- Output additionality refers to the impact of subsidies on innovation outputs (i.e. 
patents, introduction of successful innovations and the share of sales resulting 
from product innovations (and/or process innovations); 
- Impact additionality is associated with the effect of public support on firm's 
productivity or competitive position;  
C. Process-based concepts  
- Scope additionality occurs when firms, as a consequence of receiving public 
support, expand their activities, such as by entering new markets or by creating 
new partnerships (networking) (Georghiou, 2002);44 
- Cognitive capacity additionality is defined as a positive impact of support on 
firms' competencies and expertise;  
- Acceleration additionality occurs when public support has a positive effect on 
the duration of the project, either through a reduction of the implementation 
phase, or an earlier starting or ending date (Georghiou, 2002).  
 
Falk (2007) defines behavioural additionality as the process-based concept of 
additionality.
                                                          
43
 Falk (2007) classifies scale additionality as a resource-based concept, although she notes that other 
authors categorize scale additionality as a sub-category of behavioural additionality.  
44
 Falk (2007) points out that the effect of public support on cooperation could be classified as scope 
additionality, but also as cognitive capacity additionality.  
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Figure 3.4. Concepts of additionality 
Resource-based concepts                                                             Result-based concepts 
                                                             
Project 
additionality 
Input 
additionality  
Scale 
additionality  
Acceleration 
additionality  
Scope 
additionality  
Cognitive 
capacity 
additionality  
Output 
additionality  
Impact 
additionality  
                                           
                  Process- based concepts (behavioural additionality) 
Source: Falk (2007, p. 668).  
 
 Falk (2007) points out that resource-based concepts of additionality might not be 
complementary. On the contrary, the firm might experience project and scope 
additionality, without increasing investment in R&D. Furthermore, the resource-based 
concept adopts the linear model of innovation, which is often an object of criticism 
because it proposes direct causality between innovation input and output. However, not 
every R&D investment results in a successful innovation, nor is every innovation a 
result of R&D activities (such as organisational and marketing innovations) (see Section 
2.3).   
  
 Input and output additionalities are based on the linear model of innovation (see 
Section 1.4.1), where it is assumed that the innovation process is linear and sequential, 
without interactions and loops between the phases. An important shortcoming of input 
additionality is its focus on the allocation of resources, without exploring the effects of 
public intervention on innovation outputs and changes in the firms' innovative 
behaviour (Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). Another relevant limitation of input 
additionality is associated with the empirical strategies applied in most studies. Namely, 
the outcome variable can be operationalized in two manners, using either total R&D 
expenditures or net (private, own) R&D expenditures (equal to total R&D expenditures 
minus the amount of R&D subsidy). Only the latter is an appropriate outcome variable, 
because the objective of evaluation is to estimate the impact of public intervention on 
firms' own, private R&D investments (Cerulli, 2010). Our empirical review will reveal 
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that most studies on input additionality, because constrained by the lack of data on the 
amount of subsidies, use total R&D expenditures as the outcome variable. 
 
 Investigating output additionality also suffers from several limitations. The first 
issue is associated with the definition of innovation output. The literature on innovation 
categorizes innovation outputs into two groups: intermediate (direct) innovation outputs 
(such as patents and publications); and indirect innovation outputs, such as the 
introduction of product and process innovations and the share of sales from new 
products and/or processes (i.e. innovative sales) (Clarysse et al., 2009) (see Section 2.3). 
In addition, measures of firms overall performance, such as productivity, profitability 
and value added can be used as proxies for innovation output. Using patents as a 
measure of innovation output is particularly problematic for investigating output 
additionality in SMEs operating in traditional industries, as the outcome of their 
innovative activities is seldom in the form of patents (Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). 
Second, the concept of output additionality assumes a direct link between innovation 
input and output, and this assumption is unlikely to hold (Clarysse et al., 2009; 
Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012), given the non-linear nature of the innovation process, 
whereby the process is complex and non-linear, and may result not only in firms' 
improved innovation performance, but also in changes in their internal innovation 
behaviour. A non-linearity of the innovation process creates difficulties in investigating 
output additionality, especially when innovation output is operationalized using its 
indirect measures (Clarysse et al., 2009). 
 
 As the linear model of innovation was heavily criticized, with the development 
of evolutionary economics and of later generations of innovation models (from the 
Kline-Rosenberg chain-linked model to the fifth generation of networking models, see 
Section 1.4.1), the innovation process is regarded as a non-linear process, involving not 
just innovative firms but the entire innovation systems, including all economic actors 
and institutions and organizations affecting the firms' innovative activities. The 
emergence of evolutionary theorizing on innovation and system perspectives resulted in 
a shift in the design of innovation policy and its ensuing evaluation, by focusing on 
behavioural additionality (Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). 
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3.5 Evaluation models  
 
Measuring the impact of a treatment includes economic agents (firms, households, and 
individuals), potential outcomes and treatment. We will refer to firms in our further 
discussion. If we denote Ti to be treatment (Ti =1 if a firm i received a treatment and 
Ti=0 if not) and Yi (Ti) for outcomes of firms i = 1,..., N, where N is the total population 
of firms, Yi(1) is the outcome of treated firms, Yi(0) is the outcome of treated firms 
without a treatment, and ∆i is a treatment effect for a firm i, then 
      ( )    ( ) (3.4) 
 
 Equation 3.4 points to the fundamental evaluation problem. To evaluate the 
impact of a treatment, both outcomes with and without treatment should be 
simultaneously observed. Therefore, the outcome for treated firms had it not been 
treated (counterfactual outcome - Yi(0)) cannot be observed and has to be estimated, 
which implies that the treatment effect itself cannot be observed and must be estimated 
(Aakvik et al., 2005; Heckman and Vytilacil, 2007).   
 Further, two effects are usually estimated in the evaluation literature. The 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) indicates the difference in outcome between two 
counterfactuals: the outcomes for all firms if they were to be treated, Yi(1) (e.g. by 
programme participation); and the outcomes for all firms if they were not to be treated, 
Yi(0). As not all firms are treated and not all firms are untreated, both Yi(1) and Yi(0) are 
counterfactuals that have to be estimated. 
  
        ( )   ( )  (3.5) 
 
The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) indicates the difference in 
outcomes of the treated firms with and without treatment and can be written as: 
        ( )|        ( )|     (3.6) 
 
The second term    ( )|     is the expected outcome had treated firms not receive a 
treatment. This is a counterfactual outcome that is not observed. If the unconditional 
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outcome of non-treated firms is taken to estimate the counterfactual outcome, then that 
would lead to selection bias, as treated and non-treated firms may differ even before a 
treatment assignment (Aakvik et al., 2005; Heckman and Vytilacil, 2007). The problem 
of selection bias can be solved by imposing certain identifying assumptions, which will 
be further discussed in this section. Thus, evaluation methods are designed to take into 
account the estimation of counterfactual outcomes as well as to control for selection 
bias.  
 
 Cerulli (2010) provides a comprehensive discussion on the evolution of 
econometric models for evaluating the impact of public support on R&D.
45
 
Furthermore, he suggests the following taxonomy according to: 
- Type of specification: structural and non-structural (reduced-form) models; 
- Type of data used: cross-sectional and longitudinal datasets; 
- Type of policy variable: binary policy variable and policy variable in levels (the 
amount of   subsidy).  
Our discussion will be mainly focused on the distinction between structural and non-
structural models. A basic structural model treated a policy variable (subsidy received) 
as exogenous. However, as Cerulli (2010) notes, there are three possible sources of 
endogeneity of public support.
46
 First, simultaneity might occur if private investment in 
R&D and subsidies received mutually determine one another, i.e. private R&D 
investment affects subsidies, and vice versa. In this case, a government agency follows 
the 'picking the winner' strategy, which refers to the selection of firms that are more 
likely to innovate (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Gonzáles et al., 2005; Aerts and Schmidt, 
2008; Gelabert et al., 2009; Carboni, 2011; Alecke et al., 2012; Cerulli and Potí, 2012; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013). Another source of selection bias occurs when firms 
self-select themselves into support programmes (Busom, 2000; David et al., 2000; Aerts 
and Schmidt, 2008; Gelabert et al., 2009; Grilli and Murtinu, 2011). The second source 
of endogeneity is omitted-variable bias. The issue of omitting a relevant variable is 
especially prominent in the structural models, because these models only control for 
(some) observed characteristics of firms. Finally, the third potential source of 
endogeneity is error in measuring public support.  
 
                                                          
45
 See also Grilli and Murtinu (2011). 
46
 See also Arundel et al. (2008). 
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 Cerulli (2010) discusses several structural and non-structural evaluation models. 
Structural models are divided into two categories: early structural and selection models. 
- Early structural models and recent improvements: As aforementioned, a basic 
structural model considers a public policy to be exogenous, or pre-determined. When 
the public policy variable is exogenous, a structural model can be presented as a 
reduced-form model in which the investment in R&D is a function of subsidies received 
(S) and of the vector X of covariates.  
    (   ) (3.7) 
 
However, once the problem of endogeneity was recognized, researchers developed 
structural models taking into account the potential endogeneity of public support. These 
models can be estimated by Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation (for a review of 
models see Cerulli, 2010). The main practical issue in innovation evaluation literature is 
associated with the lack of valid instruments or exclusion restrictions. Furthermore, 
Cerulli (2010) argues that another pitfall of these models is that the selection decision 
remains a black box, as it is only implicitly modelled. In contrast, selection models take 
into account the selection process by estimating a system of equations consisting of both 
selection and outcome equations.  
- Selection models: The major advantage of selection models is an explicit modelling of 
the selection process. The models are estimated as a system of two equations: the 
selection and the outcome equation. However, the main limitation of selection models is 
the assumption of normality of the errors, which cannot be tested. Selection models can 
be estimated by IV estimation and by the Heckman two-step estimator (Heckit 
approach) (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). The latter has an advantage of not requiring 
an instrument for consistent estimation. However, a problem arises in the presence of 
heteroscedastic errors, which renders it an inconsistent estimator. If the researcher can 
identify a valid instrument, then IV estimation is preferred to the Heckit approach, 
because the estimation is consistent even in the case of heteroscedastic errors.  
 
 The second category of evaluation models are non-structural (or reduced-form) 
models, which include matching models (e.g. Propensity Score Matching), linear 
regression models and Difference-in-Difference (DiD) models. The major advantage of 
these models is that no assumptions are necessary about the distribution of errors or on 
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the functional form of the selection equation. However, the non-structural models in a 
cross-sectional setting control only for observed characteristics of treated and non-
treated firms (Cerulli, 2010; Cerulli and Potí, 2008).  
 
 Moreover, non-structural models cannot take into account spillover effects from 
government support. For instance, the comparison group in the matching method 
represents non-treated firms that are similar to treated firms based on chosen 
characteristics included in the vector X. Under the assumption that similar firms are 
more likely to cooperate, then non-treated firms could indirectly benefit from 
government support through linkages with treated firms. The occurrence of positive 
spillover hinders the accurate estimation of additionality (Grilli and Murtinu, 2011). 
Further, it is not clear whether the presence of spillover entails underestimation or 
overestimation of the R&D activities in non-treated firms. Economists argue that both 
cases are possible: the latter if negative spillovers occur, such as in the case of 
competition in product development; whereas the former is associated with the long-
standing argument that R&D spillovers have a positive effect as new knowledge is 
transferred to non-treated firms. Finally, treated firms can also be affected by spillovers. 
Cerrulli (2010) terms the effect of R&D spillovers as 'spillover bias'. In order to 
econometrically deal with the spillover bias, the author suggest the inclusion of a 
variable measuring spillover effects. The problem is that the literature does not suggest 
any variable for capturing R&D spillovers (Grilli and Murtinu, 2011). However, the 
most severe problem caused by presence of spillovers is that the hypothesis of Stable 
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) is violated, which implies that the 
estimation results are biased regardless of the applied evaluation method (Rubin, 1980; 
Guo and Fraser, 2010; Grilli and Murtinu, 2011). Moreover, Cerulli (2010) notes that 
the spillover bias is more pronounced when estimating the impact of public support on 
innovation output, i.e. output additionality, than in the case of estimating input 
additionality. In economic models, spillovers are assumed to have a direct impact on 
firm's performance and only an indirect effect on R&D level. Table 3.3 depicts the main 
advantages and pitfalls of each evaluation model. 
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Table 3.3. Evaluation methods - advantages and limitations 
Method Advantages Limitations 
Matching 
estimators  
- The method does not require exclusion 
restrictions (i.e. instruments). 
- The existence of several matching 
estimators provides a solid basis for 
robustness checks. 
- The model does not require specification 
of a functional form. 
- The method controls only for observable firm 
characteristics (issue of hidden bias). 
- For Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching 
estimator the variance estimation is 
problematic (bootstrapping is not valid). 
- Trade off between precision and bias. 
- Propensity Score Matching (PSM) cannot 
disentangle the differentiated effect that 
covariates have on treatment assignment and 
on the outcome. 
- Small region of common support can lead to 
biased estimates of the ATT. 
- The estimator requires a large number of 
variables. 
- All pre-treatment variables are not usually 
available. 
- Propensity Score Matching (PSM) limits the 
population of inference to those units which 
are within the region of common support.  
- Conditional independence assumption cannot 
be tested. 
Instrumental 
Variable (IV) 
approach 
- The method controls for unobserved 
firm characteristics. 
- The method requires exclusion restrictions.  
 
Selection models - Structural model whereby both the 
selection equation and the outcome 
equation are modelled and estimated.  
- The method requires exclusion restrictions.  
- Strong underlying distribution assumption  - 
joint normal distribution of the error terms of 
both the selection equation and the outcome 
equations.  
- Parametric structure of both the selection and 
the outcome equations. 
Regression 
Discontinuity 
Design (RDD) 
approach  
 - The treatment effect is estimated at the 
threshold level.  
Difference-in-
difference 
estimator  
- The outcome equation does not require a 
functional form or even a regressor.   
- The estimator accounts for time-
unvarying unobserved characteristics and 
for macroeconomic trends.  
- The estimator does not require an 
exclusion restrictions. 
- It is not necessary to model the selection 
equation. 
- The estimator does not control for firm-
specific time-varying effects. 
- Macroeconomic shocks might not have the 
same or similar impact on both treated and 
untreated firms. 
 
The conditional 
difference-in-
difference 
estimator  
- The estimator accounts for time-
unvarying unobserved characteristics and 
for macroeconomic trends.  
- The estimator does not require an 
exclusion restrictions. 
- The estimator does not control for firm-
specific time-varying effects. 
- Macroeconomic shock might not have the 
same or similar impact on both treated and 
untreated firms. 
 
Source: Blundell and Costa Dias (2009); Guo and Fraser (2010); and Grilli and Murtinu 
(2011). 
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 The OECD Framework (2007) adopts the taxonomy of evaluation methodology 
suggested by Storey (2000) in which evaluation is divided into six steps. Step I 
measures a response rate of public support measures,
47
 step II gathers information on 
the recipients' opinion about the delivery of support measures and step III provides 
recipients' self-assessment of the economic impact (additional effect or additionality) of 
support measures. Step I, II and III are related to monitoring of public intervention 
(Greene, 2009) and to qualitative evaluation (OECD, 2007). Step IV, V and VI seek to 
evaluate public support and are more associated with quantitative evaluation. These 
steps require the comparison of treated (participating) firms with a control or 
comparison group of non-treated (non-participating) firms. The difference between 
these three levels of evaluation is the choice of a control group as well as the treatment 
of selection bias. Step IV is a type of evaluation in which a control group consists of 
'average' or 'typical' firms. However, as Curran (2000) observes, comparing treated 
firms with average firms does not provide reliable benchmarks due to the high 
heterogeneity of SMEs. This shortcoming is corrected in step V, where treated firms are 
compared with 'matched' non-treated firms. Matching is done on observable firm 
characteristics, such as firm size, industry, competition pressure, age, etc. The problem 
in step V arises from using econometric methods controlling only for observables. 
Other, unobservable characteristics, such as managers' abilities and motivation, can also 
have an impact on the additionality of support measures. Step VI resolves this issue by 
applying econometric methods that take into account both observable and unobservable 
factors, and hence controlling for selection bias.   
 
3.6 Empirical literature review   
 
The long-standing issue of the effectiveness of public policy on firms' innovation effort 
has been investigated in two streams of research. One stream adopts a rather empirical 
perspective, whereby the approach to the evaluation of innovation related policies is a-
theoretical, empirical and data driven, without much consideration of theoretical 
underpinnings (termed 'measurement without theory' by Cerulli, 2010, p. 424). Another 
                                                          
47 The first step usually includes information on the number of participating firm, their size, regional and 
sectoral distribution. As Storey (2000) notes, this steps seldom provides information on the amount of 
public support measures received by individual firms, due to confidentiality clauses stipulated in contracts 
between firms and the government. 
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stream attempts to develop a more theoretically based modelling approach (Cerulli, 
2010). The former approach is based on the empirical findings from studies employing 
non-structural models that are estimated by matching estimators. The latter 
encompasses those studies that develop structural models, wherein explicitly modelling 
both the selection mechanism as well as the outcome equation.  
 
 Although structural models, by explicitly modelling and estimating the selection 
equation, can provide a more detailed evaluation, they are less applied than are non-
structural models. Among non-structural models, matching estimators seem to be the 
preferred evaluation method (Gonzáles and Pazó, 2008; Hussinger, 2008; Cerulli, 2010; 
Carboni, 2011). Cerulli (2010) argues that the prevalence of non-structural models in 
empirical studies stems from their 'objectivity'- as theoretical considerations are reduced 
to a minimum, and the results are more data-driven than those from structural models. 
Another argument for the primacy of empirics over theory is the influence of 
evolutionary and Neo-Schumpeterian economics on the field of innovation studies. 
Namely, evolutionary and innovation systems approaches are descriptive and qualitative 
in nature, criticized for their lack of formal (mathematical) modelling. This limited 
application of economic modelling is then translated into innovation studies as a rather 
eclectic approach to estimating the effectiveness of policies in the domain of innovation. 
Arvanitis (2013), in line with discussion by Cerulli (2010), notes that there is no 
commonly accepted theory of public support to explain the selection process, because 
the process itself is specific and hinges on objectives set by the government. This could 
be the reason why David et al. (2000) and David and Hall (2000) suggest that, 
theoretically, both treatment effects (additionality and crowding out) are possible, thus, 
leaving the resolution of the issue to empirical analysis. However, following Klette et al. 
(2000), developing structural models in estimating the impacts of public support could 
provide valuable insights into the selection mechanisms, and thus facilitate the analysis 
of the success of government agencies in implementing operational procedures for 
indentifying those innovation projects with high social returns.   
 
 We would extend Cerulli's argument in two directions; first, non-availability of 
longitudinal, panel data restricted the choice of evaluation methods to be applied. Our 
argument is consistent with Bloch and Graversen (2012), who note that, in a cross-
sectional analysis when the amount of subsidies is not available, 'matching methods are 
the only feasible option' (p. 209). Second, surveys such as Community Innovation 
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Survey (CIS) are not specifically designed for the evaluation of innovation related 
policies. As such, they do not contain suitable exclusion restrictions (instrumental 
variables), necessary for estimating selection models using IV approaches, Heckman 
selection models and endogenous switching models. Therefore, our argument for the 
prevalence of matching estimators in empirical studies is based on restrictions with 
regard to available data. In addition, following Cerulli (2010), matching is a more 
empirical, data driven method and that is the reason why the literature does not provide 
a core (parsimonious) evaluation model. Rather, modelling the outcome equation (in the 
case of propensity score matching, it is the propensity score equation) is data-driven, 
which can also be observed in the literature review given in this chapter. 
  
 The current state of evaluation innovation studies indicates a primacy of 
empirical analysis over theory, which creates manifold problems. An absence of a core 
theoretical model prevents comparability of empirical evidence across countries and 
over time (Cerulli, 2010). This, in turn, means that the innovation field is severely 
restricted in building a cohesive body of evidence to inform policy makers. Moreover, 
matching estimators cannot control for unobserved characteristics, thus creating two 
additional issues in evaluating public measures: treating the selection process as a 'black 
box'; and producing potentially biased treatment effects. Greene (2009), in his 
evaluation of the Prince's Trust programme, concludes that less sophisticated evaluation 
methods, following Curran's (2000) and the OECD (2007) taxonomy of evaluation 
methodology, yield more favourable treatment effects than do more sophisticated 
approaches to evaluation. His conclusion is in line with Papa (2012) and Hujer and 
Radic (2005), who, in the field of innovation related policies, conclude that unobserved 
characteristics play a significant role in the public support provision. According to 
Hujer and Radic (2005), the magnitude of the estimated treatment effects decreases as 
more variables controlling for both observed and unobserved factors are included in the 
model, thus improving our understanding of the selection mechanism. Moreover, Siegel 
et al. (2003), similar to Cerulli (2010), in their discussion on ambiguous empirical 
results on input additionality, call for more sophisticated evaluation methods.  
  
 Arvanitis (2013) argues that the major drawback of quantitative evaluation of 
innovation policy in general is associated with data limitations, most notably, non-
availability of data before and after treatment assignment, as well as availability of only 
a few variables, which prevents practitioners from adequately modelling selection 
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processes as well as firms' innovation processes (see also Cerulli, 2010; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2011; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). However, Arvanitis (2013) notes that the 
major impediment in quantitative policy evaluation is present at the empirical level, 
implying that improvements in innovation databases would substantially enhance their 
reliability. Following this line of argument, Cerulli (2010) argues that the preferred 
approach to evaluating innovation-related public support is a dominance of empirical 
analysis over theoretical considerations or, as he termed it, 'measurement without 
theory' (p. 439).
48
 However, his expectations in relation to empirical analysis in the near 
future are associated with an increased application of selection models, although 
matching estimations will still play a relevant role in quantitative evaluation in the 
domain of innovation. Research presented in this thesis is in accordance with Cerulli's 
suggestions; although we apply selection models in Chapters IV and VI, we also utilize 
matching estimators in Chapter V.  
 
 Following García-Quevedo (2004), theoretical considerations on the 
additionality versus crowding-out effect of private innovation subsidies imply that both 
effects are plausible.
49
 Public support might provide incentives for firms to increase 
their investment in innovation, but might also lead to a reduction in investment in own 
R&D or innovation, as public funds substitute for private R&D investments. David et 
al. (2000) provide an extensive review of empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
public support on innovation and conclude that, although more empirical studies 
indicate complementarity rather than substitutability between public and private R&D 
funding, the overall conclusion is still ambiguous. Lӧӧf and Heshmati (2005) in their 
review of more recent empirical evidence, draw the same conclusion. The meta-analysis 
conducted by García-Quevedo (2004) also does not provide a definite answer; the 
results indicate very weak evidence of crowding-out at the firm level.
50
 
 
 Another conclusion from García-Quevedo (2004) is that the problem of 
establishing control groups severely impedes the evaluation of public support, which 
implies that policy-makers should incorporate the requirements of best practice 
                                                          
48
 As noted in Section 1.4.2, Hong et al. (2012) argue that empirical studies on the determinants of 
innovation outweighed theoretical work in the field of innovation studies. In addition, Arundel et al. 
(2008) conclude that the availability of the CIS data resulted in the exponential increase of empirical 
studies on innovation.  
49
 Most empirical research to date deals with R&D subsidies, which is not surprising, as public policy was 
focused and is largely still focused on R&D activities rather than on innovation in a broader sense as 
defined in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005).   
50
 The meta -regression analysis covered 39 studies, out of which 17 are at the firm level. 
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evaluation into the design and budget of innovation policies. Best practice evaluation 
methodology is characterised by the use of a control group – or, at least – a comparison 
group - and a serious approach to selection bias: García-Quevedo (2004) insist that 
government support should always be treated as endogenous, due to the simultaneity 
and selection bias in the process of applying for support and in the selection process 
(David et al., 2000; Cerulli, 2010; Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). As Lӧӧf and 
Heshmati (2005, p. 5) observe: 'It is well documented in the literature that firms funded 
by the government are likely to be among those with the best ideas.'  
 
 Lӧӧf and Heshmati (2005) point out three suggestions for the advancement of 
research on innovation public support. First, researchers should focus on developing 
structural models in which government decisions are explicitly modelled. This leads to 
the second recommendation and that is the identification of the determinants of 
government selection decisions. Finally, common methodology for evaluation of 
innovation public policy should be developed. The first and second recommendations 
are difficult to implement, as information on the selection process are rarely publicly 
available. However, agreement on common methodology would enable comparison 
between studies and the provision of better policy recommendations. In our opinion, the 
advance of a common methodology is especially relevant in the context of the European 
Union, where funding is provided to innovative firms through the Framework 
Programmes and any evaluation of these programmes requires measuring evaluation 
effects across countries. Furthermore, common methodology would also enable the 
comparison of studies using the CIS datasets at national level. At the moment, 
comparison across countries (and even within countries) is seriously hampered in the 
absence of common methodology, as our empirical literature review reveals. In 
addition, the CIS questionnaire should be modified, by including more questions on 
firms' participation in innovation support measures. This modification would facilitate 
evaluation of innovation policies.  
 
 We review only firm-level studies (for a review of studies at industry and macro 
level see David et al., 2000; García-Quevedo, 2004) and only those conducted on data 
from European countries, because our analysis in the later chapters is focused on 
European SMEs. Our choice of focusing on European studies is in accordance with the 
trend of geographical coverage of empirical studies. Namely, investigating the impact of 
public support in the US was prevalent in the literature until the 1990s but, later, the 
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focus shifted to EU countries (Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). One example of the 
importance of innovation policy in the EU can be illustrated with the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS), which was launched across Europe at the beginning of the 
1990s (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010; Hong et al., 2012), whereas the first CIS wave in 
the US was conducted in 2009 (Business R&D and Innovation Survey -BRDIS) (Hong 
et al., 2012; Jankowski, 2013). 
 
 Regarding empirical studies, three types of additionality have been investigated: 
input; output; and behavioural additionality. Although the focus of our thesis is on 
output and behavioural additionality, we also include input additionality in our 
empirical review, because we believe that insights from empirical studies on input 
additionality can provide useful guidelines in investigating other types of additionality 
such as output and behavioural additionalities, particularly in regard to evaluation 
methodology and the empirical strategies adopted in these studies.  
 
 Our empirical review is divided into two segments: empirical studies applying 
matching estimators (see Appendix I, Tables A1.1 and A1.2); and those applying other 
evaluation methods (see Appendix I, Tables A1.3 and A1.4).
51
 
 
3.6.1 Input additionality  
 
Input additionality is the subject of the largest number of studies (Clarysse et al., 2009; 
Clausen, 2009; Cunningham et al., 2013). In our literature review, out of 36 studies 
investigating input additionality, a majority (25 studies) applies matching estimators. 
Few studies cover more than one country, and those are Aerts and Schmidt (2008) on 
Belgium and Germany, Marzucchi (2011) on Italy and Spain, and Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento (2012) on Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and South Africa. Most 
studies are conducted for one of two countries:  
- Germany by Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006), Aerts and 
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 Table A1.2 is a continuation of Table A1.1, that is, Table A1.2 provides further details of studies 
reviewed in Table A1.1. Similarly, Table A1.4 is a continuation of Table A1.3, that is, Table A1.4 
provides further details of studies reviewed in Table A1.3. 
132 
 
Schmidt (2008), Hussinger (2008), Aschhoff (2009), Reinkowski et al. (2010), 
Alecke et al. (2012), Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2012); 
- Spain by Busom (2000), Heijs and Herrera (2004), González et al. (2005), 
Gonzáles and Pazó (2008), Gelabert et al. (2009), Herrera et al. (2010), 
Marzucchi (2011), Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2012) and Herrera and 
Sánchez-González (2012).  
 
 Among all studies under review, only two studies investigate additionality in 
SMEs: Alecke et al. (2012) on input additionality of German SMEs; and Foreman-Peck 
(2013) on output additionality of British SMEs. Other studies cover both SMEs and 
large firms. Seventeen studies use Community Innovation Survey (CIS) databases.
52
 
The variable representing public support in the CIS datasets is a binary indicator, only 
identifying whether or not a firm received a support. The amount of subsidy is 
unknown, which means that partial crowding out cannot be empirically investigated. In 
general, any study using a binary indicator for public support can only test the 
hypothesis of additionality versus full crowding out, as noted in Section 3.4. A corollary 
of this limitation, according to Cerulli (2010), is that researchers cannot fully investigate 
the effectiveness of public support.  
 
 Arundel et al. (2008) and Cerulli and Potí (2008) point out other issues in the 
CIS data on public support. Besides the binary indicator for support, the CIS data is 
limited as to what type of support is received; i.e. it excludes tax incentives and only 
includes direct grants and loans. Another shortcoming of the CIS data is that the survey 
itself was not specifically designed for evaluating the effectiveness of innovation related 
policies, as previously noted in this Section (the CIS questionnaire, irrespective of the 
survey wave, contains a single question on the receipt of innovation support measures). 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the CIS survey has its advantages as well. First, it is 
a large-scale survey gathering extensive information on firms' innovative activities 
(Arundel et al., 2008; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). Having a large number of relevant 
variables is of high importance particularly when matching estimators are applied, given 
that the assumption of selection on observables critically hinges on the inclusion of all 
variables affecting the innovation process (see Section 5.3.1 for a detailed discussion on 
matching estimators). A second advantage of the CIS data is that both participating and 
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 The Mannheim Innovation Panel is the German innovation survey using the CIS questionnaire. The 
survey is conducted every two years (Arundel et al., 2008).  
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non-participating firms are covered by the survey. Following Smith and Todd (2005), 
the matching method can be applied if three conditions are met:  
a. Information on participating and non-participating firms should be 
contained in the same data source; 
b. A dataset contains a large set of variables for modelling the participation 
decision; 
c. Both participating and non-participating firms operate in the same 
market. 
 
 The CIS database fulfils the first condition, as already noted. The third condition 
is met by controlling for market characteristics through the inclusion of industry dummy 
variables. However, regarding the second condition, a limitation common to most 
studies in the field of evaluation of innovation related policies is a lack of information 
on the selection process, as previously noted in this Section (Aerts et al., 2006; Cerulli, 
2010; Arvanitis, 2013; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). Also, as previously mentioned, the 
CIS dataset contains a single question on whether the firm received public support 
measures (sources of funding are usually divided into local/regional, national and EU 
level, similar to the Spanish CIS dataset used in Chapter V). Fortunately, two new 
datasets analysed in this thesis (the GPrix data in Chapter IV and the MAPEER dataset 
in Chapter VI) were specifically designed for exploring issues related to the 
participation of SMEs in innovation support programmes.   
 
 Next, we discuss the estimation results and possible limitations of the studies 
under review. Four possible treatment effects can be reported: a full crowding-out effect 
(a negative and statistically significant ATT effect); a partial crowding-out effect (the 
sign of the ATT effect varies with the amount of subsidy);
53
 no additionality (a 
statistically insignificant ATT effect); and additionality (a positive and statistically 
significant ATT effect). Most studies reject a full crowding-out effect (22 studies that 
apply matching estimators and 5 studies applying other methods) and provide evidence 
of additionality (19 studies that apply matching estimators and 5 studies applying other 
methods). A partial crowding-out effect cannot be rejected in three studies; two studies 
applying the Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) method, by Marino et al. (2010) and 
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 As already noted in Section 3.4, a partial crowding-out hypothesis can be tested only when the amount 
of subsidies is available.  
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Marino and Parrota (2010), while the study by Gӧrg and Strobl (2007) applies a 
conditional difference-in-difference (DiD) method. Finally, no additionality is reported 
in four studies applying matching estimators, and those are by Duguet (2004), Kaiser 
(2004), Lӧӧf and Hesmati (2005) and Gonzáles and Pazó (2008). Lach (2002) found an 
insignificant treatment effect on large Israeli firms and Klette and Møen (2012), 
applying the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator found no input additionality in Norwegian 
firms. In addition, a full-crowding out effect cannot be rejected in 30 per cent of 
participating firms in Busom (2000), while Gelabert et al. (2009) found a crowding-out 
effect for firms with the highest level of appropriability. Catozzella and Vivarelli (2011) 
investigate the impact of public support on input-output efficiency using a bivariate 
endogenous switching model and report a full crowding-out effect.  
 
 Regarding the differential impact of public support depending on firm size, 
several studies, such as by Lach (2002), Gonzáles et al. (2005), Gonzáles and Pazó 
(2008), Lӧӧf and Hesmati (2005), Herrera et al. (2010) and Herrera and Sánchez-
Gonzáles (2012) provide evidence that input additionality is likely to be found in SMEs. 
Conversely, Cerulli and Potí (2012) report no input additionality in micro firms (from 
10-19 employees). 
 
 Further, after matching, it is necessary to estimate variance using one of the 
following methods: bootstrapping; variance estimation by Lechner (2001); and the 
variance estimator by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Three studies apply a nearest 
neighbour matching (NN) with bootstrapped standard errors (Almus and Czarnitzki, 
2003; Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Heijs and Herrera, 2004). Recently, Abadie and 
Imbens (2008) suggested that bootstrapping is not valid for NN matching, which 
implies that the results from these studies could be misleading. Moreover, several 
studies (Kaiser, 2004; Lӧӧf and Hesmati, 2005; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Cerulli and 
Potí, 2008; Herrera et al., 2010) do not report what variance estimation methods are 
applied.  
  
 Another relevant issue in PSM is the choice of matching technique (algorithm). 
Most studies apply the nearest neighbour estimator, without any robustness check by 
using other matching techniques. The literature on matching estimators (Morgan and 
Harding, 2006; Guo and Fraser, 2010) suggests that researchers should use several 
matching estimators, as there is no consensus on which estimator is superior to other 
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estimators. Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), asymptotically all matching 
estimators should yield similar results. However, finite properties of various matching 
algorithms are not fully explored. For instance, Alecke et al. (2012) apply kernel 
matching on their sample of 1,267 firms (284 treated) as kernel matching has good 
finite sample properties (Frӧhlich, 2004). Further, Kaiser (2004) argues that the sample 
in his study is small (1,115 firms, 129 treated) and applies several matching algorithms 
(NN, Kernel matching and stratification) for a robustness check.  
 
3.6.2 Output additionality  
 
In contrast to the large body of empirical studies on input additionality, few studies 
investigate output additionality (Clarysse et al., 2009), although the number of studies 
has grown in recent years (Cunningham et al., 2013). Our review includes 11 studies 
applying matching estimators and two studies applying other methods: Hujer and Radic 
(2005), who applied an IV approach and conditional difference-in-difference methods 
as a robustness check to their matching estimators; and Hussinger (2008), who applied 
semi-parametric and parametric selection models. In addition, three studies report the 
ATE effects; those by Garcia and Mohnen (2010), Schneider and Veugelers (2010) and 
Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2010). 
 
 In most studies, output additionality is measured as either propensity to 
patenting or patent counts. A few studies use innovative sales as a proxy for innovation 
output (studies by Cerulli and Potí, 2008; Hussinger, 2008; Aschhoff, 2009; Garcia and 
Mohnen, 2010; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010; Hewitt-Dundas and Roper; 2010; 
Marzucchi, 2011; Herrera and Sánchez-Gonzáles, 2012), the introduction of product 
innovation (studies by Hujer and Radic, 2005; Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2010) and the 
introduction of process innovation (a study by Marzucchi, 2011). Foreman-Peck (2013) 
measures innovation output as either the introduction of product or process innovation. 
Other indicators of innovation output such as firm performance (productivity, 
profitability, etc.) are not taken into account. The argument justifying an absence of 
studies investigating other output measures is associated with the lack of longitudinal 
data, because public support is likely to have a medium or long-run effect on innovation 
output (Hyvärinen and Rautiainen, 2007; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Clarysse 
et al., 2009; Grilli and Murtinu, 2011; Alecke et al., 2012). 
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 Most studies report a positive output additionality; studies by Hussinger (2008), 
Aschhoff (2009), Herrera et al. (2010), Reinkowski et al. 2010 (but the estimated 
treatment effect is insignificant for micro firms), Alecke et al. (2012), Herrera and 
Sánchez-Gonzáles (2012) (output additionality found for small firms, but not for 
medium-sized firms) and Foreman-Peck (2013). Two studies found insignificant 
treatment effects, those are Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004) and Cerulli and Potí (2008). 
Finally, a partial crowding out is reported by Marino and Parrota (2010). 
 
 Marzucchi (2011) reports a differential impact of public support on Italian firms 
depending on the measure of innovation output. Namely, the ATT effects of regional 
support programmes are negative and statistically significant when the outcome 
variables are the introduction of product innovation and innovative sales from products 
new to the firm; no treatment effect is reported for patent applications and innovative 
sales from products new to the market; and a positive and statistically significant effect 
on the introduction of process innovation. In similar vein, the impact of Italian national 
support programmes is only positive when the innovation output is proxied by the 
introduction of process innovation; for other measures, empirical evidence suggests no 
additionality. Different results are, however, reported for Spain, where regional support 
programmes have a positive impact on patent applications, the introduction of product 
innovations and innovative sales from products new to the market. Very similar results 
are presented for national support programmes; positive treatment parameters are 
estimated for patent application and innovative sales from products new to the market. 
 
 Hujer and Radic (2005) applied a matching approach to evaluate the impact of 
R&D subsidies on innovation output. The results indicate output additionality for both 
measures (new products and innovative sales). Yet, once other methods that allow for 
control of unobservable firm characteristics were applied, the impact of public support 
becomes negative and crowding out cannot be rejected.    
 
 Only one study specifically focuses on output additionality in SMEs. That is the 
study by Foreman-Peck (2013), who uses the CIS4 dataset to investigate the impact of 
public support on technological innovations in UK SMEs using the Nearest Neighbour 
matching estimator. The results report a positive and significant treatment effect on 
SME innovation for both firms receiving R&D tax credits and those supported by non-
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tax public support.
54
 Interestingly, empirical findings suggest a differentiated effect of 
R&D tax credits on small and medium-sized firms. The additionality effect of R&D tax 
credits is higher in medium sized firms (almost 30%), while in small firms it is only 
15%. For non-tax public support, the results are reverse; the ATT for small firms is 
twice as large in small firms as in medium-sized enterprises.  These results are in line 
with the expected impact of support measures depending on the firm size. Namely, 
medium firms benefit most from financial support, while small firms benefit most from 
non-financial support.  
 
3.6.3 Behavioural additionality  
 
The concept of behavioural additionality (BA) should be regarded as a complement, not 
a substitute to input and output additionalities (Clarysse et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 
2013). Although the literature advances a broad perspective on BA, most empirical 
studies investigate only one segment of BA;
55
 that is the impact of public intervention 
on firms' cooperative behaviour (scope additionality as defined by Falk, 2007; or 
network additionality following the OECD, 2006a, definition). Compared to a large 
number of empirical studies on input additionality and to a lesser extent on output 
additionality, behavioural additionality has been the subject of only a few studies. An 
interesting feature of the empirical analysis of behavioural additionality is that matching 
estimators are the only estimation methods that have been employed. The reason for this 
is associated with impediments imposed by the data at hand. Innovation studies, in 
general, mostly report empirical findings from Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
datasets. The main issues with this large-scale survey are twofold: first, the survey is not 
longitudinal by design, which typically precludes panel analysis; and, second, other 
evaluation methods, such as selection models and Instrumental Variable (IV) 
                                                          
54  The UK CIS1, CIS2 and CIS3 survey questionnaires included two questions on public support 
participation; the first was a generic question on the sources of public support from different 
administrative levels (regional, national, and EU), whereas the second question further ask respondents if 
they participated in various government and EU schemes, such as: Technology Development programmes 
(e.g. LINK, SMART); Technology Acquisition (e.g. Teaching Company Scheme, Demonstration 
Projects); Management Information Programmes (e.g. Industry CLUBs); and European programmes (e.g. 
Framework, Eureka). The CIS4 survey questionnaire included one question on the firms' participation in 
support measures,  but with a sub-question about the firms' claim of R&D tax credits. The CIS 5 survey 
questionnaire excluded the question on public support altogether. The CIS6 and CIS7 survey 
questionnaires reintroduced the question on the participation in public support measures, but excluded the 
sub-question about the firms' claim of R&D tax credits. 
55
 Our study suffers from the same limitation; available data do not allow for exploring other categories of 
behavioural additionality.  
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approaches require a valid instrument, which is hard if not impossible to find in CIS 
surveys (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Aerts and Schmidt, 
2008).  
 
 Among the first studies to investigate behavioural additionality is the one by 
Fier et al. (2006), who assessed the impact of public support on the innovation 
behaviour of German firms in manufacturing sectors. Behavioural additionality is 
measured by three types of cooperation: with other businesses; with scientific 
institutions; and a combination of both. The results from matching estimation on the 
third and fourth CIS datasets are positive for all three types of cooperation. Moreover, 
the results indicate the heterogeneity of the impact; the largest effect of public support is 
on combined cooperation, and the smallest on cooperation with other businesses.  
 
 Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) used a subsample of Spanish manufacturing 
firms participating in the CIS survey in 1999 to explore the impact of national support 
programmes on vertical cooperation (with suppliers and customers) and with private-
public partnerships (cooperation with universities or public laboratories). National 
programmes have a positive effect on both types of cooperation, but the effect on 
private-public partnership is more prominent; the Average Treatment Effect of the 
Treated (ATT) on this type of partnership is twice the effect on vertical cooperation. 
The study also reports the Hausman test for endogeneity of treatment assignment from a 
bivariate probit model. The results indicate that selection bias could affect the estimated 
treatment effects on public-private partnerships, but the effects on vertical cooperation 
are robust to unobserved factors.  
 
 Fernández- Ribas and Shapira (2009) investigate how local and national support 
programmes affect cooperation with international partners among manufacturing firms 
in Catalonia. The authors use the third CIS survey covering the period 1998 -2000. The 
estimated ATT effect is positive, but fairly small (8 percentage points). However, the 
econometric results from three different matching estimators (kernel, NN matching and 
stratification) are not consistent; for instance, for firms that cooperate with any 
international partner, the estimated ATT effect from the NN and kernel matching is 
statistically insignificant, but significant when stratification matching is applied. This 
inconsistency of results suggests that we should exercise caution when discussing their 
findings.  
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 Afcha- Chàvez (2011) explores behavioural additionality using the Spanish 
ESEE survey of business strategy for the period 1998-2005. The treatment effects are 
estimated for vertical cooperation and private-public partnerships while separating 
regional from national programmes. Estimated programme effects are significantly 
positive only for private-public cooperation for both sources of funding, but not 
significant for vertical cooperation. Marzucchi (2011) provides a comparative analysis 
of the forth CIS survey for Spain and Italy. They found no effect of Italian regional 
policies on any type of cooperation (horizontal, vertical, and private-public); but report 
a positive effect of national policies on each type of cooperation. Findings from Spanish 
data indicate a positive impact of both regional and national policies on each type of 
cooperation.  
 
 Antonioli et al. (2012) investigate the impact of a specific regional innovation 
policy (PRRITT) in the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna. The results are contrary to 
previous studies – the authors report no effect of public support on regional cooperation. 
Furthermore, regional policy shows a negative effect on horizontal cooperation. In 
summary, most studies report behavioural additionality, i.e. a positive impact of public 
support on firms' cooperation. However, the magnitude and significance vary depending 
on sources of funding and types of cooperative partners.  
 
 In their book on open innovation activities, Spithoven et al. (2012) investigate, 
among other issues, the impact of public funding on Belgian firms using two waves of 
the CIS survey. Similar to our analysis, three sources of funding (regional, federal and 
EU) are analysed separately. To our knowledge, this is the first study to employ any 
method other than matching to investigate behavioural additionality. Namely, having 
two waves of the data at their disposal, Spithoven et al. (2012) apply a bivariate probit 
model, using lagged values of control variables as instruments. However, regarding 
cooperative partners, due to a small sample size, they only distinguish between two 
types of partnerships: cooperation with other businesses; and private-public 
partnerships. The results suggest a differential effect of different sources of funding. 
Only participation in regional funding has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on both types of partnership. National support has no impact on research cooperation, 
whereas EU support has a positive impact on private-public partnerships. As a 
robustness check, the study reports treatment effects estimated by matching. However, 
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results are only broadly consistent with, but more optimistic than, those reported from a 
bivariate probit model. Overall, all three sources of funding have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on both types of partnerships.  
 
3.6.4 Overview of the empirical evidence  
 
The empirical review reveals heterogeneity among studies in various aspects. First, a 
broad range of explanatory variables are modelled. Lӧӧf and Heshmati (2005) note the 
absence of robust theoretical guidelines on the choice of the independent variables. As a 
consequence, economic theory does not provide a core (parsimonious) model for 
investigating the effectiveness of innovation policy. Namely, theory is not developing at 
the same pace as empirical studies, where practitioners apply sophisticated econometric 
methods disregarding the lack of theoretical development (Aerts et al., 2006).  
 
 In general, the explanatory variables used in modelling evaluation methods can 
be divided into three categories: 
- Firm characteristics: firm size, age, export, belonging to a group, firm ownership, 
cooperation with competitors and institutions, financial and skill constraints, variables 
measuring human capital, such as the share of employees with a university diploma etc. 
- Financial data: cash flow per employee, debt per employee, capital stock per 
employee, equity per employee and capital intensity.  
 - Market and sectoral characteristics: competition (market concentration, market 
power) and industrial sectors.  
 
 Most studies use cross-sectional data, thus the medium- and long-run impact of 
public support are not investigated (Arundel et al., 2008; Cerulli, 2010; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2011). Most studies are constrained by the available data to use a binary 
treatment variable, not the amount of subsidies (Arundel et al., 2008; Cerulli, 2010; 
Grilli and Murtinu, 2011; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). Regarding input additionality, 
the outcome variable can be measured in two manners: total R&D expenditures; and net 
(private or own) R&D expenditures (equal to total R&D expenditures minus the amount 
of R&D subsidy). Only the latter is an appropriate outcome variable, because the 
objective of evaluation is to estimate the impact of public intervention on firms' own, 
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private R&D investments (Cerulli, 2010). However, as most studies are characterized by 
a lack of data on the amount of subsidies, empirical results might be biased, but the 
direction of bias cannot be determined a priori, because public measures can have a 
positive effect (additionality) or a negative (crowding-out) effect.  
 
 Matching is the preferred evaluation method (Cerulli, 2010). However, Cerulli 
(2010) notes that unobserved characteristics might occur in the process. Given that 
researchers do not possess information on the quality of the proposed R&D projects 
(Grilli and Murtinu, 2011), assuming that unobserved factors have no impact on the 
treatment effects will give rise to biases in the estimated treatment effects. In this 
context, it is of high importance that empirical studies report sensitivity analysis (Guo 
and Fraser, 2010).
56
 However, only one study (by Alecke et al., 2012) reports the results 
of sensitivity analysis.  
 
 Moreover, looking at the reported treatment effects in all studies using matching 
estimators, it is  striking that not a single study reports a negative treatment effect. On 
the contrary, the estimated ATT effects are either positive and statistically significant or 
positive and statistically insignificant. Cunningham et al. (2013) observe that although a 
negative behavioural additionality is theoretically viable, there are no empirical studies 
reporting it. They proceed with their argument suggesting that behavioural additionality 
is sometimes reported to disguise the suboptimal findings on input and output 
additionality (Gӧk and Edler, 2012). We would extend their observation by noting that 
matching is the single evaluation method applied in investigating behavioural 
additionality. Thus, Cerulli's (2010) argument on studies disregarding the unobserved 
factors is easily confirmed in the domain of behavioural additionality and, to a lesser 
extent, output additionality. However, our rationalizing on the possible publication bias 
can only be confirmed through meta-analysis, which is absent for output additionality 
(Cunningham et al., 2013) and, we would add, for behavioural additionality.  
  
 The issue of positive bias associated with choice of methodology in this 
literature is further exacerbated by the lack of robustness checks. Guo and Fraser (2010) 
emphasize the importance of applying several evaluation methods before reaching a 
final conclusion regarding the effectiveness of treatment assignment. Our review reveals 
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 A detailed discussion on sensitivity analysis when applying matching estimators is relegated to Section 
5.4.1. 
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that few studies apply more than one evaluation method as a robustness check, and 
those are the studies by Lach (2002), Hujer and Radic (2005), Cerulli and Potí (2008), 
Gelabert et al. (2009), Marino et al. (2010), Spithoven et al. (2010) and Czarnitzki and 
Lopes-Bento (2013). Among these studies, most authors report that crowding out effects 
cannot be rejected, either in the full sample (for instance, Hujer and Radic, 2005; 
Gelabert et al., 2009,; and Marino et al., 2010) or in the subsamples of certain 
characteristics (for instance, Lach, 2002, found a positive treatment effect on small 
firms, but no effect on large firms).
57
  
 
 In recent years, researchers increasingly investigate more than one type of 
additionality (see, for instance, Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2004, Hussinger, 2008; Cerulli and 
Potí, 2008; Aschhoff, 2009; Herrera et al., 2010; Reinkowski et al., 2010; Marino and 
Parota, 2010; Alecke et al., 2012; Marzucchi, 2011; Herrera and Sánchez-Gonzáles, 
2012). Again, most of these studies use matching estimators, and echoing the 
proposition by Cerulli (2010), we emphasise the necessity of applying other evaluation 
methods.  
 
 Finally, the coverage of empirical studies is usually limited to one country. 
Among studies included in our review, only three studies analyse additionality in more 
than country, and even those cover mostly two countries; Aerts and Schmidt (2008) for 
Belgium and Germany; Marzucchi (2011) for Italy and Spain; Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento (2012) for Spain, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and South Africa; and Hewitt-
Dundas and Roper (2010) for Ireland and Northern Ireland. Thus, limited country 
coverage together with heterogeneous model specifications and evaluation methods 
seriously hampers international comparison and  consistent policy recommendations.  
 
3.7 Conclusions  
 
Economic theory advanced two complementary rationales for public intervention in the 
domain of innovation. Historically, the first argument on market failures was developed 
within neoclassical economics. The market-rationale argument explores different 
reasons for the failure of markets to provide adequate incentives for innovative activities 
at the organizational level. An ensuing consequence is the underinvestment of private 
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 We excluded from the list those studies applying OLS regression, because selectivity and endogeneity 
cannot be taken into account in OLS models, thus the results are inconsistent and biased.  
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R&D below a socially optimal level. Second, the evolutionary system-failure rationale 
broadened the scope of public intervention by addressing failures in the functioning of 
innovation systems. From the perspective of a contemporaneous innovation policy, both 
rationales are valid and contribute to policy design and implementation, by emphasising 
the failures in markets to provide sufficient incentives for firms to invest in R&D and 
innovation at a socially optimal level, as well as institutional, network and other system 
failures stemming from interaction and connectedness of economic agents within broad 
boundaries of innovation systems.  
 
 Evaluation of the effectiveness of innovation policies has been conducted during 
the last 30 years. A broad range of evaluation methods is applied in the quantitative 
evaluation of innovation policy. These methods can be divided into two categories - 
structural and non-structural models. The former adopt a modelling strategy of 
developing a system of equations to reflect two processes: the selection process by 
government agencies; and the innovation process within firms. These models can be 
estimated by applying an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach (such as 2SLS and 
Heckman model) and/or selection models (such as the Heckit model and endogenous 
switching selection models). Their main advantage over non-structural models is the 
ability to control for both observed and unobserved firm characteristics. Conversely, 
non-structural models are characterized by modelling only the innovation process (the 
outcome equation) without explicitly accounting for the selection process. Among these, 
matching estimators are the most applied evaluation method. The main drawback of 
matching is inability to control for unobservables.  
 
 The main research question in the quantitative evaluation is whether public 
measures induce additional effects (additionality hypothesis) or if firms substitute their 
private investment with public funding (crowding out hypothesis). By far, the most 
investigated issue is the impact of public support programmes on firms' innovation input 
(input additionality). Notwithstanding a large number of empirical studies, empirical 
evidence on input additionality remains inconclusive, although evidence of a positive 
treatment effect seems to prevail (García-Quevedo, 2004; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). 
In addition to input additionality, more recently the focus of empirical studies has 
shifted to output additionality, and most recently, to behavioural additionality. With 
respect to the former, the empirical evidence is qualitatively very similar to that on input 
additionality. Namely, although most studies find a positive treatment effect, overall the 
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empirical evidence is still mixed. Currently, only empirical evidence on behavioural 
additionality seems to provide a clear picture of positive, additional treatment effects. 
However, the main issue with this body of evidence is that all studies apply matching 
estimators, without attempting to conduct any robustness check by applying other 
evaluation methods, and particularly without applying sensitivity analysis. A lack of 
sensitivity analysis in studies applying matching estimators is endemic, thus seriously 
hampering, among other factors, the reliability of empirical findings. In addition, the 
literature on evaluation methodology suggests that less sophisticated methods yield 
more favourable effects of innovation policies (OECD, 2007; Greene, 2009).  
 
 The most recent trend in European innovation policy is a shifting focus towards 
a systemic innovation policy, that would consider broader, social and environmental 
effects of innovation. A necessity to design and implement a systemic innovation policy 
is accompanied by a necessity to develop and conduct systemic policy evaluation. 
Although these considerations are at early stage of development among scholars and 
policy makers, one recommendation is already put forward regarding policy evaluation; 
namely, that all three types of additionality should be explored in an integrated approach 
(Bach and Matt, 2005; Gӧk and Edler, 2012; Magro and Wilson, 2013). Our review of 
empirical studies shows that this practice is slowly gaining grounds and the most recent 
studies (e.g. Cerulli and Potí, 2008; Herrera et al., 2010; Alecke et al., 2012; Herrera 
and Sánchez-Gonzáles, 2012) are not solely focusing on exploring input additionality.  
 
 The research objectives of this thesis are related to above discussion. We do not 
investigate input additionality for several reasons. First, the dataset used in the 
following chapter does not contain information on firms' R&D expenditures. Second, all 
three datasets used in this thesis contain only a binary measure of public subsidies, thus 
preventing us from distinguishing between private (net) R&D expenditures and the 
amount of subsidy (Cerulli, 2010). Third, as the focus of the thesis is on SMEs, the 
literature suggests that these firms either invest in R&D to a lesser degree than do large 
firms, or that their R&D efforts are informal, particularly in firms without a formal 
R&D department (Lefebvre and Lefebvre, 1993; Hӧlzl, 2009; Ortega-Argilés et al., 
2009). However, in line with suggestions on systemic evaluation, we investigate output 
and behavioural additionality of SMEs across Europe. Another novelty of the research 
is the application of structural models estimated by selection models. According to 
Cerulli (2010), in the near future, empirical research might be directed towards an 
145 
 
increased application of structural models, although non-structural, most notably, 
matching estimators will remain a relevant evaluation method.  
 
 Finally, in this chapter, major limitations in the quantitative evaluation of 
innovation policy have been noted. Following Cerulli (2010), the preferred approach to 
evaluating public support is 'measurement over theory', that is, the dominance of 
empirical analysis over theory. Furthermore, the issue of data availability that is 
widespread in empirical studies, and this issue encompasses a number of data 
limitations. First, the lack of longitudinal data prevents empirical studies of medium- 
and long-term impacts of public interventions. Moreover, the availability of panel data 
would enable the application of estimators that can adequately treat the simultaneity and 
selection bias arising from participation in public support measures. Second, a lack of 
data on the amount of subsidies restricts the analysis of potential partial crowding out 
effects. In addition, input additionality cannot be properly modelled and investigated 
without knowing the size of support measures. Finally, the available data, particularly 
large-scale datasets such as the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), do not contain 
any information about the selection mechanisms, contributing to a lack of knowledge 
about the selection process (Aerts et al., 2006; Cerulli, 2010; Grilli and Murtinu, 2011). 
Internationally comparable empirical studies are scarce, as access to the CIS data is 
restricted to the Eurostat Safe Centre in Luxembourg or the anonymized data available 
on CD-ROM, which do not include all the countries conducting the CIS survey.  
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4.1 Introduction  
 
This Chapter reports the findings on the effectiveness of public innovation support 
programmes for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in traditional manufacturing 
industries. Throughout the European Union, there are around 400 such programmes. 
Yet, in the absence of best practice evaluation, they are of unknown effectiveness, 
which precludes identification and spreading of best practice (OECD, 2007, pp.11 and 
27; also, pp.50 and 52; see also Lenihan et al., 2007). Responding to this lacuna, the 
European Commission’s DG-Research commissioned the multi-methods GPrix 
project.
58
 The quantitative dimension of the evaluation required a new questionnaire 
survey. This Chapter reports the econometric analysis of the survey database, which 
informed the main GPrix policy recommendations.  
 
 In recent years, empirical analysis of the impact of public support on firms' 
innovative activities has been mainly concerned with additionality/crowding out. Most 
empirical studies investigate input additionality, i.e. the effect of subsidies on firms' 
R&D expenditure, as discussed in Section 3.6.1. The analysis in this Chapter, in 
contrast, focuses on output additionality, by which we mean the effect of subsidies on 
firms' innovation: operational innovations (product, process, marketing and 
organisational innovations);
59
 and innovative sales (sales resulting from product and/or 
process innovations) (see Section 3.6.2). 
 
 The main challenge to innovation policy evaluation is the potential endogeneity 
of programme participation and its corollary, selection bias. Firms’ innovation and a 
receipt of public subsidies are likely to be codetermined, because both are influenced 
not only by the observable characteristics of firms (those available to researchers such 
as measures of firm size) but also by unobservable characteristics (those generally not 
available to researchers such as management quality) (see Section 3.5). In principle 
(Curran and Storey, 2002), support may be endogenous to innovation either because 
firms that are more innovative are more likely to apply for a subsidy (self-selection of 
firms) and/or firms that are more innovative are more likely to receive a subsidy 
                                                          
58
 The GPrix project research and corresponding policy recommendations are all described and available 
from the project website: http://www.gprix.eu/ (under the “Reports” tab).  
59
 For these definitions, see the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005). 
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(government agencies select firms for participation by "cream skimming").
60
 In either 
case, favourable (unfavourable) observable and/or unobservable characteristics may 
increase (decrease) both firms’ participation in support programmes and their 
innovation behaviour. This introduces selection bias into programme evaluation. If 
evaluators assume that public funding is exogenous with respect to firms’ innovation 
behaviour then they will mistakenly attribute influences arising from underlying 
observable and unobservable firm characteristics to programme participation, which 
causes the impact of programme participation to be overestimated.  
 
 To address programme endogeneity and consequent selection bias in policy 
evaluation, various empirical strategies are employed. The major distinction between 
them lies in the treatment of the unobservable heterogeneity of firms (see Section 3.5). 
Matching methods, which are most commonly used, can only control for observables 
(see Section 5.3.1 for a detailed discussion on matching estimators), whereas selection 
models control for both selection on observables and selection on unobservables 
(Cerulli and Potí, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2013). Our preferred approach is 
the selection model supplemented by matching estimates as a robustness check.  
 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly surveys sources of 
potential government failure in innovation policy that, together, suggest reasons why 
public support programmes may fail to achieve additionality. Section 4.3 examines the 
methodology, model and the data. Section 4.4 discusses the results. Section 4.5 
concludes with policy recommendations.  
 
4.2 Government failure in innovation policy  
 
Many empirical studies
61
 note that governments might follow a "picking winners" 
strategy (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Nooteboom and Stam, 2008; Zúñiga -
Vicente et al., 2014), but empirical evidence suggest that the effects of various 
programmes are, at best, rather small (see Section 3.6). In this Section, we consider 
reasons for the lack of substantial additionality - even a crowding out effect - of public 
support. As Stiglitz and Wallsten (1999, p. 58) note: 'Ironically, underlying the current 
                                                          
60
 The terms "cream skimming", "cherry-picking" and "picking winners" are synonyms.  
61
 Several studies empirically confirm this argument (Heijs, 2003; Cantner and Kosters, 2009; Hussinger, 
2008). 
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drive for private-public partnerships is the widespread belief that government is not very 
effective in choosing good projects (i.e., picking winners) and managing research.' 
 
 The rationale for the provision of support measures arises from the occurrence of 
market failures. However, public interventions to mitigate market inefficiency can be 
impaired by various "government failures" (Nooteboom and Stam, 2008; Stiglitz and 
Wallsten, 1999; Wallsten, 2000). Firstly, due to measurement difficulties and 
asymmetric information, public agencies are hampered in selecting those firms with 
promising innovative projects that would not be undertaken without public support. 
Secondly, public agencies might be captured by the private interests of lobby groups. 
Thirdly, even in the presence of perfect information and making decisions 
independently, public choice theory suggests that public agencies would have incentives 
to “cream skim” – i.e. to subsidise those firms likely to do research and innovate in any 
case - to maximise apparent commercial returns and so justify and perpetuate agency 
resources. Fourthly, according to Wallsten (2000) adverse selection of inframarginal 
projects (those that generate positive private returns and would be undertaken by firms 
even without a public intervention) rather than marginal innovation projects (those that 
are not profitable for firms yet entail social benefits) arises because risk-averse 
governments fear loss of electoral support as a consequence of selecting programmes 
with higher probability of failure.  
 
 Finally, Crespi and Antonelli (2012) suggest another form of government failure 
related to asymmetric information. The so called "Matthew effect" arises when public 
agencies select firms based on their previous record of programme participation. In 
particular, programme managers have difficulties in assessing applications with a low 
level of scientific content and may accordingly rely on the firm's past record of 
programme participation. Together, these forms of potential government failure lead us 
to hypothesise that the estimated representative effects of public support measures to 
increase private innovation may be disappointing compared to the effects typically 
claimed by public agencies. 
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4.3 Methodology  
 
4.3.1 The model and estimation  
 
This section sets out a parsimonious model for econometric estimation of the innovation 
effects of programme participation on SMEs. This model was first set out publicly in 
Deliverable 1.3 of the GPrix project (GPrix, 2010b, pp. 11-21). The prepublication of 
models helps to assure the validity of results from subsequent estimation. That is, by 
setting out our model in advance of data analysis, we limit our options with respect to 
specification search, which is a well-known source of publication or selection bias in 
econometric literatures (Stanley, 2005). 
 
 The first problem to address is that there are many potential control variables 
(Becheikh et al., 2006, identify over 60 determinants of innovation) (see Section 1.4.2). 
Moreover, even within disciplines, let alone between them, there is no “canonical” 
model of the determinants of firms’ innovation. In the absence of such a model, a 
parsimonious model is specified as follows. 
 Dummy variables are used wherever possible to aggregate the effects of the many 
possible individual effects. Country dummy variables control for all country effects 
(i.e., all those variables associated with the “national innovation systems” approach 
as well as with other institutional effects and with macroeconomic effects); Regional 
dummies substitute for all regional effects (i.e., all those variables associated with 
the “regional innovation systems” approach); and Industry dummies substitute for all 
industry effects (i.e., all those variables associated with the “technological regimes” 
approach, e.g., technological opportunities and appropriability conditions, and 
demand conditions, etc). 
 Firm level “quasi” fixed effects (or initial conditions) are used to capture otherwise 
unobservable firm and ownership effects. Here we adapt an approach suggested by 
Blundell et al. (1995); namely, we propose aggregating most time invariant (or, at 
least, “slow moving”) firm-level and ownership influences on innovation by  
‘including a variable in the regression that approximates the build-up of knowledge 
of the firm at its point of entry into the sample’ (p. 338). According to Blundell et al. 
(1995, p. 338), such a proxy for ‘the “permanent” capacities of companies 
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successfully to commercialise new products and processes’ is designed to capture 
the aggregate effect of firm-level time invariant influences on innovation. 
 
 In this approach, there is a crucial assumption; namely, that the variables 
substituted by country, regional and industry fixed effects, or by firm “quasi” fixed 
effects, are time invariant or, at least, “slow moving” (Blundell et al., 1995). Our 
intention to evaluate programmes recently undertaken by firms (from 2005 to 2009) 
helps to make this assumption more reasonable than if we were taking a very long 
period into consideration.  
 
 The basic model has two equations: the second equation models the participation 
decision (the probability that a firm will participate in an innovation support 
programme); and the first equation is an innovation model, which estimates the 
innovation effect on firms of participating in an innovation support programme 
conditional on both other influences on innovation and the probability of participating in 
an innovation support programme. 
 
              ̂   ̂                ̂        ̂        
  ̂                   ̂          ̂ 
          ̂        ̂     
(4.1) 
 
 
              
  ̂   ̂        ̂          ̂        
           ̂          ̂           ̂ 
       ̂            ̂     
 
(4.2) 
 Subscript i indexes each firm in the sample 1…n, where n is the number of 
firms; ^ indicates “to be estimated”; C and I represent the intercept in Equations 4.1 and 
4.2 respectively; the  coefficient measures the innovation effect of programme 
participation; the  and  coefficients measure, respectively, the innovation and 
participation effects of control variables commonly identified in the literature (firm size, 
market power and the proportion of turnover exported); the k1  and   vectors contain 
coefficients that measure, respectively, the innovation and participation effects of 1k 
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vectors of Industry, Region and Country dummies, where subscripts I, R and C index 
industries, regions and countries, respectively; the k1  and   vectors contain 
coefficients that measure, respectively, the innovation and participation effects of 1k 
vectors of firm level ‘quasi’ fixed effects; the k1  vector contains coefficients that 
measure the participation effects of a 1k vector of indicators of firms’ views on factors 
promoting or impeding programme participation (Obstacle), which are the anticipated 
identifying variables; and u and  are the error terms, which capture the unobserved 
influences on the respective dependent variables. Full definitions and descriptive 
statistics for each variable are presented in Appendix II, Table A2.1 and A2.2. 
 
 An augmented model is specified by including a variable Collaboration (=1 if 
the firm responded “yes” to the question “From 2005 to 2009 did your enterprise co-
operate on any of your innovation activities with other enterprises or institutions?”; 
otherwise zero) (see Appendix II, Table A2.1). 
 
 The independent variables must include (for econometric reasons) all the control 
variables from the outcome Equation 4.1 together with at least one variable to identify 
Equation 4.2.
62
 This identifying variable (Obstacle) must influence the programme 
participation decision but not the innovation decision. From the theoretical perspective, 
factors impeding programme participation have a direct effect on the probability of 
treatment assignment, but have no impact on firms' innovative activities, as they are 
specifically associated with the selection process, not the innovation process. For this 
purpose, the survey included a question related only to programme participation. 
Whereas previous questions related directly to firms’ own, particular innovation 
behaviour, Question 31 asked firms about SME needs in general: “What are the specific 
needs for SMEs to enable them to participate in innovation support programmes?” In all 
18 parts of this question (see Appendix II, Table A2.2), the corresponding indicator 
variable was defined as 1 if the response was “Very high importance” and 0 otherwise 
(“No importance”, “Low importance”, “Important” or “High importance”). Table A2.2 
demonstrates that most of these display widely varying proportions between participants 
and nonparticipants.  
 
                                                          
62
 In practice, identifying variables may be desirable rather than essential. Lokshin and Sajaia (2011, p. 
381) report that their estimator is ‘relatively robust in terms of identification of the model’.   
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 Equation 4.1 is constructed to test the hypothesis that whether or not a firm 
innovates depends on whether or not the firm participates in a support programme. This 
makes Participation a switching variable: according to the hypothesis, if the firm 
participates (Participation = 1) then the firm enters a state in which innovation is more 
likely (Regime 1); if the firm does not participate (= 0) then the firm remains in a state 
less conducive to innovation (Regime 0).  
 
 Because the outcome variable, Innovation, can exist in one of two regimes, 
equation 1 should be estimated over both regimes 1 and 0, in which case Participation 
disappears as a separately estimated variable. Instead of the single Equation 4.1, we now 
have two equations, 4.1a and 4.1b, differentiated by an additional subscript: 1 for 
Regime 1 (all firms that participated in a support programme – i.e. Participation = 1); 
and 0 for Regime 0 (all firms that did not participate in a support programme – i.e. 
Participation = 0). Equation 4.1a estimates the probability of innovating for firms that 
participated in a support programme, whereas Equation 4.1b estimates the probability of 
innovating for firms that did not participate in a support programme. Equations 4.1a and 
4.1b, together with Equation 4.2 are estimated simultaneously by the full information 
maximum likelihood estimator (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011). 
Regime 1 (Participation =1; i.e. participants) 
               ̂   ̂          ̂            ̂          
            ̂            ̂  
           ̂          ̂      
(4.1a) 
 
Regime 0 (Participation =0; i.e. nonparticipants) 
               ̂   ̂          ̂            ̂          
            ̂            ̂  
           ̂          ̂      
(4.1b) 
 
 This switching process is endogenous if unobserved influences on Innovation 
(ui1 in Equation 4.1a and/or ui0 in Equation 4.1b) are correlated with unobserved 
influences on Participation (εi in Equation 4.2). In our three equation model (4.2, 4.1a 
and 4.1b), a bivariate outcome (Innovation) is partitioned into two regimes by a 
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potentially endogenous bivariate switching variable (Participation). The three equations 
are linked by both common observed variables and, potentially, by common unobserved 
variables. The correlations between the unobservables are denoted as follows:  
 between the error terms of the selection equation (εi) and of the outcome 
equation in regime 1 (ui1), ρ1 (rho1); 
 between the error terms of the selection equation (εi) and of the outcome 
equation in regime 0 (ui0), ρ0 (rho0); and  
 between the error terms of the two outcome regimes, ρ10. 
 
 The two correlations rho1 and rho0 are particularly important, because they give 
insight into whether or not the selection process is endogenous. If rho1 and rho0 are 
both zero, then the error terms are independent across equations, which “does not allow 
for selection on unobservables” to be related to the innovation outcome equations (4.1a 
and 4.1b) (Aakvik et al., 2005, p. 36). In this case, the selection process can be treated 
as exogenous.  
 
 The appropriate estimator for our model was developed by Aakvik et al. (2005) 
and has been made available as the switch_probit command for STATA by Lokshin and 
Sajaia (2011). The estimated switching probit model can be used to generate 
counterfactual probabilities of innovation for firms in different regimes of programme 
participation (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009, pp. 489 and 503). In turn, these enable 
statistics to be calculated that enable the effect of programme participation to be defined 
and measured “in terms of impact evaluation” (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009, p. 492). 
Three such statistics are of interest in the present analysis (see Section 3.5). 
 
 The effect of the treatment on the treated (TT) statistic 'estimates the effect of the 
programme on the entire group of people who participate in it' (Aakvik et al., 2005, 
p. 22). In the present context, TT is the difference between the predicted probability 
of innovation for a participating firm and the probability of innovation had that firm 
not participated (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009, p. 490). The average TT effect 
(ATT) is obtained by averaging TT over the subsample of participating firms 
(Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009).  
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 The average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) estimates the effect of a 
programme on the firms who did not participate (the control group) (Lokshin and 
Glinskaya, 2009).  
 The average treatment effect (ATE) is a sample estimate of the effect of programme 
participation on the innovation of a firm randomly selected from the population 
(Aakvik et al., 2005, p. 20).   
 
 
4.3.2 Data  
 
 
The population of interest is innovative or potentially innovative SMEs in traditional 
manufacturing industries. Resources dictated sampling from seven EU regions 
characterised by high employment shares in six traditional industries.
63
 The sample 
includes 312 SMEs, comprising 145 participating and 167 non-participating firms. Data 
were gathered in 2010 from seven EU countries -  the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands - and cover the period from 2005-2009. 
Detailed descriptive statistics on the survey sample are presented in Tables A2.2, A2.3 
and A2.4 (see Appendix II). The GPrix survey sample has the desired characteristics; 
namely: a good balance between participants and non-participants; and similar 
characteristics between participants and non-participants with respect to demographic 
and market characteristics.  
 
 Table A2.2 contains descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis.
64
 These are reported separately for participants and nonparticipants in support 
programmes for all firms in the database that satisfy the standard EU definition of SMEs 
(including micro enterprises). Participants are more likely to introduce innovation than 
nonparticipants, for all aggregate types of innovation as well as for each of the 
disaggregated categories. For example, for aggregate product innovation - i.e. product 
                                                          
63
 For evidence that the regions selected for the GPrix project represent the diversity of regional situations 
concerning traditional industry in the EU, see GPrix Deliverable 2.2 (2012a) http://www.gprix.eu/. GPrix 
Deliverable 3.3 (2012b) gives detail and examples of how the sample was obtained; see 
http://www.gprix.eu/. 
64
 The name of each variable is included as it appears in the dataset to enable the appropriate variable(s) 
to be identified in the dataset; hence, replication.  
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innovation in both goods and services - 93 per cent of participants engage in product 
innovation, compared to 73 per cent of the nonparticipants.  
 
 Turning to the independent variables in the model, strikingly similar as well as 
different characteristics can be observed for participants and nonparticipants. 
Participating and non-participating SMEs have the same average number of employees. 
Micro and small firms also have a similar average number of employees in both 
categories, whereas medium-sized participating firms have, on average, 5 employees 
more than non-participating firms. Furthermore, non-participating firms perceive a 
slightly higher level of competitive pressure than do participating firms (22% of 
participants and 25% of non-participants experience “very strong” competitive pressure, 
which is the highest category, Q4t_5). Industries included in our sample exhibit 
differences with respect to firms’ participation in support programmes: leather (Q3t_1), 
textiles (Q3t_3), automotive (Q3t_5) and food products (Q3t_6) have a higher 
proportion of non-participating firms; whereas ceramics (Q3t_2) and metallurgy 
(Q3t_4) have a higher proportion of participating firms.  
 
 A significantly higher proportion of participating firms invested fewer resources 
in innovative activities in the past (Q12t_1) than they do currently (52% of participants 
and 29% of non-participants). This variable is one of five included in the model to 
control for initial conditions. The other four variables included in the model to control 
for initial conditions indicate firms' perceptions of their innovative capacities with 
respect to different types of innovation in 2005. For product innovation, 31 per cent of 
participating firms perceive their past innovative capacities as above average or leading 
(Prodin_2005), compared to 24 per cent of non-participating firms. For process 
innovation, the difference is even higher; 27 per cent of participating firms and 17 per 
cent of non-participating firms indicated their innovative capacities as above average or 
leading (Procin_2005). However, for non-technological (organisational and marketing) 
innovation, there is no substantial difference in past innovative capacities between those 
participating and non-participating firms that perceive their past capacities as lagging 
(Q16_3t_1 and Q16_4t_1 respectively). Considering export activities (Q5_export), 
participating firms are slightly more export-oriented (23 per cent) relative to non-
participating firms (17 per cent). Participating firms have greater propensity to 
collaboration (Q18_yes) than non-participating firms (84% and 33 % respectively).  
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 With respect to obstacles to participating in support programmes, a higher 
number of participating firms indicate each category of administrative needs to be of 
very high importance (Q31_1t_5, Q31_2t_5, Q31_3t_5, Q31_4t_5, Q31_5t_5 and 
Q31_6t_5). However, almost the same proportion of participating and non-participating 
firms recognizes financial needs as an obstacle to participation (Q31_7t_5, Q31_8t_5 
and Q31_9t_5). Further, a higher proportion of participating firms suggest that internal 
as well as external needs of SMEs are of very high importance (Q31_10t_5, Q31_11t_5, 
Q31_12t_5, Q31_13t_5, Q31_14t_5, Q31_15t_5, Q31_16t_5 and Q31_17t_5). Only for 
appropriate general economic conditions (Q31_18t_5) does almost the same proportion 
of participating and non-participating firms perceive a very high obstacle to 
participation.  
 
 The balance between total participants and non-participants is as follows: 
participants, 46 per cent; non-participants, 54 per cent. By country, the range is from 
Germany (66%; 34%) to the UK (34%; 66%) (Table A2.3). Pleasingly, both participants 
and non-participants have similar characteristics with respect to demographics – e.g. the 
number of employees in 2009 and the mean number of employees in micro, small and 
medium- sized firms – and economic position (e.g. market power/strength of 
competition) (Table A2.2). Conversely, as expected, there are systematic differences 
between participants and non-participants in all categories of innovation. Moreover, 
formal balancing tests – referred to in Section 4.4.3 below as part of the robustness 
checking – confirmed that most variables are balanced even before matching. In sum, 
the GPrix survey sampling strategy resulted in a sample well balanced between 
participants and non-participants with similar demographic and market characteristics. 
These similar characteristics are necessary for the non-participants to be a suitable 
comparison group. 
 
 Country dummy variables are included in the model to control for country and 
regional-specific firm characteristics. Table A2.3 presents the number of participating 
and non-participating firms by country. Germany and Spain have much higher 
proportions of participating than non-participating firms. However, Italy, Netherlands 
and the UK have a smaller share of participating firms than non-participating firms, 
while Portugal and France have similar proportions.  
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 Table A2.4 presents data on innovative firms that have received support 
measures. The sample contains similar numbers of participating and non-participating 
firms in each category of innovation output. For each category and sub-category of 
innovation outcomes, both operational (product, process, organisational and marketing 
innovation) and economic (proportions of sales attributed to new or improved products 
and/or processes) outcomes, the number of innovative participating firms is around half 
of the total number of innovative firms.  
 
 To investigate whether or not there are extreme differences in the innovation 
behaviour of firms between either the countries or the industries appearing in our 
dataset, we conducted one-way ANOVA analysis on each of the aggregate categories of 
operational innovation investigated in our econometric analysis. 
Table 4.1. Tests of differences in mean percentages of firms undertaking different 
types of innovation (1) between countries and (2) between industries: p -values 
from one-way ANOVA model F-tests 
 Product 
innovation 
Process 
innovation 
Organisational 
innovation 
Marketing 
innovation 
By country 0.35 0.02 0.07 0.19 
By industry 0.37 0.04 0.07 0.00 
Note: p0.5 (p0.1) indicates no statistically significant difference at the five per cent (one per cent) 
level. 
 
 Table 4.1 reports the p-values from the F-tests of the null that the means are the 
same across, respectively, countries and industries: by country there is a significant 
difference in firms’ behaviour only in relation to process innovation; and by industry in 
relation to both process and marketing innovations. However, the significant country 
variation for process innovation is driven entirely by the Netherlands; without the 
Netherlands, the null of no significant difference in country means cannot be rejected 
(p= 0.21). Similarly, the significant industry variation in process innovation is driven by 
the leather industry (excluding leather, p=0.69); and in marketing innovation by the 
ceramics and textile industries (excluding these, p= 0.81). Overall, variation in firms’ 
innovation behaviour varies more by industry than by country. To anticipate, this is 
reflected in our econometric results by the general lack of significance of country 
variables and by the more common significance of industry dummies. 
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4.4 Results  
 
First, we present results from estimating our baseline model, focusing on the 
programme effects (Table 4.2). Then we report results from two major robustness 
checks: (1) from estimating our augmented model for the same 20 outcome variables 
(Table 4.3); and (2) from estimating the baseline model using Nearest Neighbour (NN) 
matching without replacement and with a caliper (Table 4.5). 
 
4.4.1 Baseline model  
 
 
From the perspective of evaluating the impact of publicly funded support programmes 
on SME innovation in traditional manufacturing industry, the most important results are 
the treatment effects defined in Section 4.4.1: ATE; ATT; and ATU. The validity of 
these postestimation statistics depends on the validity of the regressions that are used to 
generate the counterfactuals from which they are calculated.  
 
 The model set out in equations 4.1a, 4.1b and 4.2 was estimated separately for 
20 dependent variables: 16 binary variables indicating whether or not firms enacted a 
particular type of operational innovation (product, process, organisational and 
marketing innovation together with sub-categories of each); and four indicating 
economic outcomes (proportions of sales attributed to new or improved products and/or 
processes - innovative sales) (see Tables A2.1 and A2.2 for variable descriptions and 
descriptive statistics).  
 In each of the 20 cases, we undertook a testing down procedure to achieve 
parsimonious models consistent with both valid and efficient estimation. This is similar 
to Aakvik et al. (2005, p. 26), who do not include all variables from their initial 
specification in their final model. Because we begin with a theoretically guided and pre-
published parsimonious model, we were cautious in deleting variables. Hence, rather 
than simply deleting variables not estimated at conventional levels of statistical 
significance, we were guided by the paramount importance of the statistical validity of 
the model. The typical results of our testing down procedure were threefold. 
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 In all 20 preferred models, two or three Question 31 variables proved to be 
satisfactory instruments (see Section 4.3.1 above). 
 The country dummies were typically found to be insignificant at conventional 
levels in the outcome equations, whereas in the selection equation only two – for 
Germany and Spain – were significant influences. Some insight into the reason 
for this can be gained by consulting Table A2.2. The base (omitted) country is 
the UK, which has a lower proportion of participants than nonparticipants. 
Hence, both Germany and Spain with much higher proportions of participants 
provide a stronger contrast to the UK than do the other countries. Accordingly, 
in the models where the Germany and Spain dummies influence the selection 
process but not innovation outcomes these become additional identifying 
variables. 
 
Otherwise, all variables in the parsimonious model outlined above are included in all 20 
final specifications. The final specifications differ only according to variations in the 
identifying variables and, in the few cases where these display statistical significance, 
inclusion of one or two country dummies in the output equations.  
 
 Baseline models for all four aggregate categories of operational innovations are 
reported in full in Table A2.4 (see Appendix II). Each estimated model is the platform 
for deriving the post estimation treatment effects. For reasons of space, we do not 
interpret the estimated models; however, a representative model is interpreted as 
follows. As an example, we interpret the results for the model with the dependent 
variable “product innovation in both goods and services (combined)”. First, the 
statistically significant coefficients will be discussed. In the selection equation, the 
coefficient on one of the variables denoting the initial conditions
65
 (whether a firm 
devoted fewer, the same or more resources to innovation five years ago, variable 
Q12t_1) is statistically significant at the one per cent level. The initial conditions have a 
positive and significant effect on participation in support programmes; i.e. those firms 
which devoted more resources to innovation in 2009 than they did five years previously 
are more likely to participate in support programmes. As we are estimating the 
endogenous selection model, the model should include at least one identifying variable, 
                                                          
65
 Initial conditions - or quasi firm fixed effects - control for firm's innovation capacities at the beginning 
of the sample period (see Section 4.3.1). 
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i.e. the instrument. Four identifying variables are included in the model for combined 
product innovation: two country dummy variables, for Germany and Spain; and 
indicators for two parts of question 31 referring to different specific needs for SMEs in 
relation to programme participation (the first part indicates the importance of adequate 
external assistance and guidance after the support project, Q31_17t_5, and the second 
part indicates the importance of appropriate general economic conditions, Q31_18t_5). 
Both coefficients on the country DVs are statistically significant (Germany at the 5% 
level and Spain at the 1% level). Although the indicator on appropriate general 
economic conditions (Q31_18t_5) is statistically insignificant, it was included in the 
model; otherwise, the model would not converge. Finally, the indicator for adequate 
external assistance and guidance after the project (Q31_17t_5) has a positive and 
significant impact on programme participation.  
 
 In the output equation for participating firms (regime 1), high competitive 
pressure (Q4t_5) has a negative and significant effect on product innovation, which 
suggests that firms facing strong competition are less likely to introduce product 
innovation. Furthermore, two variables used to proxy initial conditions (i.e. innovation 
capabilities regarding product and process innovation, variables Prodin_2005 and 
Procin_2005 respectively) have a positive and significant impact on product innovation. 
Firms with leading innovation capabilities in the past are more likely to engage in 
product innovation. However, initial conditions related to organisational innovation 
(Q16_4t_1) have a negative effect on product innovation. Sectoral DVs (Q3t_2, Q3t_3, 
Q3t_4, Q3t_5 and Q3t_6) are all statistically significant, except for the leather industry 
(Q3t_1). Finally, exporting firms (Q5_export) are more likely to engage in product 
innovation (the coefficient is significant at the 5% level).  
 
 For non-participating firms (regime 0), three variables have a significant effect 
on the probability of product innovation. Initial conditions related to the resources 
devoted to innovation (Q12t_1) have a positive and significant effect on product 
innovation, which indicates that development of innovation capacities increases the 
probability of engaging in product innovation for both participating and non-
participating firms. Similar to participating firms, non-participating firms with leading 
innovation capabilities for product innovation in the past (Prodin_2005) are more likely 
to innovate. However, leading innovation capabilities in organisational innovation 
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(Q16_4t_1) have a negative impact on product innovation, again, for both participating 
and non-participating firms. 
 
 For each model, the estimated coefficients are used to calculate the programme 
effects: ATT; ATE; and ATU. These estimated effects are presented in Table 4.2, 
columns 7-14 (following Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011, standard errors are calculated by 
bootstrapping). In Table A2.2, the raw or unconditional means suggest that both overall 
and in each separate category of innovation participating firms innovate more than do 
non-participating firms. Yet the estimates of ATT, ATE and ATU tell a very different 
story, which suggests the importance of controlling for selection (Aakvik et al., 2005).  
 
 The statistical properties of the 20 estimated models are as follows. First, 
columns 3 and 4 report the correlation coefficients, rho1 and rho0. In 7 from 20 cases, 
one of the two correlation coefficients has a value of absolute unity. In other cases, 
correlation coefficients are estimated imprecisely (i.e. with relatively large standard 
errors). Following Aakvik et al. (2005, p. 37) we report the border values ( 1 and -1) as 
problematic; yet, with respect to the latter, we are “reluctant” to disregard large 
correlation coefficients "even if imprecisely estimated”, because this would be to 
disregard the potential endogeneity of the selection process. Secondly, the Wald test 
(reported in column 6) should reject the null of the independence of the selection and 
output equations. We find that in 16 from 20 cases the Wald test rejects the null of no 
selection bias due to unobservables at the 10 per cent level or lower (following Lokshin 
and Sajaia, 2011, p. 379, with respect to the size of the test); the other four are not 
sufficiently overwhelming to disregard the potential endogeneity of the selection 
process,
66
 which is grounded in theory and supported by the correlation coefficients, 
rho1 and rho0.  
                                                          
66
 The respective p-values are: 0.125; 0.140; 0.146 and  0.151. 
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Table 4.2. Baseline model - programme participation effects on innovation outputs: the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the 
average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and the average treatment effect (ATE) (Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications) 
Output dependent 
variable 
rho1 rho0 
Problem 
with a 
model? 
Wald 
test 
(p 
value) 
Average treatment effect on 
the treated - ATT 
Average treatment effect on 
the untreated  
- ATU 
Average treatment effect 
- ATE 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
Bootstr. 
SEs 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
Bootstr. 
SEs 
No 
of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
Bootstr. 
SEs 
Product innovation in 
goods 
0.300 
(0.422) 
0.792 
(0.159) 
NO 0.0713 104 -0.076*** 0.021 132 0.169*** 0.031 236 0.061*** 0.019 
Product innovation in 
services 
-1 
0.846 
(0.263) 
rho1=-1 0.0002 96 -0.196*** 0.037 123 0.542*** 0.026 219 0.228*** 0.018 
Product innovation - 
combined 
-0.999 
(0.004) 
0.871 
(0.417) 
NO 0.0232 108 -0.011 0.018 134 0.224*** 0.025 242 0.118*** 0.015 
Process innovation - 
processes for 
manufacturing goods 
-0.694 
(1.832) 
0.754 
(0.305) 
Wald test 
p=0.1252 
0.1252 105 -0.046** 0.020 132 0.359*** 0.021 237 0.180*** 0.013 
Process innovation - 
logistics, delivery or 
distribution processes 
 
-0.197 
(0.474) 
0.829 
(0.203) 
Wald test 
p=0.1402 
0.1402 104 -0.426*** 0.027 139 0.129*** 0.024 243 -0.113*** 0.017 
Process innovation - 
support processes 
 
-0.046 
(0.376) 
0.957 
(0.059) 
NO 0.0305 108 -0.299*** 0.011 141 0.057*** 0.014 249 -0.097*** 0.006 
Process innovation – 
combined 
-0.406 
(0.588) 
0.999 
(0.002) 
NO 0.0183 116 -0.078*** 0.010 145 0.224*** 0.018 261 0.084*** 0.010 
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Organisational 
innovation - new 
business practices for 
organising procedures 
-0.207 
(0.403) 
1 rho0=1 0.0147 110 -0.378*** 0.016 138 0.140*** 0.025 248 -0.089*** 0.013 
Organisational 
innovation - new 
methods of organising 
work responsibilities 
-0.768 
(0.284) 
0.802 
(0.195) 
NO 0.0293 113 -0.398*** 0.023 143 0.460*** 0.018 256 0.082*** 0.017 
Organisational 
innovation - new 
methods of organising 
external relations 
-0.469 
(0.291) 
-0.999 
(0.003) 
NO 0.0091 105 0.526*** 0.015 131 0.458*** 0.017 236 0.492*** 0.010 
Organisational 
innovation – combined 
-0.642 
(0.330) 
0.728 
(0.260) 
NO 0.0488 115 -0.160*** 0.013 140 0.314*** 0.018 255 0.102*** 0.011 
Marketing innovation - 
changes to design or 
packaging 
-0.566 
(0.322) 
0.591 
(0.337) 
Wald test 
p=0.1512 
0.1512 105 -0.204*** 0.025 137 0.371*** 0.021 242 0.116*** 0.017 
Marketing innovation - 
new media or 
techniques for product 
promotion 
-0.597 
(0.345) 
0.729 
(0.486) 
NO 0.0964 106 -0.129*** 0.045 137 0.416*** 0.027 243 0.176*** 0.232 
Marketing innovation - 
new methods for sales 
channels 
-1 
0.503 
(0.366) 
rho1=-1 0.0015 108 -0.028 0.037 135 0.694*** 0.026 243 0.374*** 0.021 
Marketing innovation - 
new methods of 
pricing 
-0.711 
(0.229) 
0.104 
(0.628) 
Wald test 
p=0.1463 
0.1463 109 -0.062*** 0.023 139 0.463*** 0.017 248 0.231*** 0.015 
Marketing innovation – 
combined 
-1 
0.440 
(0.493) 
rho1=-1 0.0111 106 -0.068** 0.030 131 0.393*** 0.025 237 0.195*** 0.018 
 
Innovative sales > 5 % 
 
-0.488 
(1.480) 
0.805 
(0.157) 
NO 0.0902 113 -0.088 *** 0.015 137 0.166*** 0.020 250 0.051 *** 0.011 
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Innovative sales > 10 
% 
-1 
0.243 
(0.833) 
rho1=-1 0.0103 110 0.007 0.024 133 0.430*** 0.026 243 0.240*** 0.017 
Innovative sales > 15 
% 
1 
-0.130 
(0.494) 
rho1=-1 0.0102 109 0.113*** 0.029 132 0.569*** 0.022 241 0.363*** 0.017 
Innovative sales > 25 
% 
-1 
-0.200 
(0.813) 
rho1=-1 0.0001 109 0.160*** 0.025 132 0.731*** 0.019 241 0.477*** 0.015 
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In sum, 13 from 20 correlation coefficients and 16 from 20 Wald tests support the 
validity of our estimation approach. Column 5 notes whether or not there are problems 
concerning the statistical validity of the estimated model in either of these respects (9 
from 20 models are satisfactory in both respects).  
  
 In the results for the baseline models, the ATT effect is smaller than the ATE in 
almost every case (19 out of 20 models). For the ATT effect, 16 from 20 estimates are 
negative, of which 14 are significantly different from zero. In sum: 
 
 ATT: the mean of the 20 values is -0.09 with a range from -0.43 to 0.53. 
 
In contrast, for ATE 17 from 20 estimates are positive and statistically significant. In 
sum:  
 
 ATE: the mean of the 20 values is 0.16 with a range from -0.11 to 0.49. 
 
 These results suggest that programme participation typically reduced the 
probability of innovation by programme participants by 9 percentage points but would 
have increased the probability for firms randomly selected from the entire population by 
16 percentage points. Together these results suggest that randomly selected firms would 
benefit more from programme participation than do participants (Aakvik et al., 2005, p. 
48). This implies that selection of SMEs into support programmes is perverse with 
respect to innovation outcomes (Aakvik et al., 2005, p. 41). 
 
 The results for the four categories of innovative sales are somewhat different 
than for operational innovations. For two categories of innovative sales (more than 15% 
and more than 25%), the ATT effect is positive and statistically significant, while the 
dominant pattern of smaller ATT than ATE is maintained. These results might suggest 
that support measures have a positive effect on more innovative firms, when innovative 
activities are proxied by the share of sales from new product and process innovations.   
 
 The finding that the ATT effect is systematically smaller than the ATE effect is 
reflected in the estimates of the ATU effect (see Table 4.2, columns 9-11). For the ATU 
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effect, all 20 estimates are positive and statistically significant. The mean of the 20 
values is 0.36 with a range from 0.06 to 0.73. 
 
 To study the relationship between unobservable characteristics related to 
programme participation and the treatment effects, we interpret the correlation 
coefficients, rho1 and rho0 (Aakvik et al., 2005, pp. 41-42). In 16 of the 20 models, 
rho1 is negative (five statistically significant at 10% or less) and rho0 is positive (ten 
significant); in two, both rho1 and rho0 are negative; in one, both rho1 and rho0 are 
positive; and in one, rho1 is positive and rho0 is negative. As an example of the 
dominant pattern, in the model where the dependent variable is process innovation - 
processes for manufacturing goods or providing services, the correlation between the 
unobservables from the selection equation and the unobservables from the output 
equation for participants (rho1) is -0.694 (although not statistically significant), while 
the correlation between the unobservables from the selection equation and the output 
equation for non-participants (rho0) is 0.754 (and significant). The economic 
interpretation is as follows. The negative rho1 indicates that the unobservable 
characteristics of the firms participating in the support programmes are negatively 
correlated – although not significantly - with the innovative activities; and the positive 
rho0 indicates that unobservable characteristics of the non-participant firms are 
positively correlated with the innovative activities. In other words, firms whose 
unobservable characteristics suggest that they are more likely to participate in the 
support programme are less likely or – taking statistical significance into account – no 
more likely to innovate relative to a random firm from the sample; whereas firms whose 
unobservable characteristics suggest that they are less likely to participate in the support 
programme have a higher propensity to innovate.  
 
 Therefore, the results suggest that the effect of support programmes on 
innovative activities is lower for the firms that are more likely to participate in the 
programmes. As Aakvik et al. (2005, p. 42) note for similar results, albeit in a different 
context, 'selection is perverse on unobservables: treatment effects are the lowest for 
those most likely to participate'. The implication of “perverse selection” is consistent 
with the characteristic contrast between a smaller ATT and a larger ATE identified 
above. 
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4.4.2 Augmented model  
 
The results for the augmented models presented in Table 4.3 show that the ATT effect is 
smaller than the ATE in 13 out of 19 models.
67
 For the ATT effect, 17 from 19 
estimates are negative, of which 15 are significantly different from zero. In sum: 
 
 ATT: the mean of the 19 values is -0.18 with a range from -0.47 to 0.23. 
 
In contrast, for ATE 14 from 19 estimates are positive and statistically significant. In 
sum:  
 ATE: the mean of the 19 values is 0.10 with a range from -0.24 to 0.41. 
 
These results suggest that programme participation typically reduced the probability of 
innovation by programme participants by 18 percentage points but would have 
increased the probability for firms randomly selected from the entire population by 10 
percentage points. 
 
 
                                                          
67
 We do not take into account results for the case where the output variable is product innovation -
combined, as the statistical properties of the model are problematic with respect to the Wald test (p-
value=0.92). 
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Table 4.3. Augmented model- programme participation effects on innovation outputs: the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the 
average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and the average treatment effect (ATE) (Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications) 
Output dependent 
variable 
rho1 rho0 
Problem 
with a 
model? 
Wald 
test  
(p 
value) 
Average treatment effect 
on the treated - ATT 
Average treatment effect on 
the untreated  
- ATU 
Average treatment effect 
- ATE 
No 
of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
Bootstr. 
SEs 
No 
of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
Bootstr. 
SEs 
No 
of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
Bootstr. 
SEs 
Product innovation 
in goods 
0.100 
(0.488 
0.764 
(0.181) 
NO 0.0839 104 -0.028 0.023 129 0.257*** 0.028 233 0.130*** 0.018 
Product innovation 
in services 
-1 
0.507 
(0.933 
rho1=-1 0.0037 97 -0.008 0.041 121 0.551*** 0.027 218 0.311*** 0.024 
Product innovation 
- combined 
-0.999 
(0.000) 
0.300 
(0.598) 
Wald test 
p=0.9173 
0.9173 108 0.127*** 0.028 130 0.001 0.041 238 0.058** 0.026 
Process innovation 
- processes for 
manufacturing 
goods 
-0.400 
(0.481) 
1 rho0=1 0.0032 106 -0.043* 0.023 131 0.323*** 0.026 237 0.153*** 0.016 
Process innovation 
- logistics, delivery 
or distribution 
processes 
 
-0.649 
(0.454) 
1 rho=1 0.0031 97 -0.441*** 0.035 129 0.274*** 0.028 226 -0.051** 0.023 
Process innovation 
- support processes 
 
-0.697 
(0.199) 
0.598 
(0.457) 
NO 0.0689 100 -0.179*** 0.022 129 0.324*** 0.025 229 0.106*** 0.021 
Process innovation 
– combined 
 
-0.984 
(0.056) 
0.990 
(0.013) 
NO 0.0729 116 -0.078*** 0.010 142 0.251*** 0.017 258 0.099*** 0.012 
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Organisational 
innovation - new 
business practices 
for organising 
procedures 
-0.477 
(0.375) 
1 rho=1 0.0083 107 -0.358*** 0.019 131 0.123*** 0.024 238 -0.093*** 0.015 
Organisational 
innovation - new 
methods of 
organising work 
responsibilities 
-0.605 
(0.268) 
1 rho=1 0.0055 105 -0.436*** 0.022 133 0.350*** 0.023 238 -0.003 0.018 
Organisational 
innovation - new 
methods of 
organising external 
relations 
-0.731 
(0.265) 
0.665 
(0.587) 
NO 0.0270 105 -0.123*** 0.028 128 0.553*** 0.019 233 0.250*** 0.018 
Organisational 
innovation – 
combined 
-1 
0.856 
(0.178) 
rho1=-1 0.0065 115 -0.208*** 0.021 137 0.345*** 0.020 252 0.095*** 0.013 
Marketing 
innovation - 
changes to design 
or packaging 
 
1 
0.576 
(0.517) 
rho1=-1 0.0480 102 -0.156*** 0.027 134 -0.278*** 0.020 236 -0.237*** 0.015 
Marketing 
innovation - new 
media or 
techniques for 
product promotion 
-0.700 
(0.298) 
1 rho0=1 0.0002 103 -0.379*** 0.034 130 0.539*** 0.032 233 0.124*** 0.031 
Marketing 
innovation - new 
methods for sales 
channels 
-0.728 
(0.312) 
1 rho0=1 0.0223 105 -0.304*** 0.033 128 0.538*** 0.031 233 0.145*** 0.026 
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Marketing 
innovation - new 
methods of pricing 
-0.553 
(0.303) 
1 rho0=1 0.0096 106 -0.473*** 0.029 131 0.365*** 0.022 237 -0.020 0.022 
Marketing 
innovation – 
combined 
-1 
0.742 
(0.277) 
rho1=-1 0.0754 109 -0.191*** 0.025 134 0.456*** 0.022 243 0.157*** 0.020 
Innovative sales > 5 
% 
-0.688 
(0.417) 
0.818 
(0.237) 
NO 0.0692 110 -0.087*** 0.017 131 0.159*** 0.019 241 0.049*** 0.013 
Innovative sales > 
10 % 
-0.231 
(0.797) 
1 rho0=1 0.0170 111 -0.261*** 0.019 133 0.121*** 0.021 244 -0.057*** 0.014 
Innovative sales > 
15 % 
-1 
-0.527 
(0.545) 
rho1=-1 0.0011 110 0.232*** 0.023 131 0.538*** 0.020 241 0.409*** 0.016 
Innovative sales > 
25 % 
-1 
0.080 
(1.258) 
rho1=-1 0.0009 110 0.007 0.025 131 0.719*** 0.021 241 0.401*** 0.022 
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 Summary results for both the baseline and the augmented models are presented 
in Table 4.4. The first conclusion is a systematically smaller ATT than ATE in both 
models. In models without diagnostic problems, this dominant pattern is found in 8 
from 9 cases in the baseline model (in 7 cases both programme effects are statistically 
significant); and in all 5 cases in the augmented model (in 4 cases both programme 
effects are statistically significant). In models with one diagnostic problem, ATT is 
smaller than ATE in 11 from 11 cases in the baseline model (in 9 cases both programme 
effects are statistically significant); and in 13 from 14 cases in the augmented model (in 
9 cases both programme effects are statistically significant).  
 
 The second conclusion is only slightly less systematic, namely a negative ATT 
and a positive ATE. In models without diagnostic problems, this pattern is found in 7 
from 9 cases in the baseline model (in 6 cases both programme effects are statistically 
significant); and in 5 from 5 cases in the augmented model (in 4 cases both programme 
effects are statistically significant). In models with one diagnostic problem, a negative 
ATT and a positive ATE is reported in 6 from 11 cases in the baseline model (in 5 cases 
both programme effects are statistically significant); and in 6 from 14 cases in the 
augmented model (in 5 cases both programme effects are statistically significant).  
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Table 4.4. Programme effects from the baseline and augmented models: summary 
Model 
Number 
of models 
Models 
without 
diagnostic 
problems 
Models with 
one 
diagnostic 
problem 
Models without diagnostic problems Models with one diagnostic problem 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  
    
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT 
negative 
& ATE 
positive 
ATT negative 
& ATE 
positive; both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT 
negative & 
ATE 
positive 
ATT negative 
& ATE 
positive; both 
statistically 
significant 
Baseline 20 9 11 8 7 7 6 11 9 6 5 
Augmented 19 5 14 5 4 5 4 13 9 6 5 
Note: As a guide to reading Table 4.4, compare numbers in columns 5-8 with column 3; for example, in the Baseline Model, eight (column 5) from nine models without diagnostic 
problems (column 3) yield ATT<ATE. Similarly, compare columns 9-12 with column 4 
174 
 
4.4.3 Matching estimation 
 
To further check the robustness of our estimated effects, we apply Nearest Neighbour 
(NN) matching without replacement with a caliper of 0.25 of the standard deviation of 
the estimated propensity score (see Table 4.5) (for a discussion on matching estimators, 
see Section 5.3.1).
68
 We report results for the 20 baseline models. For each model we 
used the same specification as the respective baseline switching selection model. 
Balancing tests show that each variable is balanced after matching; indeed, that most 
variables are balanced even before matching.
69
 This matching quality indicates that our 
sample is well balanced between treated and non-treated firms for most observed firm 
characteristics, which reinforces our discussion on the properties of our sample (see 
Section 4.3.2 and Table A2.2).  
 
 Compared to the estimated effects reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the findings 
from the matching estimator are skewed towards positive treatment effects; i.e. both 
ATT effects and ATEs are either positive or statistically insignificant. However, 
qualitatively the results are consistent with the those reported above, insofar as across 
the models the ATT is systematically smaller or the same as the ATE. Finally, we 
applied a Rosenbaum bound approach (Rosenbaum, 2002) to test for unobserved 
heterogeneity that can arise when unobserved firm characteristics have a significant 
impact on the effectiveness of innovation policy (see Section 5.5). In 15 of the 20 
baseline models, the test indicates that the ATT might be overestimated.
70
 These 
findings suggest that unobserved heterogeneity should be taken into account in the 
impact evaluation of innovation policy and supports the application of an endogenous 
switching model in our analysis.  
 
 
                                                          
68
 The choice of matching estimator reflects the consideration that the Rosenbaum bound approach 
(Rosenbaum, 2002) (see Section 5.5 on sensitivity analysis) can only be applied to NN matching without 
replacement. In order to increase the efficiency of the estimated effects, we used a caliper of the size 
suggested in the literature, because it removes 98 per cent of the initial bias due to covariates (Austin, 
2011b). 
69
 Balancing tests include standardized differences in the sample means of participating and non-
participating firms (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) and the t-test of the equality of the sample means of 
participating and non-participating firms (see, for instance, Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2013).  
70
 The test cannot be conducted for the ATU or the ATE effects.  
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Table 4.5. Results from the Nearest Neighbour (NN) estimators - baseline model 
Output dependent variable 
NN without replacement and 
caliper of 0.25 of SD of 
propensity score 
NN without replacement and caliper 
of 0.25 of SD of propensity score 
Hidden bias 
(overestimation) 
Average treatment effect on the 
treated - ATT 
Average treatment effect - ATE 
Common 
support 
Coeff. 
(subsampled SEs) 
Common 
support 
Coeff. 
(subsampled SEs) 
Product innovation in goods 230 
0.222*** 
(0.082) 
185 
0.200*** 
(0.078) 
No 
Product innovation in services 220 
0.167** 
(0.010) 
176 
0.193** 
(0.079) 
Yes 
Product innovation - combined 235 
0.194*** 
(0.058) 
193 
0.212*** 
(0.058) 
No 
Process innovation - processes for 
manufacturing goods 
242 
0.213*** 
(0.079) 
195 
0.221*** 
(0.070) 
No 
Process innovation - logistics, delivery or 
distribution processes 
228 
0.035 
(0.097) 
175 
0.034 
(0.089) 
Yes 
Process innovation - support processes 236 
0.000 
(0.094) 
188 
0.037 
(0.085) 
Yes 
Process innovation – combined 235 
0.143** 
(0.065) 
189 
0.138** 
(0.058) 
Yes 
Organisational innovation - new business 
practices for organising procedures 
235 
0.035 
(0.100) 
179 
0.017 
(0.090) 
Yes 
Organisational innovation - new methods 
of organising work responsibilities 
 
240 
-0.022 
(0.096) 
192 
0.010 
(0.085) 
Yes 
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Organisational innovation - new methods 
of organising external relations 
237 
0.231** 
(0.093) 
188 
0.250*** 
(0.083) 
No 
Organisational innovation – combined 242 
0.133 
(0.084) 
200 
0.120 
(0.074) 
Yes 
Marketing innovation - changes to design 
or packaging 
239 
0.078 
(0.080) 
189 
0.074 
(0.085) 
Yes 
Marketing innovation - new media or 
techniques for product promotion 
230 
0.085 
(0.094) 
174 
0.092 
(0.085) 
Yes 
Marketing innovation - new methods for 
sales channels 
244 
0.237*** 
(0.080) 
200 
0.235*** 
(0.078) 
No 
Marketing innovation - new methods of 
pricing 
244 
0.021 
(0.080) 
198 
0.056 
(0.072) 
Yes 
Marketing innovation – combined 228 
0.116 
(0.086) 
175 
0.126 
(0.081) 
Yes 
Innovative sales > 5 % 233 
0.141** 
(0.076) 
188 
0.154** 
(0.071) 
Yes 
Innovative sales > 10 % 232 
0.058 
(0.094) 
177 
0.062 
(0.078) 
Yes 
Innovative sales > 15 % 234 
0.023 
(0.095) 
189 
0.069 
(0.081) 
Yes 
Innovative sales > 25 % 221 
0.088 
(0.089) 
240 
0.090 
(0.079) 
Yes 
177 
 
 
4.5 Summary  
 
Summary results from the switching regressions and from matching estimations are 
reported in Table 4.6. The first conclusion is that the ATT effect is systematically 
smaller than the ATE. For models estimated by the endogenous switching method, this 
finding is reported in 19 from 20 cases in the baseline model (in 16 cases both 
programme effects are statistically significant); and in 18 from 19 cases in the 
augmented model (in 13 cases both effects are statistically significant). For the baseline 
models estimated with the matching method, the ATT is smaller than the ATE in 13 
cases (in 5 cases both effects are statistically significant).  
 
 The second conclusion arises from the somewhat less systematic finding of a 
negative ATT and a positive ATE. For models estimated by the endogenous switching 
method, this pattern is reported in 13 from 20 cases in the baseline model (in 11 cases 
both effects are statistically significant); and in 11 from 19 cases in the augmented 
model (in 9 cases both effects are statistically significant). However, results from 
matching are somewhat different, insofar as both ATT and ATE are positive in 12 from 
20 cases (in 5 cases both effects are statistically significant). As discussed in Section 
4.4.3, positively skewed programme effects estimated by matching methods are 
consistent with the proposition advanced by Hujer and Radic (2005) and Greene (2009) 
that evaluation methods that take into account only observed firm characteristics (such 
as matching methods) yield larger programme effects than those methods controlling 
further for unobserved influences.  
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Table 4.6. Programme effects from the switching regressions and from matching estimators: summary 
Model 
Number 
of 
models 
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT negative & 
ATE positive 
ATT negative & 
ATE positive; both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT & ATE both 
positive 
ATT & ATE both 
positive; both 
statistically 
significant 
Switching 
regression - 
baseline model 
20 19 16 13 11 4 3 
Switching 
regression -  
augmented model 
19 18 13 11 9 2 1 
Matching 
estimators - 
baseline model 
20 13 5 1 0 12 5 
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 Finally, two issues concerning the validity of the estimates are considered: first, 
the potential endogeneity of our Export variable; and, second, the sensitivity of the 
switching estimator to ‘model identification and the assumptions about the distribution 
of the error terms’ (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011, p. 379).  
 
 The repeated significance in the reported regressions of one or more of our five 
firm-level ‘quasi’ fixed effects (or initial conditions) is not only informative regarding 
the determinates of innovation but also increases confidence in the statistical validity of 
our estimates. There is limited scope within a cross-sectional study, particularly one 
analysing survey data, to address the potential endogeneity of regressors. Moreover, no 
estimator can address all potential specification issues. By estimating an endogenous 
switching model we address the main endogeneity issue in programme evaluation, that 
of endogenous selection (i.e. the potential endogeneity of the participation dummy). 
However, there may be particular concern that firms’ export activities may not be 
exogenous with respect to innovation. If so, then endogeneity arises from omitted 
variables rather than simultaneity. Simultaneity assumes that causation runs directly in 
both directions between innovation and exports. Conversely, we argue that if exporting 
is potentially endogenous then this is because innovation and exports are both 
dependent on similar determinants, in which case they are correlated but do not cause 
one another. This perspective on the potential endogeneity of exports is supported by 
three arguments. First, in theory, exporting may be regarded as a species of innovation. 
This view goes back at least to Schumpeter (1942, p. 83) who identified the main forms 
of innovation giving rise to the ‘process of Creative Destruction’: 
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of 
production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of 
industrial organisation that capitalist enterprise creates. (...) that 
incessantly revolutionises the economic structure from within (...). 
 
 Secondly, both case study interviews and survey data from the GPrix project 
suggest that SMEs in traditional manufacturing regard exporting as innovatory activity. 
In the GPrix survey all the examples for respondents of types of innovation followed the 
Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005), in which marketing innovation is restricted to varieties of 
marketing techniques but excludes entry into new markets. Yet, when asked to name the 
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most useful innovation support measures in which they had participated, more than 10 
per cent or respondents named export promotion programmes. Thirdly, in the respective 
literatures, models of SME innovation and of SME exporting behaviour typically have 
determinants in common: for example, firm size and dummies for industry and region.  
 
 The analysis presented in this chapter is limited in addressing the potential 
endogeneity of exports. For reasons explained above, we estimate a parsimonious model 
and so are unable to include all possible observable influences on firms’ export 
behaviour in the model. With panel data, we could use firm-level fixed effects to 
capture unobserved influences, thereby excluding them from the error term and 
precluding endogeneity arising from omitted variables. To mimic this approach in our 
cross-section model, we include, as explained above, firm-level ‘quasi’ fixed effects (or 
initial conditions) to capture otherwise unobservable firm and ownership effects. These 
five variables are derived from questions to firms about their innovation behaviour at 
the beginning of the sample period and are designed to aggregate the effects of all 
unobserved firm-level time invariant (or, at least, slowly moving) influences on all types 
of innovation, which include diversification into new markets, especially into export 
markets. By specifying our model to include firm-level ‘quasi’ fixed effects we prevent 
– or, at least, reduce – the presence in the error term of unobserved but systematic 
influences on firms’ innovation, including exporting, which eliminates – or, at least, 
attenuates – endogeneity arising from omitted variables. 
 
 It is noted in Section 4.3.1 that the estimation approach ‘relies on an assumption 
of joint normality of the error terms of the estimates’ (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011, p. 
369). However, there is no test for whether this assumption holds in the data. Instead, 
Lokshin and Sajaia (2011, p. 379) undertake Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the 
sensitivity of their estimator to ‘model identification and the assumptions about the 
distribution of the error terms’. Their results indicate that their estimator is ‘relatively 
robust in terms of identification of the model’. Moreover, the authors note that this 
finding is consistent with Wilde (2000) who found that ‘in recursive multiple-equation 
probit models with endogenous dummy regressors no exclusion restrictions for the 
exogenous variables are needed if there is sufficient variation in the data’ (cited by 
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Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011, p. 381).
71
 Conversely, specification where the error terms are 
nonnormally distributed ‘results in biased estimates for both ATE and ATT effects’. 
Moreover: ‘The bias is larger for estimations based on smaller sample sizes.’ However, 
the bias for both ATE and ATT effects is in the same direction: for a sample of similar 
size to the one analysed in this paper, true ATE of −0.175 is estimated at about −0.120 
and true ATT of −0.336 is estimated at about −0.240; in both cases, an upward bias of 
about 30 per cent. In these simulations, the errors are χ2 distributed and ‘simulation 
based on different functional forms for the nonnormal distribution of the shocks (…) 
produces similar estimates’ (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011, p. 381). 
 
 It can be concluded for our analysis, that while this evidence on the effects of 
failure of the distributional assumption in extreme forms puts a question mark over the 
precise size of our estimates of ATT and ATE, it does not undermine our main finding 
that estimated programme effects on SME participants (ATT) are systematically smaller 
than the estimated effects on randomly selected SMEs (ATE). In turn, it is this finding 
that underpins our main policy recommendation; namely, that a more inclusive selection 
procedure could improve the effectiveness of innovation support programmes for SMEs 
in traditional manufacturing industry. 
 
4.6 Conclusions  
 
In the context of a population of mainly innovating SMEs, estimated programme effects 
consistently reveal smaller innovation effects on participating firms than could have 
been realised from randomly selected programme participants. Moreover, consistent 
with this finding of smaller ATT than ATE effects, analysis of the unobserved effects 
captured by our models suggests that the more likely firms are to participate in a support 
programme as a consequence of their unobserved characteristics the less likely they are 
to innovate as a consequence. Conversely, firms that are less likely to participate as a 
consequence of their unobserved characteristics would be more likely to innovate as a 
consequence (i.e. were they to participate).
72
  
 
                                                          
71
 Monte Carlo simulations of ATE and ATT for the specification with normally distributed error terms 
demonstrate that: ‘Even for smaller sample sizes, the method produces efficient and unbiased estimates of 
ATE and ATT effects’ (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011, p. 381). 
72
 These findings are similar to the canonical study by Aakvik et al. (2005, p. 37) who also find that ‘those 
most likely to participate in the program are those who benefit least from it’. 
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 The results are consistent with the hypothesis advanced in Section 4.2; namely, 
because of potential government failure in innovation policy, the effects of public 
support measures to increase private innovation may be disappointing compared to the 
effects typically claimed by public agencies. Yet our results also suggest a direction for 
policy reform to overcome government failure, thereby increasing the potential 
additionality of innovation support programmes. We find that cream-skimming of firms 
on the basis of characteristics positively associated with innovation is less effective in 
promoting innovation than would be a strategy of randomly selecting participants. The 
policy implication is that the selection process of firms into innovation support 
programmes should be reformed by moving away from “cream skimming” towards 
random allocation. There is potential for improving the overall innovation outcomes of 
innovation support programmes for SMEs in traditional manufacturing industry by 
selecting typical firms with the most to gain from support rather than selecting those 
with the greatest propensity to innovate but the least to gain from support.
73
 In other 
words, a more inclusive selection procedure could improve the effectiveness of 
innovation support programmes for SMEs in traditional manufacturing industry. Of 
course, some continued selection on observables (e.g. due diligence with respect to size 
and solvency) will still be needed to ensure that participating firms meet eligibility 
requirements for participating in public support programmes.   
 
 Consistent with these proposals, the case for random allocation is gaining 
influence amongst policy makers. Two recent examples of successful lottery 
distribution of innovation vouchers are in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom. 
Cornet et al. (2006) investigated the effectiveness of a Dutch innovation voucher 
programme for SMEs, under which vouchers were allocated by lottery. The evaluation 
of the programme indicates that 8 out of 10 vouchers were used to introduce innovations 
which, without public support, would not have been realized. This is a very large 
treatment effect, especially given that empirical studies, if reporting additionality at all, 
typically report small programme effects.  
 
 In addition, Bakhshi et al. (2011) evaluated the short-term effects of the Creative 
Credits programme and report a high level of additionality, which quantitatively is 
                                                          
73
 Again, reflecting similar results, this echoes a conclusion from Aakvik et al. (2005, p. 48): ‘There is a 
potential for improving the overall employment-promoting effect of VR training by selecting those who 
gain the most from training rather than choosing the most employable persons.’  
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similar to the effects of the Dutch programme discussed above. Evaluators of both 
voucher schemes highlight the advantages of a random distribution according to lottery:    
 
1. to increase programme effectiveness, as argued in this paper; and 
2. to “build in” evaluation by random controlled trials (RCT) and so feed back into 
enhanced programme effectiveness. 
 
 The analysis conducted in this chapter has a number of novel features but also 
some limitations. Novel or at least unusual features include: prepublication of the model 
to be estimated; focus on the effectiveness of public innovation support programmes for 
SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries; and focus on output additionality in 
relation to both technological and non-technological innovation. Finally, the 
econometric method applied in the study allows for selection on both observed and 
unobserved firm characteristics.  
 
 There are four main limitations of the analysis. The first is inherent to all cross-
section analysis; namely, inability to account fully for the cumulating of effects over 
time and to identify the dynamic manner in which this occurs. The GPrix survey design 
compensated as far as possible for this deficiency by asking firms questions to establish 
initial conditions for firms’ current innovation activities. The second limitation is that 
we cannot test the distributional assumption of the estimator used in this study. 
However, as we argue in Section 4.5, the evidence on the effects of the failure of this 
assumption does not undermine our main finding that estimated effects on SME 
participants (ATT) are systematically smaller than the estimated effects on randomly 
selected SMEs (ATE). The third limitation is associated with the sample size. Although 
our sample size is small, the sample has desirable characteristics, in particular with 
respect to balance between treatment and comparison groups. Moreover, our estimates 
typically display characteristics associated in the literature with statistical validity 
(namely, the Wald test for independence and the size and significance of the model 
correlation coefficients). The fourth limitation is that we were unable to test for partial 
crowding out. Although the survey questionnaire includes a question on the value of 
support, most participating firms did not report this amount, because respondents did 
not know the amount of subsidy their firms received from 2005-2009. Therefore, we are 
unable to utilize this variable in our econometric model. However, the absence of the 
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amount of subsidy is a general issue in the literature on the evaluation of innovation 
policy (Zúñiga -Vicente et al., 2014).
74
 Surveys such as the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) do not contain a question on the amount of subsidies. Even when 
researchers collect primary data, the response rate to questions on the amount of subsidy 
is very low, because respondents simply do not know the amount of subsidy, which is 
the case in our study.  
 
 Finally, we comment on the external validity of the findings. Edith Penrose’s 
classic The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959, p. 7), addressed a similar issue: 
'Many firms do not grow, and for a variety of reasons (…) I am not concerned with such 
firms, for I am only concerned with (…) those firms that do grow.' By analogy, policy 
makers are concerned to encourage innovative or potentially innovative SMEs to more 
fully exploit their innovative potential. Correspondingly, the GPrix sample firms are 
overwhelmingly recent innovators (and the rest are at least sufficiently oriented towards 
innovation to engage with an innovation survey). As long as such firms are a priority for 
policy makers, then it is valid to use our results to inform policy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74
 Loss of information due to lack of data on the amount of subsidy are endemic in programme evaluation 
(Aakvik et al., 2005, p. 26) (see Section 3.6). 
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5.1 Introduction  
 
The evaluation of innovation policies, until recently, was mainly concerned with input 
and output additionality. Focusing on innovation inputs and outputs, however, means 
that we stay outside the “black box” of innovation processes, but rather observe the 
beginning (innovation inputs) or end results (innovation outputs) of those processes 
(OECD, 2006a). Behavioural additionality enables us to go beyond input and output 
additionality and assess the impact of public measures on firms' innovative behaviour. 
Following the discussion in Section 3.6.3, the literature on additionality lacks a common 
definition of behavioural additionality. Most empirical studies explore network 
additionality (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006), which occurs when firms expand their 
networks and cooperative activities as a result of participation in support programmes.  
 
 The narrow perspective on behavioural additionality, by focusing on network 
additionality, can be associated with the concept of open innovation, i.e. the impact of 
public funding on open innovation, specifically the effect on external networking. In 
2003, open innovation emerged as a new conceptual framework in the management 
literature, emphasizing the role of networking and knowledge exchange on firms' 
innovativeness, and their critical role in creating and sustaining competitive advantages 
(Chesbrough, 2003). The literature distinguishes between two types of open innovation 
practices: inbound and outbound open innovations. While the former refers to 
knowledge transfers relevant for the development of internal innovation, the latter 
encompasses marketing activities related to the commercialization of innovation. Open 
innovation is the subject of an increasing number of empirical studies, mainly focusing 
on the determinants of open innovation strategies and their impact on innovation and 
firm performance (for a comprehensive review, see  Schroll and Mild, 2012).  
 
 Drawing on Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006 data, we employed 
several matching estimators to investigate the impact of public support on open 
innovation practices in Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As 
discussed in Section 3.6, due to often noted factors hampering econometric analysis 
(such as, lack of longitudinal data and of valid instruments for selection models), 
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matching estimation has become a widely used evaluation method in the literature on 
the effectiveness of innovation policy.
75
 
 
 In this chapter, we address three research questions, two on substantive issues 
related to inbound innovation and one related to research methodology. 
a. Does public funding for innovation foster inbound open innovation in 
SMEs? If so, does it have the same or differential effects on various open 
innovation practices? 
b. Are there differences in impact on inbound open innovation between 
local/regional, federal government funding and EU funding?  
c. Are estimated treatment effects robust to unobserved heterogeneity? 
 
 This chapter contributes to the evaluation literature by providing the first 
empirical findings on the impact of public innovation support on three open innovation 
practices: cooperative behaviour in SMEs (behavioural additionality); outsourcing 
R&D; and acquiring other external knowledge (e.g. patents and know-how). The 
treatment effects are reported for three separate sources of funding: local/regional; 
national; and EU programmes. Following the literature on the determinants of R&D 
cooperation, we explicitly take into account incoming spillovers, knowledge flows from 
different sources (suppliers, customers, competitors, government and Higher Education 
Institutions) and include barriers to innovation and to cooperation in our methodological 
framework. Finally, we report the results of sensitivity analysis, conducted to check for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model.  
 
 The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 defines the concepts of open 
innovation and behavioural additionality. Section 5.3 formulates the methodological 
framework, discusses model specification and data used in the study. Section 5.4 gives 
the main results from matching, while Section 5.5 discusses findings from sensitivity 
analysis. Empirical findings for the subsample of innovative firms are presented in 
Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes.  
 
 
                                                          
75
 These limiting factors are noted in most studies on additionality of public support (see, for instance, 
Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Czarnitzki et al., 2011). 
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5.2 Open innovation 
 
 
The significance of cooperation in firms' innovation activities is reinforced with the 
concept of open innovation. With Chesbrough's (2003) seminal book, open innovation 
emerged as a new conceptual framework in innovation literature, opposite to closed 
innovation systems (Lichtenthaler, 2011). This new paradigm acknowledges firms' 
limited internal innovative capacities and suggests that generating external knowledge is 
necessary for innovation processes as firms no longer can be successful innovators by 
relying solely on internal capabilities.  
 
 Open innovation is defined as "the use of purposive inflows and outflows of 
knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and to expand the markets for external use 
of innovation, respectively" (Chesbrough et al., 2006, p. 1). Knowledge flows aiming at 
fostering internal innovation are termed inbound open innovation (technology 
exploration or acquisition), while the market expansion focusing on the 
commercialisation phase of the innovation process is termed outbound open innovation 
(technology exploitation or commercialization) (Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Dahlander 
and Gann, 2010; Lichtenthaler, 2008; Lichtenthaler, 2011).
76
 The process of technology 
exploration or acquisition (i.e. inbound open innovation) encompasses the following 
practices (Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Parida et al., 2012):
77
  
 
- Technology scouting, that is, a process of gathering information and knowledge 
from the technological environment (Cohen and Levithal, 1990; Lichtenthaler 
and Lichtenthaler, 2009; Dahlander and Gann, 2010). 
- Customer involvement: Customers can be involved in firms' internal innovation 
processes, which enables firms to develop new products or to modify the 
existing ones according to customers' needs and preferences.    
- External networking: Networking on innovation is an important component of 
open innovation, and it encompasses both formal (e.g. R&D alliances) and 
informal cooperation on innovation with individuals and organisations.  
                                                          
76
 Inbound open innovations is also referred to as the outside-in process of open innovation, whereas 
outbound open innovation is referred to as the  inside-out process of open innovation (Enkel et al., 2009). 
77
 Dahlander and Gann (2010) divided inbound and outbound open innovation practices into  two 
categories - pecuniary and non-pecuniary, whereby revealing and selling are non-pecuniary and pecuniary 
outbound innovation respectively, and sourcing and acquiring are non-pecuniary and pecuniary inbound 
innovation respectively.  
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- External participation: This form of open innovation is associated with equity 
investment in other companies in order to access their knowledge or to benefit 
from other synergies.   
- Outsourcing R&D: Extramural R&D activities performed by other firms or 
private and public organizations are an important alternative to intramural R&D.  
- Inward IP licensing (licensing-in): Firms can benefit from external knowledge 
through purchasing patents, trademarks, copyrights and other forms of IPs 
(Dahlander and Gann, 2010). 
The process of technology exploitation or commercialization (i.e. outbound open 
innovation) includes several strategies: 
- Venturing: In the context of open innovation, venturing refers to spin-offs, i.e. 
establishing new firms based on a firm's internal knowledge. 
- Outward licensing of Intellectual Property (IP)(licensing-out): This practice 
allows companies to generate profit from selling IPs to other companies 
(Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Lichtenthaler, 2011). 
 
 Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler (2009) develop a conceptual framework for 
open innovation, identifying relevant organisational capabilities which are a basis of 
dynamic capabilities of managing open innovation. The framework is regarded as a 
complement to the concept of absorptive capacity and proposes six 'knowledge 
capacities' that combine knowledge exploration, retention and exploitation: 
 
- Inventive capacity, which relates to firms' ability for internal knowledge 
exploration, i.e. creating new knowledge within a firm. Inventive capacity is not 
only associated with creation of new knowledge, but also with a process of 
incorporating new knowledge into an existing knowledge base within a firm. 
- Absorptive capacity is defined as a firm's ability for external knowledge 
exploration (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Firms' increase their absorptive 
capacity by absorbing additional knowledge into prior related knowledge. 
Therefore, the firms' existing knowledge base plays an important role in 
enhancing both, inventive and absorptive capacity.  
- Transformative capacity, which refers to firms' ability to retain and reactivate 
knowledge within the organisation over time. Again, an existing knowledge base 
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is relevant in developing transformative capacity, insofar as a larger base enables 
easier retention and exploitation of new knowledge.  
- Connective capacity is associated with firms' ability to maintain sources of 
external knowledge over time; for instance, by establishing long-term 
relationships with cooperative partners. In contrast to transformative capacity, 
connective capacity is focused on the retention and maintenance of inter-firm 
relations (external networks).  
- Innovative capacity relates to firms' ability for internal knowledge exploitation. 
Besides developing internal and external capacities for knowledge exploration 
and retention, firms need to develop a capacity for exploiting a knowledge base. 
Innovative capacity is regarded as a realized absorptive capacity.  
- Desorptive capacity, which refers to external knowledge exploitation, for 
instance through outward licensing of IP or venturing. The practice of active 
outward knowledge transfer is a recent trend in firms' management strategies.   
 
 Open innovation practices are the subject of an increasing number of empirical 
studies over the last few years. The main research objectives are aimed at identifying 
the determinants of inbound and outbound open innovation strategies, and assessing 
their impact on firms' innovation performance (for a comprehensive review of empirical 
studies, see Schroll and Mild, 2012). Both large firms and SMEs can greatly benefit 
from external knowledge. Open innovation is particularly relevant to SMEs, because 
limited human and financial resources are critical barriers to internal innovation in those 
firms (Van de Vrande, 2009; Parida et al, 2012). Conversely, limited resources can have 
a detrimental effect on open innovation in SMEs, for instance, in acquiring extramural 
R&D or maintaining collaborative networks (Huizingh, 2011). Indeed, empirical 
evidence suggests that large firms engage in open innovation to a larger extent than 
SMEs (Lihtenthaler, 2008; Bianchi et al., 2011) and, within SMEs, medium-sized firms 
are more prone to opening up innovation processes than are small firms (Van de Vrande 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, Van de Vrande et al. (2009) state SMEs mostly engage in 
user innovation (customer involvement) and in external networking. Conversely, the 
least practiced open innovations are outward and inward IP licensing, venturing and 
external participation, They argue that the latter require substantial financial resources, 
unlike customer involvement and external networking, which are often informal and 
need not entail significant financial investment.   
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 Firms' strategic decisions on whether to develop new technologies and 
innovations by increasing in-house R&D or by external knowledge acquisition depend 
on the type of technology. Innovation processes than involve generic (standardized) 
technological competences, should be developed by external knowledge exploitation 
either through cooperation or subcontracting (Narula, 2001). However, core 
technological competencies, which are the main source of firms' competitive advantage, 
should be developed internally. Furthermore, in discriminating between cooperation and 
R&D subcontracting, following the argument advanced in transaction costs economics, 
firms have incentive to opt for the latter when opportunism and free riding are more 
likely to occur, thus increasing transaction costs (Dhont-Peltrault and Pfister, 2011). If 
we assume that opportunistic behaviour decreases with the increase in the level of 
technology standardization, this would mean that R&D subcontracting is more suitable 
for developing or enhancing standardized technologies (the 'standardization' 
hypothesis). Moreover, standardized technologies usually lack a degree of novelty 
sufficient to be patentable, thus suggesting that appropriability issues are less likely to 
occur.   
 
 Conversely, due to potential cooperation failure, firms can opt for R&D 
subcontracting for developing strategic, core technologies (the 'incentive' hypothesis). 
Cooperation failure refers to reduced R&D effort in cooperative partnerships when 
cooperating firms do not clearly specify which partner will be assigned the exclusive 
property rights (Dhont-Peltrault and Pfister, 2011). For instance, Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) report a negative relationship between vertical cooperation and the 
effectiveness of appropriation methods. Moreover, Leiponen and Byma (2009) argue 
that small firms with close links to cooperative partners might face difficulties in 
protecting their returns to innovation. Unlike large firms, small firms utilize formal 
methods of protecting IPs (such as patenting) to a lesser extent, and rely more on 
informal methods such as secrecy and lead time (Leiponen and Byma, 2009). Therefore, 
to assure the maximum level of R&D effort, firms can assign exclusive property rights 
to the subcontractors, thus avoiding appropriability issues. 
 
 Finally, assessing the impact of public support on open innovation strategies is 
closely related to the concept of behavioural additionality (BA). While input and output 
additionality leave the black-box of innovation process unopened, BA goes beyond 
innovation inputs and outputs and aims at explaining what is happening inside the box. 
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It is associated with intermediate effects of public support on firms' innovative 
behaviour (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). Following Busom and Fernández-Ribas 
(2008), BA assesses the short-term impact of public programmes. Although the 
literature advances a broad perspective on BA, most empirical studies investigate only 
one segment of BA; that is the impact of public intervention on firms' cooperative 
behaviour (scope additionality as defined by Falk, 2007; or network additionality 
following the OECD, 2006a, definition).
78
 This narrow concept of BA encompasses the 
impact of public funding on inbound open innovation, specifically the effect on external 
networking. As previous studies do not investigate other forms of behavioural 
additionality, this inquiry, unlike other studies, expands research beyond cooperative 
networking to include two additional inbound open innovation strategies: outsourcing 
R&D; and acquisition of other external knowledge. 
 
5.3 Methodology  
 
5.3.1 Matching estimation  
 
The main advantage of matching estimators, compared to selection models and IV 
approaches, is that they do not require any distributional assumptions regarding the 
error terms in the selection equation and in the outcome equation. However, matching 
estimators control only for firms' observed characteristics. In cases when unobserved 
inferences are suspected to influence the treatment assignment, matching yields biased 
estimates of treatment effects.  
 
 The literature on evaluation methods distinguishes between four categories of 
estimators that control for bias due to observable variables: regression estimators; 
matching estimators; propensity score methods; and a combination of these estimators, 
usually regression with matching (Imbens, 2004). Matching estimators are further 
divided into covariate matching and propensity score matching (Zhao, 2004). Propensity 
score methods are non-parametric evaluation methods, which are based on the premise 
that participants should be matched with non-participants (a control group) conditional 
on pre-treatment observed characteristics (covariates) X. Outcomes are then compared 
between matched units and the difference in outcomes is attributed to the treatment. 
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 Our study suffers from the same limitation; available data do not allow for exploring other categories of 
behavioural additionality.  
 193 
 
Propensity score methods include weighting on propensity score, matching on 
propensity score, stratification on propensity score and regression on propensity score 
(covariate adjustment on propensity score) (Imbens, 2004).  
 
 Matching as an evaluation method is based on two assumptions. The first 
identifying assumption is referred to as the conditional independence assumption (CIA), 
unconfoundedness or selection on observables (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009).  
 ( ( )  ( ))    |  (5.1) 
 
This condition states that potential outcomes, Y(0) and Y((1), are independent ( ) of a 
treatment assignment (T), conditional on observed covariates, X, that are not affected by 
a treatment (pre-treatment variables). The CIA is a strong assumption and requires that 
all relevant observed variables are included in the estimation of treatment effects and 
that variables are measured before treatment assignment.  
 
 The second identifying assumption refers to the overlap or common support 
condition, which states that perfect predictability of a treatment assignment conditional 
on X is avoided. Therefore, both treated and non-treated firms have a positive 
probability of receiving a treatment or not. The condition can be written as:  
    (   | )    (5.2) 
 
The overlap or common support condition states that if it is completely certain that 
some firms will participate (P = 1) and that other will not (P = 0), then there is no 
observable basis for comparison between treated and non-treated firms. 
 
 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) note that for the estimation of the ATT both 
assumptions can be relaxed into unconfoundedness for non-treated firms (a comparison 
group) and the weaker overlap condition, given by:  
  (   | )    (5.3) 
 
An additional assumption is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), 
which refers to independence of the impact of a treatment on firms, i.e. the outcome in 
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one firm is not affected by the treatment of any other firms (no spillover effects). This 
assumption requires a careful selection of firms in the control group, so as to minimize 
the occurrence of spillovers (Stuart, 2010). 
 
 The crucial step in the matching procedure is the choice of covariates X. The 
literature suggests that all observed variables that simultaneously affect a treatment and 
outcome should be included in the estimation of propensity scores (the selection 
equation) (Austin, 2011a; Ho et al., 2007; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Steiner et al., 
2010). Following Steiner et al. (2010), in situations when researchers have little or no 
information on the selection mechanism, the optimal modelling strategy is to include a 
large set of covariates, because this approach increases the probability of satisfying the 
assumption of selection on observables, i.e. strong ignorability.    
 
 The next step in the propensity score matching is the estimation of the 
propensity score. Since the propensity score is a probability of receiving a treatment (in 
our case, public subsidies), researchers can choose any discrete choice model, because 
both probit and logit models usually yield similar results (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008).  
 
 For the sake of brevity, we will not review a full range of matching estimators, 
but instead will focus on those applied in our study (for a review of matching 
estimators, see Stuart, 2010; Morgan and Harding, 2006; Austin, 2011a; Imbens, 2004). 
Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching is the most commonly used matching estimator in 
the innovation literature (Czarnitzki et al., 2007). The propensity score can be used to 
construct matched pairs applying three methods (Guo and Fraser, 2010): i) nearest 
matching on the estimated propensity score; ii) Mahalanobis metric matching including 
the estimated propensity score with other matching variables;
79
 and iii) nearest 
Mahalanobis metric matching with calipers based on the propensity score. The third 
method is superior to others with respect to balancing of the covariates between a 
treatment and comparison group (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). In choosing the 
optimal caliper size, Cochran and Rubin (1973) note that 98% of the bias on a normally 
distributed covariate is removed with the caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the 
estimated covariate (in the case of PSM, the caliper is based on the estimated propensity 
score).  
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 This matching method is termed hybrid matching (Czarnitzki et al., 2011).  
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 The purpose of matching estimators is to balance observed covariates X between 
treated and untreated units. As discussed, nearest Mahalanobis metric matching with 
caliper based on the propensity score results in the best balancing quality, and that is the 
reason why we have chosen to apply this estimator. Matching arguments, besides the 
estimated propensity score, are a DV for small firms and industry DVs. The inclusion of 
additional matching arguments is motivated by the arguments advanced in the literature 
on SME innovation, whereby SMEs are a heterogeneous group of firms and their 
innovative activities should be analysed at industry level (Nooteboom, 1994; for the 
same empirical strategy see Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Spithoven et 
al., 2012). Stuart (2010) notes that NN matching with the Mahalanobis metric is not the 
best choice if the number of matching arguments in the metric is larger than 8 or if 
covariates are not normally distributed (Stuart, 2010). Although the Mahalanobis metric 
in our models included fifteen matching arguments (thirteen industry DVs, DV for 
small firms and the estimate propensity score), all four balancing tests indicate a high 
matching quality.  
 
 After the estimation of the propensity score, but prior to applying a chosen 
matching estimator, a balancing test should be conducted. The purpose of a balancing 
test before matching (stratification test) is to check how well the estimated propensity 
score has succeeded in balancing covariates.
80
 This approach requires the division of the 
sample into strata conditional on the propensity score, and checking whether there are 
no statistically significant differences between the means of the propensity score of the 
treated and non-treated firms. If the difference in means is statistically insignificant, 
then covariates are well balanced between matched pairs (Austin, 2011a; Stuart, 2010; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Lee 2013). High matching quality indicates a good 
balance of covariates between the treatment and comparison groups. Low matching 
quality, on the other hand, indicates either misspecification of the model or weak 
comparability between treated and non-treated firms. If the propensity score model is 
correctly specified, then observed covariates X should be balanced before matching. 
Therefore, checking the covariate balance after estimating the propensity score model 
also means checking model specification. If the propensity score model is not properly 
specified then matching should be repeated on a model containing interaction terms and 
higher-order terms (Rosenbaum, 2005). However, if the matching quality remains low 
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 Balancing tests before matching should not be confused with balancing tests after matching.  
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even after re-specifying the model, that would indicate that the treated firms and 
matched firms in the control group have quite different characteristics, which makes 
them bad candidates for matching. In this case, one should use alternative evaluation 
methods other than matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
 
 The literature identifies several approaches for assessing the matching quality 
after matching. The first approach consists of comparing the standardized bias before 
and after matching. The formula for calculating the standardized bias was proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and is constructed as the ratio of the difference in sample 
means of treated and non-treated firms divided by the square root of the difference 
between the variances in both groups multiplied by 0.5. Hence, for a continuous 
covariate, the standardized difference is defined as: 
 
  
 ̅   ̅ 
√  
     
 
 
(5.4) 
 
Where d denotes the standardized difference;   ̅  and  ̅  denote the sample mean of the 
covariate in treated and untreated units, respectively; and   
 and   
  denote the sample 
variance of the covariate in treated and untreated subjects respectively (Austin, 2011b).  
For a dichotomous variable, the standardized difference is given by: 
 
 
  
( ̂   ̂ )
√ ̂ (   ̂ )    ̂ (   ̂ )
 
 
(5.5) 
 
Where  ̂  and  ̂   denote the mean of the dichotomous variable in treated and untreated 
units respectively.  
 
 The issue with this approach is that the evaluation literature does not provide a 
precise guide as to how small the standardized bias should be after matching (Becker 
and Egger, 2013). The rule of thumb adopted in most empirical studies is that a 
standardized bias below 3% or 5% is acceptable (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
However, some authors argue for larger standard differences, for instance, Austin 
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(2011a) adopts the proposal by Normand et al. (2001) that any difference lower than 
10% indicates a negligible difference in the mean. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and 
Stuart and Rubin (2008) adopt a less conservative approach arguing that standardized 
bias should not be larger than 20 per cent. Conversely, Steiner and Cook (2013) suggest 
that the difference should be close to zero, especially for large-effect variables.  
 
 The second approach is based on the t-test statistics, whereby we check whether 
there are statistically significant differences in the means of covariates X after the 
matching. Significant differences after matching imply low matching quality. Finally, 
the matching quality can be assessed by checking the joint significance of all covariates 
in the selection equation based on the likelihood-ratio (LR) test. All variables should be 
jointly significant before matching, and jointly insignificant after matching. 
Furthermore, one can estimate the propensity score only for matched treated and non-
treated firms and compare the pseudo- R
2
 before and after matching. Low pseudo-R
2
 
after matching indicates a good matching quality (Sianesi, 2004; Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
 Treatment effects of any matching estimator based on the propensity score are 
only estimated in the region of common support (see Equation 5.2). Thus, it is necessary 
to check the overlap of the propensity score between treated and non-treated firms after 
matching. The method applied in this study is based on identifying a minimum and a 
maximum propensity score and then deleting those observations for which the 
propensity scores in the treatment group are smaller than the minimum, and larger than 
the maximum propensity score in the comparison group. In this case, causal estimates 
are narrower treatment effects than estimates of the ATT: the common-support 
treatment effect for the treated (Morgan and Harding, 2006).  
 
 Finally, analytical standard errors of the treatment effect are not valid for casual 
inference, as they do not take into account the estimation of the propensity score and the 
limitation of the sample to the common support region. The literature suggests three 
approaches for the variance estimation (we briefly mention the two applied in this 
study). Bootstrapping is the most frequently used method, although there is no formal 
justification for its application in the variance estimation (Imbens, 2004). Recently, 
Abadie and Imbens (2008) demonstrate that bootstrapping is not valid for NN matching 
with replacement with more than one continuous covariate. However, it is still valid for 
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kernel matching (Heckman et al., 1997). The second approach, developed by Abadie 
and Imbens (2006), requires the estimation of the sample average treatment effect on the 
treated (SATT) and then the estimation of the variance of the SATT. Two options are 
available for the variance estimation: homoscedastic and heteroscedastic standard 
errors. The latter is applied in the analysis.  
 
 Finally, based on the previously explained steps, a matching protocol can be 
presented (see Figure 5.1). 
 
 For a robustness check, three matching estimators were employed. The first is 
kernel matching, which uses weighted averages of most units in the control group to 
estimate a counterfactual outcome.
81
 The major advantage of this non-parametric 
estimator is the reduction in variance as the entire sample of the control group is used in 
matching algorithm. Kernel matching requires the selection of the kernel function and 
of the bandwidth parameter, although the former is not very relevant in practice. The 
choice of bandwidth is associated with the following bias; high bandwidth yields a 
diminishing variance at the price of biased estimates and vice versa (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
 The second is bias-adjusted covariate matching proposed by Abadie and Imbens 
(2006) and implemented in Stata software by Abadie et al. (2004). The main advantage 
of this estimator is the reduction of bias when matching is not exact and so treated and 
control units do not have the same characteristics, i.e. there is at least one continuous 
covariate. Bias reduction is achieved by adjusting the estimated non-observed 
(counterfactual) outcome for the difference between treated and its matched control 
unit. Bias-adjusted matching estimator combines matching with a regression 
adjustment. In the first step, the outcome variable is regressed by OLS on the covariates 
using only the matched sample. 
 
 In the second step, the estimated coefficients from OLS regression are used for 
predicting the outcomes for treated units and their matched untreated units. Finally, to 
obtain a counterfactual outcome of the treated units, the difference between these two 
estimated outcomes (i.e. for treated and their matched untreated units) is added to the 
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 How many comparison units will be used depends on the choice of bandwidth.  
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observed outcome of the matched treated units (Abadie et al., 2004; Gonzàles and Pazó, 
2008). 
Figure 5.1. Matching protocol 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Li (2012). 
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 We have estimated 1:4 bias-adjusted estimator, whereby 1:4 refers to the number 
of control units used in matching (four control units were used to match each treated 
unit). Ratio matching be used if there is a large number of control units (Stuart, 2010). 
Selecting multiple controls entails a bias-variance trade-off; multiple matches increase 
bias but reduce variance. What is not clear from the literature is how to choose an 
optimal number of matches (Huber et al., 2010). Following the practical example in 
Abadie et al. (2004), we used four matches, as 'it offers the benefit of not relying on too 
little information without incorporating observations that are not sufficiently similar' (p. 
298). 
 
 The third PSM estimator is Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) 
based on propensity score, which uses weights based on the propensity score to create 
an artificial population in which treatment assignment is independent of the exogenous 
covariates X. The purpose of weighting is similar to using survey sampling weights to 
obtain weighted survey samples that are representative of the population (Austin, 
2011a). Weights (   ) used for the estimation of the ATT are set to equal to 1 for 
treated units (normalization of weights), i.e.   =1 and for untreated units,    =
 ( ) 
   ( ) 
, 
where P(X)i is the estimated propensity score (probability of receiving a treatment) for 
the ith subject (Nichols, 2008; Emsley et al., 2008). 
 
 After estimating the weights, the next step is to estimate the regression function 
by weighted least squares, whereby the outcome variable is regressed on the treatment 
indicator and covariates X. The weights, in this case, ensure that the treatment indicator 
is not correlated with the covariates. The variance estimation of the IPTW estimator has 
to take into account that weights are used to create an artificial sample. It is a common 
practice to use robust variance estimation (Emsley et al., 2008; Austin, 2011a). This 
estimator belongs to a group of double robust estimators, which require modelling both 
the propensity score model and a regression model in the same estimator. Namely, the 
treatment effects are not estimated as a difference in outcomes between treated and non-
treated firms, which is a common practice in other matching methods, but rather are 
estimated using a regression model. The importance of this estimator lies in its double 
robustness property, i.e. it remains consistent if either the propensity score model is 
correctly specified or the regression model or both. Therefore, only one model needs to 
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be correctly specified for consistent estimation (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009). 
 
 
5.3.2 Model specification  
 
 
Available data allows us to explore how public support affects several inbound open 
innovation strategies, which are: external networking; outsourcing R&D; and 
acquisition of other external knowledge. As the CIS data do not contain information on 
outbound open innovation, we are not able to assess the effectiveness of public support 
on those open innovation practices.  
 
 Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) do not assess the impact of subsidies 
received from the European Union (EU), because often cooperation on innovation is a 
pre-requisite for applying for EU funding. This obvious selection bias is partially 
addressed by matching on observed firm characteristics. Although the literature on EU 
funding emphases that cooperation is a pre-requisite for applying for this source of 
funding (Defazio et al., 2009; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Teirlinck and 
Spithoven, 2012), researchers interpret this condition differently. For instance, Defazio 
et al. (2009) explicitly note that, since the first EU Framework Programme, firms 
applying for funding must be organized in networks. However, according to these 
authors, in practice this precondition is irrelevant , because the required cooperative 
networks can be established either shortly before an application or, effectively, shortly 
after receipt of EU funding for the purpose of satisfying the conditions of EU funding. 
On the other hand, Teirlinck and Spithoven (2012) argue that firms have to have had 
long-standing cooperation on innovation before accessing the selection process. This 
discrepancy in the literature suggests that two types of selection bias might arise. 
Namely, if it is necessary for firms to establish cooperative networks well prior to 
participating in EU funding, this would imply an obvious selection bias in assessing the 
effectiveness of EU programmes on cooperation. In this case, findings of a large 
additional effect would be spurious, as large treatment effects would be overestimated 
due to selection bias. (EU funding to encourage firms to cooperate would go only to 
firms already engaged in long-standing cooperation, thereby invalidating findings of 
additionality.) If, however, firms establish cooperative networks either shortly before or, 
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effectively, shortly after the provision of EU funding, then  self-selection bias might 
invalidate causal interpretation of the estimates. (In this case, participating firms are not 
typical but a self-selecting group.) In either case, treatment effects would be highly 
sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we can hypothesize that participation 
in EU funding may have a large and positive effect on cooperation, but that this effect is 
likely to be overestimated due to selection bias.  
 
 The presence of selection bias has strong implications for the empirical 
strategies to be adopted for analysing the effectiveness of EU programmes designed to 
promote cooperation among firms. Not only is it likely that evaluation findings for EU 
programmes will be influenced by selection bias but also it is possible that evaluations 
that do not differentiate between programmes administered at the EU and other levels – 
treating them as homogeneous support programmes - will also be biased.  In turn, this 
suggests that evaluators either should have information about the selection process or 
should apply those evaluation methods that control for unobserved heterogeneity (such 
as the difference-in-difference estimator). Finally, to anticipate, this discussion does not 
alter the conclusions from our analysis reported below. The reason is that sensitivity 
analysis revealed no treatment effects that are robust to unobserved heterogeneity 
among firms that participated in EU funding; our robust findings are all for programmes 
that are administered at the national or the regional level. Accordingly, as our focus is 
on drawing conclusions from robust treatment parameters, the concluding remarks omit 
any reference to the estimated treatment effects of treatment assignment to EU funds.  
 
 Further, we separately analyse receipt of local or regional support (FUNLOC) 
and of national support (FUNGMT). From the perspective of distinguishing between 
three sources of funding, our analysis is similar to the analysis by Spithoven et al. 
(2012), who found that national support has the largest effect on open innovation in 
Belgian firms.   
 
 Outcome variables are defined as follows (see Appendix III, Table A3.1. for 
variable definition and descriptive statistics): 
- Aggregate cooperation (COOPERATION): DV=1 if firms cooperate with any 
partner: consumers, suppliers, universities or other higher education institutions 
(HEIs), consultants, government or competitors; otherwise zero; 
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- Cooperation with consumers (COOP_CUSTOMERS): DV=1  if firms cooperate 
with clients or customers, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with suppliers (COOP_SUPPLIERS): DV=1  if firms cooperate 
with suppliers, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with competitors (COOP_COMPETITORS): DV=1  if firms 
cooperate with competitors or other firms in the sector, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with consultants (COOP_CONSULTANTS): DV=1 if firms 
cooperate with consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes, 
otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with HEI (COOP_HEI): DV=1  if firms cooperate with universities 
or other higher education institutions, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with government (COOP_GOVERNMENT): DV=1 if firms 
cooperate with government or public research institutes, otherwise zero. 
- Outsourcing R&D (OUTSOURCING_RD): DV=1 if firms conduct extramural 
R&D activities, otherwise zero; 
- Acquisition of other external knowledge (EXTERNAL_KNOWLEDGE): DV=1 if 
firms purchase or license patents, know-how, and other types of knowledge from 
other firms, otherwise zero. 
 
 Although our sample is restricted to SMEs, we further include a dummy variable 
for small firms (SM) with more than 10 and fewer than 50 employees. SMEs are a 
heterogeneous category, and public support could have a differential effect on small 
firms relative to medium-sized firms (Curran, 2000).  
 
 A novelty of this study is the inclusion of barriers to innovation in the estimation 
of propensity scores (Becker and Dietz, 2004). The correlation matrix between seven 
variables measuring barriers to innovation indicates that multicollinearity might exist 
between these constraining factors (the correlation matrix is presented in Table A3.2).
82
 
Thus, to avoid multicollinearity, we omit four and include three variables: too high 
innovation costs (BARRIER3); a lack of qualified personnel (BARRIER4); and 
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 The seven barriers are as follows: lack of funds within enterprise or group (BARRIER1); lack of finance 
from sources outside a firm (BARRIER2); innovation costs too high (BARRIER3); lack of qualified 
personnel (BARRIER4); lack of information on technology (BARRIER5); lack of information on markets 
(BARRIER6); and difficulty in finding cooperation partners for innovation (BARRIER7). They are 
grouped into two categories - financial and knowledge obstacles to innovation. We assume that the reason 
why collinearity might occur is because some barriers belong to the same group, i.e. measure similar 
hampering factors. For instance, BARRIER1, BARRIER2 and BARRIER3 indicate financial barriers to 
innovation. The correlation matrix indicates high collinearity between these three obstacles.  
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difficulties in finding cooperative partners (BARRIER7) (the variables are measured as 
scores: 0 - no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 - medium importance; and 3 - high 
importance). The resource-based theory of the firm posits that resources are a crucial 
determinant of firms' competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). For SMEs, 
limited human and financial resources are critical factors in hampering innovation 
activities and justify the inclusion of the aforementioned barriers to innovation. In 
addition, limited internal resources and competencies can, at least partially, be 
compensated through cooperation with network partners (Lee et al., 2010; Parida et al., 
2012).   
 
 The following variables are included to control for firms' absorptive capacity:  
- Patent activities (PROPAT): In the empirical literature on R&D cooperation, 
patents are regarded as a measure of the appropriation effort; i.e. those firms that 
actively use mechanisms to protect their intellectual property are more likely to 
successfully commercialize their inventions (Faems et al., 2005).    
- Whether firms continuously innovate (CONTINUOUS_RD). The reason to 
model these variables is that public agencies could adopt a strategy of picking 
the winners (Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Spithoven et al., 2012). In that case, 
government selects those firms that have a record of successful innovation.  
 
 The model also includes a dummy variable for belonging to a group (GP). This 
variable can have a twofold effect; it can have a positive effect on cooperation, as firms 
that are a part of the enterprise group could be more likely to cooperate with other firms 
within a group (Czarnitzki et al., 2007). On the other hand, being a part of the group can 
have an adverse effect on the probability of receiving support. Some support measures 
are restrictive insofar SMEs that are part of a group are not eligible to apply for them. 
Thus, belonging to a group can be a barrier to participation in support programmes 
(Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003).    
 
 Exporting activities (EXPORT) are modelled as a binary indicator equal to one if 
firms export and zero otherwise. Exporting can have a positive impact on cooperation, 
given that exporters potentially could have a larger network of cooperation partners than 
do non-exporting firms. Furthermore, exporting firms might have more incentive to 
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innovate as a result of competitive pressure on international markets (Busom and 
Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013).  
 
 Another novelty of our study is the inclusion of sources of information in the 
selection equation. In the literature on determinants of R&D cooperation, sources of 
information are used as a proxy for knowledge spillovers. Several empirical strategies 
can be employed for measuring the complexity of knowledge: 
- A single variable to capture different sources of information. For instance, 
Spithoven et al. (2012) measure incoming knowledge spillovers by the average 
score of the importance of information from suppliers, consumers, competitors, 
universities, government, professional conferences, journals and exhibitions.  
- Only particular sources of information are included as a measure of incoming 
knowledge spillovers; these are conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions, scientific 
journals and publications, and professional and industry associations (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2002; de Faria et al., 2010; Chun and Mun, 2012). 
- All sources of information are included. For instance, Belderbos et al. (2004) 
control for incoming spillovers by including five sources of information: from 
suppliers; customers; competitors; universities and research institutions 
(institutional incoming spillovers); and from public sources (importance of 
patents, databases and trade fairs). 
 
 The third strategy was chosen, whereby incoming spillovers are proxied by the 
importance of various sources of information, such as: (a) conferences, trade fairs and 
exhibitions (INCOMING1); (b) scientific journals and publications (INCOMING2) and 
(c) professional and industry associations (INCOMING3). Furthermore, the following 
variables are included in the model: 
 Internal source of information to measure the importance of information within a 
firm or enterprise group (INFO_INTERNAL); 
 Market sources of information: from customers (INFO_CUSTOMERS); from 
suppliers (INFO_SUPPLIERS); competitors (INFO_COMPETITORS); and 
consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes 
(INFO_CONSULTANTS); and 
 Institutional sources: from universities (INFO_HEI) and from government or 
public research institutes (INFO_GOVERNMENT).  
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 All variables are measured as scores (0 - no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 - 
medium importance; and 3 - high importance). In addition, the balancing test before 
matching reported that the two variables (INFO_INTERNAL and INFO_SUPPLIERS) 
were not balanced in the propensity score model where the treatment variable is 
government support (FUNGMT). Following the literature on matching estimators 
discussed in Section 5.3.1, if the propensity score model is not balanced before 
matching, it should be re-specified by adding interaction terms and/or polynomials. We 
added two covariates (INTERNAL_SM and SUPPLIERS_SM), created as interaction 
terms between a binary indicator for small firms and two unbalanced covariates 
(INFO_INTERNAL and INFO_SUPPLIERS). After these additional covariates were 
added to the propensity score model, covariate balance before matching was achieved. 
We used this specification of the propensity score model for each treatment variable, 
which will enable us to compare the treatment effects of all three sources of funding.  
 
 To control for industry heterogeneity, based on the NACE classification at the 2-
digit industry level, we include in our model sectoral DVs for fourteen manufacturing 
industries (see Table A3.1. for variable definitions and Table A3.2 for NACE 
classification).
83
 The base category is INDUSTRY9 (sector 25 - Manufacture of rubber 
and plastic products.  
 
5.3.3 Data  
 
 
The analysis employs Spanish CIS2006 survey data covering the period 2004-2006. 
Anonymised micro-data are provided by Eurostat. The sample consists of 8,022 small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing sectors. For a robustness check, 
following Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), the sample is restricted to those firms 
                                                          
83
 There are two discrepancies between the NACE two-digit classification and the CIS microdata (see 
Table A3.2 for NACE classification). Firstly, sector 31 - Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus is a medium-high tech sector, but it is aggregated with three high-tech sectors: 30 - 
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; 32 - Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment; and 33 - Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments.  
Secondly, sector 23 - Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel is a medium low 
tech sector but is aggregated with sector 24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, which is a 
medium high tech industry.  
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that reported positive intramural R&D expenditures, which enables us to focus on 
innovative firms.
84
  
 
 Our sample consists of 5,115 small and 2,907 medium-sized firms.
85
 Around a 
quarter of the sample participated in local or regional programmes (1,854 SMEs or 23.1 
per cent) and less than 20 per cent received national government support (1,312 firms or 
16.4 per cent). Only 182 firms (2.3 per cent) received support from EU funding. 
Furthermore, 534 firms received both local/regional and government support, but very 
few firms (59) received all three types of support.  
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A3.1 (see Appendix III). Only one-fifth of 
SMEs cooperate on innovation (22.2 per cent). Regarding cooperation partners, the 
largest number of firms cooperate with suppliers (10.7 per cent) followed by 
government institutions (8.8 per cent) and universities (7.0 per cent). The smallest 
numbers of firms engage in horizontal cooperation with competitors (3.6 per cent). With 
respect to innovation activities, only 11.3 per cent applied for a patent in the period 
covered by the survey, while 34.5 per cent of firms continuously engage in R&D 
activities, and one-fourth of SMEs undertook extramural R&D activities (24.7 per cent). 
Furthermore, a large number of SMEs are exporters (68.6 per cent). Among various 
sources of information, the most important are internal sources (mean value of 2.1), 
followed by customers and suppliers (mean values of 1.4 and 1.5 respectively). The 
least important source of information is from government and public research institutes 
(mean value of 0.4). 
 
 Table A3.4 (see Appendix III) presents numbers and percentages of SMEs 
according to their cooperative behaviour and participation in support programmes. Out 
of 8,022 firms, more than two-thirds of firms neither cooperate on innovation nor 
participate in support programmes (63.5 per cent of firms from the perspective of 
local/regional support; 67.6 per cent of firms from the perspective of government 
support; and 76.6 per cent for EU support). By contrast, the percentage of firms that 
both cooperate and participate in public funding is rather low (8.9 per cent of firm 
receiving local/regional support; 6.1 per cent of firms receiving national support; and 
                                                          
84
 In addition, this empirical strategy enables comparison between findings from our study and those from 
Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008). 
85
 Small firms are defined as those employing more than 10 and fewer than 50 workers, while medium-
sized firms employee between 50 and 250 workers. 
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1.1 per cent of firms participating in the EU support). A similar pattern is found for 
participating firms that undertake extramural R&D activities (10.1 per cent of firms 
participating in local/regional support measures; 7.1 per cent of firms receiving federal 
government support; and 1.0 per cent of firms participating in the EU support). A very 
modest share of participating firms acquires other types of external knowledge (0.8 per 
cent of firms participating in local/regional funding; 0.7 per cent of firms receiving 
national support; and 0.1 per cent of firms receiving the EU support). Table A3.5 (see 
Appendix III) shows that the number of cooperating firms participating in support 
programmes is smaller than those that do not participate, although the largest 
discrepancy is found for EU support. The only exception is cooperation with 
government institutions of firms receiving local/regional support, where 378 are 
participating and 330 are non-participating firms.   
 
5.4 Main results  
 
We estimated the impact of public support on various types of cooperation (vertical, 
horizontal, and private-public partnerships etc.) and two additional open innovation 
practices: outsourcing R&D; and acquisition of other external knowledge. As discussed 
in Section 5.3.1, the first step in matching is to estimate the propensity score. The 
results of three probit models are shown in Table A3.6. We do not interpret the results 
of probit estimations, because probit models in the case of matching are used to obtain 
the propensity score. Furthermore, a critical step in estimating probit model is to check 
whether covariates between matched pairs of treated and untreated firms are balanced 
given the estimated propensity scores. The literature on matching suggests the inclusion 
of even those covariates that are statistically insignificant, because their inclusion does 
not increase bias in subsequent matching estimations. Moreover, our study is limited by 
a lack of information on the selection process, which means that a large number of 
covariates should be modelled in the estimation of the propensity score (Steiner et al., 
2010).  
 
 The choice of three matching estimators is motivated by suggestions advanced 
in the literature on matching. Following a discussion in Section 5.3.1, we estimated the 
Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching with the Mahalanobis metric and a caliper of 0.2 of 
the standard deviation of the propensity score, because this estimator results in the best 
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covariate balance after matching (D'Agostino, 1998; Cochran and Rubin, 1973). 
However, in our study, the number of matching arguments in the Mahalanobis metric 
amounted to eleven, which could be the reason why the matching balance was worse 
than found after kernel matching. For a robustness check we applied three additional 
matching estimators: kernel matching; 1:4 bias-adjusted covariate matching with the 
Mahanalobis metric; and IPWT estimator. 
 
 Table 5.1 presents the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for three 
sources of funding. With respect to behavioural additionality, the overall results 
strongly indicate a positive but differential impact of public support for each source of 
funding. The hypothesis advanced in Section 5.3.1 regarding the impact of EU funding 
on cooperation cannot be rejected: relative to local/regional and government supports, 
the EU funding has the largest effect on each type of cooperation and for an aggregate 
category of cooperation (COOPERATION). However, following discussion advanced in 
Section 5.3.1, interpreting these results as evidence of a large additional effect would be 
spurious, given that selection bias is unavoidable in assessing the impact of EU 
programmes. Indeed, the results of sensitivity analysis reported in the next section, 
confirm our discussion; only one model, estimated on the whole sample, for the effect 
of EU funding is robust to hidden bias.  
 
 Although estimated ATT effects are fairly consistent across the four matching 
estimators, we will interpret the results from kernel matching, because the latter resulted 
in the best balance after matching for each source of funding. The results of balancing 
tests are reported in Table 5.2 below. Moreover, the regions of common support for 
each estimator are presented in Table A3.8 (see Appendix III). Very few observations 
are lost due to the common support restrictions, which indicates a large overlap of 
estimated propensity scores among treated and untreated SMEs. Finally, Figure A3.1 
(see Appendix III) shows kernel densities of the estimated propensity scores before and 
after matching. After the matching procedures, the distribution of propensity scores for 
treated and untreated firms are identical. These results suggest that the propensity score 
are very well aligned after matching.   
 
 The ATT effect of local/regional programmes on aggregate cooperation is 14.1 
percentage points (p.p.) of an increase in the probability of cooperating on innovation; 
of national programmes 8.5 percentage points of an increase in the probability of 
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cooperating on innovation; and of EU support is 17.0 p.p. of an increase in the 
probability of cooperating on innovation.
86
 A comparison between treatment effects of 
local/regional and government support reveals that participation in local/regional 
programmes has a larger effect on any type of cooperation than does participation in 
national programmes, except for cooperation with competitors (horizontal cooperation) 
and for cooperation with HEIs. Moreover, the largest ATT effect is found for 
cooperation with government institutions for both sources of funding (for local/regional 
programmes, 11.8 p.p. of an increase in the probability of cooperating with government 
institutions; and for national support, 8.4 p.p. of an increase in the probability of 
cooperating with government institutions). On the other hand, the smallest ATT effect 
of local support is reported for cooperation with competitors (2.7 p.p. of an increase in 
the probability of cooperating with competitors), and of national support for vertical 
cooperation (2.9 p.p. of an increase in the probability of cooperating with customers and 
2.6 p.p. of an increase in the probability of cooperating with suppliers) together with 
cooperation with consultants (2.8 p.p. of an increase in the probability of cooperating 
with consultants). However, as reported in Table A3.7, the 95 per cent confidence 
intervals overlap for each outcome variable, except for the model in which aggregate 
cooperation is the outcome variable. Therefore, the differences between estimated 
treatment effects are not statistically significant, except, as noted, in one model.  
 
 Turning to open innovation strategies other than cooperation, the most 
interesting finding is reported for outsourcing R&D. Participation in both local/regional 
and government support programmes results in a larger effect on extramural R&D 
activities, than on either aggregated or disaggregated categories of cooperation. The 
pattern is reversed in the case of EU funding; i.e. a substantially larger effect (17.0 p.p.) 
on aggregate cooperation than on extramural R&D activities (9.6 p.p. of an increase in 
the probability of outsourcing R&D). In contrast, receiving public support from regional 
and EU programmes has no effect on the acquisition of external knowledge, and has a 
small effect on SMEs participating in government programmes (1.2 p.p. of an increase 
in the probability of acquiring other external knowledge).  
                                                          
86
 We conducted two kernel matching estimations for EU funding: the first estimator with a bandwidth of 
0.06; and the second with 0.001. Matching quality was poor after the former, which motivated our 
decision to reduce the bandwidth to improve the balance. Indeed, a smaller bandwidth results in improved 
and satisfactory matching quality. Therefore, we present results from kernel matching with bandwidth of 
0.001. 
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Table 5.1. Average Treatment Effects (ATTs) for the whole sample of Spanish SMEs 
Dependent 
variable 
Local/regional support  Government support EU support  
NN matching 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric and 
caliper 0.02 
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 
1:4 bias 
adjusted 
covariate 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric 
IPTW 
NN matching 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric and 
caliper 0.02 
Kernel 
matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, 
bw=0.06) 
1:4 bias 
adjusted 
covariate 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric  
IPTW 
NN matching 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric and 
caliper 0.004 
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, 
bw=0.001) 
1:4 bias 
adjusted 
covariate 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric  
IPTW 
ATT 
(sub-sampled 
SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT 
(Abadie 
and Imbens 
SEs) 
ATT 
(robust 
SEs) 
ATT 
(sub-
sampled 
SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrapp
ed SEs) 
ATT 
(Abadie 
and Imbens 
SEs) 
ATT 
(robust 
SEs) 
ATT 
(sub-
sampled 
SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrappe
d SEs) 
ATT 
(Abadie 
and Imbens 
SEs) 
ATT 
(robust 
SEs) 
Aggregate 
cooperation  
0.157*** 
(0.020) 
0.141*** 
(0.014) 
0.152*** 
(0.013) 
0.142*** 
(0.014) 
0.099*** 
(0.026) 
0.085*** 
(0.014) 
0.100*** 
(0.015) 
0.089*** 
(0.016) 
0.156*** 
(0.066) 
0.170*** 
(0.035) 
0.218*** 
(0.039) 
0.175*** 
(0.038) 
Cooperation 
with 
customers 
0.054*** 
(0.012) 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.057*** 
(0.008) 
0.054*** 
(0.009) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
0.138*** 
(0.049) 
0.129*** 
(0.030) 
0.137*** 
(0.029) 
0.127*** 
(0.031) 
Cooperation 
with suppliers 
0.047*** 
(0.016) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
0.040** 
(0.020) 
0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.113** 
(0.047) 
0.106*** 
(0.034) 
0.116*** 
(0.033) 
0.103*** 
(0.033) 
Cooperation 
with 
competitors 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.045*** 
(0.013) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.044*** 
(0.009) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.106*** 
(0.040) 
0.106*** 
(0.027) 
0.124*** 
(0.026) 
0.112*** 
(0.027) 
Cooperation 
with 
consultants  
0.031** 
(0.012) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.042*** 
(0.008) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.034** 
(0.017) 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.026*** 
(0.010) 
0.030*** 
(0.010) 
0.106** 
(0.045) 
0.087*** 
(0.030) 
0.119*** 
(0.029) 
0.103*** 
(0.030) 
Cooperation 
with HEI 
0.047*** 
(0.013) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
0.049*** 
(0.008) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
0.032* 
(0.019) 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
0.052*** 
(0.010) 
0.051*** 
(0.012) 
0.081* 
(0.049) 
0.107*** 
(0.034) 
0.143*** 
(0.030) 
0.113*** 
(0.033) 
Cooperation 
with 
government  
0.115*** 
(0.014) 
0.118*** 
(0.012) 
0.128*** 
(0.010) 
0.117*** 
(0.011) 
0.069*** 
(0.019) 
0.084*** 
(0.012) 
0.097*** 
(0.012) 
0.086*** 
(0.013) 
0.181*** 
(0.058) 
0.169*** 
(0.036) 
0.184*** 
(0.034) 
0.166*** 
(0.035) 
Outsourcing 
R&D  
0.163*** 
(0.020) 
0.168*** 
(0.013) 
0.177*** 
(0.013) 
0.167*** 
(0.014) 
0.117*** 
(0.025) 
0.122*** 
(0.013) 
0.134*** 
(0.015) 
0.124*** 
(0.016) 
0.131** 
(0.067) 
0.096** 
(0.038) 
0.134*** 
(0.039) 
0.106*** 
(0.038) 
Acquisition 
of other 
external 
knowledge 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.025) 
0.000 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
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Table 5.2. Balancing tests for the whole sample 
Matching estimator 
Local/regional support  Government support  EU support 
Pseudo-
R2 
p-value 
of LR 
test 
Mean 
bias 
t-test Pseudo-R2 
p-value 
of LR 
test 
Mean 
bias 
t-test 
Pseudo-
R2 
p-value 
of LR 
test 
Mean 
bias 
t-test 
NN matching without replacement  
and caliper  
0.002 1.000 1.8 Yes 0.004 0.999 2.0 Yes 0.027 0.998 5.7 Yes 
NN matching with Mahalanobis metric 
and caliper   
0.001 1.000 0.8 Yes 0.004 0.996 1.5 
No at the 
5% l.s.a  
0.017 1.000 2.7 Yes 
Kernel matching Epanechnikov kernel, 
bw=0.06 (0.001 for EU support) 
0.000 1.000 0.9 Yes 0.001 1.000 1.7 Yes 0.002 1.000 1.4 Yes 
 Notes:  a l.s. denotes level of significance. Following the discussion on matching quality in Section 5.3.1, low values of pseudo-R2 indicate a good matching quality. Very high p-
values of the likelihood-ratio (LR) test  suggest that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null of joint insignificance of covariates at 1 % level of significance. Mean biases for 
each estimation are below 3 %, except for NN matching without replacement estimating the impact of EU support, which is slightly below 6 %. The forth balancing test, t-test 
statistics, is satisfied in each estimation (i.e. Yes - there are statistically insignificant differences in the means of covariates after matching), except for NN matching with 
Mahalanobis metric estimating the impact of government support. 
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5.5 Sensitivity analysis  
 
As noted in Section 5.3.1, the main drawback of matching as an evaluation method is 
that it only controls for selection on observables. Yet firms' innovative behaviour as 
well as the selection process can be affected also by unobserved characteristics, such as 
managerial attitude toward innovation (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008). This 
unobserved heterogeneity is referred in evaluation literature as 'hidden bias'. The 
presence of 'hidden bias' indicates a failure of the identifying assumption on 
unconfoundedness or the selection on observables (CIA). The evaluation literature 
proposes several tests that can be applied to test for the presence of 'hidden bias'. The 
results of such tests should be taken with caution, as they cannot directly confirm 
whether the CIA holds. Rather, they can indicate whether 'hidden bias' arises or not. 
However, testing for unobserved heterogeneity should always complement a propensity 
score analysis, as the assumption on unconfoundedness cannot be tested directly (Guo 
and Fraser, 2010). Naturally, the ideal robustness check would be to apply those 
evaluation methods that control for unobserved heterogeneity. However, as discussed in 
the introductory section, the lack of valid instruments precludes this empirical strategy.  
 
 Sensitivity analysis is not common in empirical studies on additionality of 
innovation policy. Indeed, no previous study on behavioural additionality reports any 
type of sensitivity analysis. Moreover, to our knowledge, only the study on input 
additionality by Alecke et al. (2012) reports the results of sensitivity analysis.
87
 The 
authors adopted the same Rosenbaum bound approach (Rosenbaum, 2002) as in our 
analysis. 
  
 The idea behind the Rosenbaum bounds approach is to determine how large the 
impact of an unobserved 'confounding' variable should be to render the treatment effect 
statistically insignificant, under the assumption that this variable simultaneously affects 
a treatment assignment and the outcome variable (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004). Sensitivity 
of the estimated results with respect to 'hidden bias' would indicate that the results are 
not robust (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008; Becker and Caliendo, 2007).  
                                                          
87
 However, we believe that the authors did not correctly apply the test using the Stata software. The user-
written command mhbounds can only be used for two types of matching estimators: NN matching without 
replacement; and stratification. Alecke et al. (2012) employ kernel matching; and, to our understanding, 
mhbounds cannot be applied to kernel matching.  
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 The probability of treatment assignment is given by (Becker and Caliendo, 
2007): 
     (     )   (    |     )   (       ) (5.6) 
 
Where xi are observed characteristics for unit i, ui is the unobserved variable, Ti denotes 
treatment assignment, β is the effect of observed characteristics xi and γ is the effect of 
unobserved variable ui on the probability of treatment assignment. When a treatment 
effect is robust to hidden bias, γ is equal to zero. However, in the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity, γ is larger than zero and two matched units i and j will have a 
different probability of receiving a treatment. Under the assumption that F is a logistic 
distribution, the odds that unit i will receive a treatment is Pi(1-Pi) and the odds that unit 
j will receive a treatment is Pj(1-Pj), while the odds ratio is then: 
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 (5.7) 
 
As both units i and j have the same observed covariates, the vector x cancels out and 
what remains is: 
 
    (       )
    (       ) 
      (     )  (5.8) 
 
 
The odds ratio is equal to one (i.e. no hidden bias) in two cases:  
- if ui - uj = 0, i.e. no differences in unobserved covariates and their impact on 
matched pairs of treated and untreated units; and  
- if γ = 0, i.e. the effect of unobserved variables on the participation decision is 
zero. 
 However, when these conditions do not hold, meaning that the study is sensitive 
to hidden bias, we want to determine how changes in γ and (ui - uj) affect the estimated 
treatment effects. The upper and lower bounds for the odds ratio denoted gamma (Γ) in 
Equation 5.7 are as follows (Rosenbaum, 2002): 
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Where e denotes exponentiation. The value of gamma (Γ) shows how much matched 
pairs differ in their odds of treatment assignment. When gamma has a value of 1 (which 
can only be the case when γ=0), that means that the treatment effect is free of hidden 
bias. In other words, if unobserved characteristics have no influence on the causal 
inference, then the estimated ATT and its confidence intervals are unbiased (Li, 2012). 
Higher values of gamma indicate a departure from random assignment (selection) on 
observables. For instance, if gamma is equal to two, treated units are twice as likely to 
receive treatment as untreated (control) units. Keele (2010) notes that using gamma 
between 1 and 2 is sufficient for sensitivity analysis, as for larger values of gamma, 
most treatment effects are not robust to hidden bias. 
 
 Under the assumption that the unobserved covariate is binary, Becker and 
Caliendo (2007) developed the Stata user-written command mhbounds for binary 
outcomes, which provides p - values for the upper and lower bounds in Equation 5.9 
calculated from the sample data. These p-values reflect the critical values associated 
with the Mantel-Haenszel test statistics (   ), which are based on the values of gamma. 
The test statistic     is calculated for each value of gamma. If    
  denotes the test 
statistics when the treatment effect is overestimated (the upper bound), and    
  is the 
test statistics when the treatment effect is underestimated (the lower bound), then the 
upper bound is given by (Becker and Caliendo, 2007):
88
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(5.10) 
 
                                                          
88
 If there is an unobserved selection bias, we expect it to be positive (i.e. overestimation of the treatment 
effect). For the calculation of the lower bound, see Becker and Caliendo (2007). It is important to note 
that each component of Equation 5.10 is observable.  
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The number of successful treated units is    , the number of successful untreated units is 
    and the number of total successes in stratum s is   .
89
 The number of successful 
treated units in the whole sample is denoted   .  
 ̃ 
 and    ( ̃ 
 ) are the large-sample approximations of the expectation and variance of 
the number of treated units for given γ.  
 The large-sample approximation of  ̃ 
  is the unique root of the Equation 5.11: 
  ̃ 
 (    )   ̃  ( 
   )(      )       
       (5.11) 
 
where     and     are the numbers of treated and untreated units in stratum s 
respectively and           . 
The decision on which root to use is based on the following condition: 
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Finally, the large-sample approximation of the variance is given by: 
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(5.13) 
 The literature on a sensitivity analysis does not provide clear guidance as to 
which value of gamma should be taken as a threshold for concluding whether a study is 
robust to hidden bias. Based on the proposal advanced by DiPrete and Gangl (2004) that 
a critical value of gamma depends on the research question, Lee and Lee (2009, p. 103) 
argue in their labour market study:  
If more track records for the sensitivity parameters are established in 
future through more applications so that researchers can agree on how 
big is big for sensitivity analysis parameters, then the sensitivity analysis 
may become useful tools in dealing with unobserved confounders. 
 
                                                          
89
 In our case, successful treated units are those participating firms who introduced a particular open 
innovation activity (i.e. outcome variable=1). Consequently, successful untreated units are those non-
participating firms who engaged in open innovation activities. 
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 Given that only one study in the literature on R&D and innovation policy 
includes a sensitivity analysis (that of Alecke et al., 2012)
90
, we consulted empirical 
studies in labour market economics (Aakvik, 2001; Hujer et al., 2004; Caliendo et at., 
2005) and, accordingly, adopt the threshold of Γ=1.5. Therefore, if a significance level - 
p-value - is above 5% for Γ≤1.5, we report that a model is sensitive to unobserved 
heterogeneity. Conversely, if a significance level is below 5% for Γ>1.5, we conclude 
that a model is robust to hidden bias. In the analysis, we set the maximum value for Γ to 
2 with increments of 0.05. 
 
 Table 5.3. reports the results of a sensitivity analysis of the main empirical 
results. We estimated the ATT effects from NN matching without replacement and with 
a caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score. The rationale 
for using this particular estimator is twofold. First, as previously mentioned, the Stata 
command for a sensitivity analysis can only be applied for NN matching without 
replacement. Second, we used the same caliper size as in Section 5.4, to be able to 
compare results from NN Mahalanobis metric matching with replacement (reported in 
Table 5.1.) and NN matching without replacement (reported in Table 5.3. below). 
 
 Besides the ATT effects estimated applying NN matching without replacement, 
Table 5.3. reports those gamma values for which the 5% significance levels of the upper 
bounds indicate whether the results are sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity; the null 
hypothesis is no treatment effect (columns titled Hidden bias at 5%), i.e. an unobserved 
covariate renders the ATT insignificant. The implication of a non-rejection of the null is 
that the reported ATT effect is spurious, because it does not take into account variations 
in unobservables. We expect a positive (unobserved) selection bias, meaning that those 
firms that are more likely to participate in public funding, are also more likely to 
undertake open innovation. For positive treatment effects, we are interested in the upper 
bounds indicating a possible overestimation of the true treatment effects (Becker and 
Caliendo, 2007).
91
 
 
                                                          
90
 The threshold in their study is Γ=3.  
91
 The null hypothesis of underestimated effects is rejected at the 1 % significance level in most cases.   
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Table 5.3. Sensitivity analysis- Rosenbaum bound approach 
Open innovation 
strategies  
Local support Government support EU support  
NN without 
replacement 
and caliper 
0.02 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation) 
b
 
NN without 
replacement 
and caliper 
0.02 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation) 
NN without 
replacement and 
caliper 0.004 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation) ATT 
(subsampled 
SEs) 
a
 
ATT 
(subsampled 
SEs) 
ATT (subsampled 
SEs) 
Aggregate cooperation 
0.135*** 
(0.016) 
No when Γ≤1.70 
0.079*** 
(0.020) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
0.126** 
(0.057) 
Yes when Γ≥1.20 
Cooperation with 
customers 
0.047*** 
(0.010) 
Yes when Γ≥1.50 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
Yes when Γ≥1.35 
0.132*** 
(0.044) 
No when Γ≤1.70 
Cooperation with 
suppliers 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
 
0.022 
(0.015) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.45 changes sign 
0.088* 
(0.053) 
Yes when Γ≥1.10 
Cooperation with 
competitors 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
Yes when Γ≥1.35 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
No when Γ≤1.85 
0.093** 
(0.037) 
Yes when Γ≥1.45 
Cooperation with 
consultants 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
0.023 
(0.014) 
Yes when Γ≥1.05 
At Γ≥1.65 changes sign 
0.093** 
(0.043) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
Cooperation with HEI 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
Yes when Γ≥1.35 
0.039* 
(0.015) 
Yes when Γ≥1.15 
0.104** 
(0.044) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
Cooperation with 
government 
0.110*** 
(0.012) 
No when Γ≤2.00 
0.086*** 
(0.016) 
No when Γ≤1.65 
0.148*** 
(0.048) 
Yes when Γ≥1.50 
 
Outsourcing R&D 
0.169*** 
(0.017) 
No when Γ≤1.90 
0.112*** 
(0.018) 
Yes when Γ≥1.45 
At Γ≥1.90 changes sign 
0.049 
(0.061) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.80 changes sign 
Acquisition of other 
external knowledge 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.85 changes sign 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
Notes: a *** ATT estimated at the one per cent level of significance; ** ATT estimated at the five per cent level of significance; * ATT estimated at the ten per cent level of significance.b Interpretation 
as follows: for example, in the case of “No when Γ≤1.70”, the upper bound is significant at the 5 per cent level when Γ is below or equal 1.7 (so Γ at the threshold level of 1.5 is statistically significant); 
“Yes when Γ≥1.50” means that the upper bound becomes insignificant at the 5 per cent level when Γ is 1.5 (so Γ at the threshold level of 1.5 is statistically insignificant); and  “Yes when Γ≥1.25” means 
that the upper bound becomes  insignificant at the 5 per cent level when Γ exceeds 1.25 (so Γ at the threshold level of 1.5 is statistically insignificant). 
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 Sensitivity analysis reveals that most estimated treatment effects are sensitive to 
hidden biases. Secondly, analysing each source of funding separately, sensitivity 
analysis suggests the following:
 92
 
 In the case of regional support, the models that are less sensitive to unobserved 
heterogeneity are those with the following outcome variables: aggregate 
cooperation; cooperation with government (least likely to be affected by hidden 
bias); and outsourcing R&D. The remaining models are rather sensitive to 
selection bias.  
 In the models of national treatment assignment, deviations from the underlying 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) are less likely to occur in the 
models with horizontal cooperation and with public institutions. For the 
remaining models, Rosenbaum's bounds indicate that ATT effects are sensitive 
to hidden bias.  
 Finally, for EU funding, most models are sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity 
at fairly low values of gamma. Two exceptions are the models with cooperation 
with customers and with public institutions, with high values of gamma (1.70 
and 1.50 respectively).  
 
 It is important to notice that the results from a sensitivity analysis adopting the 
Rosenbaum bounds are the worst-case scenarios (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004). For 
instance, in the model with the cooperation with suppliers (for local/regional support), 
the estimated ATT effect is sensitive to hidden selection bias for Γ≥1.25. However, this 
does not mean that there is no true positive effect of public support on cooperation with 
suppliers. The result suggests that, if there is a confounding variable with a large effect 
on both a treatment assignment and the outcome variable and if that variable increases 
the odds ratio of receiving a treatment for participating firms by 25 per cent (i.e. 
Γ=1.25) then the confidence interval for the ATT effect would include zero (DiPrete 
and Gangl, 2004).  
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 In five models, the significance levels of the Mantel-Haenszel test statistics on the upper bounds firstly 
fall but then begin to rise. At the point of rising significance levels, the treatment effects change sign and 
become significant (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). For instance, in the case of the ATT effect of 
government support on cooperation with suppliers, the point estimate is positive and statistically 
insignificant (ATT=0.022). The null hypothesis of no treatment effect cannot be rejected at a gamma 
value of 1. When gamma increases to 1.45 (the odds of treated firms receiving treatment relative to 
untreated firms), the significance levels indicates that the ATT effect becomes negative and statistically 
significant (see Appendix III, Table A3.9 for the Stata output).  
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 The overall conclusion from sensitivity analysis suggests that hidden bias is 
unlikely to occur only in the case of cooperation with government agencies, and to a 
lesser extent, in models with cooperation with customers. On the other side, hidden bias 
is likely to arise in modelling cooperation with suppliers, consultants and Higher 
Education Institutions. Finally, the models in which the outcome variable is the 
acquisition of external knowledge are least robust to unobserved heterogeneity, as 
hidden bias arises even at gamma equal to 1.  
 
 Our findings raise several issues. First, sensitivity analysis should be a necessary 
step when the effectiveness of R&D and innovation policy is assessed with the PSM 
analysis, as the findings indicate that treatment effects could be overestimated when 
firms' unobserved characteristics are not controlled for. Although a sensitivity analysis 
is considered to be an integral part of the PSM analysis, (Guo and Fraser, 2010; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), it is not adopted as a common practice in empirical 
innovation studies. However, a lack of sensitivity analysis is not only pertinent to 
innovation studies; Pearl (2009) points out that researchers often assume that the 
assumption of strong ignorability (i.e. CIA) holds because a large number of covariates 
is included in estimating a propensity score. However, it is not enough to recognize the 
major limitation of the PSM analysis; we should also examine whether selection on 
observables is likely to be satisfied. Although a sensitivity analysis cannot directly test 
the assumption, it can gauge the level of robustness of empirical findings to hidden bias.  
 
 Second, given the dominance of matching estimators in empirical studies, 
empirical evidence should be treated with caution. Most empirical studies reviewed in 
Section 3.6 report a positive impact of public support on firms' cooperation on 
innovation. Our results suggest that, depending on the type of cooperative partners, 
particular treatment effects could be overestimated. Third, our results indicate that 
unobserved heterogeneity is more prominent in the models with vertical cooperation, 
than in those with other types of cooperation. It could be that other factors, not 
considered in empirical studies to date, influence the effectiveness of innovation support 
on cooperation with customers and suppliers. Finally, regarding open innovation 
practices, the model with the outcome variable measuring the acquisition of other 
external knowledge is extremely sensitive to a positive unobserved selection for each 
stream of funding.  
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5.6 Results for the subsample of innovative firms  
 
As noted in Section 5.3.3, we employed the same matching estimators on the subsample 
of innovative firms. Following Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), innovative firms 
are defined as those firms reporting positive intramural R&D expenditures in the period 
2004-2006.
93
 The subsample consists of 3,861 SMEs, out of which 2,271 are small- and 
1,590 are medium-sized enterprises. Results from the probit models are presented in 
Table A3.10 (Appendix III). Again, based on four balancing tests, the best balance is 
achieved with kernel matching (see Table A3.11, Appendix III). Therefore, the ATT 
effects presented in Table 5.4 are interpreted using the estimated treatment effects from 
kernel matching.  
 
 The first interesting finding is that, qualitatively, the results for innovative firms 
are consistent with the main results. However, quantitatively, treatment effects for the 
whole sample are uniformly smaller than those reported for innovative firms, although 
the differences, on average, are not large. This pattern of larger treatment effects on 
innovative firms could suggest two stylized facts. 
- Unobserved firm characteristics have a smaller influence on causal estimates, 
because the sample is more homogenous (i.e. only innovative firms).  
- Public support, overall, is more effective in supporting open innovation practices 
in those SMEs that engage in intramural R&D activities, suggesting the 
importance of moderating influences related to firms' internal innovative 
capacities.  
 
 The findings for each stream of funding are as follows. Participation in 
local/regional support programmes has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
all open innovation practices; a very small, but significant effect is even reported for 
acquisition of other external knowledge (1.1 p.p. of an increase in the probability of 
acquiring other external knowledge). Moreover, the largest treatment effect is estimated 
for extramural R&D activities (20.2 p.p. of an increase in the probability of outsourcing 
R&D), which is a slightly higher estimate than for the aggregate cooperation (17.7 p.p.). 
The smallest effect is found for horizontal cooperation (3.3 p.p.). 
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 Spithoven et al. (2012) also estimated the treatment effects in the subsample of innovative Belgian 
firms. However, the authors do not explain how innovative firms are defined in the Belgian CIS 
questionnaire.  
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Table 5.4. Average Treatment Effects (ATTs) from the subsample of innovative Spanish SMEs 
Dependent 
variable 
Local/regional support  Government support EU support  
NN matching 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric and 
caliper 0.02 
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 
1:4 bias adjusted 
covariate 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric 
IPTW 
NN matching 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric and 
caliper 0.02 
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 
1:4 bias 
adjusted 
covariate 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric  
IPTW 
NN 
matching 
with 
Mahalanobi
s metric and 
caliper 0.006 
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, 
bw=0.001) 
1:4 bias 
adjusted 
covariate 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric  
IPTW 
ATT 
(sub-sampled 
SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT 
(Abadie and 
Imbens SEs) 
ATT 
(robust SEs) 
ATT 
(sub-sampled 
SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT 
(Abadie and 
Imbens SEs) 
ATT 
(robust SEs) 
ATT 
(sub-
sampled 
SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT 
(Abadie and 
Imbens SEs) 
ATT 
(robust SEs) 
Aggregate 
cooperation  
0.167*** 
(0.028) 
0.177*** 
(0.017) 
0.190*** 
(0.019) 
0.178*** 
(0.018) 
0.103*** 
(0.030) 
0.108*** 
(0.020) 
0.121*** 
(0.020) 
0.108*** 
(0.020) 
0.227*** 
(0.084) 
0.215*** 
(0.050) 
0.299*** 
(0.048) 
0.229*** 
(0.044) 
Cooperation 
with 
customers 
0.049*** 
(0.018) 
0.071*** 
(0.013) 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
0.072*** 
(0.013) 
0.038* 
(0.023) 
0.038*** 
(0.014) 
0.041*** 
(0.015) 
0.037** 
(0.015) 
0.182** 
(0.075) 
0.148*** 
(0.045) 
0.184*** 
(0.042) 
0.166*** 
(0.042) 
Cooperation 
with suppliers 
0.047** 
(0.023) 
0.058*** 
(0.016) 
0.061*** 
(0.015) 
0.060*** 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.024 
0.036** 
(0.017) 
0.034** 
(0.016) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
0.164** 
(0.074) 
0.129** 
(0.051) 
0.159*** 
(0.044) 
0.138*** 
(0.042) 
Cooperation 
with 
competitors 
0.014 
(0.014) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.054*** 
(0.016) 
0.063*** 
(0.010) 
0.064*** 
(0.012) 
0.062*** 
(0.011) 
0.145** 
(0.067) 
0.140*** 
(0.036) 
0.157*** 
(0.036) 
0.152*** 
(0.037) 
Cooperation 
with 
consultants  
0.029 
(0.019) 
0.043*** 
(0.014) 
0.047*** 
(0.012) 
0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.021) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
0.035** 
(0.014) 
0.136** 
(0.069) 
0.090** 
(0.042) 
0.154*** 
(0.039) 
0.125*** 
(0.039) 
Cooperation 
with HEI 
0.054*** 
(0.019) 
0.058*** 
(0.013) 
0.061*** 
(0.012) 
0.058*** 
(0.014) 
0.046** 
(0.023) 
0.057*** 
(0.017) 
0.061*** 
(0.015) 
0.057*** 
(0.017) 
0.118 
(0.077) 
0.122*** 
(0.044) 
0.171*** 
(0.043) 
0.143*** 
(0.043) 
Cooperation 
with 
government  
0.147*** 
(0.023) 
0.152*** 
(0.016) 
0.164*** 
(0.015) 
0.152*** 
(0.015) 
0.090*** 
(0.026) 
0.109*** 
(0.018) 
0.120*** 
(0.017) 
0.108*** 
(0.017) 
0.173** 
(0.081) 
0.189*** 
(0.048) 
0.226*** 
(0.047) 
0.204*** 
(0.045) 
Outsourcing 
R&D  
0.199*** 
(0.028) 
0.202*** 
(0.016) 
0.227*** 
(0.019) 
0.201*** 
(0.018) 
0.165*** 
(0.031) 
0.154*** 
(0.021) 
0.174*** 
(0.021) 
0.151*** 
(0.020) 
0.173** 
(0.085) 
0.097* 
(0.051) 
0.175*** 
(0.050) 
0.109** 
(0.046) 
Acquisition 
of other 
external 
knowledge 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.011* 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.034) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
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 Receiving government funding has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on all open innovation practices, except for acquisition of other external knowledge. 
Similar to participation in local/regional programmes, the largest effect of government 
support is on outsourcing R&D (15.4 p.p.), followed by aggregate cooperation (10.8 
percentage points) and cooperation with government institutions (10.9 p.p.). Contrary to 
receiving local/regional support, the smallest effect of government support is on 
cooperation with consultants (3.5 p.p.) and on vertical cooperation (with customers 3.8 
p.p. and with suppliers 3.6 p.p.). Similar to findings for the whole sample, the 95 per 
cent confidence intervals for the subsample of innovative firms (see Table A3.12, 
Appendix III) overlap for each outcome variable. Therefore, the differences between 
estimated treatment effects are not statistically significant. 
 
 The third source, EU funding, has the largest effect on cooperative behaviour of 
innovative firms, compared to other streams of funding. The ATT effect on aggregate 
cooperation is 21.5 p.p., followed by the effect on cooperation with government 
institutions (18.9 p.p.). Compared to local/regional and government support, the effect 
of EU funding is relative larger for each type of cooperative partners. For instance, the 
smallest effect is found for cooperation with consultants (9.0 p.p.). Another 
dissimilarity, relative to other sources, is that EU funding has a larger effect on 
cooperation, both aggregate and separately, than on extramural R&D activities (9.7 
p.p.). Finally, receiving funding from the EU has no effect on acquisition of other 
external knowledge.  
 
 Table 5.5 shows results from a sensitivity analysis of the subsample of 
innovative SMEs. The results confirm those reported for the whole sample. In addition, 
the results of the Rosenbaum bound approach for the subsample indicate that, overall, 
treatment effects are less sensitive to hidden bias, as more models are reported to be 
robust to overestimation (see also Table 5.6). This finding is consistent with our 
argument about the smaller influence of unobservables due to the more homogenous 
group of firms in the subsample. 
  
 For instance, for government support, the ATT effect on extramural R&D 
activities is not sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity for gamma values lower than 
1.60. Moreover, for innovative SMEs participating in EU funding, the results of 
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sensitivity analysis suggest that the treatment effect estimated for aggregate cooperation 
for gamma value lower than 1.75 is robust; and the ATT effects on cooperation with 
competitors are rather robust (gamma value should be above 2 to alter the estimated 
effect).  
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Table 5.5. Sensitivity analysis for a subsample of innovative SMEs  
Open innovation 
strategies  
Local support Government support EU support  
NN without 
replacement and 
caliper 0.02 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation) 
NN without 
replacement and 
caliper 0.02 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation) 
NN without 
replacement and 
caliper 0.006 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation) 
ATT 
(subsampled 
SEs) 
ATT (subsampled 
SEs) 
ATT (subsampled 
SEs) 
Aggregate 
cooperation 
0.162*** 
(0.023) 
No when Γ≤1.75 
0.095*** 
(0.025) 
Yes when Γ≥1.30 
At Γ≥1.75 changes sign 
0.244*** 
(0.066) 
No when Γ≤1.75 
Cooperation with 
customers 
0.061*** 
(0.015) 
Yes when Γ≥1.40 
0.027 
(0.018) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.60 changes sign 
0.157*** 
(0.057) 
Yes when Γ≥1.50 
Cooperation with 
suppliers 
0.047** 
(0.018) 
Yes when Γ≥1.15 
0.014 
(0.021) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.35 changes sign 
0.118* 
(0.061) 
Yes when Γ≥1.15 
Cooperation with 
competitors 
0.030** 
(0.012) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
0.058*** 
(0.014) 
No when Γ≤1.75 
0.165*** 
(0.053) 
No when Γ<2.0 
Cooperation with 
consultants 
0.026* 
(0.014) 
Yes when Γ≥1.05 
At Γ≥1.60 changes sign 
0.037** 
(0.016) 
Yes when Γ≥1.10 
At Γ≥1.80 changes sign 
0.118** 
(0.052) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
Cooperation with 
HEI 
0.039** 
(0.017) 
Yes when Γ≥1.15 
At Γ≥1.65 changes sign 
0.044** 
(0.019) 
Yes when Γ≥1.10 
At Γ≥1.70 changes sign 
0.157*** 
(0.057) 
Yes when Γ≥1.40 
Cooperation with 
government 
0.152*** 
(0.018) 
No when Γ<2.0 
0.101*** 
(0.021) 
No when Γ≤1.55 
0.181*** 
(0.063) 
Yes when Γ≥1.45 
Outsourcing 
R&D 
0.192*** 
(0.022) 
No when Γ≤1.90 
0.152*** 
(0.024) 
No when Γ≤1.60 
0.087 
(0.066) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
Acquisition of 
other external 
knowledge 
0.013 
(0.008) 
Yes when Γ≥1.05 
0.004 
(0.010) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.80 changes sign 
0.016 
(0.026) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
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5.7 Conclusions  
 
This chapter reports on the positive, but heterogeneous impact of public support on open 
innovation in Spanish SMEs. However, sensitivity analysis suggests that the programme 
effects could be overestimated due to unobserved heterogeneity, which matching 
estimators cannot account for. Notably, the results for two cooperative partners - 
cooperation with suppliers and with HEIs - seem to be highly sensitive to hidden bias. 
This is not to say that there is an issue of unobserved heterogeneity from the perspective 
of either suppliers or HEIs. On the contrary, through cooperative networking, they 
obtain all the necessary information about the firm. The issue of hidden bias is 
associated with unobserved firm characteristics, such as managerial abilities and 
attitudes, which are generally inaccessible to researchers.  
 
 Furthermore, results from the Rosenbaum bound approach are broadly in line 
with those reported by Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), who conducted the 
Hausman test and found that private-public partnerships might be affected by hidden 
bias, whereas vertical cooperation with customers and suppliers is unlikely to be 
sensitive to this source of bias. However, our analysis goes one step further and 
examines cooperative partners separately. Among private-public partnerships, we found 
that our estimates of the effect on partnerships with HEIs might be affected by a 
positive selection bias, but the opposite holds for the estimated effects on cooperation 
with government agencies, which are rather robust to unobserved firm characteristics. 
Regarding our estimates of the effect on cooperation with other firms, our sensitivity 
analysis indicate that the estimated effects on cooperation with customers are less 
sensitive, while the treatment effects on cooperation with suppliers are more sensitive to 
hidden bias.  
 
 Given the lack of sensitivity analysis in empirical studies, empirical evidence 
from matching studies should be treated with caution. The issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity is further exacerbated by the absence of valid instruments in available 
datasets (prominently the CIS data), which precludes researchers from applying other 
evaluation methods, not only as a robustness check but also as a way of controlling for 
selection on unobserved firm characteristics. In the absence of a robustness check in this 
context, the importance of a sensitivity analysis is even more pronounced.  
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 The robustness of treatment effects to unobserved factors is summarised in 
Table 5.6. In total, 27 treatment effects were estimated in the whole sample and the 
same number for the subsample of innovative SMEs. Six estimated effects in the whole 
sample are rather robust to selection bias, and eight estimates in the subsample (perhaps 
due to a more homogenous sample). In total, out of 54 treatment effects, only 14 are less 
likely to be overestimated. Finally, across both the whole sample and the subsample, 
five ATT effects are robust to hidden bias:  
 
 For local/regional support, three effects on the following open innovation 
activities: aggregate cooperation; cooperation with government institutions and 
outsourcing R&D; 
 For national (government) support, two effects - on horizontal cooperation and 
cooperation with government agencies. 
 
Table 5.6. Summary of results with respect to hidden bias 
 
 Overall, we find that public support most robustly increases SME cooperation 
with government institutions; only slightly less robust is that the largest treatment 
effects of public support - both regional (a robust finding) and federal (borderline 
robust) - are for outsourcing R&D activities. Yet there is not so much robust evidence 
that public support increases cooperative and innovative behaviour more generally. 
Recent work on cooperation failure can help us to make sense of this contrast, 
suggesting that it may be of systematic rather than merely contingent significance. 
 
 By analysing treatment effects of different types of inbound open innovations, 
our analysis discriminates between the effects of public intervention on cooperation for 
innovation and on R&D and innovation outsourcing (extramural R&D investments and 
acquiring other external knowledge). The results suggest that, depending on the source 
of funding, SMEs are more likely to respond to public support by increasing either their 
 Number of models 
Models robust to 
hidden bias 
Whole sample 27 6 
Subsample of innovative firms 27 8 
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cooperation with government institutions or their investment in extramural R&D than 
by establishing and maintaining cooperative networks. Following our discussion in 
Section 5.2, acquiring external knowledge through cooperation could be subject to 
cooperation failure. In this case, compared to cooperation with other firms, either 
increased cooperation with government institutions may be facilitated by greater trust 
that these are unlikely to appropriate the firm’s intellectual; property; or/and R&D 
subcontracting is a more viable option. This issue deserves further attention from both 
practitioners and policy-makers. For example, to increase the effectiveness of public 
support for cooperation between firms – including customers and suppliers – policy 
makers should place particular emphasis on measures designed to attenuate cooperation 
failures (Zeng et al., 2010).  
 
 Another relevant finding is associated with the larger treatment effect of regional 
support on outsourcing R&D than on networking (either aggregate or disaggregate). 
These results might suggest that SMEs compensate their limited internal innovative 
capacity by increasing their investment in extramural R&D activities, rather than by 
utilizing external knowledge through cooperative networking. 
 
 Furthermore, the estimated treatment effects and a subsequent sensitivity 
analysis of the subsample of innovative firms revealed a relevant implication regarding 
empirical strategy. Namely, matching should be applied when estimating treatment 
effects in more homogenous groups of firms, e.g. innovative firms, because they are less 
likely to be affected by heterogeneous unobserved influences. Moreover, bias reduction 
achieved by matching is based on the premise that matched units are similar in their 
observed characteristics. We can assume that innovative firms have more common 
characteristics with other innovative firms rather than with non-innovative firms. 
Finally, following the same line of argument, it can be assumed that innovative firms 
are similar in both observed and unobserved factors, implying that hidden bias is less 
likely to occur among a more homogenous group of innovative firms.  
 
 In sum, empirical evidence point out to several conclusions regarding the 
evaluation of innovation policies: 
 
- Previous studies mainly grouped cooperative partners into more aggregate 
categories of public-private partnerships and cooperation with businesses 
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(horizontal and vertical cooperation) (Fier et al., 2006; Busom and Fernández-
Ribas, 2008; Spithoven et al., 2012, p. 171 and p. 181). Our results suggest that 
each type of cooperative partner should be considered separately. For instance, 
with respect to public-private partnerships, the treatment effect is significantly 
larger for cooperation with government institutions than for cooperation with 
HEIs. Furthermore, the findings from sensitivity analysis also confirm this 
conclusion. Namely, robustness of treatment effects to unobserved heterogeneity 
varies depending on the type of cooperative partner.  
- Sources of funding have a differential effect on open innovation and should be 
investigated separately (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008). A similar 
conclusion is advanced by Spithoven et al. (2012), who investigated network 
additionality in Belgian firms and found that 'there are, indeed, substantial 
differences in impact between different types of funding' (p. 170). 
- Public support has a differential effect on open innovation practices. Our results 
echo the findings reported in other studies investigating network additionality 
(Fier et al., 2006; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Spithoven et al., 2012). 
Moreover, our study is the first to explore the effectiveness of public funding on 
extramural R&D and acquisition of other external knowledge. In the case of 
these open innovation practices, the results are again heterogeneous.  
 
 A separate analysis of three administrative levels of public funding 
(local/regional, national and EU) was conducted with the objective to empirically 
investigate whether the effectiveness of innovation support measures differs depending 
on the source of funding. In particular, we investigate whether regional public agencies 
are more effective in promoting SME innovation than are federal bodies. This procedure 
is similar to Spithoven et al. (2012), who investigated behavioural additionality among 
Belgian firms. Their empirical strategy treated each source of funding separately 
(regional, federal and EU), as regional support programmes are the most important 
source of R&D subsidies in Belgium. Empirical findings reported by Spithoven et al. 
(2012) indeed suggest that the only effective source of funding, with respect to 
behavioural additionality, is regional support. However, the empirical results reported in 
Chapter V indicate that, in the context of Spanish SMEs, all sources of funding have 
positive and highly statistically significant ATT effects. Although the ATT effects 
presented in Table 5.1 for the whole sample of Spanish SMEs are overall higher for 
local/regional support programmes than for federal programmes, the 95 per cent 
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confidence intervals shown in Table A3.7 indicate that there are no systematic 
differences between the ATT effects estimated separately for these sources of funding 
(i.e. the confidence intervals overlap). This conclusion is confirmed in the analysis of 
the subsample of innovative firm reported in Table 5.4, for which the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals are shown in Table A3.12. 
 
 Research conducted as part of the GPrix project (not reported in this thesis) may 
qualify this conclusion of “no difference”. Namely, the finding of no systematic 
differences between the regional and national support programmes could be explained 
by measurement/recording error, which would occur in the case when regional public 
agencies are simply administrating national or EU programmes. This view arose in the 
GPrix team for two reasons. First, the only questions that failed to generate survey data 
with complete or almost complete responses and that required “cleaning” were those on 
the source and (monetary) value of support received. Second, the underlying reasons for 
this failure of the question on the source of funding were revealed in interviews with 
owners and managers of SMEs participating in the GPrix survey, which revealed that 
managers usually are either not aware of which level of administration had provided 
support measures or simply recorded the delivery body. Hence, there was a non-trivial 
probability of either a non-response or a misleading response (reflecting, for example, 
that a national of EU programme could be delivered by a regional body). In addition to 
measurement error, there is not much in the way of theoretical reasoning as to why 
programme effectiveness may differ by administrative level. We offer two brief but 
offsetting suggestions. On the one hand, local/regional programmes may be more 
specifically designed for SMEs in the particular area, whereas national/international 
programmes are, perforce, more generic. On the other, national agencies may have 
higher quality personnel and be more experienced in administrating and distributing 
public funding than are regional agencies. This argument draws some support from 
comparison of the quality of evaluations conducted at, respectively, regional and 
national levels; namely, another finding by the GPrix project was that the quality of 
evaluations performed by higher-level bodies are generally of higher quality than those 
of regional public agencies. This is a topic that requires further investigation. 
 
 Empirical investigation into behavioural additionality is still in its nascent years. 
Our analysis is the first to investigate the impact of public innovation measures on open 
innovation practices other than cooperative behaviour. However, available data does not 
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allow for assessing public effectiveness on other categories of firms' behaviour, such as 
changes in competencies and expertise (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Fier et al., 
2006). Moreover, effectiveness of public support on outbound open innovation (such as 
venturing or outward licensing of IPs) could also be a subject of future research. 
Furthermore, the lack of longitudinal data inhibits exploring the medium- to long-run 
effects of programme participation on cooperative behaviour (Busom and Fernández-
Ribas, 2008). Finally, we do not have information on the number of cooperative 
partners, as it would be interesting to explore whether additionality of a support 
programme would be affected by the magnitude of cooperation. 
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6.1 Introduction  
 
Few empirical studies on the effectiveness of R&D and innovation public support 
investigate the impact of public intervention on SMEs in several countries and across a 
wide range of industries. Although empirical analysis presented in Chapter IV covers 
seven EU countries, all the surveyed SMEs belong to traditional manufacturing 
industries. In this Chapter, we utilize a unique dataset on R&D policy for SMEs 
operating in both manufacturing and service sectors across 28 European countries. The 
focus of analysis is the effect of policy both on innovation output and on open 
innovation practices in European SMEs. Thus, the two main research questions in this 
chapter refer to assessing the output additionality and behavioural additionality of R&D 
support programmes. 
 
 The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 we review additional forms 
of cooperation and networking among firms, as our dataset enables us to further explore 
network additionality. The features of the dataset and the main descriptive statistics, 
together with the research methodology of the chapter will be discussed in Section 6.3. 
The empirical results will be elaborated in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.5 will 
summarize the findings and conclude. 
 
6.2 Open innovation practices revisited  
 
 
Advantages of networking and outsourcing are numerous. First, open innovation 
reduces costs, because firms can explore economies of scale and scope in R&D 
activities (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999; Teirlinck and Spithoven, 2013). Second, 
through cooperation and outsourcing firms share risks and uncertainty related to 
innovation processes (Hagedoorn, 1993; Rese and Baier, 2011). Third, the transaction 
costs theory suggests that firms will opt for a 'buy' strategy, instead of 'make', when 
transaction costs are low. Therefore, internalization of innovation activities is pertinent 
to high transaction costs, while cooperation, outsourcing and other types of open 
innovation strategies are pursued when technological transactions entail low transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1985). 
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 Networking and inter-firm cooperation for innovation offer time advantage 
compared to internal technology and innovation development, meaning that firms can 
commercialize their inventions in a shorter time interval (Rese and Baier, 2011). This is 
particularly relevant for small firms, insofar as patenting and other formal mechanisms 
for appropriating intellectual assets are less often utilized by SMEs. The reasons are 
usually related to high costs of patent application and difficulties in maintaining secrecy 
in collaborative relationships. Leiponen and Byma (2009) found that the most important 
method of protecting IPs in Finish SMEs is speed to market. Therefore, in order to 
capture innovation returns and overcome appropriability issues, the most effective 
mechanism is quick market launch of new or improved technologies and innovations.  
 
 Mutual trust between partners is often identified as a key success factor in 
collaborative relationships (Lee et al., 2010; Barge-Gil, 2010). As a potential licensee 
can behave opportunistically and obtain information about new technologies without 
paying for them, firms may lack incentives to reveal their internal inventions. To avoid 
this 'disclosure paradox', inventors often require a formal agreement with a licensee 
(Dahlander and Gann, 2010). A recent study by Love and Roper (2005) confirms this 
argument, suggesting that firms, when deciding whether to internalize or outsource 
technological competencies, are primarily concerned with protecting information 
leakages rather than with exploring economies of scale and scope. Barge-Gil (2010) 
concludes that forcing firms to collaborate can be counterproductive and create a 
climate of mistrust. Lee et al. (2010) discuss potential negative effects of cooperation in 
the context of small and medium-sized firms: increased likelihood of leakage of core 
knowledge, which can jeopardize firms' competitive advantage; and higher levels of 
mistrust that require monitoring of a partner's behaviour which, in turn, increases costs.   
 
 Besides strong appropriation mechanisms, another way of avoiding cooperation 
failure is the use of knowledge and innovation brokers (Lee et al., 2010). These 
intermediary organisations can facilitate SMEs in finding appropriate collaborative 
partners and creating a climate of trust between partners and, at the same time, 
preventing involuntary information leakage among partners. Huizingh (2011) argues 
that both large and small firms can benefit from intermediaries, particularly for 
outbound open innovation. The questionnaire used in our study contains questions on 
the extent of use of online technology and knowledge brokers/intermediaries as sources 
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of external knowledge. We utilize this question to measure the openness of innovation 
processes and the use of knowledge brokers. 
 
 Another source of external knowledge included in the analysed survey is 
strategic alliances. Narula and Hagedoorn (1999) refer to strategic alliances as 
cooperative agreements aimed at long-term profit optimisation. They argue that the 
form of cooperative agreement depends on the underlying motives: establishing and 
maintaining vertical cooperation with customers and suppliers is mainly motivated by 
cost reduction and short-term profit increase; whereas firms enter strategic alliances to 
increase the value of the firm and it long-term market position. However, SMEs are less 
likely to form strategic alliances than are large firms, due to a higher level of physical 
resources needed for this type of open innovation (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999; Narula, 
2004). We extend this argument by pointing out that partnerships, through strategic 
alliances, would also require certain entrepreneurial/managerial resources and 
competencies, identified as the major constraint in the resource-based view of the firm 
(see Section 1.3.5). Furthermore, the high failure rate of strategic alliances is also 
associated with higher levels of investment and involvement required for this type of 
cooperation (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999). But, if SMEs do cooperation through 
strategic alliances, their impact on SME performance and innovativeness is positive, 
suggesting that this form of networking is an important source of external knowledge 
(Lee et al., 2010). Furthermore, irrespective of the firm size, strategic alliances as a 
form of networking on technology transfer are particularly relevant for capital and 
knowledge-intensive industries, where the introduction of product and process 
innovations entails high risk and uncertainty and new technologies are constantly and 
rapidly developed (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999; Wynarczyk et al., 2013). 
  
 In addition, our dataset contains information on non-equity alliances, defined as 
a type of alliance that is not based on formal economic return for either party. Following 
Hagedoorn (2002), non-equity alliances are more relevant for firms in high-tech and 
ICT sectors than for firms in medium and low-tech industries. Emden et al. (2006, p. 
338) define co-development alliances as 'non-equity-based relationships in which each 
party contributes a significant portion of the end solution'. A unique feature of non-
equity alliances is that partners maintain a certain level of competitiveness towards one 
another, while cooperating through this type of alliances. In their partner selection 
process model, three components are identified as important for realizing potentials for 
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value creation in non-equity alliances: technological alignments of the partners 
(resource complementarities); relational alignments (cultural and operational 
compatibilities); and strategic alignments (a similar motivation and noncompeting goals 
with respect to entering alliance relationships). 
 
6.3 Methodology  
 
6.3.1 Data  
 
The dataset used in the analysis was gathered in 2010 within the MAPEER project 
commissioned by the European Commission’s DG-Research. 94  The survey 
questionnaire covered the period 2005-2010. The sample includes 763 SMEs from 28 
European countries. The survey was targeted at the population of SMEs with less than 
250 employees and an annual turnover of less than 50 million Euros (EU definition of 
SMEs - Article 2 of the Annex of Recommendation 2003/361/EC) (European 
Commission, 2005). Within the group, micro-sized firms are defined as those with less 
than 10 employees, small firms with 10 or more and less than 50 employees and 
medium-sized firms with 50 or more and less than 250 employees. The sample consists 
of 376 micro firms, 242 small firms and 145 medium-sized firms. Given the small 
number of firms from individual countries, we grouped them into four categories 
following the European Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2011).
95
 The 
categories are as follows: 
 
 'Innovation leaders', countries whose innovation performance is well above the 
EU27 average.
96
 Our sample consists of 146 SMEs operating in countries from 
this category.  
 'Innovation followers', countries with performance close to the EU27 average 
(219 firms in our sample; this is the base or reference category);  
                                                          
94
 The description of and information about the project are given on the project's web page http://mapeer-
sme.eu/. 
95
 The European Innovation Scoreboard publishes the average innovation performance based on a 
composite indicator, encompassing 24 individual indicators. The innovation performance of each Member 
State is then compared to the average innovation performance of all 27 EU Member States. The 
Innovation Scoreboard in 2011 refers to innovation performance in the years 2009/2010. We have utilized 
this report because the survey data were gathered in 2010.  
96
 For the list of countries in each category, see Table A4.1.  
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 'Moderate innovators', countries whose performance is below that of the EU27 
average (284 firms in the sample); and 
 'Modest innovators', representing countries whose performance is well below 
that of the EU27 average (114 firms in the sample).  
 
Grimpe and Sofka (2008) control for heterogeneity in national innovation systems by 
grouping 13 EU countries on the basis of their total national R&D expenditure (GERD) 
as a share of each countries' GPD. For a robustness check, they grouped countries based 
on the share of firms performing R&D on a continuous basis. We opted to control for 
distinct national innovation systems based on both innovation inputs and outputs, and 
not just on innovation inputs (such as R&D expenditure).
97
  
 
 Table A4.1 (Appendix IV) shows means and standard deviations for treatment 
variables, output dependent variables and control variables. Half of the surveyed SMEs 
(52.9 per cent) participated in national/regional R&D programmes in the period covered 
by the survey. Less than a third of firms (27.4 per cent) received public support from 
international sources, whereas the largest number of firms (59.9 per cent) participated in 
either national or international support measures. Innovation output is proxied by 
innovative sales, i.e. the share of sales from new or substantially improved products and 
processes. Slightly more than two thirds of firms report to have generated more than 
10% of innovative sales (67.2 per cent of firms); more than half of firms report more 
than 20% of innovative sales (57.2 per cent of firms); less than half of firms report more 
than 30 % of innovative sales (46.7 per cent of firms); more than one third of firms 
report more than 40 % of innovative sales (39.7 per cent of firms); and slightly more 
than one third of firms report more than 50 % of innovative sales (34.7 per cent of 
firms).  
 
 When considering open innovation practices, the largest number of firms (62.3 
per cent) utilizes informal networks with other firms as a source of external knowledge, 
followed by customer involvement (58.3 per cent of firms) and informal networks with 
research organizations (52.7 per cent). The least practiced open innovation is non-equity 
alliances with other firms (25.5 per cent). With regard to firm characteristics, the modal 
group of SMEs’ reported total R&D expenditures as a percentage of total expenditure is 
                                                          
97
 A composite index is calculated based on individual indicators grouped in five categories: three of 
them measure innovation input; and two categories represent innovation outputs.  
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the range of 11 to 20 per cent, two-thirds of firms are exporters (66.2 per cent), and a 
similar proportion of SMEs reports a high competitive intensity (62.8 per cent). 
Moreover, almost 40 per cent of firms have a separate R&D department, while almost 
half of the sample firms have a defined R&D and innovation strategy for the period 
2010-2015. Less than a third of firms are located in technology parks/areas
98
 and have 
integrated a technology platform
99
 (26.7 and 23.2 per cent respectively). Finally, 
regarding barriers to participation, the largest number of firms identified administrative 
needs to be the most important specific SME need, particularly simple application 
procedures (54.7 per cent) and simple reporting requirements (44.1 per cent). Besides 
administrative needs, almost half of the firms reported financial needs (in particular, 
high funding rates) and internal needs associated with compliance of programme aims 
to SMEs interests (41.8 and 41.7 per cent respectively). 
 
6.3.2 Model specification  
 
 
Our empirical strategy encompasses estimating two models - a parsimonious (baseline) 
model and an augmented (final) model. In the models assessing output additionality, the 
outcome variable is innovation output measured as the share of sales from new or 
substantially improved product and process innovations. As innovative sales is a 
categorical variable, it was necessary to create binary outcome variables to enable the 
estimation of an endogenous switching model. Thus, five outcome variables were 
generated with increasing proportions of innovative sales: 
- Innovative sales more than 10 % (variable Q14_morethan10); 
- Innovative sales more than 20 % (variable Q14_morethan20);  
- Innovative sales more than 30 % (variable Q14_morethan30);  
- Innovative sales more than 40 % (variable Q14_morethan40); and 
                                                          
98
 Usually, the literature on agglomeration and networking for innovation does not distinguish between 
science and technology parks (STPs). However, Albahari et al. (2013) suggest a division between them as 
the latter have no university shareholding, whereas the former are characterized by a university 
shareholding. Firms locate their businesses in technology parks to exploit the benefits of agglomeration 
externalities arising from spatial proximity. Because of physical closeness, firms located in technology 
parks can easily establish and maintain linkages and engage in knowledge transfer, particularly in 
exchanging tacit knowledge (Howells, 2002; Boschma, 2005).  
99
 Technology platforms are defined as 'technologies with wide and swift applicability across a range of 
related and unrelated sectors' (De Propris and Corradini, 2013). In other words, technology platforms are 
established among firms operating in a range of industries, with the aim of developing complementary 
products, technologies or services by utilizing common resources (Gawar, 2010). 
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- Innovative sales more than 50% (variable Q14_morethan50). 
 
 Regarding behavioural additionality, the dataset contains information about two 
inbound open innovation practices (external networking and close involvement of end 
users/customers). External networking encompasses six different sources of external 
knowledge:  
- Use of online technology or knowledge brokers/intermediaries;  
- Informal networking with other firms; 
- Informal networking with research organizations; 
- Strategic alliances with other firms; 
- Non-equity alliances with other firms (a type of alliance that is not based on 
formal economic return for either party); and  
- Participation in innovation networks, S&T parks, clusters, etc. 
 
 Moreover, our dataset contains information on customer involvement (i.e. close 
involvement of end users/customers in idea generation/concept development). Each 
inbound practice is measured on a five-point scale (from 'Don't apply at all' to 'Apply 
expensively'). Based on the scale, binary indicators were created for each type of open 
innovation practice, where the indicator is equal to 0 if the firm reports either of three 
categories ('Do not apply at all'; 'Do not apply'; or 'Neutral') and is equal to 1 if the firm 
reports either 'Apply' or 'Apply extensively' for a particular type of open innovation. 
 
 Furthermore, sources of funding are separated into national and international 
innovation programmes. As the first robustness check, and given the issues with 
diagnostics when streams of funding are analysed separately, we also estimated the 
model with a joint source of funding (the firm participated in either national or 
international programmes).  
 
 The treatment parameters are obtained by estimating an endogenous switching 
model. Following the discussion in Section 4.3.1, the endogenous switching model has 
two equations: the second equation models the participation decision (the probability 
that a firm will participate in an R&D support programme); and the first equation is an 
innovation model, which estimates the innovation effect on firms of participating in an 
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R&D support programme conditional on both other influences on innovation and the 
probability of participating in an R&D support programme. 
 
             ̂   ̂                                    ̂ 
                       ̂                    ̂ 
           ̂           ̂        ̂     
(6.1) 
 
 
              
  ̂                       ̂                        ̂ 
                   ̂            ̂           ̂ 
       ̂            ̂     
 
(6.2) 
 Subscript i indexes each firm in the sample 1…n, where n is the number of 
firms; ^ indicates “to be estimated”; C and I represent the intercept in equations 6.1 and 
6.2 respectively; the  coefficient measures the innovation effect of programme 
participation; the α and   coefficients measure, respectively, the innovation and 
participation effects of control variables controlling for absorptive capacity, firm 
characteristics and external (environmental) factors; the k1  and   vectors contain 
coefficients that measure, respectively, the innovation and participation effects of 1k 
vectors of industry and country group dummies, where subscripts I and C index 
industries and country groups, respectively; the k1 β and   vectors contain coefficients 
that measure, respectively, the innovation and participation effects of 1k vectors of 
firm level ‘quasi’ fixed effects; the k1  vector contains coefficients that measure the 
participation effects of a 1k vector of indicators of firms’ views on factors promoting 
or impeding programme participation (Barriers), which are the anticipated identifying 
variables (exclusion restrictions); and u and  are the error terms, which capture the 
unobserved influences on the respective dependent variables. 
 
 Control variables are grouped into three categories: those measuring firms' 
absorptive capacity; those controlling for firm characteristics; and those controlling for 
external, environmental (external) influences.  
 
Absorptive capacity. Firms' absorptive capacity is usually measured by internal R&D 
activities, proxied by several measures: internal (intramural) R&D expenditures; the 
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share of R&D personnel; and the presence of a separate R&D department (Spithoven et 
al., 2010). Our dataset contains information on each measure, but the variable 
measuring R&D expenditures (RD_expenditure) represents total R&D expenditures, 
thus including the following categories: R&D staff salaries; contracts to outside R&D 
performers; acquisition of machinery, equipment and software; purchase of patents and 
know-how from other organizations; training in R&D; and, market introduction of 
innovations. Having a separate R&D department is measured as a binary variable (=1 if 
a firm has a separate R&D department; 0 otherwise; RD_department) (see Table A4.1, 
Appendix IV for the variable definition). However, the variable measuring R&D 
expenditures (RD_expenditure) is highly correlated with the variable measuring the 
share of R&D personnel (the correlation coefficient is 0.79), suggesting a potential 
problem with multicollinearity if both variables were to enter the model (Greene, 2005). 
Hence, the model specification includes only the former, because it is a broader measure 
of innovation input. In the final (extended) model estimated as a robustness check, we 
have also included a binary variable RD_strategy equal to 1 if the firm has defined a 
R&D and innovation strategy for the next five years (zero otherwise).  
 
 Firm characteristics. We control for a firm's degree of internationalization by 
including a binary indicator that is equal to 1 if a firm undertakes exporting activities 
(Export). Exporting firms tend to have more incentive to innovate as a result of 
competitive pressure on international markets (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; 
Parida et al., 2012). SMEs are a heterogeneous group of firms; correspondingly, we 
created three binary indicators for micro firms with less than 10 employees 
(Micro_firms),
100
 small firms having between 10 and 49 employees (Small_firms) and 
medium-sized firms having between 50 and 249 employees (Medium_firms). Moreover, 
the final (extended) model includes two variables to control for firm-level "quasi" fixed 
effects (or initial conditions) (see Section 4.3.1 for a discussion). The first variable 
(Q18a_leading) is equal to 1 if firms report that their research and innovation record 
was leading compared to other firms in the industry five years prior to the survey (zero 
otherwise). The second variable (Q19_fewer) is equal to 1 if firms report having 
devoted fewer resources to innovation five years prior to the survey (zero otherwise).  
 
 Environmental (external) factors. Our model also takes into account 
environmental factors (Lichtenthaler, 2009), such as competitive pressure, industry 
                                                          
100
 Micro firms are the base category. 
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characteristics, and whether firms operate in technology parks and integrate technology 
platforms. Competitive intensity is measured as a binary indicator, equal to 1 if a firm 
reports that the competition is strong in its main markets (zero otherwise) 
(Competition). Furthermore, the final (extended) model includes two binary indicators 
for firms located in technology parks (Tech_parks), and for those that integrate a 
cluster/technology platform (Tech_platform). Finally, we control for sectoral 
heterogeneity by constructing six industry categories: high tech; medium high tech; 
medium low tech; low tech; Information and Communication Technology (ICT); and 
services (as the base category).
101
 
 
 Barriers to participation (identifying variables or exclusion restrictions). 
Following the discussion in Section 4.3.1, the selection question must include all the 
control variables from the outcome equation together with at least one variable to 
identify the selection equation. Identification restrictions are imposed on the model by 
including variable(s) that influence the participation decision, but do not directly affect 
the innovation decision. The survey questionnaire within the MAPEER project, similar 
to the GPrix survey, included questions related only to programme participation. 
Questions 53, 54, 55 and 56 asked firms about SME needs in general: “Which would 
you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in R&D programmes?” 
In all 21 parts of this question (see Table A4.1, Appendix VI), the corresponding 
indicator variable was defined as 1 if the response was “Most important” and 0 
otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”).  
 
6.4 Results  
 
6.4.1 Output additionality  
 
For evaluating the impact of programme participation on innovation output, we 
estimated three treatment parameters - the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT); the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATU); and the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE - from fifteen parsimonious (baseline) models, five for each 
stream of funding (national, international and joint funding). Estimated treatment effects 
                                                          
101
 Manufacturing industries – the first five categories - are grouped based on NACE classification 
according to technology intensity (OECD, 2006b) (see Table A4.2, Appendix IV).  
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for each model are presented in Table 6.1 (baseline specification) and in Table 6.2 
(augmented specification).  
 
 Out of 15 baseline models, only two are without diagnostic problems102; in other 
models either correlation coefficients are equal to the extreme values of the absolute 
unity or the likelihood-test ratio suggests no selection bias. However, as discussed in 
Section 4.4.1, we report the border values (1 and -1) as problematic; but we are 
“reluctant” to disregard large correlation coefficients "even if imprecisely estimated”, 
because this would be to disregard the potential endogeneity of the selection process 
(Aakvik et al., 2005, p. 37). Moreover, the likelihood-ratio test (reported in column 5) 
should reject the null of the independence of the selection and output equations. We find 
that in 8 from 15 cases the likelihood-ratio test rejects the null of no selection bias due 
to unobservables at the 10 per cent level or lower. However, it is highly unlikely that the 
assignment of public innovation measures is free of selection bias, and for this reason 
the literature on R&D and innovation policy argues that public support should always 
be treated as endogenous variable (for a discussion on selection bias see Section 3.4). 
 
 The interpretation of the treatment effects begins with the two models without 
diagnostic problems. Interestingly, both models refer to participation in national support 
programmes. For a broader measure of innovation output (innovative sales more than 
20%), both treatment effects are negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level. However, the ATE effect is smaller than the ATT effect, and the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals do not overlap, indicating that in this case random allocation of 
national funding would further reduce the probability of innovation. Namely, on 
average, receiving national public funding reduces the probability of innovation by 
programme participants by 23.3 percentage points; in comparison, receiving national 
public funding would have reduced the probability of innovation for firms randomly 
selected from the entire population by 35.6 percentage points. However, this 
comparison is not replicated in the second model for more innovative firms (innovative 
sales more than 40%). In this case, both treatment effects are statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level, but the ATT effect is smaller than the ATE effect. On average, 
receiving national public funding reduces the probability of innovation by programme 
participants by 30.4 percentage points. Conversely, receiving national public funding 
                                                          
102
 Stata outputs for these models are shown in Appendix IV, Tables A4.3 and A4.4 respectively. For the 
sake of space, we do not report Stata outputs for the remaining 13 baseline models. 
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would have increased the probability of innovation for firms randomly selected from the 
entire population by 13.7 percentage points. 
 
 If we draw attention to the models with diagnostic problems, a prevailing pattern 
of negative ATT and positive ATE emerges. As the confidence intervals reported for 
both treatment effects (see Table 6.1) are not overlapping in any case, we can conclude 
that there is a systematic difference between the treatment effects across all models.  
 For the ATT effect, all 13 estimates are negative and significantly different from 
zero at the 1 per cent level. In sum: 
 ATT: the mean of the 13 values is -0.241 with a range from -0.445 to -0.099. 
 
In contrast, for the ATE effect, 11 from 13 estimates are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. In sum:  
 ATE: the mean of the 13 values is 0.055 with a range from -0.342 to 0.224. 
 
 These results suggest that programme participation typically reduced the 
probability of innovation by programme participants by 24.1 percentage points but 
would have increased the probability for firms randomly selected from the entire 
population by 5.5 percentage points. Overall results, therefore, indicate that random 
distribution of support measures among European SMEs would result in a small, but 
positive additional effect. In contrast, the empirical evidence reveals that programme 
assignment is perverse regarding innovation output.  
 Furthermore, besides estimating treatment parameters for participation in a 
variety of support measures (national, international and joint national/international), 
another robustness check was conducted by including additional control variables in the 
model specification to construct an augmented model.
103
 The additional control 
variables, as noted in Section 6.3.2, are as follows: DV for resources devoted to 
innovation (Q19_fewer); DV for the firm's research and innovation record in 2005 
(Q18a_leading); DV for the location of the firm in technology park/area (Tech_park); 
DV for the integration of a cluster/technology platform (Tech_platform); and DV for the 
development of R&D and innovation strategy (RD_strategy) (see Table A4.1). 
                                                          
103
 Some models also include additional exclusion restrictions, if they were statistically significant in the 
selection equation and statistically insignificant in the outcome equation.  
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Treatment effects for the augmented models are presented in Table 6.2. Out of 15 
baseline models, only two are without diagnostic problems; in other models either one 
of the correlation coefficients is equal to the extreme value of absolute unity or the 
likelihood-test ratio suggests no selection bias. In 12 from 15 cases the likelihood- test 
rejects the null of no selection bias due to unobservables at the 10 per cent level or 
lower. Regarding the remaining three cases, one is on the borderline (p-value is equal to 
0.1056, in the model estimating the treatment effects of international programme 
participation on firms with innovative sales above 30 %), but the other two cases are 
problematic, as the p-values overwhelmingly suggest that the null of no selection bias 
cannot be rejected. 
  
 Our initial focus is on two models without diagnostic problems.
104
 The first 
model reports the impact of participation in international support measures on rather 
innovative firms with innovative sales above 40%. Both treatment effects are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of significance, while he ATT is negative 
and the ATE is positive. On average, receiving international public funding reduces the 
probability of innovation by programme participants by 38.3 percentage points. With 
respect to the ATE effect, the findings suggest that, on average, receiving international 
public funding would have increased the probability of innovation for firms randomly 
selected from the entire population by 21.9 percentage points. Another relevant finding 
is associated with the estimated correlation coefficients rho1 and rho0 in this model, 
whereby their signs and statistical significance indicate perverse selection on 
unobservables: for the highly innovative SMEs participating in international support 
measures (i.e. those reporting innovative sales in excess of 40 per cent of turnover), 
unobservables that positively affect the probability of participation in international 
support measures have a negative impact on the probability of having a large share of 
innovative sales (rho1=-0.725; statistically significant at the 1% level). In contrast, for 
the highly innovative non-participating SMEs, the unobservables promoting 
participation in international programmes are positively correlated with a large 
innovation output (rho0=0.569; statistically significant at the 5% level).  
 The second model without diagnostic problems estimates the impact of joint 
support (either receiving national or international support) on highly innovative firms 
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 Stata outputs for these models are presented in Appendix IV, Tables A4.5 and A4.6. For the sake of 
space, we do not report Stata outputs for the remaining 13 augmented models with diagnostic problems.  
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with innovative sales above 50%. Both treatment effects are statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance. While the pattern of smaller ATT than ATE effect is 
maintained, both effects are negative. More precisely, on average, receiving either 
national or international public funding reduces the probability of innovation by 
programme participants by 49.6 percentage points. With respect to the ATE effect, the 
findings suggest that, on average, receiving either source of public funding would have 
reduced the probability of innovation for firms randomly selected from the entire 
population by 11.6 percentage points. Moreover, similar to the above model on the 
impact of international support, the estimated correlation coefficients rho1 and rho0 in 
this model indicate perverse selection on unobservables: for the most innovative SMEs 
participating in either support measures (i.e. those reporting innovative sales in excess 
of 50 per cent of turnover), unobservables that positively affect the probability of 
participation in joint support measures have a negative impact on the probability of 
having a large share of innovative sales (rho1= -0.720; statistically significant at the 5% 
level). In contrast, for the most innovative non-participating SMEs, the unobservables 
promoting participation in either stream of funding are positively correlated with a large 
innovation output (rho0=0.809; statistically significant at the 1% level).  
 
 Focusing on the treatment parameters in the augmented models with diagnostic 
problems, a pattern of smaller ATT than ATE is reported across all, but one model, 
which is in line with the results from the baseline models. Furthermore, treatment 
effects are systematically different given a lack of overlap in the confidence intervals in 
all models (see Table 6.2).   
 For the ATT effect, 12 of 13 estimates are negative and significantly different 
from zero at the 1 per cent level. In sum: 
 ATT: the mean of the 13 values is -0.211 with a range from -0.435 to -0.004. 
 
In contrast, for the ATE effect, 12 from 13 estimates are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. In sum:  
 ATE: the mean of the 13 values is 0.086 with a range from -0.351 to 0.199. 
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Table 6.1. Baseline model - programme participation effects on innovation outputs: the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the 
average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and the average treatment effect (ATE) (Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications) 
Output 
dependent 
variable 
rho1 rho0 
Problem with 
a model? 
LR 
test 
(p 
value) 
Average treatment effect on the 
treated - ATT 
Average treatment 
effect on the 
untreated  
- ATU 
Average treatment effect 
- ATE 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
95 % 
confidence 
intervals 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
No of 
obs.  
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
95% 
confidence 
intervals 
 National support (N=763) 
Innovative sales 
>10%  
-1 
0.689 
(0.380) 
rho1= -1 0.0016 314 
-0.218*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.234 -0.202] 283 
0.365*** 
(0.012) 
597 
0.062*** 
(0.007) 
[0.049      0.076] 
Innovative sales > 
20%  
0.934 
(0.089) 
0.583 
(0.396) 
No  0.0485 315 
-0.233*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.245 -0.222] 282 
-0.490*** 
(0.010) 
597 
-0.356*** 
(0.004) 
[-0.363    -0.349] 
Innovative sales > 
30% 
-0.999 
(0.002) 
0.373 
(0.625) 
rho1= -0.999 0.0303 324 
-0.207*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.221 -0.194] 288 
0.570*** 
(0.012) 
612 
0.157*** 
(0.009) 
[0.139      0.175] 
Innovative sales > 
40% 
-0.950 
(0.085) 
0.526 
(0.486) 
No  0.0503 324 
-0.304*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.318 -0.290] 288 
0.629*** 
(0.011) 
612 
0.137*** 
(0.011) 
[0.115      0.159] 
Innovative sales 
>50%  
-0.994 
(0.048) 
0.762 
(0.268) 
rho1= 0.994 0.0076 324 
-0.445*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.460 -0.430] 288 
0.697*** 
(0.011) 
612 
0.093*** 
(0.013) 
[0.068      0.118] 
 International support (N=763) 
Innovative sales 
>10%  
-0.594 
(0.586) 
0.570 
(0.443) 
LR test  
p= 0.2967 
0.2967 180 
-0.206*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.223 -0.188] 444 
0.248*** 
(0.006) 
624 
0.117*** 
(0.006) 
[0.105      0.129] 
Innovative sales 
>20%  
-0.284 
(0.520) 
0.329 
(0.411) 
LR test  
p= 0.6427 
0.6427 180 
-0.152*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.168 -0.135] 444 
0.178*** 
(0.006) 
624 
0.083*** 
(0.005) 
[0.073      0.094] 
Innovative sales 
>30% 
-0.553 
(0.503) 
0.153 
(0.460) 
LR test  
p= 0.6473 
0.6473 183 
-0.099*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.116 -0.081] 450 
0.353*** 
(0.006) 
633 
0.224*** 
(0.007) 
[0.211      0.236] 
Innovative sales 
>40% 
1 
0.313 
(0.584) 
LR test  
p= 0.4659 & 
rho1 = 1  
0.4659 186 
-0.245*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.262 -0.228] 492 
-0.380*** 
(0.010) 
678 
-0.342*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.353    -0.331] 
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Innovative sales 
>50%  
-0.456 
(0.434) 
0.254 
(0.459) 
LR test  
p= 0.5774 
 0.5774 180 
-0.232*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.253 -0.211] 444 
0.220*** 
(0.006) 
624 
0.090*** 
(0.007) 
[0.078      0.103] 
 
 
Joint support (N=763) 
 
Innovative sales 
>10%  
-1 
0.508 
(0.536) 
rho1= -1 0.0196 383 
-0.205*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.220 -0.191] 250 
0.376*** 
(0.013) 
633 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
[0.007      0.037] 
Innovative sales 
>20% 
-0.774 
(0.290) 
0.634 
(0.451) 
LR test  
p= 0.1736 
0.1736 372 
-0.282*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.294 -0.269] 240 
0.412*** 
(0.011) 
612 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
[-0.023     0.006] 
Innovative sales 
>30% 
-1 
0.493 
(0.766) 
rho1= -1 0.0167 380 
-0.314*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.327 -0.300] 249 
0.577*** 
(0.014) 
629 
0.038*** 
(0.010) 
[0.017      0.058] 
Innovative sales 
>40% 
-0.873 
(0.181) 
0.190 
(0.757) 
LR test  
p= 0.2267 
0.2267 372 
-0.203*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.216 -0.190] 240 
0.560*** 
(0.012) 
612 
0.098*** 
(0.011) 
[0.076      0.120] 
Innovative sales 
>50%  
-0.999 
(0.000) 
0.484 
(0.540) 
rho1= -0.999 0.0613 372 
-0.332*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.348 -0.317] 240 
0.686*** 
(0.014) 
612 
0.067*** 
(0.013) 
[0.040      0.093] 
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Table 6.2. Augmented model - programme participation effects on innovation outputs: the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the 
average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and the average treatment effect (ATE) (Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications) 
Output 
dependent 
variable 
rho1 rho0 
Problem with 
a model? 
LR 
test 
(p 
value) 
Average treatment effect on the 
treated - ATT 
Average treatment 
effect on the 
untreated  
- ATU 
Average treatment effect 
- ATE 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
95% confidence 
intervals 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
No of 
obs.  
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
95% 
confidence 
intervals 
 National support (N=763) 
Innovative sales 
>10%  
-1 
0.604 
(0.580) 
rho1= -1 0.0014 324 
-0.212*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.230 -0.195] 288 
0.364*** 
(0.013) 
612 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
[0.046      0.078] 
Innovative sales > 
20%  
-1 
0.230 
(0.783) 
rho1= -1 0.0140 324 
-0.134*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.154 -0.113] 288 
0.477*** 
(0.015) 
612 
0.154*** 
(0.010) 
[0.134      0.174] 
Innovative sales > 
30% 
0.999 
(0.000) 
0.554 
(0.395) 
rho1= 0.999 0.0118 315 
-0.283*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.302 -0.264] 282 
-0.424*** 
(0.014) 
597 
-0.351*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.364    -0.339] 
Innovative sales > 
40% 
-1 
0.475 
(0.556) 
rho1= -1 0.0025 324 
-0.294*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.312 -0.276] 288 
0.645*** 
(0.012) 
612 
0.150*** 
(0.012) 
[0.126      0.174] 
Innovative sales 
>50%  
1 
0.738 
(0.273) 
rho1= 1 0.0012 324 
-0.435*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.455 -0.416] 288 
0.688*** 
(0.012) 
612 
0.097*** 
(0.014) 
[0.070      0.124] 
 International support (N=763) 
Innovative sales 
>10%  
-1 
0.999 
(7.192) 
rho1= -1 
rho0= 0.999 
0.0596 180 
-0.258*** 
(0.015) 
[-0.286 -0.229] 444 
0.333*** 
(0.009) 
624 
0.159*** 
(0.008) 
[0.143      0.175] 
Innovative sales 
>20%  
0.440 
(0.544) 
0.371 
(0.385) 
LR test  
    p=0.4914 
0.4914 180 
-0.184*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.205 -0.162] 444 
0.247*** 
(0.007) 
624 
0.123*** 
(0.007) 
[0.109      0.138] 
Innovative sales 
>30% 
 
-0.691 
(0.323) 
0.586 
(0.326) 
LR test  
    p=0.1056 
0.1056 180 
-0.322*** 
(0.012) 
[-0.346 -0.299] 444 
0.407*** 
(0.008) 
624 
0.199*** 
(0.009) 
[0.182      0.216] 
Innovative sales 
>40% 
-0.725 
(0.251) 
0.569 
(0.289) 
No  0.0592 180 
-0.383*** 
(0.012) 
[-0.407 -0.359] 444 
0.461*** 
(0.009) 
624 
0.219*** 
(0.011) 
[0.198      0.241] 
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Innovative sales 
>50%  
-0.389 
(0.391) 
-0.243 
(0.491) 
LR test  
    p=0.5962 
0.5962 180 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
[-0.030  0.022] 421 
0.143*** 
(0.009) 
601 
0.099*** 
(0.008) 
[0.085      0.114] 
 
 
Joint support (N=763) 
 
Innovative sales 
>10%  
-1 
0.277 
(0.558) 
rho1= -1 0.0015 372 
-0.167*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.185 -0.149] 240 
0.367*** 
(0.016) 
612 
0.043*** 
(0.009) 
[0.024      0.061] 
Innovative sales 
>20% 
-1 
0.035 
(0.703) 
rho1= -1 0.0156 372 
-0.090*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.110 -0.071] 240 
0.483*** 
(0.015) 
612 
0.133*** 
(0.011) 
[0.112      0.154] 
Innovative sales 
>30% 
-1 
-0.090 
(0.765) 
rho1= -1 0.0112 372 
-0.073*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.094 -0.052] 240 
0.563*** 
(0.016) 
612 
0.175*** 
(0.012) 
[0.152      0.197] 
Innovative sales 
>40% 
-1 
0.311 
(0.633) 
rho1= -1 0.0950 367 
-0.285*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.305 -0.266] 238 
0.622*** 
(0.017) 
605 
0.071*** 
(0.014) 
[0.043      0.099] 
Innovative sales 
>50%  
-0.720 
(0.290) 
0.809 
(0.221) 
No  0.0285 365 
-0.496*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.512 -0.480] 237 
0.460*** 
(0.013) 
602 
-0.116*** 
(0.012) 
[-0.140    -0.092] 
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 These results suggest that programme participation typically reduced the 
probability of innovation by programme participants by 21.1 percentage points but 
would have increased the probability for firms randomly selected from the entire 
population by 8.6 percentage points. Overall results confirm the findings from the 
baseline models; i.e. random distribution of public funding among firms similar to those 
in our sample of mostly innovating SMEs (two thirds of firms reported to have 
generated more than 10% of innovative sales, as noted in Section 6.3.1) would yield a 
positive additional effect on SME innovation performance. 
 
6.4.2 Behavioural additionality   
 
 
The impact of public support on SME innovative behaviour is limited to the assessment 
of network additionality, whereby binary outcome variables represent the seven 
categories of networking and cooperation for innovation detailed in Section 6.3.2.  
 
 In line with the empirical strategy adopted for assessing output additionality, 
twenty one parsimonious (baseline) models were estimated to assess the impact of three 
sources of funding (national, international and joint support) on seven types of 
networking activities. The treatment effects are presented in Table 6.3. Out of 21 
models, only two are without diagnostic problems; in other models either correlation 
coefficients are equal to the extreme values of the absolute unity or the likelihood-ratio 
test indicates no selection bias. As previously discussed in Section 3.4, public support in 
a domain of innovation cannot be treated as an exogenous, pre-determined variable, 
given the sources of selection bias acknowledged in the literature. The two models 
without diagnostic issues refer to SMEs participating in joint support: in the first model 
the outcome variable is the use of online technology or knowledge brokers; and in the 
other model the outcome variable is participation in innovation networks, S&T parks 
and clusters.
105
 
 
 The estimated treatment effects are rather heterogeneous across different 
network activities. We first focus on the interpretation of the two models without 
problems with diagnostic tests. The relationships between treatment effects and their 
                                                          
105
 Stata outputs for these models are presented in Appendix IV, Tables A4.7 and A4.8 respectively. For 
the sake of space, Stata outputs for the remaining 19 baseline models are not presented.  
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signs and statistical significance are consistent across both models. Namely, both 
treatment effects are negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, and for 
both models the ATT effect is smaller than the ATE. The interpretation of the 
programme effects is as follows. Participation in either national or international 
programmes reduces the probability of the use of online technology or of knowledge 
brokers by programme participants by 47.2 percentage points and would have also 
decreased this probability for firms randomly selected from the entire population by 
42.4 percentage points. Likewise, receiving either national or international support 
decreases the probability of participation in innovation networks by 44.9 percentage 
points and would have reduced the probability for firms randomly selected from the 
entire population by 29.9 percentage points. 
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Table 6.3. Baseline model - programme participation effects on innovation behaviour: the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the 
average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and the average treatment effect (ATE) (Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications) 
Output dependent variable rho1 rho0 
Problem 
with a 
model? 
LR test 
(p 
value) 
Average treatment effect on the 
treated - ATT 
Average treatment 
effect on the 
untreated  
- ATU 
Average treatment effect 
- ATE 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
95% 
confidence 
intervals 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
No of 
obs.  
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
95% cnfidence 
intervals 
 
 
National support (N=763) 
 
Use of online technology or 
knowledge 
brokers/intermediaries 
-1 
-0.206 
(1.072) 
rho1= -1 0.0587 312 
0.073*** 
(0.008) 
[0.057    0.089] 280 
0.674*** 
(0.006) 
592 
0.359*** 
(0.007) 
[0.345    0.372] 
Informal networking with 
other firms -0.693 
(0.620) 
0.999 
(0.001) 
LR test 
(p=0.4467) 
& 
rho0=0.999 
0.4467 329 
-0.303*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.314 -0.291] 283 
0.415*** 
(0.007) 
612 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
[0.018    0.044] 
Informal networking with 
research organizations  
-0.999 
(0.116) 
0.281 
(0.533) 
rho1=  
-0.999 
0.0482 314 
0.071*** 
(0.009) 
[0.053    0.089] 271 
0.633*** 
(0.011) 
585 
0.332*** 
(0.009) 
[0.315    0.349] 
Strategic alliances with other 
firms  
-1 
0.812 
(0.216) 
rho0= -1 0.0350 305 
0.507*** 
(0.010) 
[0.487    0.527] 272 
-0.325*** 
(0.011) 
577 
0.114*** 
(0.008) 
[0.099    0.129] 
Non-equity alliances with 
other firms 
-1 
0.027 
(0.618) 
rho1= -1 0.0016 306 
0.046*** 
(0.010) 
[0.026    0.065] 271 
0.753*** 
(0.006) 
577 
0.381*** 
(0.007) 
[0.367    0.395] 
Participation in innovation 
networks, S&T parks, 
clusters etc. 
0.023 
(0.771) 
1 rho0= 1 0.0120 311 
-0.475*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.493 -0.458] 271 
0.200*** 
(0.012) 
582 
-0.160*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.177 -0.144] 
Close involvement of end 
users/customers  
-0.413 
(0.766) 
0.522 
(0.506) 
LR test 
p=0.5935 
0.5935 300 
-0.227*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.246 -0.209] 267 
0.316*** 
(0.009) 
567 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
[0.010    0.048] 
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International support (N=763) 
 
Use of online technology or 
knowledge 
brokers/intermediaries 
0.999 
(0.019) 
0.364 
(0.381) 
 
rho1=0.999 
0.0127 179 
-0.325*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.348 -0.303] 435 
-0.348*** 
(0.004) 
614 
-0.342*** 
(0.004) 
[-0.349 -0.335] 
Informal networking with 
other firms 
-1 
0.999 
(0.004) 
rho1= -1 & 
rho0= 0.999 
0.0455 177 
-0.313*** 
(0.015) 
[-0.343 -0.283] 409 
0.390*** 
(0.006) 
586 
0.178*** 
(0.007) 
[0.164    0.191] 
Informal networking with 
research organizations  
-0.999 
(0.026) 
-0.002 
(0.490) 
rho1=  
-0.999 & 
LR test 
(p=0.1427) 
0.1427 176 
0.188*** 
(0.014) 
[0.160    0.215] 409 
0.555*** 
(0.009) 
585 
0.444*** 
(0.008) 
[0.428    0.459] 
Strategic alliances with other 
firms  
-0.213 
(0.477) 
-0.062 
(0.447) 
LR test 
p=0.9004 
0.9004 171 
0.225*** 
(0.016) 
[0.194    0.256] 404 
0.322*** 
(0.010) 
575 
0.293*** 
(0.009) 
[0.276    0.310] 
Non-equity alliances with 
other firms 
1 
-0.999 
(0.231) 
rho1= 1 & 
rho0=  
-0.999 
0.0004 172 
0.298*** 
(0.016) 
[0.267    0.330] 393 
-0.236*** 
(0.008) 
565 
-0.070*** 
(0.005) 
[-0.081 -0.060] 
Participation in innovation 
networks, S&T parks, 
clusters etc. 
-0.647 
(0.373) 
0.223 
(0.550) 
LR test 
p=0.4159 
0.4159 176 
0.014 
(0.015) 
[-0.016  0.044] 404 
0.542*** 
(0.008) 
580 
0.383*** 
(0.009) 
[0.365    0.402] 
Close involvement of end 
users/customers  
-0.465 
(0.446) 
0.488 
(0.579) 
LR test 
p=0.4653 
0.4653 169 
-0.207*** 
(0.012) 
[-0.229 -0.184] 391 
0.289*** 
(0.008) 
560 
0.140*** 
(0.008) 
[0.125    0.155] 
 
 
Joint support (N=763) 
Use of online technology or 
knowledge 
brokers/intermediaries 
0.956 
(0.122) 
0.649 
(0.413) 
No 0.0871 366 
-0.472*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.489 -0.455] 232 
-0.347*** 
(0.010) 
598 
-0.424*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.437 -0.412] 
Informal networking with 
other firms 
 
0.032 
(1.146) 
0.551 
(0.553) 
LR test 
p=0.7527 
0.7527 371 
-0.181*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.193 -0.169] 233 
0.132*** 
(0.009) 
604 
-0.060*** 
(0.006) 
[-0.072 -0.048] 
Informal networking with 
research organizations  
 
-0.999 
(0.038) 
0.432 
(0.450) 
rho1= 
 -0.999 
0.0296 358 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
[-0.022  0.010] 227 
0.677*** 
(0.012) 
585 
0.259*** 
(0.010) 
[0.240    0.278] 
Strategic alliances with other 
firms  
0.810 
(0.318) 
0.475 
(0.725) 
LR test 
p=0.3041 
0.3041 360 
-0.136*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.155 -0.116] 235 
-0.279*** 
(0.010) 
595 
-0.193*** 
(0.008) 
 
[-0.207 -0.179] 
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Non-equity alliances with 
other firms 
-1 
0.202 
(0.707) 
rho1= -1 0.0031 352 
-0.027** 
(0.012) 
[-0.050 -0.003] 225 
0.761*** 
(0.009) 
577 
0.283*** 
(0.010) 
[0.263    0.302] 
Participation in innovation 
networks, S&T parks, 
clusters etc. 
0.522 
(0.395) 
0.966 
(0.049) 
No 0.0005 353 
-0.449*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.466 -0.433] 224 
-0.061*** 
(0.012) 
577 
-0.299*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.314 -0.284] 
Close involvement of end 
users/customers  
1 
-0.181 
(0.793) 
rho0= 1 0.0750 350 
-0.374*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.391 -0.358] 225 
0.197*** 
(0.012) 
575 
-0.152*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.169 -0.134] 
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 In the model where the outcome variable is the use of online technology and of 
knowledge brokers, the correlation coefficient rho1 is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. This demonstrates that, for SMEs participating in 
either national or international support measures, unobservables positively affecting the 
probability of participation in joint support measures have also a positive impact on the 
probability of the usage of online technologies or of knowledge brokers (rho1=0.956). 
This finding may be explained by the argument that participation in support 
programmes could be regarded as cooperation with government institutions, and thus is 
consistent with the unobservables having a positive effect on other types of cooperation. 
In the model where the outcome variable is participation in innovation networks, the 
positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient rho0 indicates that, for non-
participating SMEs, the unobservables promoting programme participation are 
positively correlated with participation in innovation networks (rho0= 0.966). This 
finding is in line with the previous argument about considering treatment assignment 
into public funding as a type of cooperation, in this case with government.  
 
 Following the same empirical strategy that was applied to assessing output 
additionality by way of estimating the baseline specification, we estimated the 
augmented specification for all seven outcome variables measuring networking 
activities (see Table 6.4). Out of 21 models, only two were estimated without problems 
indicated by diagnostic testing. Both of these models assess the effectiveness of 
participation in joint support programmes, whereas the respective outcome variables are 
informal networking with other firms and informal networking with research 
organizations.
106
 The pattern of smaller ATT and larger ATE pertains in both models.  
 
 The estimated treatment effects in the model where the outcome variable is 
informal networking with other firms indicate that programme participation reduces the 
probability of networking by programme participants by 29.2 percentage points and 
would have decreased the probability for firms randomly selected from the entire 
population by 3.6 percentage points. Moreover, a positive and statistically significant 
correlation coefficient rho0 demonstrates that for non-participating SMEs the 
unobservables promoting programme participation are positively correlated with 
                                                          
106
 Stata outputs for these models are shown in Appendix IV, Tables A4.9 and A4.10 respectively. For the 
sake of space, Stata outputs for the remaining 19 augmented models are not presented.  
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informal networking with other firms (rho0=0.862). The coefficient rho1 is not 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level of significance or below.
107
 
 
 In addition, participation in either national or international support measures 
decreases the probability of informal networking with research organizations by 
participating SMEs by 11.9 percentage points, but would have increased the probability 
for firms randomly selected from the entire population by 17.4 percentage points. 
Moreover, a negative and statistically significant correlation coefficient rho1 suggests a 
perverse selection on observables; for participating SMEs, unobservables that positively 
affect the probability of participation in joint support measures have a negative impact 
on the probability of informal networking with research organizations (rho1= -0.842). 
The coefficient rho0 is statistically insignificant.  
                                                          
107
 The criteria for statistical significance of the rho coefficient are: 1.65 of the standard error (SE) for the 
10 per cent level of significance; 1.96 of the SE for the 5 per cent level of significance; and 2.63 of the SE 
for the 1 per cent level of significance.  
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Table 6.4. Augmented model - programme participation effects on innovation behaviour: the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), 
the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and the average treatment effect (ATE) (Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 
replications) 
Output dependent 
variable 
rho1 rho0 
Problem 
with a 
model? 
LR test 
(p 
value) 
Average treatment effect on the 
treated - ATT 
Average treatment 
effect on the 
untreated  
- ATU 
Average treatment effect 
- ATE 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
95% 
confidence 
intervals 
No of 
obs. 
Coeff. 
(bootstr. 
SEs) 
No of 
obs.  
Coeff. 
(bootstr. SEs) 
95% 
confidence 
intervals 
 
 
National support (N=763) 
 
Use of online technology 
or knowledge brokers/ 
intermediaries 
-1 
-0.999 
(0.000) 
rho1= -1 & 
rho0= -0.999 
0.0017 330 
0.307*** 
(0.008) 
[0.292    0.322] 286 
0.665*** 
(0.010) 
616 
0.477*** 
(0.006) 
[0.466    0.488] 
Informal networking 
with other firms 
-1 
-0.520 
(0.625) 
rho1= -1 0.0680 329 
0.452*** 
(0.009) 
[0.435    0.470] 279 
0.447*** 
(0.008) 
608 
0.451*** 
(0.005) 
[0.441    0.460] 
Informal networking 
with research 
organizations  
-0.764 
(0.333) 
0.009 
(0.638) 
LR test  
p= 0.4861 
0.4861 323 
0.190*** 
(0.009) 
[0.172    0.209] 276 
0.562*** 
(0.010) 
599 
0.362*** 
(0.008) 
[0.346    0.377] 
Strategic alliances with 
other firms  
0.095 
(0.588) 
1 rho0= 1 0.0240 300 
-0.492*** 
(0.013) 
[-0.517 -0.466] 273 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
573 
-0.267*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.281 -0.252] 
Non-equity alliances 
with other firms 
-1 
0.142 
(0.540) 
rho1= -1 0.0001 300 
-0.064*** 
(0.012) 
[-0.088 -0.040] 265 
0.708*** 
(0.009) 
565 
0.304*** 
(0.011) 
[0.283    0.325] 
Participation in 
innovation networks, 
S&T parks, clusters etc. 
-0.450 
(0.537) 
1 rho0= 1 0.0024 305 
-0.463*** 
(0.012) 
[-0.486 -0.440] 266 
0.436*** 
(0.012) 
571 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.063 -0.020] 
Close involvement of 
end users/customers  
0.053 
(0.607) 
0.999 
(0.001) 
rho0= 0.999 0.0048 300 
-0.362*** 
(0.012) 
[-0.386 -0.339] 267 
0.081*** 
(0.015) 
567 
-0.155*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.174 -0.135] 
 International support (N=763) 
Use of online technology 
or knowledge brokers 
1 
0.442 
(0.325) 
rho1= 1 0.0031 178 
-0.361*** 
(0.015) 
[-0.390 -0.332] 410 
-0.344*** 
(0.006) 
588 
-0.350*** 
(0.005) 
[-0.359 -0.340] 
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Informal networking 
with other firms 
-1 
0.732 
(0.546) 
rho1= -1 0.0399 179 
-0.280*** 
(0.016) 
[-0.312 -0.248] 412 
0.390*** 
(0.006) 
591 
0.186*** 
(0.008) 
[0.172    0.201] 
Informal networking 
with research 
organizations  
-1 
-0.182 
(0.396) 
rho1= -1 0.0235 176 
0.229*** 
(0.016) 
[0.198    0.260] 425 
0.551*** 
(0.112) 
601 
0.455*** 
(0.009) 
[0.437    0.473] 
Strategic alliances with 
other firms  
0.426 
(0.886) 
0.979 
(0.046) 
LR test 
p=0.1139 
0.1139 171 
-0.379*** 
(0.018) 
[-0.414 -0.345] 418 
-0.056*** 
(0.011) 
589 
-0.152*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.170 -0.134] 
Non-equity alliances 
with other firms 
-1 
0.865 
(0.259) 
rho1= -1 0.0223 172 
-0.557*** 
(0.015) 
[-0.586 -0.528] 413 
0.745*** 
(0.007) 
585 
0.365*** 
(0.119) 
[0.342    0.389] 
Participation in 
innovation networks, 
S&T parks, clusters etc. 
-0.844 
(0.277) 
1 
rho0= 1 & 
LR test  
p= 0.1057 
0.1057 176 
-0.445*** 
(0.016) 
[-0.476 -0.414] 404 
0.606*** 
(0.011) 
580 
0.287*** 
(0.011) 
[0.265    0.310] 
Close involvement of 
end users/customers  
-1 
0.573 
0.643 
rho1= - 1 0.0235 169 
-0.253*** 
(0.017) 
[-0.287 -0.220] 391 
0.426*** 
(0.010) 
560 
0.219*** 
(0.010) 
[0.201    0.238] 
 Joint support (N=763) 
Use of online technology 
or knowledge 
brokers/intermediaries 
0.601 
(0.635) 
0.882 
(0.193) 
LR test  
p= 0.1909 
0.1909 359 
-0.638*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.653 -0.623] 229 
-0.284*** 
(0.013) 
588 
-0.500*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.515 -0.486] 
Informal networking 
with other firms 
-0.562 
(0.435) 
0.862 
(0.213) 
No 0.0989 371 
-0.292*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.305 -0.279] 233 
0.372*** 
(0.010) 
604 
-0.036*** 
(0.008) 
[-0.052 -0.020] 
Informal networking 
with research 
organizations  
-0.842 
(0.231) 
0.579 
(0.369) 
No  0.0766 353 
-0.119*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.137 -0.101] 225 
0.628*** 
(0.013) 
578 
0.174*** 
(0.011) 
[0.153    0.195] 
Strategic alliances with 
other firms  
0.390 
(0.486) 
1 rho0= 1 0.0014 360 
-0.464*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.485 -0.442] 235 
-0.098*** 
(0.011) 
595 
-0.320*** 
(0.007) 
[-0.334 -0.307] 
Non-equity alliances 
with other firms 
-0.680 
(0.454) 
1 rho0= 1 0.0269 349 
-0.701*** 
(0.009) 
[-0.720 -0.682] 222 
0.452*** 
(0.014) 
571 
-0.252*** 
(0.014) 
[-0.279 -0.224] 
Participation in 
innovation networks, 
S&T parks, clusters etc. 
-0.208 
(0.805) 
1 rho0= 1 0.0004 353 
-0.473*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.494 -0.451] 224 
0.309*** 
(0.015) 
577 
-0.166*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.187 -0.145] 
Close involvement of 
end users/customers  
-0.760 
(0.246) 
1 rho0= 1 0.0134 350 
-0.373*** 
(0.010) 
[-0.393 -0.354] 225 
0.416*** 
(0.016) 
575 
-0.066*** 
(0.011) 
[-0.087 -0.045] 
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6.4.3 Summary 
 
Summary results for output additionality are reported in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. If we 
combine results from both baseline and augmented models, then in 26 of 30 models, the 
ATT effect is smaller than the ATE (in 13 baseline models and 13 augmented models; 
in both cases, 12 of the respective models estimate both treatment parameters at 
conventional levels of statistical significance ). Furthermore, in 25 models, the ATT 
effect is negative (12 baseline and 13 augmented models), whereas the ATE effect is 
positive (and in 24 from these 25 models, both treatment parameters are statistically 
significant).  
 Summary results for behavioural additionality are reported in Tables 6.8 and 
6.9.
108
 In 17 of the 21 baseline (parsimonious) models, the ATT effect is smaller than 
the ATE (and in 15 of these models both treatment parameters are statistically 
significant). Similarly, in 19 of the 21 augmented models, the ATT effect is smaller than 
the ATE (and both treatment effects in all 19 are statistically significant). However, a 
pattern of positive ATT and negative ATE is not so prominent in the models assessing 
behavioural additionality. Namely, this pattern is found in only 6 baseline models and in 
the same number of augmented models. 
                                                          
108
 After checking whether confidence intervals overlap, we identified one baseline model in which the 
confidence intervals for the ATT and ATE effects overlap; the outcome variable in the model is the use of 
online technology and knowledge brokers and the treatment variable is international support. Therefore, 
the treatment estimates for this model are not reported in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. Moreover, confidence 
intervals overlap in two augmented models. The first model estimated the impact of national support on 
informal networking with other firms, and the second model reports the effect of participation in 
international programme measures on the use of online technology and knowledge brokers. Again, the 
results from these models are not reported in Tables 6.7 and 6.8.  
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Table 6.5. Programme effects for output additionality: summary 
Model 
Number 
of 
models 
Models 
without 
diagnostic 
problems 
Models 
with one 
diagnostic 
problem 
Models  
with two 
diagnostic 
problems 
Models without diagnostic problems Models with diagnostic problems 
13.  14.  15.  16.  17.  18.  19.  20.  21.  22.  23.  24.  25.  
     
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT 
negative 
& ATE 
positive 
ATT 
negative & 
ATE 
positive; 
both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT 
negative 
& ATE 
positive 
ATT 
negative & 
ATE 
positive; 
both 
statistically 
significant 
Baseline  15 2 12 1 1 1 1 1 12 11 11 11 
Augmented 15 2 12 1 1 1 1 1 12 11 12 11 
Note: As a guide to reading Table 6.5, compare numbers in columns 6-9 with column 3; for example, in the augmented models, one (column 6) from two models without diagnostic 
problems (column 3) yields ATT<ATE. Similarly, compare columns 10-13 with columns 4 and 5 together. 
 
Table 6.6. Programme effects for output additionality: summary 
Model 
Number 
of 
models 
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT negative & 
ATE positive 
ATT negative & ATE 
positive; both 
statistically significant 
Baseline model 15 13 12 12 12 
Augmented model 15 13 12 13 12 
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Table 6.7. Programme effects for behavioural additionality: summary 
Model 
Number 
of 
models 
Models 
without 
diagnostic 
problems 
Models 
with one 
diagnostic 
problem 
Models  
with two 
diagnostic 
problems 
Models without diagnostic problems Models with diagnostic problems 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  
     
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT 
negative 
& ATE 
positive 
ATT 
negative & 
ATE 
positive; 
both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT 
negative 
& ATE 
positive 
ATT 
negative & 
ATE 
positive; 
both 
statistically 
significant 
Baseline  21 2 15 4 2 2 0 0 15 13 6 5 
Augmented 21 2 17 2 2 2 1 1 17 17 5 5 
Note: As a guide to reading Table 6.7, compare numbers in columns 6-9 with column 3; for example, in the augmented models, one (column 6) from two models without diagnostic 
problems (column 3) yield ATT<ATE. Similarly, compare columns 10-13 with columns 4 and 5 together. 
 
Table 6.8. Programme effects for behavioural additionality: summary 
Model 
Number 
of 
models 
ATT<ATE 
ATT<ATE 
& both 
statistically 
significant 
ATT negative & 
ATE positive 
ATT negative & 
ATE positive; both 
statistically 
significant 
Baseline  21 17 15 6 5 
Augmented model 21 19 19 6 6 
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6.5 Conclusions  
  
In this chapter, we investigated the impact of R&D policy on SME innovation, in 
particular, focusing on output and behavioural additionality. Before interpreting the 
main findings, it should be noted that the results should be taken with caution, given the 
problems with diagnostic tests in most of our estimated models. Although our dataset is 
the largest achievable with the resources that were available, it is relatively small for the 
required estimator, particularly taking into account the number of countries covered 
with the survey. Difficulties with diagnostic testing might be associated with 
heterogeneity of the data with respect to survey coverage; i.e. the MAPEER dataset 
includes firms from 28 countries and from both manufacturing and service sectors. 
Accordingly, we proceed with the interpretation of the findings, but mainly focus on 
results from the models without diagnostic problems. 
 
 In assessing the effectiveness of R&D policy on innovation output (i.e. output 
additionality), robust results are reported for two baseline models and two augmented 
models. In the former, both models are estimated for participation in national support 
programmes. A common finding in both models is that public intervention seem to have 
a crowding-out effect, demonstrated by a negative and statistically significant ATT 
effect. Estimated ATE effects, however, are not consistent across two models. For less 
innovative firms (innovative sales more than 20%), the ATE effect is negative and even 
smaller than the ATT effect, suggesting that in this case allocating public funding 
randomly would not reduce – indeed, in comparison would worsen - the adverse effect 
found for participating firms. Conversely, in highly innovative firms (innovative sales 
more than 40%), the estimated ATE effect is positive and statistically significant. 
Therefore, for this category of SMEs, public intervention in the form of randomly 
allocated funds would have a significant additional effect. Notwithstanding the 
problems with diagnostic testing, this finding is replicated across all but one model with 
diagnostic problems.  
 
 Another finding from the models without diagnostic problems points to perverse 
selection into public support. In three from four models, negative and statistically 
significant correlation coefficients between the error terms of the selection equation and 
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the outcome equation in regime 1 (regime conductive to innovation) suggests a perverse 
selection on unobservables for participating firms.  
 
 As estimated treatment effects in the augmented models are broadly consistent 
with those from the baseline models, the overall results – a prevailing pattern whereby 
ATT<ATE - seem to suggest that firms receiving public support are less likely to 
increase their innovation output as a consequence of treatment assignment. In this 
respect, the findings from the analysis of the MAPEER dataset are consistent with those 
reported in Chapter IV on the analysis of the GPrix survey. In both analyses, empirical 
evidence indicate that the 'picking-the-winner' strategy adopted by government agencies 
yields no additional effect, if not even a crowding-out of private funding.  
 
 In this chapter, we also estimated programme effects on firms' innovative 
behaviour, specifically on networking and cooperation for innovation (i.e. behavioural 
additionality). Again, most parameters are imprecisely estimated, but four models report 
robust and consistent findings of a smaller ATT than ATE effect. Analysing each type 
of networking separately, the results suggest that a distribution of support measures via 
a lottery system would only marginally increase the probability of using online 
technology or knowledge brokers
109
, but would have significantly increased the 
probability of informal networking with other firms
110
 as well as of participation in 
innovation networks. The largest potential effect of random distribution is implied by 
the results for informal networking with research organizations, for which the ATT 
effect is significantly negative and the ATE significantly positive. Finally, if we take 
into account the findings for each open innovation practice and from both baseline and 
augmented models, the dominant pattern is still of smaller ATT than ATE. Therefore, 
the overall results seem to indicate that, for most types of networking and cooperation 
for innovation, a random distribution of R&D support measures would have a 
substantially larger effect - even if only by reducing crowding out - than using the 
current selection criteria. 
                                                          
109
 This conclusion does not hold for the case of participation in international support programmes, 
because the treatment effects are not statistically different in either the baseline or in the augmented 
model.  
110
 In the augmented model, treatment effects are not statistically different for firms participating in 
national funding. Again, we emphasize the indicative nature of our findings.   
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7.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this thesis was to analyse the effectiveness of innovation support 
programmes on SME innovation. The focus of this thesis is on output and behavioural 
additionalities in the specific contexts of, respectively, traditional manufacturing SMEs 
(the GPrix dataset), European SMEs operating in both manufacturing and service 
sectors (the MAPEER dataset), and Spanish manufacturing SMEs (the CIS2006 
dataset). Innovation policy and its effectiveness are of high importance for policy-
makers at the national and supra-national levels, because innovation is regarded as the 
key to achieving sustainable economic growth and high employment. At the firm level, 
special attention is devoted to the innovation processes in SMEs, because of the 
contribution of this heterogeneous group to employment and production (European 
Commission, 2013b). 
 
 Two main issues in the evaluation of innovation policies are related to the 
presence of selection bias in the distribution of public support and to the necessity of 
having a group of participating (treated) firms and of non-participating (control) firms in 
order to empirically estimate treatment effects. The first issue of selection bias occurs 
for two reasons: a) firms' self-select themselves into support programmes; and b) 
government agencies are more likely to select those firms with the higher probability of 
successful innovation projects. Therefore, estimating the impact of innovation policies 
requires an adequate treatment of participation in support programmes as an 
endogenous factor. The second issue is associated with the evaluation methodology. 
Programme effects – additionality and crowding out – cannot be observed and so must 
be estimated. In turn, the estimation of programme effects requires the estimation of 
counterfactual outcomes (e.g. the treatment effect on non-participating firms and the 
effect of non-treatment on participating firms), which requires that evaluators should 
have data on both treated and non-treated firms (i.e. treatment and control groups 
respectively).  
 
 The empirical work in the thesis is based on three extensive enterprise surveys: 
a) the GPrix survey of SMEs in traditional manufacturing sectors in seven EU regions; 
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b) the large-scale Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of Spanish SMEs, and c) the 
MAPEER survey of SMEs across Europe.  
 
 The evidence presented supports the proposition that public measures have a less 
favourable effect on SMEs’ innovation output and innovative behaviour than the claims 
of policy makers and programme managers would suggest. We find that there is a 
pervasive selection bias into support programmes, whereby public agencies adopt a 
'picking-the-winner' strategy that yields a smaller additional effect of programme 
support than would randomly allocating public support among innovative SMEs. 
Furthermore, regarding behavioural additionality, participating in public support 
measures induces a typically small treatment effect among Spanish SMEs, while the 
largest effects on participating firms are found for cooperation with government 
institutions and for outsourcing R&D. Moreover, by analysing behavioural additionality 
among European SMEs (the MAPEER dataset), the empirical evidence indicates that, 
similar to output additionality, a random allocation of public measures to relatively 
innovative SMEs would induce a larger additionality effect than does the current 
selection process.  
 
 Overall, the empirical evidence is contrary to those reported in most empirical 
studies. Namely, as our review of the empirical literature argued in Section 3.6, there is 
a sharp distinction between findings reported from studies applying matching estimators 
and those applying selection models. While the former uniformly report positive 
treatment effects, the evidence from latter are mixed. Our findings are consistent with 
this observation. The detailed discussion of the main findings in the thesis is provided in 
the following section.  
 
7.2 Main findings   
 
The first research question refers to the theoretical contributions to conceptualizing and 
modelling the innovation process at the organizational level. The review of two streams 
of literature, neoclassical economics and evolutionary theory, reveals the absence of a 
canonical theoretical model for the determinants of innovation. This conclusion is 
consistent with the current advances in the literature on the effectiveness of innovation 
support programmes, surveyed in Chapter III. The prevailing approach to modelling and 
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analysing the determinants of innovation as well as the impact of public intervention in 
relation to innovation is an eclectic one. This poses a particular challenge to economists 
who are trained to derive empirical specifications from theory: for, in the area of 
innovation generally and in the evaluation of innovation support programmes in 
particular, empirical studies outweigh theoretical contributions or, as suggested by 
Cerulli (2010, p. 424), we have "measurement without theory".  
 
 Chapter II focuses on the innovation process in SMEs, particularly on its 
advantages and limitations relative to innovation in large firms. The major constraints 
on enhancing their absorptive capacity are associated with their typically limited 
financial and human resources. In analysing SME internal resources, resource-based 
theory can also provide useful insights. In contrast, SME behavioural traits (e.g. 
smallness, absence of bureaucratic inertia), are usually recognized as the main 
advantages of SMEs in comparison to their larger counterparts. In addition, the 
literature provides several theoretical frameworks for conceptualizing SME innovation, 
such as portfolio/contingency models or taxonomies of SMEs based on their innovation 
activities.  
 
 In Chapter III, we continue the review of theoretical contributions in relation to 
the rationales for public innovation support, identifying two complementary 
frameworks: the neoclassical market-failure rationale; and the evolutionary system-
failure rationale. Moreover, the evolution of policy in the domain of innovation revealed 
a large number of policy instruments applied in contemporaneous policy making. The 
second part of Chapter III provides an overview of evaluation methods and identities a 
dominance of matching estimators in empirical studies. In addition, considering the 
empirical evidence from all three streams of research - input, output and behavioural 
additionalities - the majority of studies report a positive treatment effect. However, the 
crucial limitations of the studies on the additionality effects of innovation support 
programmes are: (1) a very limited number of studies applying selection models and 
other quantitative methodologies that can take into account unobserved firm 
characteristics; and (2), a limited availability of longitudinal data, consequently severely 
restricted insights into the medium- and long-run effects of public intervention in the 
domain of innovation. In this thesis, the available data allows us to address the former 
but not the latter limitation. 
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 The key research question in the thesis is the impact of innovation support 
measures on innovation output and on the innovative behaviour of SMEs. The 
effectiveness of public measures is assessed through empirical analysis of three 
different databases and by applying several evaluation methods. In Chapter IV, we 
investigated whether public measures in the domain of innovation positively effects 
innovation outputs in traditional manufacturing SMEs across seven EU regions in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. 
Innovation output is measured as the introduction of technological innovations (product 
and process), of non-technological innovations (organizational and marketing) and as 
the share of sales from new products and/or processes (i.e. innovative sales). The 
treatment effects are estimated by a binary endogenous switching model. Two 
robustness checks were conducted: a) besides estimating treatment parameters of a 
baseline (parsimonious) model, another set of results is reported for an augmented 
model; and b) matching estimators were applied using both baseline and augmented 
models. Based on the estimated average treatment on the treated (ATT) and the average 
treatment effects (ATE) we report two main findings, while focusing more on the 
second finding associated with the relationship between the ATT effect and the ATE. 
The first set of results refers to the estimated ATT effects, whereby its mean value in 20 
baseline models is -0.09, suggesting that treatment assignment typically reduced the 
probability of innovation output by programme participants by 9 percentage points. This 
finding is consistent with that from 20 augmented models, where the mean value of the 
ATT effects is -0.18, indicating that treatment assignment typically reduced the 
probability of innovation output by programme participants by 18 percentage points.  
 
 As already noted, the second finding relates to the relationship between the ATT 
and the ATE effects. Namely, the ATT effect is systematically smaller than the ATE 
both in the baseline and in the augmented models. In addition, in the majority of cases, 
the ATT effects are negative while the ATEs are positive. This finding indicates a 
crowding out effect of innovation support programmes on participating SMEs, but also 
that an additional effect would have been attainable had support measures been 
randomly allocated among innovative SMEs (almost all firms in the sample report 
undertaking innovative activities and so qualify as innovative). 
 
 Chapter V investigated behavioural additionality in Spanish SMEs applying a 
range of matching estimators to the dataset from the Spanish Community Innovation 
 270 
 
Survey (CIS) conducted in 2006. Behavioural additionality in our analysis refers to a 
particular category of network additionality, whereby the research question concerns the 
effect of public intervention on the probability of establishing and maintaining network 
relationships with suppliers, customers, competitors, government and Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs). Furthermore, the treatment effects were estimated on two additional 
open innovation practices: outsourcing R&D; and acquiring other external knowledge 
(such as patents and know-how).  
 
 The empirical evidence suggests a positive, but heterogeneous impact of public 
support on open innovation in Spanish manufacturing SMEs. However, the results of 
sensitivity analysis indicate that many of the programme effects could be overestimated 
due to unobserved heterogeneity, which matching estimators cannot account for. 
Notably, the results for two cooperative partners - cooperation with suppliers and with 
HEIs - seem to be highly sensitive to hidden bias. We conclude that while hidden bias 
may be endemic in matching studies, there is no evidence that hidden bias is consistent 
across different studies of the effectiveness of public support on cooperation. A 
corollary is the usefulness of investigating the effects of public support for different 
types of cooperative partners separately, in which we depart from some previous studies 
(e.g. Fier et al., 2006; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Spithoven et al., 2012, p. 171 
and p. 181). Similar reasoning leads us also to the usefulness of investigating the effects 
of support from different levels of government separately (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 
2008).  
  
 In total, 18 treatment effects were estimated from the whole sample and the 
same number from the subsample of innovative SMEs. Five estimated effects in the 
whole sample are rather robust to selection bias; and six estimates in the subsample 
(perhaps due to being a more homogenous sample). In total, out of 36 treatment effects, 
only 11 are not likely to be overestimated. Finally, across both the whole sample and the 
subsample of innovative firms, five ATT effects are robust to hidden bias:  
 
 For local/regional support, three effects on the following open innovation 
activities - aggregate cooperation, cooperation with government institutions, and 
outsourcing R&D; 
 For national (government) support, two effects - on horizontal cooperation and 
cooperation with government institutions. 
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 Overall, we find that public support most robustly increases SME cooperation 
with government institutions; only slightly less robust is that the largest treatment 
effects of public support - both regional (a robust finding) and federal (borderline 
robust) - are for outsourcing R&D activities. Our results suggest that, depending on the 
source of funding, SMEs are more likely to respond to public support by increasing 
either their cooperation with government institutions or their investment in extramural 
R&D than by establishing and maintaining cooperative networks.  
  
  A larger number of robust treatment parameters is reported for the subsample of 
innovative SMEs than for the whole sample. Moreover, the robust ATT effects are 
uniformly larger in the subsample than in the whole sample, suggesting that public 
support has a larger additionality effect on SMEs that undertake innovation, relative to 
those firms that do not innovate. The evidence is consistent to Penrose's (1959) 
argument that her theory of firm growth applies only to those firms that want to grow 
rather than to all firms; we find that innovation support is most effective when randomly 
allocated to firms that self-report as innovative in one form or another. 
 
 Finally, in Chapter VI, the hypotheses of both output and behavioural 
additionalities have been investigated using the MAPEER dataset of European SMEs, 
covering the period 2005-2010. The treatment effects are estimated by applying a binary 
endogenous switching model, similar to that in Chapter IV. In assessing the 
effectiveness of R&D policy on innovation output (i.e. output additionality), robust 
results are reported for two baseline models and two augmented models. In the former, 
both models are estimated for participation in national support programmes. A common 
finding in both models is that public intervention seem to have a crowding-out effect, 
demonstrated by a negative and statistically significant ATT effect. Estimated ATEs, 
however, are not consistent across two models. For less innovative firms (innovative 
sales more than 20%), the ATE effect is negative and even smaller than the ATT effect, 
suggesting that in this case allocating public funding randomly among the population 
relatively innovating SMEs would not worsen the adverse effect found for participating 
firms. Conversely, in highly innovative firms (innovative sales more than 40%), the 
estimated ATE effect is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, for this category 
of SMEs, public intervention in the form of randomly allocated funds would have a 
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significant additional effect. Notwithstanding the problems with diagnostic testing, this 
finding is replicated across all but one model with diagnostic problems.  
 
 Another finding from the models without diagnostic problems points to perverse 
selection into public support. In three from four models, negative and statistically 
significant correlation coefficients between the error terms of the selection equation and 
the outcome equation in regime 1 (regime conducive to innovation) suggests a perverse 
selection on unobservables for participating firms.  
 
 Given that the estimated treatment effects in the augmented models are broadly 
consistent with those from the baseline models, the overall results – a prevailing pattern 
whereby ATT<ATE - seem to suggest that firms receiving public support are less likely 
to increase their innovation output as a consequence of treatment assignment than would 
be the case among firms selected from the sample at random. In this respect, the 
findings from the analysis of the MAPEER dataset are consistent with those reported in 
Chapter IV on the analysis of the GPrix survey. In both analyses, the evidence indicates 
that the ”picking-the-winner” strategy adopted by government agencies not only yields 
no additional effect but even gives rise to a crowding-out of private funding, i.e. the 
treatment effects are either zero or sometimes are even negative.   
 
 In this chapter, we also estimated programme effects on firms' innovative 
behaviour, specifically on networking and cooperation for innovation (i.e. behavioural 
additionality). Again, most parameters are imprecisely estimated, but four models report 
robust and consistent findings of a smaller ATT effect than ATE. Analysing each type 
of networking separately, the results suggest that a distribution of support measures via 
a lottery system would only marginally increase the probability of using online 
technology or knowledge brokers, but would have significantly increased the 
probability of informal networking with other firms as well as of participation in 
innovation networks. The largest potential effect of random distribution is implied by 
the results for informal networking with research organizations, for which the ATT 
effect is significantly negative and the ATE significantly positive. Finally, if we take 
into account the findings for each open innovation practice and from both baseline and 
augmented models, the dominant pattern is still of smaller ATT than ATE. Therefore, 
the overall results seem to indicate that, for most types of networking and cooperation 
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for innovation, a random distribution of R&D support measures would have a more 
positive effect than using the current selection criteria. 
 
Table 7.1.  Comparison of the analyses conducted on the GPrix dataset and on the 
MAPEER dataset 
  GPrix data MAPEER data 
Type of 
additionality 
studied 
- Output additionality  - Output additionality  
- Behavioural additionality  
Measures of 
innovation 
output 
- Product innovation  
- Process innovation  
- Organisational innovation  
- Marketing innovation  
- Innovative sales  
- Innovative sales  
Source of 
funding  
- Either national or 
international funding   
- National funding 
- International funding  
- Either national or international 
funding 
Main finding - Systematically smaller ATT 
than ATE effect  
- Systematically smaller ATT than 
ATE effect 
 
 Table 7.1 provides a comparison between the analysis conducted in Chapter IV 
on the GPrix dataset and the one conducted in Chapter VI on the MAPEER dataset. The 
main differences are associated with the type of additionality studied, the measures of 
innovation output employed and the source(s) of funding investigated. With respect to 
the type of additionality studies, the analysis of the MAPEER data is broader,  
encompassing the effectiveness of public measures in relation to output and behavioural 
additionality, while the analysis of the GPrix data focuses exclusively on output 
additionality. Regarding the measures of innovation output, the GPrix analysis is more 
comprehensive than the MAPEER analysis, by investigating five distinct measures: 
introduction of product innovation; introduction of process innovation; introduction of 
organisational innovation; introduction of marketing innovation; and innovative sales. 
In contrast, the MAPEER analysis employs a single measure of innovation output, that 
of innovative sales. Furthermore, the datasets differ regarding the sources of funding 
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that are separately investigated. The treatment assignment in the GPrix dataset is 
defined as firms' participation in either national or international innovation support 
measures, whereas in the MAPEER dataset, the distinction is made between national 
and international sources of funding, besides firms' participation in either type of 
funding. Finally, the similarity between the analyses conducted on the GPrix and on the 
MAPEER datasets is associated with the main findings reported in both analyses on the 
systematically smaller Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) than the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE).  
 
7.3 Policy implications 
 
The main research question investigated in the thesis is whether public support enhances 
SME innovation. In other words, does public support have an additionality effect on 
innovation? The empirical studies focus on three distinct types of additionality: input, 
output and behavioural. Given the specific subject of this thesis, innovation in SMEs, 
we did not empirically test for input additionality, as SMEs usually conduct informal 
R&D or unmeasured innovation-related activities such as technical design, which 
implies that accurate data on their intramural and extramural R&D and innovation-
related expenditures are scarce. Therefore, the focus of the thesis is on output and 
behavioural additionalities.  
 
 Output additionality is investigated in Chapters IV and VI. The major difference 
between analyses in these chapters is sector and country coverage. Namely, the dataset 
used in Chapter IV includes SMEs in traditional manufacturing sectors across seven EU 
regions, while the dataset used in Chapter VI is gathered from SMEs across 
manufacturing and service sectors in 28 European countries. Notwithstanding the 
differences in the industry and country coverage, findings from both empirical analyses 
are consistent – indicating that public support has a smaller additionality effect on 
innovation outputs in participating SMEs (the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
- ATT) relative to the effect it could have had if allocated to SMEs chosen at random 
from the respective samples (the Average Treatment Effect - ATE). Our main policy 
recommendation regarding output additionality is derived from the relationship between 
the ATT and ATE effects. However, a cautionary note should be taken into account, as 
noted in the concluding remarks in Chapters IV and VI. Namely, in the first stage of the 
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selection process, a certain selection on observables (e.g. “due diligence” with respect to 
firm size and solvency) should be applied by government agencies. After this initial 
screening of the applicants, eligible SMEs then enter the second stage of the selection 
process, i.e. distribution of support measures through lottery. 
 
 Besides output additionality, another type of additionality – behavioural – was 
also a subject of quantitative evaluation in the thesis. Behavioural additionality was 
investigated using two distinct datasets: CIS2006 for Spanish SMEs; and the MAPEER 
dataset for SMEs across 28 European countries. The impact of innovation support 
programmes on behavioural additionality in Spanish SMEs was investigated in Chapter 
V. Taking the three sources of funding jointly (local/regional; federal government; and 
EU), the estimated ATT effects indicate that the largest impact of public support is 
found for cooperation with government institutions and for outsourcing R&D. In 
addition, the treatment parameters for other networking partners (customers, suppliers, 
competitors, consultants and HEIs) are rather small and the difference between them is 
not statistically significant. Moreover, the results of sensitivity analysis indicate that 
treatment effects might not be robust to unobserved heterogeneity. Given the limitations 
most researchers face in analysing the additionality effects of innovation related policies 
with respect to information on the selection process, the empirical findings for Spanish 
SMEs suggest the need for data on the selection process in order to control for 
unobservables related to the selection mechanism.  
 
 Finally, behavioural additionality was also estimated in Chapter VI, using the 
MAPEER sample of European SMEs. The overall results, similar to the conclusion on 
behavioural additionality reached in Chapter V, indicate that a random distribution of 
public support measures among innovative European SMEs could induce a larger 
additionality effect, relative to the current selection process by public agencies. Again, 
we should bear in mind that a distribution of support measures via lottery does not 
exclude due diligence checking on the part of public agencies, which should be 
performed as a first stage in the selection process – after which a random allocation of 
public instruments could be performed.  
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7.4 Contributions to knowledge  
 
 
Our research has contributed to the current evaluation of public policy in several 
directions. First, we investigate output additionality in traditional manufacturing SMEs 
across Europe. No previous study explicitly focuses on additionality effects among 
traditional SMEs in traditional manufacturing sectors. In this analysis, we applied 
binary endogenous switching models, which is another contribution to knowledge, as 
this modelling, to our knowledge, has not been applied hitherto in the context of output 
additionality.  
 
 Second, we applied a range of matching estimators in Chapter V to investigate 
behavioural additionality in Spanish SMEs. Although the issue of behavioural 
additionality has been previously investigated for Spanish firms, our analysis 
contributes to the empirical literature by separately investigating three sources of 
funding. In addition, we conducted sensitivity analysis, as a recommended part of any 
analysis conducted by applying matching estimators. To our knowledge, only one study 
by Alecke et al. (2012), although in the context of input additionality, reports the results 
of sensitivity analysis.  
 
 Third, no study, irrespective of the type of additionality investigated, reports 
both the ATT effects and the ATEs. Analysis conducted in Chapters IV and VI 
estimates both treatment effects, in addition to estimating the Average Treatment effect 
of the Untreated (ATU) as well.  
 
 Fourth, empirical evidence presented in Chapter VI refers to both output and 
behavioural additionalities of European SMEs. To our knowledge, no previous studies 
cover such a large number of countries. Thus, our results can be taken as a general 
overview of the effectiveness of innovation policies on innovation performance among 
European SMEs.  
 
 Five, the range of empirical evidence from the thesis is consistent with Greene's 
(2009) argument, as noted in Section 3.6, on the inverse relationship between study 
quality and the size of estimated treatment effects on participating firms. Consistent 
with Greene’s hypothesis, the empirical analyses conducted in Chapters IV and VI 
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employ endogenous switching models, that are more sophisticated than matching 
estimators, as the former control for both selection on observable and unobservable firm 
characteristics, whereas the latter are limited to selection on observed characteristics 
only. While the estimated treatment effects on participating firms are mostly negative 
when estimated by endogenous switching models (i.e. implying a crowding out effect of 
public funding), the estimated ATT effects from matching estimators reported in 
Chapter V are uniformly positive, suggesting an additional effect of innovation support 
measures. 
 
 Finally, policy implications drawn from the empirical analyses in the thesis 
about the random allocation of public support among innovative, or mostly innovative 
firms, are in line with Penrose's (1959) comment on the subject of her investigation, as 
noted in Section 4.5. Namely, Penrose excluded from her exposition firms that do not 
grow and/or do not want to grow, and developed her theory of firm growth by 
exclusively analysing those firms that do grow. In similar vein, the analysis in this 
thesis and its ensuing policy implications refer to innovating SMEs, as noted in Sections 
4.5 and 6.5. Therefore, policy recommendations stemming from the empirical findings 
in the thesis are concerned with SMEs that undertake some type of innovation but could 
undertake more. 
 
7.5 Limitations of the research  
 
The major limitation of our research is the lack of longitudinal data. In cross-sectional 
analysis, we cannot model the dynamics of participation in public support programmes. 
The literature suggests that a successful record of previous participation increases the 
likelihood of applying for and receiving public funding in the future. Moreover, the 
effect of public support is likely to be distributed over the medium to long run (David et 
al., 2000; Lach, 2002; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga -
Vicente et al., 2014), rather than to exhibit only a contemporaneous or short-run effect, 
which is the only impact captured in a cross-sectional setting.  
 
 Second, a few limitations stem from the applied econometric techniques. 
Regarding the binary endogenous switching models applied in Chapters IV and VI, 
there is no known way to test for the joint normality of the error terms, which is an 
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underlying assumption in selection models. Furthermore, the matching estimators 
applied in Chapter V cannot take into account unobservable firm characteristics, which 
are likely to occur in the selection process. Although, following the best practice in the 
literature on matching, we conducted sensitivity analysis to provide some testing of the 
robustness of the estimated treatment effects, the analysis as such cannot answer the 
question as to whether potential unobserved heterogeneity influences the treatment 
assignment. In addition, the underlying assumption of matching estimators is that there 
are no spillover effects. This is a common limitation in any studies applying matching 
estimators. Cerulli (2010) notes that the issue of dealing with spillovers is foremost 
associated with problems of operationalizing spillovers, i.e. designing an appropriate 
measure of spillovers, as the literature on additionality in innovation policy does not 
provide any guidelines on how to measure and model spillover effects.  
 
 Third, a further limitation of our analysis is associated with the sample size 
permitted by the databases used in Chapters IV and VI. Namely, both datasets are too 
small for estimating individual country treatment effects. It would be of importance for 
policy makers and practitioners to compare the effectiveness of public interventions 
across countries. Yet sample size is one of the key limitations of empirical studies more 
generally. Moreover, besides the fact that very few studies include more than one 
country, comparison among studies is seriously hampered by the absence of a core 
(parsimonious) model and the corollary of differences in modelling strategies and 
applied evaluation models.  
 
 Fourth, as discussed in Chapter III, most studies do not contain information 
about the amount of subsidies. That is also a limitation of our research, preventing us 
from testing the hypothesis of a partial crowding out effect. Empirical evidence from the 
few studies with available levels of subsidies have indicated that partial crowding out 
could be pertinent to the treatment assignment.   
 
 Finally, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) datasets are not specifically 
designed for the evaluation of innovation policy. Thus, no information on the selection 
process is available, which is a common and significant obstacle to evaluation studies 
(Cerulli, 2010). 
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7.6 Directions for future research   
 
 
Limitations of our study discussed above can also provide avenues for future research. 
Availability of panel data would allow the modelling of dynamics in the innovation 
process which, in turn, would facilitate the estimation of the  medium- and long-run 
effects of support measures. Furthermore, using longitudinal data would enable the 
application of evaluation methods that are capable of controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity (such as Fixed Effects estimators, GMM estimators and conditional 
Difference-in-Difference estimators). Regarding the measurement of subsidies, the 
availability of levels of subsidies would enable the distinction between net (private, 
own) R&D effort and total R&D expenditure with the former being the adequate 
outcome variable for investigating input additionality (Cerulli, 2010). In addition, 
availability of the amount of subsidies would enable testing of the hypothesis of a 
partial crowding out effect (Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga -Vicente et al., 2014). 
 
 An interesting avenue for future research, according to work by Antonioli and 
Marzucchi (2012), would be to investigate the causal relationships between input, 
output and behavioural additionality. We expect that the structural models, such as the 
one suggested by Garcia and Mohnen (2010), might provide some guidelines on how to 
incorporate all three types of additionality in one model, similar to the CDM model. 
 
 In Chapters V and VI, we investigated the treatment effects on firms' innovative 
behaviour (behavioural additionality). However, due to lack of data on other types of 
behavioural additionality, such as scale and scope additionality, follow-up and 
management additionality (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006), our focus was specifically 
on network additionality. The other types of behavioural additionality are promising 
directions for future research, as no study has yet econometrically analysed these types 
of behavioural additionality.  
 
 Finally, as noted in Chapter III, most empirical studies focus on manufacturing 
sectors. The role of service innovation in firms' innovation performance is gaining 
attention (Dankbaar and Vissers, 2010) and is likely to be the subject of future studies 
(Zúñiga -Vicente et al., 2014). 
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Appendix I 
Table A1.1. Empirical studies applying matching estimators - part I 
Authors Country Dataset Sample size Sectors Treatment 
variable  
Outcome 
variable 
Model specification 
Czarnitzki 
and Fier 
(2002) 
Germany  Pooled cross 
sectional data, 
Mannheim 
Innovation Panel - 
Services 1997-1999 
1,084 firms, 
210 treated  
Service sectors  Binary  Input additionality  
- Innovation 
intensity 
(innovation 
expenditure over 
sales)  
- Innovation 
expenditure  
- Firm size (log) 
- DV if firm is located in Eastern 
Germany 
- DV for continuous R&D activities 
- Lagged share of employees with a 
university degree in natural science and 
engineering (absorptive capacity) 
- Lagged share of employees in 
business administration 
- Population density of the district  
-Firm age (inverse) 
- Sectoral growth rates 
- DV for legal form  
- Time DV for 1998 and industry DVs  
 
Almus and 
Czarnitzki 
(2003) 
Eastern 
Germany 
Pooled cross 
sectional data, 
Mannheim 
Innovation Panel 
(MIP) for 1995, 
1997 and 1999 
 
828 firms (625 
treated and 303 
untreated 
firms) 
Manufacturing 
sectors 
Binary   
 
Input additionality  
- R&D intensity 
(ratio of R&D 
expenditure to sale)  
- Firm size 
- Firm size squared 
- Firm age  
- Market competition  
- Sectoral and time DVs  
- Import ratio 
- Foreign competition (export related 
sales) 
- Concentration ratio 
- Capital intensity (tangible assets per 
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employee)  
- DV for legal firm  
- Previous R&D experience (DV 
whether firm has R&D departments)  
- DV for belonging to a group  
Aerts and 
Czarnitzki 
(2004) 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
CIS3 (1998-2000) 
merged with annual 
account data and 
patent data (only 43 
firms filed for 
patents) 
776 firms (180 
treated)  
Manufacturing 
and selected 
service sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D expenditure  
- R&D intensity 
(R&D expenditure 
over turnover)  
 
Output 
additionality  
-DV for patenting 
firms  
- Number of patents 
per employee 
- Firm size  
- Patent stock  
- Export quota (exports over turnover)  
- Capital intensity  
- Cash flow per employee 
- Debt per employee 
- Belonging to a group  
- DV for foreign parent company  
Duguet 
(2004) 
France  Pooled cross 
sectional data, BRN 
(fiscal files) and 
R&D surveys from 
1985 to 1997 
 
Between 1032 
and 1672 firms 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Binary   Input additionality  
- DV if firms 
increased R&D 
expenditure 
-  Growth rate of 
R&D expenditure 
- Lagged firm size (measured as sales) 
- Lagged private R&D to sales 
- Lagged debt to sales ratio 
- Past public support (DV for receiving 
   support and a constructed average 
   subsidy rate)  
Czarnitzki 
and 
Hussinger 
(2004) 
Germany  Pooled cross 
sectional data, 
merged the MIP and 
PROFI databases 
from 1992 to 2000  
3,799 firms 
(588 treated) 
Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality 
- Total R&D 
expenditure 
- Total R&D 
intensity  
- Private R&D 
expenditures (net of 
subsidies) 
- Private R&D 
intensity (private 
R&D expenditures 
over sales) 
 
- Firm size (logarithm of the number of 
employees) 
- Patent stock per employee (lagged 
value) 
- DV for firms located in East Germany  
- Firm age (logarithm) 
- DV for belonging to a group 
- DV for firms belonging to a group 
with a foreign parent company  
- Export quota (exports over sales) 
- Import intensity at industry level 
- Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
- DV for capital companies (firms with 
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liability limiting legal form) 
- Time and twelve industry DVs  
 
Heijs and 
Herrera 
(2004) 
Spain  Business Strategy 
Survey (1998-2000) 
 
681 firms, 243 
treated firms 
Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D intensity  
- Firm size 
- Firm age 
- Firm ownership 
- Investment capacity  
- Innovation funding difficulty  
- Evolution of the main market 
- Evolution of market share   
  (diversification) 
- Export propensity 
- Import propensity   
- Formality of innovative activity  
- Cooperative attitude 
- Technological export  
- Technological import 
- Regional and sectoral DVs 
 
Kaiser 
(2004) 
Denmark  Ministry of 
Economic and 
Business Affairs for 
two years separately 
1999 and 2001 
 
550 firms Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Binary   Input additionality 
- R&D intensity 
(R&D expenditures 
over sales  
- DV for holding at least one patent 
- DV for cooperation  
- DV for new or improved product  
- Share of high qualified employees 
- Export DV 
- Share of exports in Euros  
- Year DV for 1999 
- Sectoral DVs  
 
 
Lӧӧf and 
Hesmati 
(2005) 
Sweden  CIS3  
1998-2000 
merged with the 
register data  
770 firms, 160 
treated 
Manufacturing 
and business 
services  
Binary  Input additionality 
- R&D per 
employee 
- Firm size  
- Firm size squared 
- Gross investment per employees 
- Capital stock per employee 
- Equity per employee 
- Debt per employee 
- Financial constraints  
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- Skill constraints 
- Export  
- Foreign owned 
- Belonging to a group 
- Recurrent R&D 
- Demand pull R&D 
- 15 sectoral DVs  
Hujer and 
Radic 
(2005)  
Germany  IAB Establishment 
Panel (1997-2001) 
2,714 firms, 
492 treated  
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Binary  Output 
additionality  
- DV for the 
introduction of 
product innovation  
- Competition intensity  
- Gini concentration  
- Export share  
- State of technology  
- DV for firms with a separate R&D 
department  
- Share of high qualified employees 
- Number of R&D cooperation 
- Firm size (the number of employees) 
- Share of one man businesses 
- Share of firms as partnerships 
- Share of private limited companies 
- Share of capital companies 
- Business development (Likert scale) 
Fier et al. 
(2006) 
Germany  Merged two waves 
of Mannheim 
Innovation Panel 
(MIP) data with 
PROFI, DPMA and 
CATI data, periods 
covered 1998-2000 
and 2001-2003; 
additional data 
collected via 
telephone survey  
659 firms, 142 
treated  
Manufacturing 
and selected 
service sectors  
Binary  Behavioural 
additionality  
- DV for firms 
collaborating only 
with other 
businesses  
- DV for firms 
collaborating only 
with scientific 
institutions 
- DV for firms that 
collaborate with 
other businesses 
and  scientific 
institutions 
- Firm size (logarithm of turnover)  
- Firm age 
- Three DVs whether firms exhibit no, 
occasional or regular R&D activities  
- Patenting activities (lagged DV) 
- Export intensity  
- Regional DV for firms located in East 
Germany  
- Eight sectoral DVs and one year DVs 
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Czarnitzki 
and Licht 
(2006)  
Germany 
(Western 
and Eastern 
separately) 
Pooled cross 
sectional data, 
Mannheim 
Innovation Panel for 
1994, 1996, 1998 
and 2000 merged 
with data on patents 
application from the 
German Patent 
Office  
1,967 for 
Eastern 
Germany (735 
treated), 4,495 
for Western 
Germany (638 
treated) 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D 
expenditures 
- Innovation 
expenditure (R&D 
and other inputs)  
  
- Firm size (logarithm of the number of 
  employees)  
- Herfindahl index of market  
  concentration  
- Firm age 
- DV for export activity  
- Patent stock  
- DV for own R&D department 
- Credit rating  
- Firm ownership  
- Industry and time DVs  
Aerts and 
Schmidt 
(2008) 
Flanders 
(Belgium) 
and 
Germany 
CIS 4 (2002-2004) 157 firms from 
Flanders and 
484 firms from 
Germany 
Manufacturing 
sector and 
computer 
services, R&D 
services and 
business-related 
services 
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D expenditure  
- R&D intensity 
(ratio of R&D 
expenditures over 
turnover) 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of the 
number of employees)  
- Firms' patent stock (to control for the 
previous R&D activities) 
- DV for belonging to a group 
- DV for firms belonging to a group 
with a foreign parent company  
- Export quota (ratio of export over 
turnover) 
- DV for the firms from East Germany 
- Sectoral DVs  
- Interaction term between the industry 
DVs and the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees 
Gonzáles, 
and Pazó 
(2008) 
Spain  Business Strategy 
Survey (unbalanced 
panel of firms from 
1990 to 1999) 
9,455 
observations 
from 2,214 
firms 
Manufacturing 
sectors 
Binary   Input additionality 
- R&D intensity 
(R&D expenditure 
over sales)  
- Firm size 
- Firm age  
- Capital growth  
- Export (DV) 
- Market power (DV) 
- Foreign capital (DV)  
- Technological sophistication (DV) 
- Industry, regional, time and size DVs  
Busom and 
Fernandez
-Ribas 
Spain 
(Catalonia) 
CIS 1999 624 firms, 180 
treated   
Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Behavioural 
additionality  
- DV for all types 
- Firm size (number of employees) 
- DV =1  if at least one time-person is 
allocated to R&D over a longer period 
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(2008)  of cooperation 
- DV for customers/ 
suppliers 
partnerships  
- DV for public-
private cooperation 
- DV =1 if a firm applied for patents in 
Spain  
- DV = 1 if a firm applied for patents in 
Spain and abroad 
- Ratio of R&D researchers to non-
R&D employees 
- Logarithm of average wage of R&D 
employees  
- DV= 1 if a foreign share in ownership 
is at least 50% 
- Export intensity (share of export in 
total sales)  
- Five industry DVs (based on the 
OECD classification of manufacturing 
firms according to technological 
intensity) 
 
Cerulli and 
Potí (2008) 
Italy  CIS3 (1998-2000) 
merged with balance 
sheet variables 
 
5,672 firms 
(2,347 treated) 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality: 
- R&D 
expenditures  
- R&D intensity 
(ratio of R&D 
expenditures to 
turnover)  
- R&D per 
employee 
 
Output 
additionality  
- Innovative 
turnover  
- Firm size (number of employees) 
- Share of employees with a degree or  
  university diploma  
- Share of turnover from export  
- Capital stock per employee 
- Cash flow per employee 
- Share of debt in total liabilities 
- Value of IPR and capitalized R&D  
  expenditures per employee  
- Belonging to a foreign group  
- Firm age 
- Belonging to a group  
- Regional and sectoral DVs 
 
 
 
Fernandez
-Ribas and 
Shapira 
Spain 
(Catalonia) 
CIS3 period 1998-
2000 
930 firms  Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Behavioural 
additionality 
- DV =1 if a firm 
- Firm size (three DVs for small, 
medium-sized and large firms) 
- Export intensity (exports over sales) 
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(2009) cooperates with 
partners abroad;  
- DV=1 if a firm 
cooperates in joint 
R&D project with 
at least one partner 
from the EU  
- DV=1 if a  firm 
cooperates in joint 
R&D project with 
at least one partner 
outside the EU 
 
 
- DV=1 if a firm uses patents to protect 
innovation  
- DV=1 if a firm invests in machinery, 
equipment and other technological 
knowledge (patents, licences etc.) 
- DV=1 for firms with continuous 
R&D activities  
- Human capital (number of R&D 
researchers over a number of non-R&D 
employees   
- Five industry DVs (OECD 
classification)  
Aschhoff 
(2009) 
Germany Pooled CIS dataset 
merged with a 
database with the 
grant size and patent 
application data, 
period 1994-2005 
8,528 
observations 
from 3.583 
firms 
Manufacturing 
and knowledge-
intensive service 
sectors 
Continuous  Input additionality 
- R&D expenditure 
 
Output 
additionality 
- Innovative sales 
from products new 
to the market  
Model specification for input 
additionality  
- DV for the receipt of subsidy from 
EU 
   schemes in  previous 2 periods  
- DV for the receipt of subsidy at  
   regional level in  previous 2 periods 
- Logarithm of firm size 
- Logarithm of firm age 
- DV for continuous R&D investment 
- Shares of employees with a university  
   degree 
- Patent stock  
- DV for belonging to national group 
- DV for belonging to national group  
- DV for East Germany 
- Sectoral and time DVs   
Model specification for output 
additionality  
- Counterfactual R&D expenditure  
- R&D induced by funding  
- R&D expenditures for firms with no 
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grants 
- R&D expenditures of firms that  
  received grants first time 
- R&D expenditures of frequent   
  recipients 
- Logarithm of innovative sales  
- Logarithm of innovative sales  
  squared 
- Logarithm of patent stock 
- DV for cooperation 
- DV for East Germany  
- Sectoral and time DVs 
 
Herrera et 
al. (2010)  
Spain  Pooled cross 
sectional data, 
Business Strategy 
Survey in 1999 and 
2000 
 
1,718 firms, 
208 treated 
Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D intensity 
(ratio of R&D 
expenditures to 
sales)  
 
Output 
additionality  
- Propensity to 
patenting (number 
of patents per 
employee)  
 
- Lagged explanatory variables  
  (previous R&D expenditure)   
- Firm size 
- Firm age 
- Regional and sectoral DVs 
- Firm's ownership  
- Innovation funding difficulty 
- Growing market DV 
- Market concentration (main market 
  less than 10 competitors) 
- Export propensity  
Marino et 
al. (2010) 
Denmark  Pooled cross 
sectional data, 
Danish R&D 
statistics merged 
with IDA database, 
accounting database 
and CEBR database 
for the period 1997-
2005 
13,007 
observations, 
441 treated 
firms 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Continuous 
and 
categorical  
Input additionality 
- R&D expenditure 
(logarithm) 
- Growth rate of 
private R&D 
expenditure 
- Logarithm of total assets over value  
  added (proxy for capital intensity) 
- Logarithm of share of loans in total  
  liabilities (indebtedness)  
- Share of export in sales 
- R&D intensity indicator 
- Public funding intensity (ratio of  
  public funding to private R&D  
  expenditure) 
- Share of highly-skilled employees 
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- Share of vocational workers  
- DV for R&D department  
- DV for foreign ownership  
- DV for firms established less than 3  
  years ago  
- DV for co-patent (proxy for  
  cooperation) 
- DVs for size, industry and year 
 
Reinkowsk
i et al. 
(2010) 
Germany  
(Thuringia-
East 
Germany) 
GEFRA-Business 
Survey 2004 (2001-
2003) 
1,484 firms, 
284 treated 
Manufacturing 
and business 
oriented service 
sectors 
Binary Input additionality  
- Logarithm of 
R&D intensity  
(R&D expenditures 
over total turnover) 
 
Output 
additionality 
- DV for patent 
registration 
 
- Logarithm of firm size (number of  
   employees) 
- Logarithm of firm age 
- Logarithm of firm age square 
- Share of high-skilled employees 
- Regional sales 
- Share of sales in West Germany 
- DV for firms with R&D department 
Marino 
and 
Parrota 
(2010) 
Denmark  Danish R&D 
statistics merged 
with IDA database 
and accounting 
database 1997-2005 
(pooled cross 
sectional data for 
two consecutive 
years) 
268 
observations  
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Continuous  Input additionality 
- Private R&D 
expenditures  
 
Output 
additionality 
- Number of patent 
applications  
 
Behavioural 
additionality  
- Share of R&D 
employees 
- Total asset value 
- Indebtedness 
- R&D intensity  
- Public funding intensity  
- Share of highly-skilled employees 
- Export DV 
- Size, industry and time DVs 
Carboni 
(2011) 
Italy  Survey of 
Manufacturing 
Firms 2003 (2001-
1,235 firms Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality 
- Private (internal 
and external) R&D 
- Firm size (logarithm of the number of  
  employees) 
- Firm size squared (logarithm)  
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2003) expenditures per 
employee 
- Internally 
financed R&D  
- Credit financed 
R&D 
- Capital intensity  
- Share of researchers in total number 
of employees 
- DV for the innovation status 
- Ratio of debt over total debt  
- DV for credit constraints  
- DV if firm received support other 
than for R&D  
- Export DV  
- Fifteen sectoral DVs  
 
 
 
 
Alecke et 
al. (2012)  
East 
Germany  
GEFRA Business 
Survey in 2003 
 
1,267 firms, 
284 treated 
firms 
(only SMEs in 
the sample) 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D intensity 
(R&D expenditure 
relative to turnover)  
 
Output 
additionality  
- Patent application  
- Firm size 
- Firm age  
- Capital intensity (tangible assets per  
   employee) 
- Investment intensity (investment  
  divided by sale) 
- Share of highly skilled workers in 
total number of employees 
- Export ratio  
- DV for firm's legal form 
- DV for belonging to a group 
- DV for R&D experience (absorptive  
   capacity)  
- DV for own R&D department  
- Industry DVs  
 
 
 
 
Marzucchi 
(2011) 
Italy and 
Spain  
CIS4 (2002-2004) 7,905 firms in 
Spain and 
3,851 in Italy  
Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- Intramural R&D 
expenditure 
- Turnover (logarithm) 
- DVs for firm size 
- DV for belonging to a group 
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- Intramural R&D 
intensity 
(intramural R&D 
expenditure over 
turnover) 
 
Output 
additionality  
- DV for process 
innovation 
- Share of  
innovative sales 
due to products new 
to the market 
- Share of  
innovative sales 
due to products new 
to the firm 
- Sum of innovative 
sales  
- DV for patent 
application 
 
Behavioural 
additionality 
- DV for 
engagement in 
formal training 
programme   
- DV for 
cooperation with 
other firms 
- DV for 
cooperation with 
research 
organisations 
- DV for affiliation with multinationals 
- Exporting 
- DV for engagement in R&D  
- DV for permanent engagement in  
  R&D 
- DVs for lack of internal funding 
- DVs for difficulties in accessing 
  external funding  
- DVs for the importance of the  
   government sources of information 
- DVs for the importance of  
   information from professional and  
   industry associations  
- Sectoral DVs 
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- DV for acquisition 
of information from 
other firms 
- DV for acquisition 
of information from 
universities or 
private research 
institutes  
Afcha 
Chavez 
(2011) 
Spain  Business Strategy 
Survey for the 
period 1998-2005 
1,136 firms 
(7,029 
observations)  
Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Behavioural 
additionality  
- DV=1 if firms 
cooperate with 
consumers or 
suppliers 
- DV =1 if firms 
cooperate with 
universities or 
technological 
centres  
- Firm size (DV) 
- Firm age 
- Industry DVs 
- Percentage of foreign capital  
- DV = 1 if firms introduce product 
innovations 
- DV = 1 if firms introduce process 
innovations 
- Number of product innovations 
- Number of patents (in and outside of 
Spain) 
- DV = 1 if firms elaborate research 
indicators  
- Payments for licences 
- DV = 1 if firms employs engineers 
and graduates  
- DV = 1 if firms employs workers 
with experience in R&D activities  
- DV=1 if firms received regional 
subsidies 
- DV=1 if firms received national 
subsidies 
 
 
 
Cerulli and 
Potí (2012) 
Italy  Pooled CIS3 (1998-
2000) and 
CIS4(2002-2004), 
2,574 firms; 
longitudinal 
data 5,923 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D expenditure 
- R&D intensity  
- Firm size 
- Share of employees with a degree or 
  university diploma  
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(CIS4 merged with 
balance sheet data)   
 
firms.  - R&D per 
employee 
- Share of turnover from export  
- Capital stock per employee 
- Cash flow per employee 
- Chare of debt in total liabilities 
- Value of IPRs and capitalized 
   expenditures per employee 
- DV for belonging to foreign group 
- DV for firm age (=1 of firm was  
   founded between 1998-2000) 
- DV for belonging to a group 
- Regional and sectoral DVs  
Czarnitzki 
and Lopes- 
Bento 
(2012) 
Spain, 
Germany, 
Belgium 
(Flanders), 
Luxembour
g and South 
Africa 
CIS4, period 2002-
2004 
For Belgium, 
Germany and 
Luxembourg, CIS-
harmonized survey 
for South Africa and 
PITEC dataset for 
Spain 
805 firms from 
Flanders, 1,491 
firms from 
Western 
Germany, 730 
firms from 
Eastern 
Germany, 
6,006 firms 
from Spain, 
248 firms from 
Luxembourg 
and  510 firms 
from South 
Africa  
Manufacturing 
and business 
related service 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality 
- Innovation 
intensity (ratio of 
total innovation 
expenditure to 
sales) 
- Internal R&D 
investment (ratio of 
internal R&D 
expenditures to 
sales) 
- Firm age (natural logarithm) 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of the 
number of employees) 
- DV for belonging to a group 
- DV for the headquarter located in 
foreign territory 
- Capital stock (proxied by the lagged 
investment into tangible assets divided 
by the number of employees) 
- DV for permanent internal R&D 
activities 
- DV for exporting  
- Industry DVs   
Herrera 
and 
Sánchez-
González 
(2012) 
Spain  Longitudinal PITEC 
(Panel of 
Technological 
Innovation) dataset 
(2003-2007) 
4,713 firms 
(1,218 
subsidized) 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Binary  Input additionality 
-  Private R&D 
intensity (ratio of 
internal R&D 
expenditures to 
turnover) 
 
Output 
additionality 
- Innovative sales 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of the 
number of employees) 
- Firm age (DV whether the firm is 
newly created or not) 
- DV whether the firm is private 
without foreign capital 
- Exporting (ratio of exports over sales) 
- DV whether the firm undertakes 
continuous R&D activities 
- DV whether the firm received 
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from products new 
to the firm 
- Innovative sales 
from products new 
to the market   
subsidies in the previous period  
- Three DVs for industry categories 
(high-tech manufacturing, medium- 
tech manufacturing and high-tech 
service sectors) 
- Regional DVs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antonioli 
et al. 
(2012) 
Italia 
(Emilia-
Romagna) 
PRRIITT survey 
data merged with 
balance sheet data, 
period covered 
2006-2008 
408 firms, 99 
treated  
Manufacturing  Binary  Behavioural 
additionality  
- DV=1 if 
employees' 
competences are 
improved 
- DV=1 if training 
programmes were 
provided 
- DV=1 if training 
programmes for 
improving 
specialized 
competencies were 
provided 
- DV =1 if a firm 
cooperates with 
suppliers 
 - DV =1 if a firm 
cooperates with 
customers 
- DV =1 if a firm 
cooperates with 
competitors 
- Firm size (logarithm of the number of 
employees) 
- Expenditure per capita in intramural 
R&D and advertising  
- Cash flow per capita 
- Short-term debt index  
- Five sectoral DVs (according to 
Pavitt taxonomy) and ten regional DVs  
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- DV =1 if a firm 
cooperates with 
firms in the same 
group within the 
region 
- DV =1 if a firm 
cooperates with 
firms in the same 
group outside the 
region 
Foreman-
Peck 
(2013) 
United 
Kingdom  
CIS4, period 2002-
2004 
(only SMEs) 
12,199 firms Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Binary  Output 
additionality  
- Either product or 
process innovation, 
either new to the 
firm or to the 
market  
- Share of graduates in the total number 
of employees 
- Number of graduated employees  
- Firm size (logarithm of turnover) 
- DVs for collaboration (with other  
  firms in the group, with suppliers,  
  with customers, with competitors  
  and with universities) 
- Intramural R&D over turnover 
- Plant and machinery investment over  
   turnover  
- Turnover (as a proxy for firm size) 
- Firm age  
- DV for belonging to a group  
- Exporting (foreign sales) 
- Sectoral and regional DVs  
Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-
Bento 
(2013) 
Belgium 
(Flanders)  
Pooled CIS4 (2002-
2004), CIS5 (2004-
2006), CIS6(2006-
2008) merged with 
Belfirst database 
and ICAROS 
database 
4,761 
observations 
(292 treated 
firms) 
Manufacturing 
and business 
related service 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- Internal R&D 
intensity (internal 
R&D expenditures 
to sales) 
- Share of R&D 
employees 
- Firm size (logarithm of the number of 
employees)  
- Firm size squared (logarithm of the 
number of employees squared)  
- DV for firms belonging to a group  
- DV for firms having headquarters on 
foreign territory  
- Firm age (logarithm) 
- Patent stock per employee 
- Exporting (export-to-sales ratio) 
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- Labour productivity (sales per 
employee)  
- Number of IWT projects within the 
three preceding years  
- Industry and time DVs 
Antonelli 
and Crespi 
(2013) 
Italy  Merged MCC data 
from two waves 
(1998-2003); panel 
data  
752 firms  Manufacturing 
sectors  
Binary  Input additionality  
- R&D expenditure 
per employee 
- Private R&D 
expenditure per 
employee 
- DV for past R&D subsidy  
- Firm size (lagged logarithm of the 
number of employees) 
- DV if firms engage in any innovative 
activities 
- Share of R&D employees in total 
number of employees  
- Export (lagged DV) 
- Fixed investment per employee 
(lagged logarithm) 
- DV for firms belonging to a group 
- Lagged DV for firms that were 
declined when applying for a loan 
- Share of employees with university 
degree (lagged value) 
- Industry DVs based on Pavitt 
taxonomy 
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Table A1.2. Empirical studies applying matching estimators - part II 
Authors Estimators 
Pre-
treatment 
variables 
Balance 
variables  
(covariates 
only, PS 
only, 
covariates 
and PS) 
Type of 
balancing 
test 
Type of 
variance 
estimation 
 
Robustness 
check 
Results Limitations  
Czarnitzki 
and Fier 
(2002) 
Nearest 
neighbour 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric 
Not clear  Propensity 
score with the 
population 
density of 
districts, in 
Mahalanobis 
metric 
industry DVs  
Difference 
in mean 
before and 
after 
matching.  
Bootstrapped 
SEs 
No  Full crowding 
out can be 
rejected.  
ATT is 5.7 
percentage 
points (p.p.) 
for innovation 
intensity and 
1.6% p.p. for 
innovation 
expenditure.  
- Bootstrapping is applied for 
estimating the variance. 
- Standardized bias not used as a 
balancing test. 
- No robustness check. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
Almus and 
Czarnitzki 
(2003) 
Nearest 
neighbour 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric and 
caliper  
Not clear  Hybrid 
matching - 
propensity 
score and 
industry DVs 
Difference 
in mean 
before and 
after 
matching, 
kernel 
density 
before and 
after 
matching  
 
 
Bootstrapped 
SEs 
No  Full crowding 
out can be 
rejected. 
ATT is 3.94 
p.p. 
- Bootstrapping is applied for 
estimating the variance. 
- Standardized bias not used as a 
balancing test. 
- No robustness check. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
Aerts and 
Czarnitzki 
(2004) 
Nearest 
neighbour  
matching with 
No  No Difference 
in means 
after 
Lechner -
corrected SEs 
OLS; subsample 
of innovative 
firms. 
Crowding out 
is rejected in 
both the 
- Small sample size 
- No robustness check  applying 
other matching estimators 
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Mahalanobis 
metric and 
with 
replacement  
matching, 
kernel 
density   
sample 
including non-
innovating 
firms and in 
the subsample 
with only 
innovating 
firms.   
ATT for R&D 
intensity is 
2.9% p.p.  
No effect on 
the patent 
application 
(no output 
additionality). 
- No sensitivity analysis 
- Standardized bias not used as 
balancing test  
Duguet 
(2004) 
Nadaraya-
Watson 
estimator 
(Gaussian 
kernel)   
Yes  Not reported  Not reported  Bootstrapped 
SEs 
Additional 
outcome 
variables: 
- DV for 
increase in 
R&D 
expenditure to 
sales ratio   - 
growth rate of 
R&D 
expenditure to 
sales ratio 
ATT 
statistically 
insignificant 
in 12 from 13 
models; ATE 
statistically 
insignificant 
in 8 from 13 
models.  
- The study estimates ATT, 
ATE and ATU for each year 
separately. 
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators. 
Czarnitzki 
and 
Hussinger 
(2004) 
Hybrid 
matching (NN 
matching with 
Mahalanobis 
metric)  
Partly  Matching 
variables are 
propensity 
score and firm 
size. 
Mahalanobis 
metric based 
on industry 
Difference 
in means 
after 
matching  
Lechner (2001) 
SEs 
Subsample of 
SMEs (firms 
with less than 
500 employees) 
Additionality 
found for all 
four outcome 
variables 
(ATT ranging 
from 0.90 to 
1.15 %). 
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- Standardized bias not used as 
balancing test. 
- SMEs are defined as firms 
with less than 500 employees.  
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and time DVs  
Heijs and 
Herrera 
(2004) 
Nearest 
neighbour 
matching  
Not 
reported 
Not reported  Not reported  Bootstrapped 
SEs 
4 model 
specifications; 
estimation for 
subsamples 
according to 
firm size. 
Additionality 
reported as 
ATT is 
between 1.6 % 
and  
2.1 %.  
- Bootstrapping is applied for 
estimating the variance.  
Small firms are defines as 
having less than 200 employees, 
medium-sized firms as having 
200-500 employees.  
- Very small sub-samples.  
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- No robustness check using 
other matching estimators.  
Kaiser 
(2004) 
Nearest 
neighbour, 
kernel 
matching and 
stratification 
matching   
Not 
reported  
 Not reported Not reported Bootstrapped 
SEs.  
IV approach; 
matching on 
subsamples of 
manufacturing 
and service 
sectors. 
ATT 
insignificant, 
i.e. no 
additionality 
and no 
crowding out.  
- Small sample size.  
- No sensitivity analysis for 
matching estimator.  
- The study does not report 
whether balancing test was 
conducted and what type. 
Lӧӧf and 
Hesmati 
(2005) 
Nearest 
Neighbour and 
kernel 
matching   
Not 
reported 
Not reported Difference 
in means 
after 
matching.  
Not reported Subsample of 
medium-sized 
and large firms. 
Crowding out 
hypothesis can 
be rejected, 
but 
additionality is 
found only in 
firms with less 
than 50 
employees.  
- The study does not report type 
of variance estimation.  
- Small common support region 
(156 firms for kernel and 216 
for NN matching). 
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- Standardized bias not used as 
balancing test. 
 
Hujer and  
Radic 
(2005) 
NN matching 
estimator 
No  Propensity 
score only; 
exact 
matching on 
industrial 
sectors. 
Standardized 
bias before 
and after 
matching.  
Not reported  Kernel 
matching,  
multivariate 
probit, IV 
approach 
(simultaneous 
probit model), 
conditional 
difference-in-
Results 
change 
depending on 
the method 
applied; 
additionality 
found when 
methods 
controlling for 
- No sensitivity analysis for 
matching estimators.  
- Type of variance estimation is 
not reported.  
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difference 
estimator  
observables 
are applied; 
when methods 
controlling for 
unobservables 
are applied, 
crowding out 
cannot be 
rejected. 
Fier et al. 
(2006) 
NN matching 
with 
replacement 
and 
Mahalanobis 
metric  
Not clear  Matching 
arguments in 
Mahalanobis 
metric: 
- propensity 
score  
- firm size 
- lagged patent 
DV 
- 3 DVs for 
regularity of 
R&D 
activities 
- firm age 
- 7 industry 
DVs 
- regional DV 
Difference 
in means 
before and 
after 
matching  
Lechner (2001) Bivariate probit 
model for the 
continuing 
collaboration.  
- Crowding 
out is found in 
the model 
where the 
outcome 
variable is  
collaboration 
with other 
businesses. 
Additionality 
reported in 
models where 
the outcome 
variables are 
collaboration 
with scientific 
institutions 
and 
cooperation 
with both 
competitors 
and scientific 
institutions.  
- The ATU 
effect is also 
estimated (it is 
negative and 
- No sensitivity analysis for 
matching estimators 
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators   
- Standardized bias not used as 
balancing test. 
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statistically 
significant for 
collaboration 
with both 
other 
businesses and  
scientific 
institutions). 
Czarnitzki 
and Licht 
(2006)  
Nearest 
neighbour 
matching  
Not clear  Propensity 
score, industry 
and year DVs 
Difference 
in means 
after 
matching. 
Not reported  Control group 
restricted to 
permanent R&D 
performers.  
Crowding out 
effect can be 
rejected.  
Input 
additionality is 
reported for 
both measures 
of innovation  
Input.  
 
- Type of variance estimation is 
not reported. 
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test.  
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- Difference-in-Difference 
(DiD) method could be applied 
on the pooled cross-sectional 
data. 
Aerts and 
Schmidt 
(2008) 
Nearest 
Neighbour 
matching with 
replacement 
No  PS on control 
variables and 
exact 
matching on 
firm size 
variable and 
DV for Easter 
German firms 
Difference 
in means 
before and 
after 
matching. 
Lechner (2001)  - Only R&D 
active firms 
- Additional 
control variables  
Crowding-out 
can be rejected 
in both the 
Flemish and 
the German 
case.  
Input 
additionality is 
found in both 
countries. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- No robustness check using 
other matching estimators.  
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test. 
Gonzáles 
and Pazó 
(2008) 
Bias-adjusted 
Nearest 
Neighbour 
(NN) 
estimator   
Yes  Propensity 
score, lagged 
outcome 
variable, 
lagged subsidy 
DV, sectoral, 
size and time 
DVs.  
Difference 
in means 
before and 
after 
matching; 
kernel 
density  
Abadie and 
Imbens -
corrected 
standard errors   
- For 
subsamples 
based on firm 
size and 
industry 
classification; 
- Two control 
groups: all non-
The ATT and 
ATU effects 
are 
statistically 
insignificant.  
Full crowding 
out can be 
rejected, but 
- Difference-in-Difference 
(DiD) method could be applied 
because of availability of two-
period data.  
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- Standardized bias not used as 
balancing test.  
- The dose-response model 
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treated firms 
and just R&D 
performing 
firms. 
no 
additionality is 
found except 
in small firms 
and those 
operating in 
low-
technology 
sectors. 
could be applied, as the amount 
of subsidy is available, to test 
for the partial crowding out 
effect.   
Busom and 
Fernández-
Ribas 
(2008) 
Univariate and 
bivariate 
probit models 
No   PS only  Difference 
in means 
after 
matching  
Bootstrapped 
SEs   
- Matching 
(kernel and 
stratification)  
- Hausman test 
for endogeneity  
Behavioural 
additionality 
found for both 
public-private 
cooperation as 
well as 
customers/ 
suppliers 
partnerships 
- Four covariates not balanced 
after matching (authors should 
either re-specify a probit model, 
use other matching estimators or 
both), but the authors report 
results with unbalanced 
covariates.  
- Type of kernel used in kernel 
matching is not reported. 
- The choice of bandwidth is not 
reported nor a robustness check 
with several bandwidths is 
conducted. 
-  Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test.  
- No sensitivity analysis.  
Cerulli and 
Potí (2008) 
Nearest 
matching, 
stratification, 
three-nearest 
neighbours, 
kernel 
matching, 
radius 
matching 
Partly  Not reported Difference 
in means 
before and 
after 
matching; 
kernel 
density 
before and 
after 
matching  
Not reported - Heckman 
selection model; 
OLS 
-  Subsamples 
based on firm 
size, industry 
and location 
With regard to 
input 
additionality, 
full crowding 
out can be 
rejected, but 
not for low 
knowledge 
intensive 
services, small 
firms (10-19 
- The study does not report what 
method for estimating variances 
is applied.  
- Standardized bias not  used as 
balancing test. 
- No sensitivity analysis for 
matching estimators. 
- For kernel matching, 
robustness check could include 
different bandwidth. 
  
 348 
 
employees) 
and the 
automotive 
industry. 
No output 
additionality is 
reported (a 
statistically 
insignificant 
ATT effect). 
  
 
Fernández-
Ribas and 
Shapira 
(2009) 
NN matching 
(with and 
without 
weights);  
stratification 
and 
kernel 
matching  
No  Not reported  Difference 
in mean after 
matching  
Bootstrapped 
SEs  (100 
replications) 
Bivariate probit 
models for three 
outcome 
variables 
(cooperation 
with partners 
abroad; 
cooperation in 
joint R&D 
project with at 
least one partner 
from the EU; 
cooperation in 
joint R&D 
project with at 
least one partner 
outside the EU) 
The results are 
not robust (the 
statistically 
significant 
ATT effects 
are reported 
when 
stratification is 
used, and 
insignificant 
effects when 
other 
matching 
estimators are 
applied). 
- Balancing test after matching 
is reported but it is not clear for 
which estimator. 
- The results are not robust (the 
statistically significant ATT 
effects are reported when 
stratification is used, and 
insignificant effects when other 
matching estimators are 
applied). 
- Type of kernel function is not 
reported. 
- The choice of bandwidth is not 
reported nor a robustness check 
with several bandwidths is 
conducted. 
-  Standardized bias is not used 
as balancing test.  
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- Medium- sized firms are 
defined as having 50-285 
employees (not in line with the 
European Commission 
regulation)  
Aschhoff 
(2009) 
NN matching 
with 
Not 
defined for 
Propensity 
score, firm 
t-test on the 
mean 
Lechner (2001) Binary probit 
models 
Full and 
partial 
- Given the availability of the 
amounts of subsidies, a 
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Mahalanobis 
metric   
each 
covariate  
size and patent 
stock included 
in 
Mahalanobis 
metric, exact 
matching for 
subsidy DVs 
and year DVs  
differences 
after 
matching.  
separately for 
each pair of 
subsidy 
category  
crowding out 
can be 
rejected. Both 
input and 
additionalities 
are reported.  
generalized propensity score 
(GDS) could be estimated and a 
dose-response method could be 
used. 
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators. 
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test. 
 
Herrera et 
al. (2010)  
Nearest 
Neighbour 
(NN) 
matching 
estimator  
Yes  Not reported Difference 
in means 
before and 
after 
matching.  
Bootstrapped 
SEs.  
Robustness 
check based on 
firm size.  
Input and 
output 
additionalities 
cannot be 
rejected, but 
the effect is 
larger for 
SMEs. Hence, 
the impact of 
public support 
is sensitive to 
firm size.  
 
 
 
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators.  
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test. 
- Bootstrapped SEs are not valid 
for NN matching. 
Marino et 
al. (2010) 
Generalized 
Propensity 
Score (GPS) 
method   
Yes     Matching with 
categorical 
treatment 
variable; 
conditional 
difference in 
difference 
estimator. 
Negative 
treatment 
effect for large 
amounts of 
subsidies (a 
partial 
crowding-out 
hypothesis 
cannot be 
rejected). 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
Reinkowski Kernel No For Difference Bootstrapped -Different - Input - Micro firms are defined as 
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et al. (2010) matching  Mahalanobis 
metric 
matching 
propensity 
score, industry 
DVs and size 
DVs. 
in means 
before and 
after 
matching 
SEs (500 
repetitions) 
matching 
estimators: 
stratification, 5-
NN with caliper 
and 
Mahalanobis 
metric 
matching; 
- Subsamples 
based on firm 
size 
- Subsample of 
permanent R&D 
performers 
additionality is 
reported; a 
mean estimate 
for R&D 
intensity is 3.7 
p.p. (the 
largest effect 
is found for 
micro firms). 
- Output 
additionality is 
reported: the 
ATT effect is 
22 p.p. (but 
statistically 
insignificant 
effect for 
micro firms). 
having between 1 and 20 
employees (the CIS survey 
defines micro firms as having 
less than 10 employees). 
- Standardized bias is not used 
as   a balancing test. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- Bootstrapping is not valid for 
NN matching. 
Marino and 
Parrota 
(2010) 
Generalized 
Propensity 
Score (GPS) 
method  
Yes  Not reported Not reported  No  Positive and 
decreasing 
effect for all 
three types of 
additionality. 
Also, for all 
three types of 
additionality, 
crowding out 
cannot be 
rejected for 
higher 
amounts of 
subsidy (a 
partial 
crowding-out 
hypothesis 
cannot be 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
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rejected).  
Carboni 
(2011) 
NN matching 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric with 
replacement  
Yes  Not reported Kernel 
density of 
the 
propensity 
score, 
difference in 
means after 
matching  
Bootstrapped 
SEs   
Subsample with 
only innovative 
firms; OLS 
regression 
The ATT is 
separately 
estimated for 
grants, tax 
incentive and 
direct loans 
and input 
additionality is 
found for all 
three policy 
instruments.  
-  Standardized bias not used as 
balancing test.  
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimator.  
- Not clear why 
 Generalized Propensity Score 
(GPS) was not applied as the 
amount of subsidy was 
available.  
Alecke et al. 
(2012)  
Kernel 
matching  
 
No  Not reported Difference 
in means 
before and 
after 
matching, 
pseudo-R
2
. 
Bootstrapped 
SEs. 
Robustness 
check using 
stratification 
matching, k=5 
nearest-
neighbour 
matching, 
Mahalanobis 
metric distance 
matching. Also 
subsamples 
based on firm 
size and only for 
subsample of 
firms with 
permanent R&D  
activities. 
Additionality 
is reported: 
- For input 
additionality, 
the ATT effect 
is on average 
2.4 p.p. 
- For output 
additionality, 
the ATT effect 
is on average 
20 p.p.  
- Results 
confirmed for 
subsamples 
based on firm 
size.  
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test.  
- Bootstrapped SEs are not valid 
for NN matching. 
- For sensitivity analysis 
applying the Rosenbaum 
approach, the authors employed 
a user-written command 
mhounds in Stata statistical 
software. To our knowledge, 
that command can only be used 
for sensitivity analysis after NN 
matching without replacement 
and after stratification method.   
Marzucchi 
(2011) 
5- NN 
matching  
Four pre-
treatment 
covariates 
(turnover 
and 3 DVs 
for firm 
size) 
Not reported Not reported Bootstrapped 
SEs (200 
replications).  
5-NN with 
caliper, kernel 
matching, 
trimming for 
kernel matching  
Input 
additionality 
not found for 
regional 
policy; but 
found for 
national 
National and regional policies 
analysed separately for both 
countries.  
- Balancing test not reported. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- Bootstrapped SEs not valid for 
NN matching.  
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policy; 
heterogeneity 
in output and 
behavioural 
additionality 
depending on 
the their 
measures.   
Afcha 
Chavez 
(2011) 
NN matching  Not clear  Not reported  Not reported Not reported  Subsamples of 
- firms that did 
not cooperate in 
the previous 
years  
- firms that did 
cooperate in the 
previous years  
- Behavioural 
additionality 
found for 
cooperation 
with 
universities or 
technological 
centres.  
- Statistically 
insignificant 
ATT effect is 
reported for 
vertical 
cooperation 
(with 
consumers and 
suppliers).  
- Balancing test is not reported. 
- Variance estimation is not 
reported. 
- No robustness check using 
other matching estimators.  
- No sensitivity analysis. 
Cerulli and 
Potí (2012) 
Matching 
estimators, 
Control 
Function 
approach, 
Heckman 
selection 
model, 
Difference-in-
difference 
estimator  
Yes  Not reported Before 
matching = 
difference in 
means t-test; 
no balancing 
test after 
matching.  
Not reported  Yes, different 
evaluation 
methods  
Additionality 
except for low 
knowledge-
intensive 
services and 
very small 
firms (10-19 
employees). 
- Sample size varies 
significantly for each matching 
estimator as well as for other 
methods.  
- No balancing test after 
matching.  
- No sensitivity analysis.  
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Czarnitzki 
and Lopes- 
Bento 
(2012) 
Nearest 
Neighbour 
(NN) 
matching 
estimator with 
replacement 
and with 
Mahalanobis 
metric   
Partly  PS with 
additional 
matching 
arguments in 
two cases: 
firm age for 
Western 
Germany, two 
industry DVs 
and DV for 
the 
headquarter 
located in 
foreign 
territory for 
Flanders. 
Difference 
in means t-
test after 
matching.  
Lechner-
corrected SEs 
OLS regression. Input 
additionality 
found in each 
country.  
 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators.  
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test. 
 
Herrera 
and 
Sánchez-
González 
(2012) 
Bias-adjusted 
matching 
estimator  
Pre-
treatment 
outcome 
and 
treatment 
variables  
PS  Difference 
in means t-
test before 
and after 
matching. 
Not reported.  No - Input 
additionality 
found in 
SMEs. 
- Output 
additionality 
reported for 
small firms, 
but not for 
medium-sized 
firms. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators.  
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test. 
Antonioli et 
al. (2012) 
1:5 NN 
matching  
Yes  Not reported  - Difference 
in means 
between 
treated and 
non-treated 
firms before 
and after 
matching;   
- Pseudo-R
2  
Bootstrapped 
SEs (200 
replications)  
1:5 NN 
matching with 
0.05 caliper; 
kernel matching 
with 
Epanechnikov 
kernel; 1% 
trimming for 1:5 
NN matching  
Behavioural 
additionality 
found for the 
improvement 
of workers' 
competencies 
('cognitive 
capacity 
additionality') 
- R&D activities are proxied by 
intramural R&D and advertising 
expenditures jointly. 
- Size and choice of bandwidth 
for kernel matching not 
reported. 
- Results of balancing tests are 
not reported.  
 - Standardized bias is not used 
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test 
- LR test of 
joint 
significance 
of covariates 
after 
matching  
and for the 
cooperation 
with other 
firms in the 
group outside 
the region.  
- For other 
outcome 
variables, the 
ATTs effects 
are not 
statistically 
significant.  
as a balancing test. 
- No sensitivity analysis.  
Foreman- 
Peck (2013) 
Nearest 
Neighbour 
(NN) 
matching 
estimator with 
caliper  
Partly  Not reported  Yes, 
standardized 
bias before 
and after 
matching  
Not reported  NN without 
caliper  
Additionality 
reported as the  
ATT effects 
are between 
20 and 30 %. 
- Product and process 
innovations are treated jointly.  
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators.  
- Variance estimator is not 
reported.   
Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-
Bento 
(2013) 
NN matching 
with caliper 
and 
Mahalanobis 
metric  
Partly  PS only; in 
robustness 
check PS and 
DV whether a 
firm received 
a subsidy from 
other sources  
Difference 
in means 
between 
treated and 
non-treated 
firms before 
and after 
matching  
Lechner (2001) OLS regression 
for stability of 
treatment effect 
over time;  
OLS and kernel 
regression on 
the treatment 
effect on the 
number of 
supported 
projects; 
NN matching 
when other 
sources of 
funding are 
taken into 
- Consistent 
results:  
- Input 
additionality is 
reported as the 
ATT effect is  
3.73 p.p. when 
the outcome 
variable is  
R&D intensity 
and the effect 
is 9.57 p.p. 
when the 
outcome 
variable is 
R&D 
- Robustness check: IV 
approach (it is questionable 
whether the  instruments have a 
theoretical justification) 
- The size of caliper is not 
reported. 
- The choice of caliper size is 
not justified. 
- Standardized bias is not used 
as a balancing test. 
- No sensitivity analysis. 
- No robustness check applying 
other matching estimators.  
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account;  
subsample of 
only innovative 
firms; IV 
approach 
(exclusion 
restrictions are 
lagged subsidy 
receipt and the 
average size of 
subsidy per 
project)  
 
employment.  
- Treatment 
effects are 
stable over 
time. 
- Treatment 
effects are not 
affected by the 
receipt of 
support from 
other sources 
and by the 
receipt of 
grants 
repeatedly.  
Antonelli 
and Crespi 
(2013) 
NN matching  Yes  Not reported  Not reported  Not reported  No  - Additionality 
found when 
the outcome 
variable is 
R&D per 
employee (the 
ATT effect is 
2.59 p.p.). 
-  The ATT 
effect is not 
significant 
when the 
outcome 
variable is 
private R&D. 
- Balancing test is not reported.  
- The size of the common region 
is  not reported. 
- Variance estimation is not 
reported. 
- No robustness check. 
- No sensitivity analysis. 
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Table A1.3. Empirical studies applying other evaluation methods - part I 
Authors Country Dataset Sample size Sectors Treatment 
variable 
Outcome 
variable 
Model specification 
Busom (2000) Spain  Cross-sectional 
data from 1988 
provided by the 
Spanish Ministry 
of Industry  
154 firms (75 
participating 
firms) 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Binary  Input 
additionality  
- R&D 
expenditure 
- R&D intensity 
(R&D 
expenditure 
over employees) 
- R&D 
personnel 
- R&D intensity 
with respect to 
R&D personnel 
(R&D personnel 
over employees)  
- Firm size (number of 
employees) 
- Firm age  
- Public ownership (DV for firms 
that are partly publicly owned) 
- Foreign ownership (DV for 
firms that were participated with 
foreign capital) 
- Price determination (DV for the 
firm that declared to set prices 
and then adjusted production to 
sales) 
- Quantity determination (DV for 
the firm that declared to make 
production plans and then 
adjusted prices) 
- Regulated prices (DV for firms 
with regulated prices) 
- Monopoly (DV for the firm that 
declared behaving as such) 
- Strategic response (DV for the 
firm that declared it would 
increase own R&D in response to 
a rival’s) 
- Importance of R&D in the short 
run (DV for the firm that declared 
R&D to be important in the short 
run) 
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- Competitors as a source of ideas 
-  Firm's own patents as a source 
of ideas 
- DV for the firms that report 
scientific and technical 
publications to be important 
- R&D cooperation (DV for the 
firm that cooperates on R&D 
with others) 
- DV for the firm conducting 
either basic or applied research  
- DV for the firm conducting 
development  
- DV for the firm reporting that 
R&D activities are oriented 
towards process innovation 
- DV for the firm reporting that 
R&D activities are oriented 
towards process innovation 
- Number of patents obtained by 
firm during the previous ten years 
- Export intensity (exports over 
sales) 
- Industry DVs 
Lach (2002) Israel  Panel data from 
the Surveys of 
Research and 
Development in 
Manufacturing 
(1991-1995) 
Between 165-
195 R&D 
performing 
firms per year 
(6-year 
longitudinal 
data) 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Continuous  Input 
additionality  
- R&D 
expenditure 
 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of 
employment) 
- Sales (natural logarithm) 
- Industry and year DVs  
Gonzáles et el. 
(2005) 
Spain  Business 
Strategy Survey 
(unbalanced 
panel data from 
1990-1999) 
2,214 firms 
(9,455 
observations) 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Continuous Input 
additionality  
- R&D intensity 
(logarithm of 
R&D 
- Firm size (DVs for five 
categories)  
- Firm age  
- Degree of technological 
sophistication 
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expenditures 
over sales) 
- Capital growth  
- Exporting (DV if the firm is 
exporter) 
- DV for firms with foreign 
capital  
- DV for firms with the market 
power 
- Time, regional and 17 industry 
DVs 
 
Gӧrg  and Strobl 
(2007) 
Ireland  Annual Business 
Survey (1999 -
2002) merged 
with Forbás 
annual database 
on grant 
payments  
6,378 
observations 
(5,422 non-
participating) 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Continuous Input 
additionality  
- R&D 
expenditure 
(natural 
logarithm)  
Propensity score: 
- Firm size (lagged value) 
- Firm age (lagged value) 
- Export intensity (lagged value) 
- Domestic input use (lagged 
value) 
- Average wage (lagged value) 
- Labour productivity (lagged 
value) 
- Foreign ownership (lagged 
value) 
- DV for firms receiving R&D 
grant in the previous year  
Aerts and 
Schmidt (2008) 
Flanders 
(Belgium) 
and 
Germany 
CIS 3 data 
(1998-2000) and 
CIS4 data (2002-
2004) merged 
with patent 
application data  
314 firms 
from Flanders 
and 968 firms 
from 
Germany  
Manufacturing 
sector and 
computer 
services, R&D 
services and 
business-
related 
services 
Binary   Input 
additionality  
- R&D 
expenditure 
- Natural 
logarithm of 
R&D  
expenditure 
- R&D intensity 
(ratio of R&D 
expenditure 
over turnover) 
- Natural 
- For propensity score: 
- Firm size (natural 
logarithm of the number 
of employees)  
- Firms' patent stock (to 
control for the previous 
R&D activities) 
- DV for belonging to a 
group 
- DV for firms 
belonging to a group 
with a foreign parent 
company  
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logarithm of 
R&D intensity 
- Export quota (ratio of 
export over turnover) 
- DV for the firms from 
East Germany 
- Sectoral DVs  
- Interaction term 
between the industry 
DVs and the natural 
logarithm of the number 
of employees 
- In OLS in differences: 
-Difference over time in 
funding 
-Difference over time in 
firm size (natural 
logarithm of the number 
of employees 
-Difference over time in 
patent stock 
-Difference over time in 
the export quota  
Hussinger (2008) Germany  Pooled cross-
sectional dataset 
covering the 
period 1992-
2000 (CIS 
merged with the 
BMBF project-
level data on 
R&D funds and 
the patent 
database of the 
German Patent 
and Trade Mark 
Office)  
3,744 
observations 
(723 
participating) 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Continuous  Input 
additionality 
- Private R&D 
expenditure 
divided by the 
number of 
employees 
Output 
additionality  
- Innovative 
sales from new 
products  
-Firm size (number of 
employees) 
- Firm age  
- Market concentration (the 
firm’s sales divided by the total 
industry sales on a 3-digit NACE 
level) 
- Patent stock per employee 
(proxy for the firm's past 
successful innovation activity) 
- Credit rating index 
- Export intensity (export sales 
divided by total sales) 
- DV for firms that belong to a 
firm group with a foreign parent 
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company 
- DV for firms with limited 
liability  
- DV for firms located in Eastern 
Germany  
- Time and industry DVs  
Gelabert et al. 
(2009) 
Spain  CIS (2000-2005), 
unbalanced 
pooled cross-
sectional data  
5,045 
observations  
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Continuous  Input 
additionality  
- R&D 
expenditure 
(natural 
logarithm) 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of 
the number of employees - 
lagged value) 
- Financial constraints 
(importance of three financial 
factors in conducting innovation - 
lagged value) 
- Export intensity (ratio of 
exports over sales - lagged value) 
- Employees' qualifications 
(proportion of highly skilled 
employees - lagged value) 
- Year, regional and industry DVs 
Garcia and 
Mohnen (2010) 
Austria  CIS3 (1998-
2000) 
546 
innovating 
firms  
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Binary  Input 
additionality 
- R&D intensity 
(R&D 
expenditure) 
Output 
additionality 
- Innovative 
sales from 
products new to 
the firm  
- Innovative 
sales from 
products new to 
the market  
- Firm size (natural logarithm of 
the number of employees) 
- Competition (DV for those 
firms reporting that the 
international market is 
prevailing) 
- Cooperation (DV is the firm 
cooperates with other firms and 
institutions) 
- Human capital (the ratio of the 
number of workers with 
higher education divided by the 
total number of workers) 
- Appropriability (proxied by the 
perceived importance of 
economic risk as an obstacle to 
innovation) 
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- Financial difficulties (the 
perceived difficulty in accessing 
finance as an obstacle to 
innovation) 
- Demand pull (importance of 
customers as a source of 
information) 
- Science push (importance of 
universities and public research 
institutes as sources of 
information) 
- DV for belonging to a group 
- DV for firms that belong to a 
firm group with a foreign parent 
company  
- Industry DVs (high-tech, low-
tech and the wholesale industry) 
 
 
Schneider and 
Veugelers (2010) 
Germany 
(West 
German 
firms)  
CIS4 (2002-
2004) 
1,715 firms  Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Binary  Output 
additionality  
- Innovative 
sales from  
new or 
substantially  
- Innovative 
sales from 
products new to 
the firm   
- Innovative 
sales 
from products 
new to the 
market  
 
 
- Firm size (logarithm of 
employment) 
- Firm age (natural logarithm) 
- R&D intensity (intramural R&D 
expenditure over sales) 
- Importance of external sources 
of knowledge (termed basicness 
of R&D)  
- DV for belonging to a group 
- 14 sector DVs  
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Hewitt-Dundas 
and Roper (2010) 
Ireland and 
Northern 
Ireland  
Pooled data from 
three waves of 
the Irish 
Innovation Panel 
(IIP) data 
covering the 
period 1994-
2002 
1,571 
observations 
from Ireland 
and 1,156 
observations 
from Northern 
Ireland  
Manufacturing 
sector  
Binary  Output 
additionality 
- Innovative 
sales from new 
products  
- Innovative 
sales from new 
and improved 
products 
- Product 
innovation 
(DV=1 if the 
firm introduced 
product 
innovation)  
- In-house R&D 
- Supply chain links 
- Non supply chain links 
- Plant size (the number of 
employees) 
- Plant size squared 
- Type of production (vintage, 
one-offs, small batches, large 
batches) 
- DV for the firm belonging to 
multi-plant group 
- DV for the externally owned 
plants 
- Workforce qualifications  
- Capital investment per 
employee 
- Five industry DVs  
Catozzella and 
Vivarelli (2011) 
Italy  CIS3 (1998-
2000) 
746 firms that 
introduced 
only product 
innovation 
(389 
participating 
and 357 non-
participating)  
Manufacturing 
sector  
Binary  Input-output 
efficiency 
(innovative 
productivity) 
- Ratio of  
innovative sales 
over total 
innovation 
expenditure 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of 
the number of employees) 
- Growth rate in the number of 
employees 
- Export intensity (ratio of 
turnover from export over 
turnover) 
- Prevailing market coverage  
- DV for belonging to a group 
- DV for belonging to a group 
with a foreign headquarter 
- Industry DVs  
- Industry DVs based on Pavitt's 
taxonomy 
- Importance of sources of 
information (universities, 
research institutes and 
conferences) 
- Importance of market sources of 
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information (customers, suppliers 
and competitors) 
- DV for cooperation for 
innovation with universities and 
research institutes 
- Motives for undertaking 
innovation (entering new 
markets; increasing production 
capacity; increasing production 
flexibility; lowering labour costs) 
- Importance of internal and 
financial barriers to innovation  
- DV for patenting activities  
- Sixteen DVs for innovative 
strategies (combination of four 
innovative inputs: internal R&D; 
external R&D; acquisition of 
machinery and equipment;  
acquisition of know-how) 
- DVs for introducing managerial 
and/or strategic and/or 
organizational innovation) 
- Evaluation of the innovative 
effect on product quality  
- DV for products new to the 
market  
Klette and Møen 
(2012) 
Norway  Panel R&D 
survey (1982-
1995) merged 
with 
manufacturing 
statistics  
192 business 
units (697 
observations)  
High-tech 
manufacturing 
industries 
(machinery, 
electrical 
equipment and 
technical 
instruments)  
 
 
Continuous  Input 
additionality 
- R&D 
expenditure  
- Sales 
- Sales squared  
- Total R&D subsidies  
- Cash flow (proxy for liquidity 
constraints) 
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Papa (2012) Italy  CIS3 (1998-
2000) 
1,784 firms Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Binary  Input 
additionality 
- R&D intensity 
(internal R&D 
expenditures 
divided by the 
turnover) 
Selection equation: 
- Stock of knowledge capital 
(stock of   R&D capital plus 
stock of patents divided by the 
number of employees) 
  history of R&D investment and  
  purchase of patents) 
- Export intensity (share of 
exports in 
  total turnover) 
- Capital intensity (tangible assets 
divided by the number of 
employees) 
- DVs for financial difficulties 
(high,  
   medium, low) 
- Cash flow per employees 
- Leverage ratio (financial 
expenditures as a percentage of 
revenues) 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of 
total employment) 
 -DV for belonging to a group 
- DV for belonging to a group 
with a  
   foreign headquarter 
- Regional and industry DVs 
Outcome equation  
- Capital intensity (tangible assets 
divided by the number of 
employees) 
- DVs for financial difficulties 
(high,  
   medium, low) 
- Cash flow per employees 
- Leverage ratio (financial 
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expenditures as a percentage of 
revenues) 
- Firm size (natural logarithm of 
total employment) 
 -DV for belonging to a group 
DV for belonging to a group with 
a  
   foreign headquarter 
- Regional and industry DVs 
- Objectives of innovation 
- Sources of information 
- Methods for protecting 
innovation 
Bloch and 
Graversen (2012) 
Denmark  R&D survey 
(1995-2005) 
1,904 
observations  
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors  
Continuous  Input 
additionality  
- Private (net) 
R&D 
expenditures 
- Lagged value of private R&D 
expenditures (logarithm) 
- Lagged value of R&D subsidies 
- Cooperation with other firms 
- Cooperation with public 
research institutes 
- Total sectoral funding budget 
(logarithm) 
- DV for R&D subsidy from 
foreign sources 
- DV for R&D subsidy from 
domestic sources 
- Firm size (DV) 
- Industry and time DVs  
Spithoven et al. 
(2012) 
Belgium  Panel data 
consisting of two 
waves: CIS3 
(1998-2000) and 
CIS4 (2002-
2004) 
1,202 
observations 
(601 firms) 
Manufacturing 
and service 
sectors 
Binary  Behavioural 
additionality  
- DV for 
cooperation 
with businesses 
(customers, 
suppliers and 
competitors) 
- DV for 
- Firm size (logarithm of the 
number of employees) 
- R&D activity (DV) 
- Patenting activity (DV) 
- Incoming knowledge spillovers 
(importance of various sources of 
information) 
- Strategic appropriability of 
knowledge (importance of 
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cooperation 
with public 
research 
institutions  
mechanisms for protecting 
innovation) 
- Complexity of knowledge 
(importance of information 
obtained from public research 
institutions and professional 
conferences) 
- Higher education intensity of 
personnel (logarithm)  
- Export intensity (logarithm) 
- DV for domestic group 
membership  
- DV for foreign group 
membership 
- Importance of risk constraints 
- Importance of financial 
constraints 
- Industry DVs based on Pavitt's 
taxonomy  
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Table A1.4. Empirical studies applying other evaluation methods - part II   
Authors Estimator Instruments 
Robustness 
check 
Type of additionality  
Results Limitations  
Busom 
(2000) 
Heckman 
selection 
model (both 
two-step and 
full-
information 
maximum-
likelihood) 
No instrument  OLS estimation  Input additionality  - Overall results suggest 
additionality, but for 30% of 
participating firms,  
full crowding out effects 
cannot be rejected. 
- No exclusion restrictions 
were used in the estimation 
of Heckman model.  
- OLS regression cannot be 
an appropriate robustness 
check, as it does not control 
for selection bias. 
Lach (2002) Fixed effects 
(FE) estimator 
and system 
GMM 
estimator  
- Natural logarithm of 
exports  
- Lagged independent 
variables and the 
dependent variable  
- OLS  
- Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) 
estimator 
- Model 
specifications in 
first differences 
and in levels 
Input additionality - In the short run, no 
additionality nor crowding-
out (using the DiD 
estimator) 
- In the long run, at the 
means of the data, an 
additional dollar 
of R&D subsidy increase 
company-financed R&D 
expenditures by 41 cents on 
average. 
- A positive and statistically 
significant treatment effect is 
found for small firms, but no 
effect is reported for large 
firms.   
  
Gonzáles et 
al. (2005) 
Simultaneous 
equation 
model with 
thresholds 
estimated by 
Heckman 
procedure 
- Subsidies expected 
in advance by firms 
- Alternative 
model 
specifications  
Input additionality - Public subsidies have a 
positive, 
yet modest effect.  
- The estimated percentage 
increase in privately 
financed R&D expenditures 
is higher for the smallest 
- Public support is treated as 
exogenous. 
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(a partial 
maximum 
likelihood 
estimation - 
MLE instead 
of the two-step 
estimation) 
firms.  
- The analysis also suggests 
that subsidies are distributed 
mainly to firms that would 
have performed innovative 
activities irrespective of such 
subsidies. 
Gӧrg and 
Strobl  
(2007) 
Conditional 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DiD) 
estimator 
(combination 
of matching 
with the 
Difference-in-
Difference 
estimator) on 
pooled cross-
sectional data 
Not needed - Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) 
estimator 
- Alternative 
dependent 
variable (R&D 
expenditure per 
employee) 
- Plants divided 
into domestic and 
foreign  
Input additionality - The impact of R&D grants 
depends on the grant size 
and on the ownership of the 
plant. For domestic plants, 
large grants yield crowding-
out effect, whereas small 
grants result in the additional 
effect (the hypothesis of a 
partial crowding out is 
supported). For foreign 
plants, insignificant 
treatment effects are 
reported, irrespective of the 
grant size.  
- Pooled cross-sectional 
analysis, not a panel 
analysis, thus the estimator 
does not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Aerts and 
Schmidt 
(2008) 
Conditional 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DiD) 
estimator 
(combination 
of matching 
with the 
Difference-in-
Difference 
estimator) on 
pooled cross-
sectional data 
 
 
Not needed - Subsample of 
only R&D active 
firms  
- Additional 
control variables  
Input additionality Crowding-out can be 
rejected in both German and 
Flemish case. Input 
additionality reported for 
both countries.  
- Pooled cross-sectional 
analysis, not a panel 
analysis, thus the estimator 
does not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Hussinger 
(2008) 
Heckman 
selection 
model and 
semiparametri
c selection 
models (three 
models 
developed by 
Cosslett, 1991; 
by Newey, 
1999; and by 
Robinson, 
1988)  
- Interaction term of 
the patent stock and 
past publicly funded 
projects 
- DV for capital 
companies 
- DV for foreign 
parent companies 
- Credit rating index 
- OLS regression  - Input additionality 
- Output additionality 
- Empirical results reject 
crowding-out effects on both 
innovation input and 
innovation output.   
 
Gelabert et 
al. (2009) 
Instrumental 
Variable (IV) 
estimation of 
the Fixed 
Effects (FE) 
model  
The budget dedicated 
to R&D policies, 
across geographical 
regions and sectors. 
- Additional 
control variables 
- Tobit model 
estimated by the 
Instrumental 
Variable (IV) 
approach of the 
Fixed Effects 
(FE)  
model 
- Matching 
estimation (bias-
adjusted matching 
estimator) 
Input additionality - A significant negative 
interaction between public 
support and appropriability 
mechanisms (i.e. a negative 
moderating role of 
appropriability). 
- Crowding- 
out effect is found for those 
firms reporting the highest 
levels of appropriability. 
- GMM estimator could be 
used as a robustness check 
to control for a dynamics of 
R&D investment  
- Given the availability of 
the amount of subsidy, a 
dose-response function 
could be used instead of 
matching estimators 
applicable on binary 
treatment variable.  
 
 
Garcia and 
Mohnen 
(2010) 
System of 
simultaneous 
equations 
(simultaneous 
bivariate 
probit model 
and 
simultaneous 
bivariate tobit 
Sources of 
information  
No  - Input additionality 
- Output additionality  
- The ATE effects are 
positive and statistically 
significant on both 
innovation input and output. 
Only government support is 
found to have a positive 
additional effect; the EU 
funding has no effect when 
the impact of government 
- The model estimates the 
ATE effects, but not the 
ATT effects.  
- No robustness check.  
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model) support is taken into account.  
Schneider 
and 
Veugelers 
(2010) 
Instrumental 
Variable (IV) 
approach 
- The share of 
subsidized firms in 
the region where the 
firm is established 
- The share of 
subsidized firms per 
industry (at the 
NACE 2-digit 
level) 
 
- Reestimating the 
model applying 
an alternative 
definition of 
young, innovative 
firms  
Output additionality - The study reports a 
negative and statistically 
significant ATE effect. 
- The ATT effects are not 
estimated, only the ATE 
effects. 
- Using an endogenous 
binary switching model 
would enable the estimation 
of the ATT effect as well as 
serving as a robustness 
check.   
Hewitt-
Dundas and 
Roper 
(2010) 
Instrumental 
Variable (IV) 
approach  
- DV (=1 if the firm 
received support for 
process development; 
zero otherwise) 
- DV (=1 if the firm 
received support for 
R&D; zero 
otherwise) 
- DV (=1 if the firm 
received support for 
capital investment; 
zero otherwise) 
- Subsample of 
only indigenously 
owned plants  
Output additionality  - In whole sample, the ATE 
effects are positive but not 
statistically significant for 
Ireland, but are statistically 
significant for Northern 
Ireland. 
- In the subsample of 
indigenously owned plants, 
in both countries, the ATE 
effects are positive and 
statistically significant.   
- The ATT effects are not 
estimated, only the ATE 
effects.  
- No robustness check; 
instead of or as robustness 
check, the authors could 
apply the endogenous 
binary switching model.  
Catozzella 
and 
Vivarelli 
(2011) 
Bivariate 
endogenous 
switching 
model  
Not reported No  Input-output efficiency  Crowding-out effect, as the 
ATT effect is negative and 
statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level.   
- It is not clear  if the 
authors did not include 
instrumental variables in 
their model,  or whether 
they include them without 
reported them. 
- Double inclusion of 
industry DVs in the model 
(26 industry DVs together 
with the categorization of 
industries following Pavitt's 
taxonomy).   
- Problem with diagnostics 
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test (correlation coefficient 
is equal to one). 
- No robustness check 
applying other methods or 
alternative model 
specifications.  
Klette and 
Møen 
(2012) 
Fixed Effects 
(FE) 
estimator, 
Difference-in-
Difference 
(DiD) 
estimator  
Not needed - FE estimation 
with loglog model 
specification  
(both dependent 
variable and R&D 
subsidies are in 
natural 
logarithms) 
- Model 
specification with 
DVs for small and 
large firms  
- Model 
specification with 
separate sources 
of funding  
Input additionality  No effect, i.e. neither 
crowding out nor 
additionality is reported.  
- Year dummies are not 
included in the model.  
- Firm size is not controlled 
for in the original model, 
but it is included as a 
robustness check.  
Papa (2012) Endogenous 
switching type 
II-tobit model 
Export intensity  - OLS regression 
- Heckman 
selection model 
- Heckman 
treatment model 
Input additionality  No effect, i.e. neither 
crowding out nor 
additionality is reported;  
insignificant ATT and ATE 
effects. 
It is questionable if export 
intensity is a valid exclusion 
restriction.  
Bloch and 
Graversen 
(2012) 
System GMM 
estimator  
Lagged R&D 
subsidies and lagged 
private R&D 
expenditure 
- OLS regression 
- 2SLS regression 
Input additionality  Partial and full crowding out 
effects can be rejected. Input 
additionality reported; 
additionality effect of 0.12 
per cent. 
- Highly unbalanced panel 
data (a large number of 
firms only have two 
consecutive observations). 
- Limited use of 
instruments.  
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Spithoven 
et al. (2012) 
Bivariate 
probit model 
Lagged values of 
independent variables  
- NN 
Mahalanobis 
matching with 
replacement  
Behavioural additionality  Behavioural additionality is 
reported.  
- When applying a bivariate 
probit model, the ATE 
effect is estimated, not ATT 
effect. 
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Appendix II 
Table A2.1. Variable definition  
Variable Definition 
Innovation output 
DV= 1 if innovation takes place; =0 if innovation does not 
take place 
Participation 
DV=1 if the firm participated in one or more support 
programmes; = 0 if it did not 
Size Number of employees in 2009 
MPower 
DV = 1 if the firm responded “Very strong” to the question 
“How would you judge the competition in your main 
market(s)”; otherwise 0 
Export 
The percentage of the firm’s turnover accounted for by 
exports 
Industry Industry dummy variables  (the omitted category is “Other”) 
Country Country dummy variables (the omitted category is the UK) 
Quasi firm fixed effects (QFFE)  
Resources devoted by the firm to 
innovation compared to the 
present 
DV = 1 if the response was “Fewer”; = 0 if “About the 
same” or “More” 
The firm’s capabilities relative to 
other firms in their industry with 
respect to product innovation  
DV = 1 for “Above average” and “Leading”; = 0 for 
“Average” and “Lagging” 
The firm’s capabilities relative to 
other firms in their industry with 
respect to process innovation 
 
DV = 1 for “Above average” and “Leading”; = 0 for 
“Average” and “Lagging” 
 
 
 
The firm’s capabilities relative to 
other firms in their industry with 
respect to organisational 
innovation 
DV = 1 for “Above average” and “Leading”; = 0 for 
“Average” and “Lagging” 
The firm’s capabilities relative to 
other firms in their industry with 
respect to marketing innovation 
DV = 1 for “Above average” and “Leading”; = 0 for 
“Average” and “Lagging” 
Collaboration  DV =1 if the firm responded “Yes” to the question “From 
2005 to 2009 did your enterprise co-operate on any of your 
innovation activities with other enterprises or institutions?”; 
otherwise 0 
Obstacle DV = 1 if the response was “Very high importance” to the 
question “What are the specific needs for SMEs to enable 
them to participate in innovation support programmes?”and 
0 otherwise (“No importance”, “Low importance”, 
“Important” or “High importance”).  
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Table A2.2.  Variable descriptions with means and standard deviations (SD) for 
participants and non-participants  
Variable Variable in the dataset 
 
Participants 
 
Non-
participants 
Product innovation in goods Product_innovation_goods_yes 
0.83 
(0.38) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
Product innovation in services Product_innovation_services_yes 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
Product innovation - combined Product_innovation 
0.93 
(0.26) 
0.73 
(0.45) 
Process innovation - processes for 
manufacturing goods or providing 
services  
Q8_1_2 
0.86 
(0.35) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
Process innovation - logistics, 
delivery or distribution processes  
Q8_2_2 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
Process innovation - support 
processes (e.g. maintenance, 
purchasing, accounting etc.) 
Q8_3_2 
0.64 
(0.48) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
Process innovation - combined  Process_innovation_total 
0.91 
(0.29) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
Organisational innovation - new 
business practices for organising 
procedures  
Q9_1_2 
0.58 
(0.49) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
Organisational innovation - new 
methods of organising work 
responsibilities and decision making  
Q9_2_2 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
Organisational innovation - new 
methods of organising external 
relations with other firms or public 
institutions  
Q9_3_2 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.29 
(0.46) 
Organisational innovation - combined  Organizational_innovation 
0.78 
(0.41) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
Marketing innovation - changes to 
aesthetic design or packaging  
Q10_1_2 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
Marketing innovation - new media or 
techniques for product promotion    
Q10_2_2 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
Marketing innovation - new methods 
for sales channels  
Q10_3_2 
0.43 
(0.50) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
Marketing innovation - new methods 
of pricing goods or services  
Q10_4_2 
0.29 
(0.46) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
Marketing innovation - combined  Marketing_innovation  
0.74 
(0.50) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
Innovative sales > 5 % Q17_4 
0.86 
(0.34) 
0.71 
(0.46) 
Innovative sales > 10 % Q17_3 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
 
Innovative sales > 15 % 
 
Q17_1 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
Innovative sales > 25 % Q17_2 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
 
Any type of innovation 
  
TOTAL  
0.99 
(0.08) 
0.90 
(0.30) 
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Number of employees in 2009  Q2_2009 
34.56 
(46.78) 
34.54 
(45.98) 
Number of employees in micro firms 
(less than 10 employees) 
 
4.73 
(2.14) 
4.16 
(2.22) 
Number of employees in small firms 
(less than 50 employees and more 
than 10) 
 
22.51 
(9.57) 
23.13 
(9.60) 
Number of employees in medium -
sized firms (less than 250 employees 
and more than 50) 
 
110.23 
(50.19) 
104.77 
(51.50) 
Market power (strength of 
competition) 
Q4t_5 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
Leather industry  Q3t_1 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
Ceramics  Q3t_2 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
Textiles  Q3t_3 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
Mechanical/Metallurgy  Q3t_4 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
Automotive  Q3t_5 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
Food products  Q3t_6 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
Other sectors  Q3t_7 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
Resources invested in innovative 
activities five years ago  
Q12t_1 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
Innovative capacities for product 
innovation in 2005 (above average 
and leading)  
Prodin_2005 
0.31 
(0.47) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
Innovative capacities for process 
innovation in 2005 (above average 
and leading) 
Procin_2005 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
Innovative capacities for marketing 
innovation in 2005 (lagging) 
Q16_3t_1 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
Innovative capacities for 
organizational innovation in 2005 
(lagging) 
Q16_4t_1 
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.29 
(0.46) 
Export  Q5_export 
22.65 
(30.37) 
16.91 
(28.58) 
Collaboration 
111
  Q18_yes 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
Administrative needs - simple 
application procedure (very high 
importance)  
Q31_1t_5 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
Administrative needs - short time-to-
contract periods (very high 
importance)  
Q31_2t_5 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
Administrative needs - short 
application-to-funding periods (very 
high importance) 
  
Q31_3t_5 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
Administrative needs - simple 
reporting requirements (very high 
importance) 
  
Q31_4t_5 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
                                                          
111
 Collaboration is not included in the baseline model, but is included in the augmented model. This 
dummy variable has a value of 1 if a firm collaborates on innovation activities with other firms or 
institutions.  
 376 
 
Administrative needs - transparent 
proposal evaluation procedures (very 
high importance)  
Q31_5t_5 
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.18 
(0.37) 
Administrative needs - adequate 
assistance/guidance during project by 
programme officer   (very high 
importance) 
Q31_6t_5 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
Financial needs - high funding rates 
(very high importance) 
Q31_7t_5 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
Financial needs - limited 
requirements to get loans (very high 
importance) 
Q31_8t_5 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
Financial needs - availability of 
additional financing opportunities 
(very high importance) 
Q31_9t_5 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
SME (internal needs) - adequate in-
house knowledge on project 
management (very high importance)  
Q31_10t_5 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
SME (internal needs) - adequate 
networks of potential partners (very 
high importance) 
Q31_11t_5 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
SME (internal needs) - compliance of 
programme aims to SMEs interests 
(very high importance) 
Q31_12t_5 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
SME (internal needs) - strong 
acknowledgement of need to 
participate in innovation programmes 
(very high importance) 
Q31_13t_5 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
SME (internal needs) - easy access to 
information about available 
programmes (very high importance) 
Q31_14t_5 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
External needs - adequate marketing 
of/ information about programmes 
(very high importance) 
Q31_15t_5 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
External needs - adequate external 
assistance/guidance during project 
(very high importance) 
Q31_16t_5 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
External needs - adequate external 
assistance/guidance after project 
(very high importance) 
Q31_17t_5 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
External needs - appropriate general 
economic conditions (very high 
importance) 
Q31_18t_5 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
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Table A2.3. Number of participating and non-participating firms by country
112
  
Country 
Number of 
firms 
Number of 
participating 
firms 
Number of non-
participating firms 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Germany   
38 25 13 0.66 
(0.48) 
Spain  53 34 19 0.64 
(0.48) 
Italy  46 18 28 0.39 
(0.49) 
Netherlands  31 12 19 0.39 
(0.49) 
Portugal  19 9 10 0.47 
(0.51) 
France  34 16 18 0.47 
(0.51) 
United Kingdom  91 31 60 0.34 
(0.48) 
TOTAL  312 145 167  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112
 Data in Table A2.3 are for SMEs only (312 firms in total). There are 21 large firms in the sample.   
 378 
 
Table A2.4 Innovative firms that received support in each category of innovation 
Variable 
Number of 
innovative 
firms 
Percentage of 
innovative 
firms 
Number of 
innovative 
firms that 
received 
support 
Percentage of 
innovative firms 
that received 
support 
Product innovation in 
goods 
224 67.27 % 117 52.23 % 
Product innovation in 
services 
148 44.44 % 75 50.68 % 
Product innovation - 
combined 
269 80.78 % 136 50.56 % 
Process innovation - 
processes for 
manufacturing goods or 
providing services  
234 70.27 % 124 52.99 % 
Process innovation - 
logistics, delivery or 
distribution processes  
107 32.13 % 59 55.14 % 
Process innovation - 
support processes (e.g. 
maintenance, purchasing, 
accounting etc.) 
190 57.06 % 87 45.79 % 
Process innovation - 
combined  
271 81.38 % 132 48.71 % 
Organisational innovation - 
new business practices for 
organising procedures  
171 51.35 % 85 49.71 % 
Organisational innovation - 
new methods of organising 
work responsibilities and 
decision making  
142 42.64 % 68 47.89 % 
Organisational innovation - 
new methods of organising 
external relations with other 
firms or public institutions  
124 37.24 % 75 60.48 % 
Organisational innovation - 
combined  
231 69.37 % 118 51.08 % 
Marketing innovation - 
changes to aesthetic design 
or packaging  
130 39.04 % 67 51.54 % 
Marketing innovation - new 
media or techniques for 
product promotion    
129 38.74 % 67 51.94 % 
Marketing innovation - new 
methods for sales channels  
103 30.93 % 62 60.19 % 
Marketing innovation - new 
methods of pricing goods or 
services  
83 24.92 % 43 46.24 % 
Marketing innovation - 
combined  
211 63.36 % 109 
51.66 % 
Innovative sales > 5% 246 73.87 % 127 51.63 % 
Innovative sales > 10% 
 
191 57.36 % 96 50.26 % 
Innovative sales > 15% 
 
154 46.25 % 79 51.30 % 
Innovative sales > 25% 
 
97 29.13 % 53 54.64 % 
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Table A2.5. Results for baseline model - combined categories of product and process innovations  
Variable in the 
dataset    
Product innovation - combined Process innovation - combined 
Participation in 
support programme 
Non-participation 
in support 
programme 
Selection decision 
Participation in 
support programme 
Non-participation in 
support programme 
Selection decision 
Coeff. SE
a
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Q2_2009 0.042 0.052 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.006** 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
Q4t_5 -5.164*** 0.707 -0.714 0.447 -0.090 0.265 -0.115 0.419 -0.519** 0.261 0.095 0.202 
Q3t_1 2.913 1.825 -0.771 0.529 0.012 0.494 7.257*** 0.847 -0.665 0.511 -0.182 0.478 
Q3t_2 14.541*** 1.947 1.008 0.714 -0.224 0.466 0.570 0.694 0.443 0.516 0.034 0.372 
Q3t_3 14.800*** 1.164 0.246 0.504 -0.127 0.356 -0.079 0.553 0.392 0.417 -0.108 0.296 
Q3t_4 9.223*** 1.269 0.684 0.484 0.286 0.291 0.373 0.478 0.237 0.344 0.360 0.237 
Q3t_5 9.852*** 1.190 0.340 0.524 -0.081 0.357 0.462 0.629 0.060 0.410 -0.008 0.320 
Q3t_6 12.382*** 1.763 0.544 0.521 -0.553* 0.373 7.404*** 0.742 0.473 0.358 -0.580* 0.328 
Netherlands             
Portugal             
France             
Germany     0.721** 0.296       
Spain     1.427*** 0.257     1.437*** 0.267 
Q12t_1 -0.623 1.301 0.877*** 0.288 0.703*** 0.179 -0.344 0.423 0.974*** 0.250 0.688*** 0.173 
Prodin_2005 9.046*** 0.792 1.175** 0.536 -0.173 0.254 0.159 0.439 -0.066 0.370 -0.127 0.241 
Procin_2005 8.858*** 0.792 -0.499 0.543 0.377 0.260 0.945* 0.525 0.511 0.380 0.400 0.253 
Q16_3t_1 -0.540 1.155 -0.021 0.306 0.082 0.238 0.727 0.551 -0.190 0.308 0.075 0.219 
Q16_4t_1 -4.023*** 1.463 -0.549* 0.309 -0.080 0.247 -0.331 0.429 -0.334 0.286 -0.093 0.227 
Q5_export 0.117 ** 0.058 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.005* 0.003 
Q18_yes             
Q31_3t_5             
Q31_7t_5             
Q31_10t_5             
Q31_17t_5     0.783 ** 0.380       
Q31_18t_5     -0.332 0.281       
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Log likelihood -205.85905     -248.48591     
No of obs. 242     261     
rho1 -0.999 (0.005)     -0.406  (0.588)     
rho0 0.871  (0.417)     0.999   (0.002)     
Wald test p = 0.0232     p=0.0183     
Notes: 
a
 SE denotes standard error.  
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Table A2.6. Results for baseline model - combined categories of organisational and marketing innovations 
Variable in the 
dataset 
Organisational innovation - combined Marketing innovation - combined 
Participation in 
support 
programme 
Non-participation 
in support 
programme 
Selection decision 
Participation in 
support programme 
Non-participation in 
support programme 
Selection decision 
Coeff. SE
a
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Q2_2009 0.009** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
Q4t_5 -0.511* 0.289 -0.094 0.272 -0.019 0.205 -0.704** 0.329 -0.269 0.290 0.484* 0.261 
Q3t_1 6.827*** 0.417 -0.597 0.540 -0.1505 0.462 0.243 0.776 -0.201 0.693 0.194 0.686 
Q3t_2 -0.075 0.546 1.124* 0.625 0.013 0.387 6.740*** 1.825 7.238*** 0.419 -0.503 0.410 
Q3t_3 0.415 0.477 0.535 0.428 -0.174 0.321 7.721*** 2.049 0.899* 0.465 -0.342 0.395 
Q3t_4 0.185 0.370 0.276 0.340 0.494** 0.242 -0.096 0.367 0.132 0.361 0.224 0.298 
Q3t_5 0.569 0.599 0.465 0.379 0.051 0.331 -0.221 0.489 -0.015 0.432 -0.246 0.386 
Q3t_6 -0.230 0.387 -0.017 0.326 -0.622* 0.333  0.513 0.725 0.461 -1.054*** 0.369 
France             
Spain     1.464*** 0.279 0.954* 0.520 -0.737 0.473 1.708*** 0.311 
Netherlands             
Italy             
Portugal 0.360 0.582 6.682*** 0.497 -0.141 0.370       
Q12t_1 0.141 0.318 0.851*** 0.270 0.725*** 0.183 0.816*** 0.262 0.472 0.304 0.835*** 0.213 
Prodin_2005       -0.473 0.365 0.723** 0.368 -0.466* 0.275 
Procin_2005       0.226 0.402 -0.055 0.404 0.301 0.285 
Q16_3t_1 -0.056 0.267 -0.074 0.314 -0.017 0.209 -0.783** 0.343 -0.844** 0.355 -0.081 0.270 
Q16_4t_1 -0.145 0.269 -0.739** 0.328 -0.014 0.219 0.247 0.396 0.051 0.367 0.067 0.277 
Q5_export 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 
Q31_3t_5     -0.908*** 0.241       
Q31_7t_5           -0.597** 0.236 
Q31_10t_5             
Q31_17t_5           0.898*** 0.315 
Q31_18t_5             
Log likelihood -247.31131     -219.12568     
No of obs. 255     241     
rho1 -0.642 (0.330)     0.809  (0.187)     
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rho0 0.728 (0.260)     -0.071  (0.353)     
Wald test p = 0.0488     p=0.0651     
Notes: 
a
 SE denotes standard error. 
 383 
 
Appendix III 
Table A3.1. Variable definition, mean and standard deviation of dependent and independent variables 
Variable Variable definition Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
FUNLOC DV=1 if a firm received local/regional support; 0 otherwise; 0.231 0.422 
FUNGMT DV=1 if a firm received government support; 0 otherwise; 0.164 0.370 
FUNEU DV=1 if a firm received EU support; 0 otherwise; 0.023 0.149 
COOPERATION  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with suppliers, customers, competitors, consultants, universities and government; 0 
otherwise; 
0.222 0.416 
COOP_CUSTOMERS DV=1 if a firm cooperates with customers; 0 otherwise; 0.061 0.240 
COOP_SUPPLIERS  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with suppliers; 0 otherwise; 0.107 0.309 
COOP_COMPETITORS DV=1 if a firm cooperates with competitors; 0 otherwise; 0.036 0.187 
COOP_CONSULTANTS  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes; 0 otherwise; 0.057 0.232 
COOP_HEI DV=1 if a firm cooperates with universities or other Higher Education Institutions (HEI); 0 otherwise; 0.070 0.255 
COOP_GOVERNMENT  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with government or public research institutes; 0 otherwise; 0.088 0.284 
OUTSOURCING_RD DV=1 if a firm conducts extramural R&D; 0 otherwise; 0.247 0.431 
EXTERNAL_KNOWLEDGE DV=1 if a firm purchases or licenses patents, know -how and other types of knowledge from other firms; 0 otherwise;  0.025 0.157 
SMALL_FIRMS  DV=1 if a firm has between 10 and 50 employees; 0.638 0.481 
BARRIER3 Importance of too high innovation costs as a barrier to innovation (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.842 1.090 
BARRIER4 Importance of lack of qualified personnel as a barrier to innovation (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.441 1.006 
BARRIER7  Importance of difficulties in finding cooperative partners as a barrier to innovation (score between 0- no importance; 1 
- low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.996 1.041 
PROPAT DV=1 if a firm applied for a patent; zero otherwise; 0.113 0.316 
CONTINOUS_RD DV=1 if a firm continuously perform R&D activities during 2004-2006; 0 otherwise; 0.345 0.475 
GP DV=1 if a firm belongs to enterprise group; zero otherwise; 0.258 0.438 
EXPORT  DV=1 if a firm is exporter; zero otherwise; 0.686 0.464 
INCOMING1 Importance of following sources of information: conferences, trade fairs and exhibitions (score between 0- no 
importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.051 1.041 
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INCOMING2 Importance of following sources of information: scientific journals and publications (score between 0- no importance; 
1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.861 0.930 
INCOMING3 Importance of following sources of information: professional and industry associations (score between 0- no 
importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.688 0.867 
INFO_INTERNAL  Importance of the information generated within the firm or enterprise group (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
2.135 1.006 
INFO_CUSTOMERS Importance of customers as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium 
importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.363 1.145 
INFO_SUPPLIERS  Importance of suppliers as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium 
importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.541 1.102 
INFO_COMPETITORS Importance of competitors as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium 
importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.059 1.034 
INFO_CONSULTANTS  Importance of consultants as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium 
importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.791 0.977 
INFO_HEI Importance of HEIs as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium 
importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.515 0.851 
INFO_GOVERNMENT Importance of government as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium 
importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.348 0.667 
INDUSTRY1 DV=1 if a firm operates in sectors 20 or 21; 0 otherwise; 0.053 0.224 
INDUSTRY2 DV=1 if a firm operates in sector 22; 0 otherwise; 0.041 0.198 
INDUSTRY3 DV=1 if a firm operates in sector 27; 0 otherwise; 0.024 0.153 
INDUSTRY4 DV=1 if a firm operates in sector 28; 0 otherwise; 0.132 0.339 
INDUSTRY5 DV=1 if a firm operates in sectors 15 or 16; 0 otherwise; 0.129 0.336 
INDUSTRY6 DV=1 if a firm operates in sectors  17 or 18; 0 otherwise; 0.053 0.224 
INDUSTRY7 DV=1 if a firm operates in sector 19; 0 otherwise; 0.017 0.129 
INDUSTRY8 DV=1 if a firm operates in sectors  23 or 24; 0 otherwise; (base category) 0.096 0.294 
INDUSTRY9 DV=1 if a firm operates in sector 25; 0 otherwise; 0.061 0.240 
INDUSTRY10 DV=1 if a firm operates in sector 26; 0 otherwise; 0.068 0.252 
INDUSTRY11 DV=1 if a firm operates in sector 29; 0 otherwise; 0.116 0.320 
INDUSTRY12 DV=1 if a firm operates in sectors 30, 31,32 or 33; 0 otherwise; 0.094 0.291 
INDUSTRY13 DV=1 if a firm operates in sectors  34 or 35; 0 otherwise; 0.046 0.209 
INDUSTRY14 DV=1 if a firm operates in sectors  36 or 37; 0 otherwise; 0.071 0.257 
Table A3.2. NACE classification of economic activity - Rev. 1.1 
 385 
 
Economic activity - Section D: Manufacturing 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
18 
Manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 
19 
Tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture, manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
21 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
22 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
23 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
26 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
27 
Manufacture of basic metals 
28 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
29 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.5 
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30 
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.5 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
36 Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c.5 
37 Recycling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.3. Correlation matrix for barriers to innovation (Stata output)  
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             | barrier1 barrier2 barrier3 barrier4 barrier5 barrier6 barrier7 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    barrier1 |   1.0000 
    barrier2 |   0.7200   1.0000 
    barrier3 |   0.6088   0.6145   1.0000 
    barrier4 |   0.4296   0.3962   0.4281   1.0000 
    barrier5 |   0.4135   0.4214   0.4249   0.6751   1.0000 
    barrier6 |   0.4068   0.4274   0.4089   0.5736   0.7263   1.0000 
    barrier7 |   0.3971   0.4395   0.3551   0.4299   0.4835   0.5323   1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.4. Cooperation and programme participation in local or regional and government programmes (N=8,022) 
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Cooperation Outsourcing R&D 
Acquisition of other external 
knowledge 
Local or regional support Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes 
711 
(8.9 %) 
1,071 
(13.4 %) 
809 
(10.1 %) 
1,045 
(13.0 %) 
63 
(0.8 %) 
1,791 
(22.3 %) 
No 
1,143 
(14.2 %) 
5,097 
(63.5 %) 
1,171 
(14.6 %) 
4,997 
(62.3 %) 
141 
(1.8 %) 
6,027 
(75.1 %) 
Government (national) 
support 
      
Yes 
493 
(6.1 %) 
819 
(10.2 %) 
570 
(7.1 %) 
742 
(9.2 %) 
54 
(0.7 %) 
1,258 
(15.7 %) 
No 
1,289 
(16.1 %) 
5,421 
(67.6 %) 
1,410 
(17.6 %) 
5,300 
(66.1 %) 
150 
(1.9 %) 
6,560 
(81.7 %) 
EU support       
Yes 
90 
(1.1 %) 
92 
(1.2 %) 
82 
(1.0 %) 
1,898 
(23.7 %) 
6 
(0.1 %) 
176 
(2.2 %) 
No 
1,692 
(21.1 %) 
6,148 
(76.6 %) 
100 
(1.2 %) 
5,942 
(74.1 %) 
198 
(2.5 %) 
7,642 
(95.2 %) 
Note: For each stream of funding and each type of open innovation (cooperation, outsourcing R&D and acquisition of other external knowledge), the sum of percentages adds to 100 
percent.  
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Table A3.5. Type of cooperation and participation (subsample of cooperating firms) 
 
Type of 
cooperation 
 
Local or regional support 
 
Government support EU support 
Participating firms 
(N=711) 
Non-participating 
firms 
(N=1,071) 
Participating firms 
(N=493) 
Non-participating 
firms 
(N=1,289) 
Participating firms 
(N=90) 
Non-participating 
firms 
(N=1,692) 
Customers 
(N=493) 
225 268 155 338 40 453 
Suppliers (N=859) 302 557 221 638 46 813 
Competitors (290) 119 171 109 181 29 261 
Consultants 
(N=456) 
203 253 151 305 35 421 
HEI (N=562) 256 306 217 345 46 516 
Government 
(N=708) 
378 330 265 443 57 651 
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Table A3.6. Probit estimates with marginal effects for three types of funding  
 Local/regional support  Government support  EU support 
Covariates  Coefficients  
(SEs) 
Marginal 
effects  
(SEs) 
Coefficients  
(SEs) 
Marginal 
effects 
(SEs)  
Coefficients 
(SEs)  
Marginal 
effects  
(SEs) 
gp -0.001 -0.000 0.020 0.005 -0.058 -0.003 
 (0.039) (0.011) (0.042) (0.010) (0.078) (0.004) 
sm 0.198*** 0.056*** -0.267*** -0.060*** 0.021 0.001 
 (0.076) (0.021) (0.081) (0.018) (0.149) (0.008) 
export 0.029 0.008 0.082* 0.019* 0.074 0.004 
 (0.038) (0.011) (0.043) (0.010) (0.080) (0.004) 
info_internal 0.031 0.009 0.114** 0.026** 0.024 0.001 
 (0.039) (0.011) (0.045) (0.010) (0.085) (0.004) 
info_suppliers -0.031 -0.009 0.037 0.008 0.022 0.001 
 (0.029) (0.008) (0.031) (0.007) (0.058) (0.003) 
info_customers 0.021 0.006 0.008 0.002 -0.013 -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005) (0.039) (0.002) 
info_competitors -0.030 -0.008 -0.010 -0.002 0.027 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.022) (0.005) (0.041) (0.002) 
info_consultants 0.137*** 0.039*** 0.109*** 0.025*** -0.028 -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005) (0.040) (0.002) 
info_HEI 0.118*** 0.033*** 0.158*** 0.036*** 0.084* 0.004* 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.025) (0.006) (0.043) (0.002) 
info_government 0.071** 0.020** 0.033 0.007 0.153*** 0.008*** 
 (0.031) (0.009) (0.033) (0.007) (0.055) (0.003) 
incoming1 0.032 0.009 0.004 0.001 -0.022 -0.001 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.024) (0.005) (0.045) (0.002) 
incoming2 -0.035 -0.010 -0.026 -0.006 0.042 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.007) (0.029) (0.006) (0.052) (0.003) 
incoming3 -0.027 -0.008 -0.056** -0.013** -0.035 -0.002 
 (0.025) (0.007) (0.028) (0.006) (0.051) (0.003) 
barrier3 0.030* 0.009* 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.000 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.035) (0.002) 
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barrier4 0.040** 0.011** -0.008 -0.002 0.013 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005) (0.039) (0.002) 
barrier7 0.023 0.007 0.063*** 0.014*** 0.042 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.035) (0.002) 
propat 0.236*** 0.067*** 0.187*** 0.042*** 0.303*** 0.015*** 
 (0.049) (0.014) (0.052) (0.012) (0.086) (0.004) 
continous_RD 0.328*** 0.092*** 0.421*** 0.095*** 0.191** 0.010** 
 (0.038) (0.011) (0.041) (0.009) (0.077) (0.004) 
0b.info_suppliers#1.sm -0.017  0.181  0.100  
 (0.102)  (0.111)  (0.209)  
1. info_suppliers #0b.sm 0.028  -0.055  0.018  
 (0.072)  (0.079)  (0.144)  
1. info_suppliers #1.sm -0.052  0.152*  -0.038  
 (0.084)  (0.091)  (0.175)  
2. info_suppliers #0b.sm -0.035  -0.129*  0.022  
 (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.119)  
2. info_suppliers #1.sm -0.033  0.138**  0.079  
 (0.061)  (0.068)  (0.125)  
3o. info_suppliers #0b.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
3o. info_suppliers #1o.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
0b.info_internal#1.sm 0.039  0.459***  0.069  
 (0.134)  (0.155)  (0.294)  
1. info_internal #0b.sm -0.041  -0.004  0.242  
 (0.103)  (0.120)  (0.209)  
1. info_internal #1.sm -0.372***  0.160  -0.072  
 (0.100)  (0.112)  (0.214)  
2. info_internal #0b.sm 0.071  -0.002  0.092  
 (0.068)  (0.075)  (0.136)  
2. info_internal #1.sm -0.055  0.092  -0.134  
 (0.062)  (0.070)  (0.135)  
3o. info_internal #0b.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
3o. info_internal #1o.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant -1.398***  -1.869***  -2.657***  
 (0.136)  (0.159)  (0.309)  
1. info_suppliers  -0.012  -0.000  -0.002 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.005) 
2. info_suppliers  -0.024*  -0.000  0.002 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.005) 
3. info_suppliers  -0.023  0.001  0.000 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.006) 
1.sm  0.030***  -0.004  -0.002 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.004) 
1. info_internal  -0.062***  -0.018  0.002 
  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.008) 
2. info_internal  0.008  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.007) 
3. info_internal  0.020  0.010  0.001 
  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.007) 
Industry DVs   Included    Included   Included  
No. of observations 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 8,022 
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Table A3.7. Average Treatment Effects (ATTs) for the whole sample - kernel matching estimates with confidence intervals 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Local/regional support  Government support  EU support  
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 95% confidence 
intervals  
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 95% confidence 
intervals  
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.001) 95% confidence 
intervals ATT  
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT  
(bootstrapped SEs) 
ATT  
(bootstrapped SEs) 
Aggregate 
cooperation  
0.141*** 
(0.014) 
[0.113         0.169] 
0.085*** 
(0.014) 
[0.056            0.113] 
0.170*** 
(0.035) 
[0.100            0.239] 
Cooperation with 
customers 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
[0.036         0.070] 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
[0.009            0.050] 
0.129*** 
(0.030) 
[0.069            0.188] 
Cooperation with 
suppliers 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
[0.019         0.059] 
0.026** 
(0.013) 
[0.001            0.051] 
0.106*** 
(0.034) 
[0.040            0.172] 
Cooperation with 
competitors 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
[0.013         0.040] 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
[0.029            0.061] 
0.106*** 
(0.027) 
[0.052            0.161] 
Cooperation with 
consultants  
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
[0.018         0.055] 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
[0.008            0.047] 
0.087*** 
(0.030) 
[0.029            0.146] 
Cooperation with 
HEI 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
[0.023         0.061] 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
[0.025            0.069] 
0.107*** 
(0.034) 
[0.040            0.174] 
Cooperation with 
government  
0.118*** 
(0.012) 
[0.094         0.141] 
0.084*** 
(0.012) 
[0.061            0.107] 
0.169*** 
(0.036) 
[0.098            0.240] 
Outsourcing R&D  0.168*** 
(0.013) 
[0.142         0.194] 
0.122*** 
(0.013) 
[0.097            0.148] 
0.096** 
(0.038) 
[0.022            0.171] 
Acquisition of other 
external knowledge 
0.007 
(0.005) 
[-0.004        0.017] 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
[0.000            0.024] 
0.000 
(0.016) 
[-0.032          0.032] 
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Table A3.8. Regions of common support for matching estimators with the estimated propensity score  
 
Estimator 
Local support Government support EU support 
Common 
support 
Common 
support 
(percentage of 
total sample) 
Common 
support 
Common 
support 
(percentage of 
total sample 
Common 
support 
Common 
support 
(percentage of 
total sample 
NN matching without 
replacement and with 
caliper  
7,963 99.26 % 8,014 99.90 % 8,022 100 % 
NN matching with 
Mahalanobis metric and 
caliper  
7,952 99.13 % 7,984 99.53 % 8,000 99.73 % 
Kernel matching 8,022 100 % 8,021 99.99 % 8,021 99.99 % 
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Figure A3.1. Kernel density of the estimated propensity scores before and after 
matching for each source of funding (first raw for local/regional funding; second 
raw for national funding and third raw for EU funding)  
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Table A3.9. Stata output of mhbounds command (outcome variable- cooperation 
with suppliers; treatment variable - government support) 
Gamma         Q_mh+     Q_mh-     p_mh+     p_mh- 
    1        1.51354   1.51354   .065071   .065071   
 1.05        1.06286   1.96534   .143922   .024687   
  1.1        .633235   2.39651    .26329   .008276   
 1.15        .222907   2.80924   .411804   .002483   
  1.2        .061488   3.20519   .475485   .000675   
 1.25        .438155   3.58581   .330637   .000168   
  1.3        .800152   3.95235   .211811   .000039   
 1.35        1.14866   4.30594   .125348   8.3e-06   
  1.4        1.48473   4.64755   .068807   1.7e-06   
 1.45         1.8093   4.97808   .035203   3.2e-07   
  1.5        2.12318    5.2983   .016869   5.8e-08   
 1.55        2.42713   5.60892   .007609   1.0e-08   
  1.6        2.72182   5.91057   .003246   1.7e-09   
 1.65        3.00785   6.20383   .001316   2.8e-10   
  1.7        3.28577   6.48922   .000509   4.3e-11   
 1.75        3.55608   6.76721   .000188   6.6e-12   
  1.8        3.81922   7.03823   .000067   9.7e-13   
 1.85        4.07562   7.30268   .000023   1.4e-13   
  1.9        4.32564   7.56092   7.6e-06   2.0e-14   
 1.95        4.56965   7.81328   2.4e-06   2.8e-15   
    2        4.80796   8.06007   7.6e-07   3.3e-16 
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Table A3.10. Probit estimates with marginal effects for the subsample of innovative firms  
  
 Local/regional support Government support EU support  
Covariates  Coefficients  
(SEs) 
Marginal 
effects  
(SEs) 
Coefficients  
(SEs) 
Marginal 
effects  
(SEs) 
Coefficients  
(SEs) 
Marginal 
effects  
(SEs) 
Gp 0.009 0.003 0.050 0.014 -0.089 -0.006 
 (0.050) (0.017) (0.052) (0.015) (0.095) (0.007) 
Sm 0.170* 0.057* -0.356*** -0.103*** 0.020 0.001 
 (0.102) (0.034) (0.106) (0.031) (0.198) (0.014) 
Export 0.041 0.014 0.005 0.001 0.034 0.002 
 (0.058) (0.019) (0.062) (0.018) (0.116) (0.008) 
info_internal 0.014 0.005 0.169** 0.049** 0.056 0.004 
 (0.071) (0.024) (0.083) (0.024) (0.159) (0.011) 
info_suppliers -0.083** -0.028** -0.039 -0.011 -0.068 -0.005 
 (0.039) (0.013) (0.041) (0.012) (0.075) (0.005) 
info_customers 0.027 0.009 0.025 0.007 -0.006 -0.000 
 (0.026) (0.009) (0.027) (0.008) (0.051) (0.004) 
info_competitors -0.054** -0.018** -0.024 -0.007 0.014 0.001 
 (0.027) (0.009) (0.029) (0.008) (0.053) (0.004) 
info_consultants 0.128*** 0.043*** 0.122*** 0.035*** -0.051 -0.004 
 (0.025) (0.008) (0.027) (0.008) (0.051) (0.004) 
info_HEI 0.108*** 0.036*** 0.179*** 0.052*** 0.091* 0.006* 
 (0.028) (0.009) (0.029) (0.008) (0.050) (0.003) 
info_government 0.132*** 0.044*** 0.056 0.016 0.233*** 0.016*** 
 (0.037) (0.012) (0.038) (0.011) (0.062) (0.004) 
incoming1 0.002 0.001 -0.010 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.030) (0.010) (0.032) (0.009) (0.058) (0.004) 
incoming2 -0.013 -0.004 -0.010 -0.003 0.033 0.002 
 (0.034) (0.011) (0.036) (0.010) (0.065) (0.004) 
incoming3 -0.050 -0.017 -0.059* -0.017* -0.026 -0.002 
 (0.033) (0.011) (0.035) (0.010) (0.063) (0.004) 
barrier3 0.019 0.006 -0.031 -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.008) (0.025) (0.007) (0.046) (0.003) 
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barrier4 0.030 0.010 -0.009 -0.003 0.032 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.009) (0.028) (0.008) (0.051) (0.004) 
barrier7 0.070*** 0.024*** 0.124*** 0.036*** 0.089* 0.006* 
 (0.024) (0.008) (0.025) (0.007) (0.046) (0.003) 
Propat 0.256*** 0.086*** 0.215*** 0.062*** 0.255*** 0.018*** 
 (0.056) (0.019) (0.059) (0.017) (0.098) (0.007) 
continous_RD 0.085* 0.028* 0.202*** 0.059*** 0.040 0.003 
 (0.051) (0.017) (0.056) (0.016) (0.101) (0.007) 
0b.info_suppliers#1.sm -0.104  0.160  0.066  
 (0.144)  (0.152)  (0.277)  
1. info_suppliers #0b.sm -0.097  -0.202**  -0.013  
 (0.094)  (0.099)  (0.171)  
1. info_suppliers #1.sm -0.108  0.038  -0.172  
 (0.114)  (0.121)  (0.230)  
2. info_suppliers #0b.sm -0.102  -0.202**  -0.045  
 (0.079)  (0.081)  (0.149)  
2. info_suppliers #1.sm -0.114  0.066  0.065  
 (0.086)  (0.093)  (0.170)  
3o. info_suppliers #0b.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
3o. info_suppliers #1o.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
0b.info_internal#1.sm -0.095  0.636**  -0.081  
 (0.263)  (0.297)  (0.585)  
1. info_internal #0b.sm 0.132  0.165  0.413  
 (0.179)  (0.206)  (0.364)  
1. info_internal #1.sm -0.211  0.561***  0.257  
 (0.177)  (0.197)  (0.366)  
2. info_internal #0b.sm -0.016  0.056  0.084  
 (0.100)  (0.111)  (0.209)  
2. info_internal #1.sm -0.070  0.168  -0.233  
 (0.096)  (0.108)  (0.211)  
3o. info_internal #0b.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
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3o. info_internal #1o.sm 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant -1.020***  -1.593***  -2.539***  
 (0.235)  (0.273)  (0.533)  
1. info_suppliers  -0.043*  -0.059***  -0.015 
  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.011) 
2. info_suppliers  -0.073***  -0.066***  -0.012 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.011) 
3. info_suppliers  -0.064**  -0.062**  -0.018 
  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.012) 
1.sm  0.033**  -0.027*  -0.004 
  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.006) 
1. info_internal  0.001  0.051  0.031* 
  (0.047)  (0.042)  (0.019) 
2. info_internal  0.012  0.019  0.004 
  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.015) 
3. info_internal  0.033  0.034  0.013 
  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.015) 
Industry DVs  Included   Included   Included  
No. of observations  3,861 3,861 3,861 3,861 3,808 3,808 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A3.11. Balancing tests for the subsample of innovative firms  
 
Matching estimator 
Local/regional support Government support EU support 
Pseudo-
R
2
 
LR 
test 
Mean 
bias 
t-test 
Pseudo-
R
2
 
LR 
test 
Mean 
bias 
t-test 
Pseudo-
R
2
 
LR 
test 
Mean 
bias 
t-test 
NN matching without replacement  
and caliper  
0.003 1.000 1.6 Yes  0.007 0.993 2.5 Yes  0.029 1.000 5.2 Yes  
NN matching with Mahalanobis 
metric and caliper   
0.003 1.000 1.2 Yes  0.005 0.999 1.6 Yes  0.034 1.000 3.7 Yes  
Kernel matching Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06 (0.001 for EU 
support) 
0.000 1.000 0.8 Yes  0.001 1.000 1.0 Yes  0.003 1.000 1.7 Yes  
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Table A3.12.  Average Treatment Effects (ATTs) for the subsample of Spanish SMEs - kernel matching estimates with confidence intervals  
Dependent 
variable 
Local/regional support Government support  EU support  
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 
95% confidence 
intervals  
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 95% confidence 
intervals  
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.001) 95% confidence 
intervals 
ATT 
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT  
(bootstrapped SEs) 
ATT  
(bootstrapped SEs) 
Aggregate 
cooperation  
0.177*** 
(0.017) 
[0.143         0.211] 0.108*** 
(0.020) 
[0.070            0.147] 0.215*** 
(0.050) 
[0.116            0.314] 
Cooperation with 
customers 
0.071*** 
(0.013) 
[0.045         0.098] 0.038*** 
(0.014) 
[0.010            0.066] 0.148*** 
(0.045) 
[0.058            0.237] 
Cooperation with 
suppliers 
0.058*** 
(0.016) 
[0.028         0.089] 0.036** 
(0.017) 
[0.002            0.070] 0.129** 
(0.051) 
[0.029            0.230] 
Cooperation with 
competitors 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
[0.016         0.050] 0.063*** 
(0.010) 
[0.043            0.083] 0.140*** 
(0.036) 
[0.070            0.210] 
Cooperation with 
consultants  
0.043*** 
(0.014) 
[0.015         0.070] 0.035** 
(0.016) 
[0.004            0.066] 0.090** 
(0.042) 
[0.008            0.172] 
Cooperation with 
HEI 
0.058*** 
(0.013) 
[0.032         0.084] 0.057*** 
(0.017) 
[0.024            0.090] 0.122*** 
(0.044) 
[0.035            0.209] 
Cooperation with 
government  
0.152*** 
(0.016) 
[0.121         0.183] 0.109*** 
(0.018) 
[0.073            0.144] 0.189*** 
(0.048) 
[0.094            0.283] 
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Outsourcing 
R&D  
0.202*** 
(0.016) 
[0.170         0.235] 0.154*** 
(0.021) 
[0.114            0.195] 0.097* 
(0.051) 
[-0.003          0.197] 
Acquisition of 
other external 
knowledge 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
[-0.001        0.023] 
0.011 
(0.008) 
[-0.006          0.027] 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
[-0.038          0.036] 
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Appendix IV 
Table A4.1. Variable definition and descriptive statistics  
Variable 
Variable name in 
the database 
Variable construction 
Mean  
(standard 
deviation) 
Treatment variables 
Participation in national support measures National_support 
DV=1 if the firm participated in national/regional R&D programmes in the last five 
years; zero otherwise 
0.529 
(0.500) 
Participation in international support measures Internat_support 
DV=1 if the firm participated in international R&D programmes in the last five 
years; zero otherwise 
0.274 
(0.447) 
Participation in either national or international support 
measures 
Joint_support 
DV=1 if the firm participated in either national/regional R&D programmes or 
international programmes in the last five years; zero otherwise 
0.599 
(0.491) 
Output dependent variables      
Innovative sales more than 10% - proportion of sales is 
above 10% from new or substantially improved products 
of processes introduced since 2005  
Q14_morethan10 DV =1 if the share is above 10% ; zero otherwise  
0.672 
(0.470) 
Innovative sales more than 20% - proportion of sales is 
above 20% from new or substantially improved products 
of processes introduced since 2005  
Q14_morethan20 DV =1 if the share is above 20%; zero otherwise 
0.572 
(0.495) 
Innovative sales more than 30% - proportion of sales is 
above 30% from new or substantially improved products 
of processes introduced since 2005  
Q14_morethan30 DV =1 if the share is above 30%; zero otherwise 
0.467 
(0.499) 
Innovative sales more than 40% - proportion of sales is 
above 40% from new or substantially improved products 
of processes introduced since 2005  
Q14_morethan40 DV =1 if the share is above 40%; zero otherwise 
0.397 
(0.490) 
Innovative sales more than 50% - proportion of sales is 
above 50 % from new or substantially improved products 
of processes introduced since 2005 
 
Q14_morethan50 DV =1 if the share is above 50%; zero otherwise 
0.347 
(0.476) 
Use of online technology or knowledge 
brokers/intermediaries 
Q23_1 
DV=1 if the response was "Apply" or "Apply extensively"; =0 if "Don't apply at 
all", "Don't apply" or "Neutral" to the question "Do you have a specific approach 
towards acquiring external knowledge - Use of online technology or knowledge 
0.323 
(0.468) 
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brokers/intermediaries" 
Informal networking with other firms Q23_2 
DV=1 if the response was "Apply" or "Apply extensively"; =0 if "Don't apply at 
all", "Don't apply" or "Neutral" to the question "Do you have a specific approach 
towards acquiring external knowledge - Informal networking with other firms" 
 
0.623 
(0.485) 
Informal networking with research organizations  Q23_3 
DV=1 if the response was "Apply" or "Apply extensively"; =0 if "Don't apply at 
all", "Don't apply" or "Neutral" to the question "Do you have a specific approach 
towards acquiring external knowledge - Informal networking with research 
organizations" 
0.527 
(0.500) 
Strategic alliances with other firms  Q23_4 
DV=1 if the response was "Apply" or "Apply extensively"; =0 if "Don't apply at 
all", "Don't apply" or "Neutral" to the question "Do you have a specific approach 
towards acquiring external knowledge - Strategic alliances with other firms" 
0.457 
(0.498) 
Non-equity alliances with other firms Q23_5 
DV=1 if the response was "Apply" or "Apply extensively"; =0 if "Don't apply at 
all", "Don't apply" or "Neutral" to the question "Do you have a specific approach 
towards acquiring external knowledge - Non-equity alliances with other firms" 
0.255 
(0.436) 
Participation in innovation networks, S&T parks, clusters 
etc. 
Q23_6 
DV=1 if the response was "Apply" or "Apply extensively"; =0 if "Don't apply at 
all", "Don't apply" or "Neutral" to the question "Do you have a specific approach 
towards acquiring external knowledge - Participation in innovation networks, S&T 
parks, clusters etc." 
0.399 
(0.490) 
Close involvement of end users/customers in idea 
generation/concept development  
Q23_7 
DV=1 if the response was "Apply" or "Apply extensively"; =0 if "Don't apply at 
all", "Don't apply" or "Neutral" to the question "Do you have a specific approach 
towards acquiring external knowledge - Close involvement of end users/customers 
in idea generation/concept development" 
0.583 
(0.494) 
Control variables in baseline model     
Annual R&D expenditures as % of total expenditure 
(including both intramural and extramural R&D activities; 
purchase of patents and know-how; training in R&D; and 
market introduction of innovation 
RD_expenditure 
=1 if the share is 0-10 %;  =2 if the share is 11-20%; =3 if the share is 21-50 %; =4 
if the share is >50% 
2.020 
(1.121) 
Geographic markets where firms sell goods or services  
Export DV=1 if firms engage in exporting activities; zero otherwise 
0.662 
(0.473) 
How would you judge the competition in your main 
market(s) 
Competition  DV = 1 if the firm responded "Very strong"; otherwise 0 
0.628 
(0.484) 
R&D department  RD_department DV=1 if firms have a separate R&D department; zero otherwise 
0.397 
(0.490) 
 
 406 
 
Micro firms  Micro_firms 
DV=1 if firms have less than 10 employees; zero otherwise 
0.493 
(0.500) 
Small firms  Small_firms 
DV=1 if firms have more than then 10 but less than 50 employees; zero otherwise 0.317 
(0.466) 
Medium-sized firms  Medium_firms 
DV=1 if firms have more than then 50 but less than 250 employees; zero otherwise 0.190 
(0.393) 
High tech firms    High_tech 
DV=1 if firm report to be operating in high technology industries; zero otherwise   0.198 
(0.399) 
Medium high tech firms Medium_high 
DV=1 if firm report to be operating in medium high technology industries; zero 
otherwise   
0.136 
(0.343) 
Medium low tech firms Medium_low 
DV=1 if firm report to be operating in medium low technology industries; zero 
otherwise   
0.122 
(0.327) 
Low tech firms Low_tech 
DV=1 if firm report to be operating in low technology industries; zero otherwise   0.147 
(0.354) 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) firms ICT DV=1 if firm report to be operating in ICT industries; zero otherwise   
0.202 
(0.402) 
Firms in service sectors Service  
DV=1 if firm report to be operating in service sectors; zero otherwise   0.195 
(0.397) 
'Innovation leaders', i.e. countries whose performance is 
well above the EU27 average 
Leaders  
DV=1 if countries are Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden; zero otherwise 0.191 
(0.394) 
'Innovation followers', i.e. countries whose performance is 
close to that of the EU27 average 
Followers  
DV=1 if countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom; zero otherwise (base 
category) 
0.287 
(0.453) 
'Moderate innovators', i.e. countries whose performance is 
below that of the EU27 average 
Moderate 
DV=1 if countries are Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Spain; zero otherwise 
0.372 
(0.484) 
'Modest innovators', i.e. countries whose performance is 
well below that of the EU27 average 
Modest  
DV=1 if countries are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; zero otherwise  
0.149 
(0.367) 
Additional control variables in augmented  model    
Resources devoted by the firm to innovation compared to 
the present 
Q19_fewer DV = 1 if the response was "Fewer"; = 0 if "About the same" or "More" 
0.432 
(0.496) 
The firm’s research and innovation record  relative to 
other firms in their industry in 2005 
Q18a_leading  DV = 1 for "Leading"; = 0 for "Average" and "Lagging" 
0.233 
(0.423) 
Location of the firm in technology park/area  Tech_park DV=1 if firms are located in a technology park/area; zero otherwise 
0.267 
(0.443) 
Integration of a cluster/technology platform  Tech_platform DV=1 if firms integrate a cluster/technology platform; zero otherwise 0.232 
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(0.422) 
Developed R&D and innovation strategy for the next five 
years  
RD_strategy  
DV=1 if firms have developed R&D and innovation strategy for the next five years; 
zero otherwise  
0.490 
(0.500) 
Exclusion restrictions (barriers to participation)    
Administrative needs - simple application procedure   Q53a5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Simple application procedures” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.547 
(0.498) 
Administrative needs - short time-to-contract periods  Q53b5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Short time-to-contract periods” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.402 
(0.491) 
Administrative needs - short time-to-funding periods  Q53c5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Short time-to-funding periods” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.438 
(0.497) 
Administrative needs - short proposal evaluation periods  Q53d5 
 
 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Short proposal evaluation periods” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
0.365 
(0.482) 
Administrative needs - transparent proposal evaluation 
procedures  
Q53e5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Transparent proposal evaluation procedures” and 0 otherwise 
(“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
0.429 
(0.495) 
Administrative needs - adequate assistance/guidance 
during project by Project officer   
Q53f5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Adequate assistance/guidance during project by Project 
officer ” and 0 otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or 
“Important”) 
0.361 
(0.481) 
Administrative needs -  simple reporting requirements Q53g5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
0.441 
(0.497) 
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R&D programmes? - Simple reporting requirements” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
Financial needs - high funding rates  Q54a5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? -  High funding rates” and 0 otherwise (“Not important at all”, 
“Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.418 
(0.494) 
Financial needs - limited requirements to get loans  Q54b5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Limited requirements to get loans” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.278 
(0.448) 
Financial needs - availability of additional financing 
opportunities  
Q54c5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Availability of additional financing opportunities” and 0 
otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.258 
(0.438) 
 
SME (internal needs) - adequate in-house knowledge on 
project management  
 
Q55a5 
 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Adequate in-house knowledge on project management” and 0 
otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.250 
(0.433) 
SME (internal needs) - adequate networks of potential 
partners  
Q55b5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Adequate networks of potential partners” and 0 otherwise 
(“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
0.251 
(0.434) 
SME (internal needs) - compliance of programme aims to 
SMEs interests  
Q55c5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Compliance of programme aims to SMEs interests” and 0 
otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
0.417 
(0.493) 
SME (internal needs) - easy access to information about 
available programmes  
 
Q55d5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Easy access to information about available programmes” and 
0 otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.338 
(0.473) 
SME (internal needs) - strong acknowledgement of need 
to participate in innovation programmes  
Q55e5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
0.231 
(0.422) 
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 R&D programmes? - Strong acknowledgement of need to participate in innovation 
programmes” and 0 otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” 
or “Important”) 
External needs - adequate marketing of/ information about 
programmes  
 
Q56a5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Adequate marketing of/ information about programmes” and 
0 otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.245 
(0.431) 
External needs - adequate external assistance/guidance 
during project  
Q56b5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Adequate external assistance/guidance during project” and 0 
otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
0.297 
(0.457) 
External needs - adequate external assistance/guidance 
after project  
Q56c5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Adequate external assistance/guidance after project” and 0 
otherwise (“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
0.210 
(0.408) 
External needs -  appropriate technological conditions Q56d5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Appropriate technological conditions” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
 
0.200 
(0.400) 
External needs -  appropriate market conditions Q56e5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Appropriate market conditions” and 0 otherwise (“Not 
important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.262 
(0.440) 
External needs - appropriate general economic conditions Q56f5 
DV = 1 if the response was “Most important” to the question  
"Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in 
R&D programmes? - Appropriate general economic conditions” and 0 otherwise 
(“Not important at all”, “Not important”, “Neutral” or “Important”) 
0.251 
(0.434) 
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Table A4.2. NACE Rev. 1.1 classification of manufacturing industries based on technology 
intensity  
 NACE rev. 1.1 
High-technology intensive industries   
Aircraft and spacecraft  353 
Pharmaceuticals  2423 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 
Radio, TV and communications equipment  32 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  33 
Medium high-technology intensive industries   
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c 31 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 
Chemicals, excluding pharmaceuticals 24 excluding 2423 
Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c 352+354+355 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c 29 
Medium low-technology intensive industries  
Building and repairing of ships and boats 351 
Rubber and plastics products 25 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 27-28 
Low-technology intensive industries  
Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling  36-37 
Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing  20-22 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 17-19 
 
Source: OECD (2006) 
 
 411 
 
Table A4.3. Stata output for Table 6.1 - baseline model for the outcome variable 
Q14_morethan20% and the treatment variable National_support 
 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        597 
                                                  Wald chi2(19)   =     119.44 
Log likelihood = -697.94464                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
National_support | 
  RD_expenditure |   .2646175   .0593114     4.46   0.000     .1483694    .3808657 
          Export |   .2235557   .1248314     1.79   0.073    -.0211094    .4682208 
     Competition |  -.2064032   .1162027    -1.78   0.076    -.4341562    .0213499 
   RD_department |   .4647884   .1271939     3.65   0.000      .215493    .7140838 
     Small_firms |   .5019668    .132002     3.80   0.000     .2432477    .7606858 
    Medium_firms |   .3399108    .168609     2.02   0.044     .0094432    .6703783 
             ICT |   -.039245   .1784199    -0.22   0.826    -.3889415    .3104516 
       High_tech |   .3935551   .1891262     2.08   0.037     .0228745    .7642357 
Medium_high_tech |   .2800859   .2055375     1.36   0.173    -.1227602     .682932 
        Low_tech |   .1757023   .1914237     0.92   0.359    -.1994811    .5508858 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.0756874   .2004708    -0.38   0.706    -.4686029     .317228 
          Modest |   .4758848   .1907526     2.49   0.013     .1020166    .8497529 
        Moderate |   .5044922   .1379337     3.66   0.000     .2341471    .7748372 
         Leaders |  -.1128448   .1714396    -0.66   0.510    -.4488602    .2231707 
           Q53a5 |   .2157107   .1176571     1.83   0.067     -.014893    .4463145 
           Q53e5 |  -.2379858   .1089085    -2.19   0.029    -.4514426    -.024529 
           Q53f5 |   -.212693   .1239695    -1.72   0.086    -.4556688    .0302828 
           Q53g5 |   .3024794   .1310898     2.31   0.021     .0455481    .5594107 
           Q56a5 |  -.2370802   .1260118    -1.88   0.060    -.4840589    .0098984 
           _cons |  -1.287014    .223033    -5.77   0.000     -1.72415   -.8498771 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q14_morethan20_1 | 
  RD_expenditure |    .346018   .0631558     5.48   0.000     .2222349    .4698011 
          Export |    .343929   .1457299     2.36   0.018     .0583037    .6295543 
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     Competition |  -.0919527   .1258373    -0.73   0.465    -.3385894    .1546839 
   RD_department |   .4152879   .1366268     3.04   0.002     .1475043    .6830716 
     Small_firms |   .1992147    .150196     1.33   0.185     -.095164    .4935934 
    Medium_firms |   .2186404   .1885824     1.16   0.246    -.1509742    .5882551 
             ICT |     .18193   .2066791     0.88   0.379    -.2231535    .5870135 
       High_tech |   .0823958   .2033589     0.41   0.685    -.3161803    .4809719 
Medium_high_tech |   .3870964   .2204663     1.76   0.079    -.0450095    .8192024 
        Low_tech |    .117047   .2163464     0.54   0.588    -.3069842    .5410782 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.0720578   .2298733    -0.31   0.754    -.5226012    .3784856 
          Modest |   .5868417   .2205092     2.66   0.008     .1546515    1.019032 
        Moderate |   .2735386   .1551746     1.76   0.078    -.0305981    .5776752 
         Leaders |   .0498003   .1890688     0.26   0.792    -.3207678    .4203684 
           _cons |  -1.896981   .2611918    -7.26   0.000    -2.408907   -1.385054 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q14_morethan20_0 | 
  RD_expenditure |   .3617256   .0850035     4.26   0.000     .1951218    .5283295 
          Export |    .405946   .1596679     2.54   0.011     .0930027    .7188893 
     Competition |   .1494808   .1808904     0.83   0.409    -.2050579    .5040195 
   RD_department |   .6386812   .1916454     3.33   0.001     .2630632    1.014299 
     Small_firms |  -.2791534    .271756    -1.03   0.304    -.8117853    .2534785 
    Medium_firms |  -.1187781   .2429793    -0.49   0.625    -.5950088    .3574526 
             ICT |  -.0002391   .2232277    -0.00   0.999    -.4377573    .4372791 
       High_tech |    .060269    .286801     0.21   0.834    -.5018507    .6223886 
Medium_high_tech |   .3158726   .3029902     1.04   0.297    -.2779773    .9097226 
        Low_tech |   .0698013   .2398128     0.29   0.771    -.4002231    .5398257 
 Medium_low_tech |   .0302486    .259805     0.12   0.907    -.4789599     .539457 
          Modest |   .7203163   .2574969     2.80   0.005     .2156316    1.225001 
        Moderate |   .2458776   .2003216     1.23   0.220    -.1467455    .6385007 
         Leaders |   .0077079    .227163     0.03   0.973    -.4375233    .4529392 
           _cons |  -.8141757   .3109352    -2.62   0.009    -1.423597    -.204754 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |   1.687197   .6919129                      .3310726    3.043321 
        /athrho0 |   .6673332   .6008183                      -.510249    1.844915 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |   .9337893   .0885909                      .3194842    .9954643 
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            rho0 |   .5832229   .3964505                     -.4701392    .9512648 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =     6.05  Prob > chi2 = 0.0485 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       315 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.2334671   .0056808   -41.10   0.000    -.2446012    -.222333 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       282 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.4897803   .0104284   -46.97   0.000    -.5102196    -.469341 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       597 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.3556805   .0036413   -97.68   0.000    -.3628174   -.3485436 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A4.4. Stata output for Table 6.1 - baseline model for the outcome variable 
Q14_morethan40% and the treatment variable National_support 
 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        612 
                                                  Wald chi2(15)   =     115.41 
Log likelihood = -721.29217                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
National_support | 
  RD_expenditure |   .2735851   .0572094     4.78   0.000     .1614567    .3857134 
          Export |   .1714215   .1220202     1.40   0.160    -.0677337    .4105768 
     Competition |   -.237637   .1153998    -2.06   0.039    -.4638165   -.0114575 
   RD_department |   .4829465   .1223066     3.95   0.000     .2432299    .7226632 
     Small_firms |   .4903477   .1274722     3.85   0.000     .2405067    .7401886 
    Medium_firms |   .3454308   .1645576     2.10   0.036     .0229038    .6679577 
             ICT |  -.0455824   .1743819    -0.26   0.794    -.3873646    .2961997 
       High_tech |    .301633    .187032     1.61   0.107     -.064943    .6682091 
Medium_high_tech |   .2225728   .2010144     1.11   0.268    -.1714083    .6165539 
        Low_tech |   .0671398   .1866492     0.36   0.719     -.298686    .4329656 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.1344887   .1972035    -0.68   0.495    -.5210004    .2520231 
          Modest |   .3959503   .1838538     2.15   0.031     .0356034    .7562972 
        Moderate |   .5080168   .1336173     3.80   0.000     .2461317    .7699019 
         Leaders |  -.0288846   .1663791    -0.17   0.862    -.3549815    .2972124 
           Q53g5 |   .2740484   .0941252     2.91   0.004     .0895665    .4585303 
           _cons |  -1.316507   .2145036    -6.14   0.000    -1.736927    -.896088 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q14_morethan40_1 | 
  RD_expenditure |   .0886667   .0739853     1.20   0.231    -.0563417    .2336752 
          Export |  -.1882039   .1393569    -1.35   0.177    -.4613384    .0849307 
     Competition |   .1109837   .1261839     0.88   0.379    -.1363322    .3582997 
   RD_department |  -.1254016   .1370118    -0.92   0.360    -.3939398    .1431367 
     Small_firms |  -.4066888   .1399103    -2.91   0.004    -.6809079   -.1324696 
    Medium_firms |  -.4723349   .1805906    -2.62   0.009    -.8262859   -.1183838 
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             ICT |   .0294822   .1923967     0.15   0.878    -.3476084    .4065729 
       High_tech |   -.320637   .1962342    -1.63   0.102    -.7052489    .0639748 
Medium_high_tech |  -.0751825      .2125    -0.35   0.723    -.4916749      .34131 
        Low_tech |  -.0209486   .2081187    -0.10   0.920    -.4288539    .3869566 
 Medium_low_tech |   .1138601   .2214582     0.51   0.607      -.32019    .5479102 
          Modest |  -.1071327   .2084677    -0.51   0.607    -.5157218    .3014564 
        Moderate |  -.4108789   .1456441    -2.82   0.005    -.6963361   -.1254216 
         Leaders |   .0333677   .1931892     0.17   0.863    -.3452763    .4120116 
           _cons |   .9453939   .2964098     3.19   0.001     .3644414    1.526346 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q14_morethan40_0 | 
  RD_expenditure |   .3654562   .0876016     4.17   0.000     .1937602    .5371523 
          Export |    .248826    .168426     1.48   0.140    -.0812828    .5789349 
     Competition |  -.1572825   .1706072    -0.92   0.357    -.4916665    .1771014 
   RD_department |   .6890709   .1897445     3.63   0.000     .3171786    1.060963 
     Small_firms |  -.2182538   .2996306    -0.73   0.466    -.8055191    .3690115 
    Medium_firms |  -.2067101   .2862564    -0.72   0.470    -.7677623    .3543421 
             ICT |  -.0641866   .2317244    -0.28   0.782     -.518358    .3899848 
       High_tech |  -.0551824   .3092865    -0.18   0.858    -.6613728     .551008 
Medium_high_tech |   .3137696   .3022539     1.04   0.299    -.2786372    .9061763 
        Low_tech |   .0452621   .2500072     0.18   0.856    -.4447429    .5352671 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.0849428   .2701049    -0.31   0.753    -.6143387    .4444532 
          Modest |   .3715238   .2628781     1.41   0.158    -.1437078    .8867554 
        Moderate |   .2540792   .2428569     1.05   0.295    -.2219116    .7300699 
         Leaders |   .0650137   .2281119     0.29   0.776    -.3820774    .5121049 
           _cons |  -.9554895   .3283776    -2.91   0.004    -1.599098   -.3118813 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |  -1.831274   .8695893                     -3.535638     -.12691 
        /athrho0 |   .5850282   .6721294                     -.7323213    1.902378 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |  -.9499505   .0848667                     -.9983031    -.126233 
            rho0 |   .5263104   .4859478                     -.6244834    .9564405 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =     5.98  Prob > chi2 = 0.0503 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       324 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.3040444   .0070293   -43.25   0.000    -.3178216   -.2902671 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       288 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |    .629136   .0107892    58.31   0.000     .6079896    .6502824 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       612 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   .1368257   .0112801    12.13   0.000     .1147171    .1589343 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A4.5. Stata output for Table 6.2 - augmented model for the outcome variable 
Q14_morethan40% and the treatment variable Internat_support 
 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        624 
                                                  Wald chi2(21)   =     117.09 
Log likelihood = -663.89873                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Internat_support | 
  RD_expenditure |   .3491512   .0653462     5.34   0.000     .2210749    .4772274 
          Export |   .3526477    .141691     2.49   0.013     .0749385     .630357 
     Competition |   .1267265   .1248973     1.01   0.310    -.1180677    .3715206 
    Q18a_leading |   .3066738    .140851     2.18   0.029     .0306109    .5827367 
       Q19_fewer |   .1809797   .1248265     1.45   0.147    -.0636759    .4256352 
     RD_strategy |   .2963741   .1280303     2.31   0.021     .0454393    .5473089 
   RD_department |  -.1673414   .1362374    -1.23   0.219    -.4343618    .0996789 
     Small_firms |   .5136904   .1431559     3.59   0.000       .23311    .7942709 
    Medium_firms |   .6718022   .1777692     3.78   0.000     .3233808    1.020223 
             ICT |  -.0198283    .187715    -0.11   0.916    -.3877428    .3480863 
       High_tech |  -.0935011   .2031972    -0.46   0.645    -.4917602    .3047581 
Medium_high_tech |  -.1483543   .2165703    -0.69   0.493    -.5728243    .2761158 
        Low_tech |  -.2262283   .2129451    -1.06   0.288    -.6435931    .1911364 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.4694872   .2292838    -2.05   0.041    -.9188753   -.0200991 
          Modest |  -.1868683   .2077297    -0.90   0.368    -.5940111    .2202745 
        Moderate |   .1108529   .1456749     0.76   0.447    -.1746646    .3963704 
         Leaders |  -.3334775   .1866958    -1.79   0.074    -.6993944    .0324395 
       Tech_park |   -.141118   .1599095    -0.88   0.378    -.4545347    .1722988 
   Tech_platform |   .0347479   .1409338     0.25   0.805    -.2414772    .3109731 
           Q55b5 |   .5212036    .128062     4.07   0.000     .2702066    .7722005 
           Q56a5 |  -.4997463    .143608    -3.48   0.001    -.7812129   -.2182798 
           _cons |  -2.052897   .2517218    -8.16   0.000    -2.546263   -1.559532 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Q14_morethan40_1 | 
  RD_expenditure |    .047133   .1532311     0.31   0.758    -.2531943    .3474604 
          Export |  -.2235249   .2290942    -0.98   0.329    -.6725413    .2254915 
     Competition |  -.1732342   .1908881    -0.91   0.364     -.547368    .2008995 
    Q18a_leading |  -.1471074   .2003813    -0.73   0.463    -.5398475    .2456326 
       Q19_fewer |  -.1080795   .1846711    -0.59   0.558    -.4700283    .2538692 
     RD_strategy |  -.3132276   .1900999    -1.65   0.099    -.6858165    .0593613 
   RD_department |   .2123574    .191232     1.11   0.267    -.1624505    .5871652 
     Small_firms |  -.4219925   .2164268    -1.95   0.051    -.8461813    .0021963 
    Medium_firms |  -.4654328   .2757956    -1.69   0.091    -1.005982    .0751167 
             ICT |   .0615903   .2722617     0.23   0.821    -.4720327    .5952134 
       High_tech |  -.0424594   .2936038    -0.14   0.885    -.6179123    .5329935 
Medium_high_tech |   .1998354   .3170256     0.63   0.528    -.4215233    .8211942 
        Low_tech |   .2131995   .3404051     0.63   0.531    -.4539822    .8803812 
 Medium_low_tech |   .3935369   .3576047     1.10   0.271    -.3073555    1.094429 
          Modest |   .5700692    .328062     1.74   0.082    -.0729206    1.213059 
        Moderate |  -.0114928   .2103991    -0.05   0.956    -.4238675     .400882 
         Leaders |   .1790547   .3150626     0.57   0.570    -.4384567    .7965661 
       Tech_park |   .1016392   .2306607     0.44   0.659    -.3504475    .5537258 
   Tech_platform |   .2121153   .2036228     1.04   0.298     -.186978    .6112086 
           _cons |   .9178207   .7875828     1.17   0.244    -.6258133    2.461455 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q14_morethan40_0 | 
  RD_expenditure |    .386054   .0795109     4.86   0.000     .2302155    .5418924 
          Export |   .2090658   .1481454     1.41   0.158    -.0812938    .4994253 
     Competition |   .0268414   .1334029     0.20   0.841    -.2346235    .2883062 
    Q18a_leading |   .2540219   .1684102     1.51   0.131     -.076056    .5840998 
       Q19_fewer |  -.0205102   .1380436    -0.15   0.882    -.2910707    .2500504 
     RD_strategy |   .4917788   .1386527     3.55   0.000     .2200245    .7635332 
   RD_department |   .2010859   .1648323     1.22   0.222    -.1219795    .5241513 
     Small_firms |  -.0568396   .1761437    -0.32   0.747    -.4020749    .2883957 
    Medium_firms |  -.4353591   .2467777    -1.76   0.078    -.9190345    .0483164 
             ICT |  -.0779422   .2075382    -0.38   0.707    -.4847096    .3288252 
       High_tech |  -.2857327   .2285777    -1.25   0.211    -.7337369    .1622714 
Medium_high_tech |   .1497814   .2380142     0.63   0.529    -.3167178    .6162806 
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        Low_tech |   .0740077   .2165841     0.34   0.733    -.3504893    .4985046 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.1346611   .2375916    -0.57   0.571    -.6003321    .3310098 
          Modest |   .1530738   .2148786     0.71   0.476    -.2680804    .5742281 
        Moderate |  -.0250267   .1636905    -0.15   0.878    -.3458542    .2958009 
         Leaders |    -.27131   .2059826    -1.32   0.188    -.6750284    .1324084 
       Tech_park |   .3191547   .1836126     1.74   0.082    -.0407194    .6790287 
   Tech_platform |   .1238816   .1691092     0.73   0.464    -.2075663    .4553295 
           _cons |  -1.170287   .2455098    -4.77   0.000    -1.651478   -.6890969 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |   -.918442   .5302138                     -1.957642     .120758 
        /athrho0 |   .6458152   .4274645                     -.1919997     1.48363 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |  -.7251595   .2513975                     -.9609095    .1201744 
            rho0 |   .5688461    .289143                     -.1896747    .9021459 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =     5.65  Prob > chi2 = 0.0592 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       180 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.3831744   .0122615   -31.25   0.000    -.4072066   -.3591422 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 422 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       444 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |    .461435   .0093012    49.61   0.000      .443205    .4796651 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       624 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   .2194848   .0108486    20.23   0.000     .1982219    .2407477 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 423 
 
Table A4.6. Stata output for Table 6.2 - augmented model for the outcome variable 
Q14_morethan50% and the treatment variable Joint_support 
 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        602 
                                                  Wald chi2(23)   =     158.34 
Log likelihood =  -628.1716                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Joint_support    | 
  RD_expenditure |    .355184   .0663936     5.35   0.000     .2250549    .4853131 
          Export |   .3085777   .1334842     2.31   0.021     .0469536    .5702019 
     Competition |  -.2722651   .1245337    -2.19   0.029    -.5163467   -.0281835 
    Q18a_leading |   .1438989   .1546474     0.93   0.352    -.1592044    .4470022 
       Q19_fewer |   .3734633    .124342     3.00   0.003     .1297575    .6171692 
     RD_strategy |    .468996   .1297098     3.62   0.000     .2147695    .7232226 
   RD_department |   .2094246   .1391138     1.51   0.132    -.0632335    .4820826 
     Small_firms |   .5534443   .1439967     3.84   0.000     .2712159    .8356727 
    Medium_firms |   .5036274   .1807023     2.79   0.005     .1494574    .8577975 
             ICT |    .028164   .1864929     0.15   0.880    -.3373553    .3936834 
       High_tech |   .4052328   .2098795     1.93   0.054    -.0061236    .8165891 
Medium_high_tech |   .4111893    .226508     1.82   0.069    -.0327582    .8551369 
        Low_tech |   .2255347   .2007286     1.12   0.261    -.1678862    .6189556 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.2151206   .2137201    -1.01   0.314    -.6340044    .2037632 
          Modest |   .4496696   .2030164     2.21   0.027     .0517648    .8475744 
        Moderate |   .5323983   .1491423     3.57   0.000     .2400848    .8247117 
         Leaders |  -.0900976   .1861106    -0.48   0.628    -.4548677    .2746725 
       Tech_park |  -.1132943   .1631936    -0.69   0.488    -.4331478    .2065592 
   Tech_platform |    .119652   .1524095     0.79   0.432    -.1790652    .4183691 
           Q53b5 |   -.287023   .1263085    -2.27   0.023    -.5345832   -.0394628 
           Q53g5 |    .357096   .1224175     2.92   0.004     .1171621    .5970298 
           Q55c5 |   .3009728   .1288445     2.34   0.019     .0484422    .5535034 
           Q56a5 |  -.3887055   .1521572    -2.55   0.011    -.6869281   -.0904828 
           _cons |  -1.687793   .2455388    -6.87   0.000     -2.16904   -1.206546 
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-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q14_morethan50_1 | 
  RD_expenditure |   .0555302   .1057651     0.53   0.600    -.1517655    .2628259 
          Export |   .0629472    .194133     0.32   0.746    -.3175465    .4434409 
     Competition |   .0743911   .1403597     0.53   0.596    -.2007089    .3494911 
    Q18a_leading |   .0944682   .1596583     0.59   0.554    -.2184564    .4073928 
       Q19_fewer |  -.2048094    .139796    -1.47   0.143    -.4788046    .0691858 
     RD_strategy |  -.1431674   .1767955    -0.81   0.418    -.4896803    .2033455 
   RD_department |   .1521474   .1488583     1.02   0.307    -.1396095    .4439044 
     Small_firms |  -.4344586   .1618373    -2.68   0.007     -.751654   -.1172633 
    Medium_firms |  -.5715042   .2010274    -2.84   0.004    -.9655107   -.1774976 
             ICT |  -.1513048   .2116591    -0.71   0.475     -.566149    .2635395 
       High_tech |  -.4607625   .2206516    -2.09   0.037    -.8932317   -.0282933 
Medium_high_tech |  -.1140379   .2420838    -0.47   0.638    -.5885135    .3604377 
        Low_tech |  -.2595168   .2413972    -1.08   0.282    -.7326468    .2136131 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.1602041   .2646693    -0.61   0.545    -.6789465    .3585383 
          Modest |   .2366982   .2567071     0.92   0.356    -.2664386    .7398349 
        Moderate |  -.1607928    .178082    -0.90   0.367    -.5098271    .1882416 
         Leaders |  -.0767525    .214736    -0.36   0.721    -.4976273    .3441223 
       Tech_park |   .4002539   .1744354     2.29   0.022     .0583668     .742141 
   Tech_platform |   .0473125   .1555783     0.30   0.761    -.2576153    .3522404 
           _cons |   .3719841   .6724082     0.55   0.580    -.9459118     1.68988 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q14_morethan50_0 | 
  RD_expenditure |   .5447352   .1127241     4.83   0.000     .3237999    .7656705 
          Export |   .1993034   .1840047     1.08   0.279    -.1613392     .559946 
     Competition |  -.3670411    .175223    -2.09   0.036    -.7104718   -.0236103 
    Q18a_leading |     .13946   .2236681     0.62   0.533    -.2989214    .5778415 
       Q19_fewer |   .0613523    .206463     0.30   0.766    -.3433078    .4660123 
     RD_strategy |   .8578264   .1876549     4.57   0.000     .4900295    1.225623 
   RD_department |   .2824083   .2087873     1.35   0.176    -.1268073    .6916239 
     Small_firms |  -.0381934   .2947653    -0.13   0.897    -.6159228    .5395361 
    Medium_firms |  -.1328357   .3416227    -0.39   0.697    -.8024038    .5367325 
             ICT |  -.2665599     .27573    -0.97   0.334    -.8069808    .2738609 
       High_tech |   .0065277   .3178512     0.02   0.984    -.6164491    .6295045 
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Medium_high_tech |   .1357715   .3313479     0.41   0.682    -.5136584    .7852014 
        Low_tech |  -.1750808   .2865985    -0.61   0.541    -.7368035    .3866418 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.1670091    .281587    -0.59   0.553    -.7189094    .3848912 
          Modest |   .1900722   .3120866     0.61   0.543    -.4216063    .8017508 
        Moderate |   .3582731   .2229192     1.61   0.108    -.0786405    .7951867 
         Leaders |  -.0581687   .2532893    -0.23   0.818    -.5546066    .4382693 
       Tech_park |    .006911   .2323564     0.03   0.976    -.4484992    .4623212 
   Tech_platform |   .3045352   .2456054     1.24   0.215    -.1768426    .7859129 
           _cons |  -1.119524   .3035633    -3.69   0.000    -1.714497   -.5245508 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |  -.9068903   .6009153                     -2.084663    .2708821 
        /athrho0 |   1.125264   .6402638                     -.1296302    2.380158 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |  -.7196363   .2897154                     -.9695455    .2644455 
            rho0 |   .8093921    .220817                     -.1289089    .9830196 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =     7.12  Prob > chi2 = 0.0285 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       365 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.4959366   .0083709   -59.25   0.000    -.5123433     -.47953 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       237 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   .4604012   .0130887    35.18   0.000     .4347478    .4860547 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       602 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.1157419   .0122628    -9.44   0.000    -.1397766   -.0917071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A4.7. Stata output for Table 6.3 - baseline model for the outcome variable 
Q23_1 and the treatment variable Joint_support 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        598 
                                                  Wald chi2(18)   =     138.70 
Log likelihood = -666.98421                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Joint_support    | 
  RD_expenditure |   .4023882   .0622332     6.47   0.000     .2804133     .524363 
          Export |   .3162801   .1295052     2.44   0.015     .0624546    .5701056 
     Competition |  -.1687623    .122106    -1.38   0.167    -.4080856    .0705611 
   RD_department |   .3844571   .1302937     2.95   0.003     .1290861    .6398281 
     Small_firms |   .5672606   .1372714     4.13   0.000     .2982137    .8363075 
    Medium_firms |   .3970851   .1734926     2.29   0.022     .0570459    .7371244 
             ICT |  -.0692418   .1783929    -0.39   0.698    -.4188854    .2804018 
       High_tech |    .189973   .1979808     0.96   0.337    -.1980622    .5780082 
Medium_high_tech |   .2452408   .2190782     1.12   0.263    -.1841446    .6746261 
        Low_tech |   .1080715   .1928645     0.56   0.575    -.2699359    .4860788 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.2957482   .2014461    -1.47   0.142    -.6905753    .0990788 
          Modest |   .3167507   .1935402     1.64   0.102    -.0625812    .6960826 
        Moderate |   .4938691   .1416781     3.49   0.000      .216185    .7715531 
         Leaders |  -.0582706   .1716074    -0.34   0.734    -.3946149    .2780738 
           Q53c5 |  -.2517281   .1154632    -2.18   0.029    -.4780318   -.0254245 
           Q53g5 |   .3208134   .1168995     2.74   0.006     .0916947    .5499322 
           Q55c5 |   .3614343   .1584656     2.28   0.023     .0508474    .6720211 
           Q55d5 |  -.4571667   .1225155    -3.73   0.000    -.6972927   -.2170407 
           _cons |  -1.288582   .2306264    -5.59   0.000    -1.740602   -.8365631 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_1_1          | 
  RD_expenditure |   .0851899   .0649049     1.31   0.189    -.0420213    .2124012 
          Export |   .0094327   .1516238     0.06   0.950    -.2877446    .3066099 
     Competition |  -.2059021   .1290565    -1.60   0.111    -.4588483     .047044 
   RD_department |   .2895985   .1369649     2.11   0.034     .0211522    .5580449 
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     Small_firms |   .4540225   .1456601     3.12   0.002      .168534    .7395109 
    Medium_firms |   .1448184   .1922793     0.75   0.451    -.2320421    .5216789 
             ICT |   .0140528   .2011687     0.07   0.944    -.3802306    .4083363 
       High_tech |  -.0112318   .2088194    -0.05   0.957    -.4205103    .3980466 
Medium_high_tech |  -.1648184   .2367467    -0.70   0.486    -.6288334    .2991966 
        Low_tech |  -.3133731   .2370909    -1.32   0.186    -.7780627    .1513164 
 Medium_low_tech |   .0600089   .2253631     0.27   0.790    -.3816946    .5017125 
          Modest |   .3228147   .2040886     1.58   0.114    -.0771916     .722821 
        Moderate |  -.1533604     .15535    -0.99   0.324    -.4578408      .15112 
         Leaders |  -.2200543   .1951255    -1.13   0.259    -.6024932    .1623847 
           _cons |  -1.197048   .2687563    -4.45   0.000      -1.7238    -.670295 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_1_0          | 
  RD_expenditure |   .2766361   .1268177     2.18   0.029     .0280779    .5251943 
          Export |   .0497023   .2024189     0.25   0.806    -.3470315    .4464362 
     Competition |  -.3095753    .172229    -1.80   0.072     -.647138    .0279873 
   RD_department |   .1622151   .2314285     0.70   0.483    -.2913765    .6158068 
     Small_firms |  -.2410169    .351767    -0.69   0.493    -.9304675    .4484338 
    Medium_firms |   .2723129   .2658652     1.02   0.306    -.2487734    .7933992 
             ICT |   .2575467   .2519692     1.02   0.307    -.2363038    .7513973 
       High_tech |   .0486738   .3108626     0.16   0.876    -.5606057    .6579533 
Medium_high_tech |   .0219306   .3415109     0.06   0.949    -.6474186    .6912797 
        Low_tech |   .2287352   .2574231     0.89   0.374    -.2758047    .7332751 
 Medium_low_tech |    .052549    .301095     0.17   0.861    -.5375865    .6426844 
          Modest |   .5602818   .2755073     2.03   0.042     .0202974    1.100266 
        Moderate |   .0362866   .2690757     0.13   0.893    -.4910921    .5636652 
         Leaders |  -.1772315   .2322465    -0.76   0.445    -.6324263    .2779634 
           _cons |  -.3043646   .2700044    -1.13   0.260    -.8335635    .2248343 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |   1.892975   1.411668                      -.873844    4.659794 
        /athrho0 |   .7741112    .714261                     -.6258146    2.174037 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |    .955632   .1224869                     -.7033219    .9998207 
            rho0 |   .6493137   .4131226                     -.5551635    .9744668 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =     4.88  Prob > chi2 = 0.0871 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       366 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.4720295   .0087238   -54.11   0.000    -.4891279   -.4549311 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       232 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.3467678   .0095554   -36.29   0.000    -.3654961   -.3280396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       598 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.4244067   .0063083   -67.28   0.000    -.4367708   -.4120426 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A4.8. Stata output for Table 6.3 - baseline model for the outcome variable 
Q23_6 and the treatment variable Joint_support 
 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        577 
                                                  Wald chi2(18)   =     130.83 
Log likelihood = -644.71303                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Joint_support    | 
  RD_expenditure |   .4179928   .0634109     6.59   0.000     .2937096    .5422759 
          Export |   .3423679   .1301345     2.63   0.009     .0873089    .5974269 
     Competition |  -.2326028   .1241418    -1.87   0.061    -.4759163    .0107107 
   RD_department |   .2913064   .1332152     2.19   0.029     .0302094    .5524033 
     Small_firms |   .5403833    .141264     3.83   0.000      .263511    .8172556 
    Medium_firms |   .4796263   .1784899     2.69   0.007     .1297925    .8294601 
             ICT |   .0323735    .182168     0.18   0.859    -.3246692    .3894162 
       High_tech |   .3173909   .2008284     1.58   0.114    -.0762255    .7110073 
Medium_high_tech |   .3282488   .2209116     1.49   0.137    -.1047301    .7612276 
        Low_tech |    .165151   .2009095     0.82   0.411    -.2286245    .5589264 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.2040352   .2073444    -0.98   0.325    -.6104227    .2023523 
          Modest |   .4426506   .2155912     2.05   0.040     .0200997    .8652015 
        Moderate |   .4994668   .1458614     3.42   0.001     .2135837    .7853499 
         Leaders |  -.0555439   .1769111    -0.31   0.754    -.4022833    .2911954 
           Q53b5 |  -.2444728   .1037882    -2.36   0.018    -.4478938   -.0410517 
           Q53g5 |   .3786616   .1203169     3.15   0.002     .1428448    .6144784 
           Q55c5 |   .3090084   .1110643     2.78   0.005     .0913263    .5266904 
           Q56a5 |  -.3258325   .1404133    -2.32   0.020    -.6010375   -.0506275 
           _cons |   -1.46233   .2402939    -6.09   0.000    -1.933297   -.9913624 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_6_1          | 
  RD_expenditure |   .2005571   .0936151     2.14   0.032      .017075    .3840393 
          Export |  -.1704701   .1935586    -0.88   0.378    -.5498381    .2088978 
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     Competition |  -.0788345   .1430504    -0.55   0.582    -.3592081    .2015391 
   RD_department |   .3532084    .149582     2.36   0.018     .0600331    .6463837 
     Small_firms |   .1532957   .1924196     0.80   0.426    -.2238397    .5304311 
    Medium_firms |  -.0734568   .2318925    -0.32   0.751    -.5279577    .3810442 
             ICT |  -.2162229   .2274922    -0.95   0.342    -.6620994    .2296535 
       High_tech |  -.2521107   .2401332    -1.05   0.294    -.7227632    .2185418 
Medium_high_tech |  -.2796096   .2649524    -1.06   0.291    -.7989067    .2396875 
        Low_tech |  -.7447902   .2830952    -2.63   0.009    -1.299647   -.1899339 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.5826691   .2632264    -2.21   0.027    -1.098583   -.0667548 
          Modest |   .0964796   .2669759     0.36   0.718    -.4267834    .6197427 
        Moderate |  -.2989473   .2177364    -1.37   0.170    -.7257028    .1278082 
         Leaders |     -.0175   .2113534    -0.08   0.934    -.4317451    .3967451 
           _cons |  -.3374209   .6775352    -0.50   0.618    -1.665366    .9905238 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_6_0          | 
  RD_expenditure |   .4034728   .0758774     5.32   0.000     .2547558    .5521898 
          Export |   .3967221    .146468     2.71   0.007       .10965    .6837942 
     Competition |    -.18566   .1436984    -1.29   0.196    -.4673036    .0959837 
   RD_department |   .1789886   .1596804     1.12   0.262    -.1339793    .4919564 
     Small_firms |   .2034678   .1849749     1.10   0.271    -.1590763     .566012 
    Medium_firms |   .2653111   .2147409     1.24   0.217    -.1555733    .6861956 
             ICT |   .2322743   .2069687     1.12   0.262    -.1733769    .6379255 
       High_tech |    .384815   .2356484     1.63   0.102    -.0770474    .8466774 
Medium_high_tech |    .232634   .2644574     0.88   0.379     -.285693    .7509611 
        Low_tech |   .1235955   .2262041     0.55   0.585    -.3197564    .5669474 
 Medium_low_tech |   .2373193   .2359898     1.01   0.315    -.2252123    .6998509 
          Modest |  -.1551297   .2862212    -0.54   0.588     -.716113    .4058536 
        Moderate |   .1368658   .1716165     0.80   0.425    -.1994963    .4732279 
         Leaders |  -.1571784   .1983884    -0.79   0.428    -.5460125    .2316557 
           _cons |  -.8375964   .2439047    -3.43   0.001    -1.315641    -.359552 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |   .5797442   .5436356                     -.4857619     1.64525 
        /athrho0 |   2.024101   .7302064                      .5929227    3.455279 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |   .5224795   .3952313                     -.4508462     .928203 
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            rho0 |   .9656914   .0492453                      .5319944    .9980076 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =    15.36  Prob > chi2 = 0.0005 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       353 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.4493254   .0085394   -52.62   0.000    -.4660623   -.4325885 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       224 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.0608236   .0119489    -5.09   0.000     -.084243   -.0374043 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       224 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.0608236   .0119489    -5.09   0.000     -.084243   -.0374043 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       577 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.2987056   .0077219   -38.68   0.000    -.3138402    -.283571 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A4.9. Stata output for Table 6.4 - augmented model for the outcome variable 
Q23_2 and the treatment variable Joint_support 
 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        604 
                                                  Wald chi2(22)   =     150.25 
Log likelihood = -676.32083                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Joint_suppor     | 
  RD_expenditure |   .3243455   .0683323     4.75   0.000     .1904166    .4582744 
          Export |   .2948207   .1300574     2.27   0.023     .0399128    .5497286 
     Competition |  -.2253083   .1238869    -1.82   0.069    -.4681221    .0175055 
    Q18a_leading |   .1551269   .1545522     1.00   0.316    -.1477899    .4580437 
       Q19_fewer |   .3044536   .1235001     2.47   0.014     .0623978    .5465093 
     RD_strategy |    .552151   .1269405     4.35   0.000     .3033523    .8009497 
   RD_department |   .1492198    .141375     1.06   0.291      -.12787    .4263096 
     Small_firms |   .4992139   .1431531     3.49   0.000      .218639    .7797889 
    Medium_firms |   .4216671    .179332     2.35   0.019     .0701828    .7731514 
             ICT |   .0473918   .1827905     0.26   0.795    -.3108709    .4056546 
       High_tech |    .370667   .2072853     1.79   0.074    -.0356047    .7769387 
Medium_high_tech |   .3688219   .2216799     1.66   0.096    -.0656627    .8033066 
        Low_tech |   .1360297     .19946     0.68   0.495    -.2549047    .5269641 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.2032574   .2094989    -0.97   0.332    -.6138678    .2073529 
          Modest |   .5133501   .2023728     2.54   0.011     .1167068    .9099935 
        Moderate |   .4619303   .1501008     3.08   0.002     .1677381    .7561224 
         Leaders |   .0161465   .1806874     0.09   0.929    -.3379943    .3702872 
       Tech_park |  -.1772437   .1640304    -1.08   0.280    -.4987375      .14425 
   Tech_platform |   .1235845   .1516613     0.81   0.415    -.1736662    .4208352 
           Q55c5 |   .4136141   .1229113     3.37   0.001     .1727123    .6545159 
           Q55d5 |  -.2253611   .1362632    -1.65   0.098    -.4924321    .0417099 
           Q56a5 |  -.2748658    .146415    -1.88   0.060     -.561834    .0121023 
           _cons |  -1.498753   .2399268    -6.25   0.000    -1.969001   -1.028505 
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-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_2_1          | 
  RD_expenditure |  -.1146259   .0934631    -1.23   0.220    -.2978102    .0685585 
          Export |    .143377   .1812148     0.79   0.429    -.2117975    .4985516 
     Competition |   .0654689   .1471379     0.44   0.656    -.2229162    .3538539 
    Q18a_leading |   .0026068   .1659371     0.02   0.987    -.3226239    .3278375 
       Q19_fewer |  -.0677489   .1514936    -0.45   0.655    -.3646709     .229173 
     RD_strategy |   .0891092    .195839     0.46   0.649    -.2947283    .4729467 
   RD_department |    .052712   .1582894     0.33   0.739    -.2575296    .3629536 
     Small_firms |  -.3050111    .174744    -1.75   0.081    -.6475031    .0374809 
    Medium_firms |  -.0784341   .2270372    -0.35   0.730    -.5234188    .3665506 
             ICT |  -.1505408   .2323142    -0.65   0.517    -.6058682    .3047867 
       High_tech |  -.4938215   .2359489    -2.09   0.036    -.9562728   -.0313702 
Medium_high_tech |   -.234673   .2594254    -0.90   0.366    -.7431376    .2737915 
        Low_tech |  -.6015496   .2682998    -2.24   0.025    -1.127408   -.0756917 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.2006664   .2808967    -0.71   0.475    -.7512139    .3498811 
          Modest |   .0938063   .2603461     0.36   0.719    -.4164626    .6040753 
        Moderate |  -.3853272   .1787705    -2.16   0.031    -.7357109   -.0349434 
         Leaders |   .2462013   .2296375     1.07   0.284    -.2038799    .6962824 
       Tech_park |  -.0057519   .1885108    -0.03   0.976    -.3752263    .3637225 
   Tech_platform |   .1402939   .1633064     0.86   0.390    -.1797807    .4603685 
           _cons |   1.305263   .5872564     2.22   0.026     .1542619    2.456265 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_2_0          | 
  RD_expenditure |   .3169084   .0936955     3.38   0.001     .1332687    .5005482 
          Export |   .3930375   .1542647     2.55   0.011     .0906842    .6953907 
     Competition |  -.2008154   .1561013    -1.29   0.198    -.5067683    .1051376 
    Q18a_leading |  -.0364249   .2035004    -0.18   0.858    -.4352784    .3624285 
       Q19_fewer |   .4512608   .1551932     2.91   0.004     .1470877    .7554339 
     RD_strategy |   .5029505   .1698264     2.96   0.003      .170097    .8358041 
   RD_department |  -.0977077   .2076477    -0.47   0.638    -.5046898    .3092744 
     Small_firms |   .2278657   .2025463     1.13   0.261    -.1691178    .6248491 
    Medium_firms |   .0249529   .2421843     0.10   0.918    -.4497196    .4996255 
             ICT |  -.0645677   .2300422    -0.28   0.779    -.5154422    .3863068 
       High_tech |    .053467   .2867535     0.19   0.852    -.5085595    .6154935 
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Medium_high_tech |   .2985144   .2936297     1.02   0.309    -.2769893    .8740181 
        Low_tech |    .090796   .2354015     0.39   0.700    -.3705824    .5521745 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.1921831   .2420155    -0.79   0.427    -.6665249    .2821586 
          Modest |  -.0588996   .2939675    -0.20   0.841    -.6350653     .517266 
        Moderate |   .1000584   .1945565     0.51   0.607    -.2812654    .4813821 
         Leaders |   .1412201   .2343816     0.60   0.547    -.3181593    .6005995 
       Tech_park |   -.270172   .2137697    -1.26   0.206     -.689153    .1488089 
   Tech_platform |  -.1699784   .2173597    -0.78   0.434    -.5959957    .2560388 
           _cons |  -.2362018   .2654915    -0.89   0.374    -.7565554    .2841519 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |  -.6360061   .6355906                     -1.881741    .6097285 
        /athrho0 |   1.302486   .8292339                     -.3227824    2.927755 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |   -.562174   .4347188                     -.9546467    .5439359 
            rho0 |   .8623618   .2125593                     -.3120206    .9942882 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =     4.63  Prob > chi2 = 0.0989 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       371 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.2918618   .0066112   -44.15   0.000    -.3048196    -.278904 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       233 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   .3722927   .0100356    37.10   0.000     .3526232    .3919623 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       604 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.0357252   .0081513    -4.38   0.000    -.0517013    -.019749 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A4.10. Stata output for Table 6.4 - augmented model for the outcome 
variable Q23_3 and the treatment variable Joint_support 
 
Switching probit model                            Number of obs   =        578 
                                                  Wald chi2(22)   =     142.59 
Log likelihood = -607.43866                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Joint_support    | 
  RD_expenditure |   .3417879   .0692895     4.93   0.000      .205983    .4775929 
          Export |    .266443   .1329128     2.00   0.045     .0059386    .5269473 
     Competition |  -.2652909   .1269666    -2.09   0.037    -.5141409    -.016441 
    Q18a_leading |   .2316789   .1566021     1.48   0.139    -.0752555    .5386133 
       Q19_fewer |   .3125734   .1256326     2.49   0.013     .0663381    .5588087 
     RD_strategy |   .5364487   .1291308     4.15   0.000     .2833569    .7895405 
   RD_department |   .1242236   .1408402     0.88   0.378    -.1518181    .4002653 
     Small_firms |   .4562178   .1440898     3.17   0.002      .173807    .7386285 
    Medium_firms |    .534912   .1846305     2.90   0.004     .1730428    .8967812 
             ICT |   .0472154   .1858316     0.25   0.799    -.3170078    .4114386 
       High_tech |   .4767469   .2060542     2.31   0.021     .0728882    .8806056 
Medium_high_tech |   .3758283   .2210987     1.70   0.089    -.0575172    .8091738 
        Low_tech |   .2430647   .2040055     1.19   0.233    -.1567787     .642908 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.2712546   .2159783    -1.26   0.209    -.6945642     .152055 
          Modest |   .4146353   .2108519     1.97   0.049     .0013731    .8278974 
        Moderate |   .4846074   .1496192     3.24   0.001     .1913592    .7778556 
         Leaders |  -.0854493   .1841625    -0.46   0.643    -.4464013    .2755027 
       Tech_park |  -.1441577   .1642813    -0.88   0.380    -.4661432    .1778277 
   Tech_platform |   .1603142   .1516987     1.06   0.291    -.1370098    .4576383 
           Q55c5 |    .420945   .1246492     3.38   0.001      .176637     .665253 
           Q56a5 |   -.386883   .1430864    -2.70   0.007    -.6673271   -.1064388 
           Q56f5 |  -.2341166   .1395317    -1.68   0.093    -.5075937    .0393606 
           _cons |   -1.54467   .2498276    -6.18   0.000    -2.034323   -1.055017 
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-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_3_1          | 
  RD_expenditure |  -.1288209   .0773016    -1.67   0.096    -.2803292    .0226873 
          Export |  -.0868916   .1610728    -0.54   0.590    -.4025885    .2288053 
     Competition |   .0788903   .1389763     0.57   0.570    -.1934982    .3512788 
    Q18a_leading |   .2959351   .1740422     1.70   0.089    -.0451813    .6370515 
       Q19_fewer |  -.0449016   .1418667    -0.32   0.752    -.3229553     .233152 
     RD_strategy |   .2385325   .1803882     1.32   0.186    -.1150218    .5920869 
   RD_department |   .0548179    .154492     0.35   0.723     -.247981    .3576167 
     Small_firms |  -.2088661   .1664433    -1.25   0.210    -.5350889    .1173567 
    Medium_firms |  -.1789026   .2069615    -0.86   0.387    -.5845397    .2267345 
             ICT |   .0957315   .2179717     0.44   0.661    -.3314851    .5229482 
       High_tech |   .0444805   .2220933     0.20   0.841    -.3908145    .4797754 
Medium_high_tech |   .2056013   .2558846     0.80   0.422    -.2959234     .707126 
        Low_tech |  -.2425587   .2400981    -1.01   0.312    -.7131422    .2280249 
 Medium_low_tech |   .4497663   .2848144     1.58   0.114    -.1084596    1.007992 
          Modest |  -.3886988   .2340141    -1.66   0.097     -.847358    .0699604 
        Moderate |  -.5258618   .1684994    -3.12   0.002    -.8561146    -.195609 
         Leaders |   .3276496   .2334967     1.40   0.161    -.1299955    .7852947 
       Tech_park |  -.0819434   .1843429    -0.44   0.657    -.4432488     .279362 
   Tech_platform |   .2023092   .1630361     1.24   0.215    -.1172356     .521854 
           _cons |   1.086654   .4494527     2.42   0.016     .2057433    1.967566 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Q23_3_0          | 
  RD_expenditure |   .3169339   .1164655     2.72   0.007     .0886657    .5452022 
          Export |   .5700203   .1971953     2.89   0.004     .1835246    .9565161 
     Competition |  -.2321881   .2006206    -1.16   0.247    -.6253974    .1610211 
    Q18a_leading |   .3075895   .2404881     1.28   0.201    -.1637584    .7789375 
       Q19_fewer |   .3400346   .1977107     1.72   0.085    -.0474712    .7275404 
     RD_strategy |   .7618029   .2033866     3.75   0.000     .3631725    1.160433 
   RD_department |  -.0852969   .2456516    -0.35   0.728    -.5667652    .3961715 
     Small_firms |   .2564167   .2462558     1.04   0.298    -.2262359    .7390693 
    Medium_firms |  -.3322843    .381537    -0.87   0.384    -1.080083    .4155146 
             ICT |  -.1747011   .2765155    -0.63   0.528    -.7166615    .3672593 
       High_tech |  -.3167812   .3778849    -0.84   0.402    -1.057422    .4238597 
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Medium_high_tech |   .1754269   .3551558     0.49   0.621    -.5206657    .8715195 
        Low_tech |  -.3283876   .3270428    -1.00   0.315    -.9693798    .3126045 
 Medium_low_tech |  -.0095596   .3149503    -0.03   0.976    -.6268508    .6077315 
          Modest |  -.4063202   .3990595    -1.02   0.309    -1.188463    .3758221 
        Moderate |    -.15476   .2761672    -0.56   0.575    -.6960378    .3865178 
         Leaders |  -.1737512   .2720493    -0.64   0.523     -.706958    .3594557 
       Tech_park |   .0634203    .260379     0.24   0.808    -.4469131    .5737536 
   Tech_platform |   .4610982   .2617026     1.76   0.078    -.0518294    .9740258 
           _cons |  -1.023305   .3472542    -2.95   0.003    -1.703911   -.3426995 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        /athrho1 |  -1.228435     .79307                     -2.782823     .325954 
        /athrho0 |   .6615821   .5557983                     -.4277626    1.750927 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            rho1 |  -.8421247   .2306454                      -.992375    .3148806 
            rho0 |   .5794153   .3692045                     -.4034498    .9414809 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho1=rho0=0):chi2(2) =     5.14  Prob > chi2 = 0.0766 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       353 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tt, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.1187854   .0090855   -13.07   0.000    -.1365927   -.1009781 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       225 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize tu, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   .6281265   .0129744    48.41   0.000     .6026971    .6535559 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =       578 
                                                Replications       =      1000 
 
      command:  summarize te, detail 
        _bs_1:  r(mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   .1740734   .0108255    16.08   0.000     .1528559    .1952909 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
